THE TWO-EVILS TRAP

 THE 592 GUARDIAN

ACCOUNTABILITY   •   TRANSPARENCY   • GUYANA


THE TWO-EVILS TRAP



Why  Mohamed’s Sins Do Not Measure Irfaan Ali’s Acres

The 592 Guardian Editorial Board  |  July ,2026

Nazim Baksh’s defence of President Irfaan Ali’s Long Creek farm, published in the Guyana Chronicle a week after the story broke, performs a familiar trick. It never contests the central factual claim at issue — that satellite polygon measurement places the cleared acreage at roughly 155 acres, well above the sub-75-acre figure the president’s own account implies. Instead, across some seven hundred words, Baksh redirects the reader toward an entirely different scandal: the United States indictment of Azruddin and Nazar Mohamed on gold-smuggling and sanctions-evasion charges.àThe move is not analysis. It is substitution — trading a live question about the president’s land for a live prosecution of his loudest accuser, as though one settles the other.

COMPARATIVE GUILT IS NOT EXCULPATION

The logic animating Baksh’s piece runs roughly as follows: Azruddin Mohamed has been indicted in the United States for gold smuggling; therefore his accusations against President Ali carry no weight; therefore the president’s farm requires no further scrutiny. Each step in that chain is doing work the evidence does not support. A federal indictment against one citizen speaks to that citizen’s conduct. It does not, by any rule of logic or law, verify or falsify a second citizen’s land holdings. Guyanese readers are entitled to hold both propositions simultaneously — that the Mohamed family faces serious federal charges in the United States, and that the president has not yet released the documentation that would resolve a straightforward acreage dispute. Baksh asks readers to trade one question for the other. The 592 Guardian declines the trade.

A federal indictment against one citizen speaks to that citizen’s conduct. It does not verify or falsify a second citizen’s land holdings.

THE QUESTIONS BAKSH LEAVES UNTOUCHED

What the piece does not do is instructive. It does not address the Google Earth polygon measurement establishing approximately 155 acres of cleared land at Long Creek, set against the sub-75-acre figure implied by the president’s own framing of the property. It does not engage with ENODO Global’s forensic sentiment analysis of the public reaction — a Stability Index of 42.5, a Negative Friction reading of 58 percent, and a fifty-point gap between official narrative and public perception. It does not mention Transparency International Guyana’s formal intervention calling for independent verification of the property’s size and provenance. Nor does it engage Christopher Ram’s public demand for a Commission of Inquiry. A rebuttal that omits every specific, checkable claim in the controversy it purports to rebut has not rebutted anything. It has changed the subject.

THE SIMPLEST ANSWER WAS ALWAYS AVAILABLE

Nothing in this dispute required seven hundred words of character argument, an appeal to the president’s 2025 book on food security, or a nine-year-old armed robbery in Curaçao. It required documents. Title records, survey filings, and clearance permits for Long Creek would settle the acreage question in an afternoon — not through the testimony of sympathetic columnists, but through instruments that either exist or do not, and either match the president’s account or do not. That the government has instead produced editorial defences of the president’s agricultural philosophy, rather than the underlying paperwork, is itself informative. Guyana’s citizens are not asking whether President Ali admires farming. They are asking to see the deed.

A NOTE ON “PUBLIC FUNDS”

Some readers have suggested that columns of this kind are underwritten by public money. The 592 Guardian has not independently verified Nazim Baksh’s funding arrangements, his commissioning relationship with the Guyana Chronicle, or any state involvement in that outlet’s editorial budget, and we decline to assert what we have not confirmed. That question deserves its own investigation, on its own evidence, rather than absorption into the farm controversy as an unproven aside. We raise it here only to flag it as a distinct and open line of inquiry — not to fold it into a claim we cannot yet support.

TWO SEPARATE LEDGERS

Curaçao in 2012 and Soesdyke in 2026 are two different accountability ledgers, involving two different sets of facts, two different sets of accusers and accused, and two different bodies of evidence. Guyanese readers do not owe either man a discount on the other’s account. The Mohamed indictment, if proven, is a matter for U.S. federal courts. The Long Creek acreage, whenever the documents finally surface, will be a matter of survey and title.

Until they do, no quantity of ink spent on the sins of the president’s critics will substitute for the paperwork the president alone controls.

The Board

 

Deferred Until Dry Season: How Guyana’s Own Radar Promises Expose the Excuse for Ignoring Kanashen’s Skies

THE 592 GUARDIAN
ACCOUNTABILITY • TRANSPARENCY • GEORGETOWN, GUYANA
AIRSPACE & ACCOUNTABILITY


Deferred Until Dry Season: How Guyana’s Own Radar Promises Expose the Excuse for Ignoring Kanashen’s Skies

A Toshao’s repeated complaints, a minister’s weather excuse, a military that says it grounds flights when it rains, and a police commander who says he knows nothing — set against a government that has spent the past year telling foreign partners it has radar precisely because rain and cloud cover are no longer an obstacle.
By The 592 Guardian Editorial Board |  July 2026

THE COMPLAINT
Joseph Ayaw, Toshao of Kanashen, has now made the same report to Guyanese authorities on at least four separate occasions over more than a year — twice to the Guyana Defence Force this year alone, once directly to Minister of Natural Resources Vickram Bharrat at last year’s National Toshao Council, and again to the same minister at a Toshaos meeting last week.

In each case the account is consistent: unidentified aircraft, sometimes as often as six times in a single week, crossing from the western Brazil border toward the east over the Kanashen Amerindian Protected Area, a title-held indigenous territory of roughly 648,000 hectares in Region Nine.

One of the illegal aircraft

Ayaw is not speculating. He has photographic evidence of the aircraft. He has a specific, recalled precedent — a prior interception in which a helicopter crew was detained and “taken to Georgetown,” the outcome of which he says was never communicated back to him. And he has, by his own account, a direct answer from the minister responsible: an aerial overflight promised at last year’s Toshao Council, never carried out, now deferred a second time — to “when the dry season steps in.”

THE EXCUSE DOESN’T SURVIVE CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT’S OWN RECORD

The weather excuse deserves scrutiny on its own terms, because Guyana’s government has spent the last twelve months publicly building the case that weather is no longer a constraint on border surveillance. In August 2025 the GDF signed a memorandum of understanding with Colombia’s Ministry of Defence for aerial surveillance cooperation.

Two months later, President Irfaan Ali told the opening of the French Embassy in Georgetown that Guyana was ready to accept France’s offer of land and maritime radar systems specifically to monitor cross-border movement around Essequibo. Radar and synthetic-aperture systems are valued in border-security contexts precisely because they operate independent of cloud cover, rainfall, and daylight — the opposite of a visual overflight, which is what appears to be the only method the Ministry of Natural Resources has offered Ayaw.

If the capability announced to Colombia and France in 2025 exists in any operational form, a wet-season excuse for not surveilling Kanashen collapses. If it does not yet exist in a form usable for this purpose, that is itself the story: a government citing hardware and partnerships in international statements that it cannot, or will not, deploy for an indigenous village that has been asking for the same aerial oversight since at least 2025.

He said that he’s looking into that as soon as the weather, when the dry season steps in, he will look into that. — Toshao Joseph Ayaw, relaying Minister Bharrat’s response
It is also worth noting that weather has not stopped joint-agency enforcement elsewhere in the interior during this same period. GGMC’s own November 2025 operation in the Ireng area — well within the wet season — resulted in seized equipment and the arrest of several non-nationals. In January 2026, the government suspended the licenses of 107 Brazilian miners for failing to declare gold, a decisive administrative action that required no aircraft at all. Whatever is preventing an overflight of Kanashen, it is not simply rain.

THREE INSTITUTIONS, THREE DIFFERENT STORIES
The most damaging element of this account is not the flights themselves but the contradiction between the agencies responsible for responding to them. GDF sources described to this outlet a joint operation as recently as last month that resulted in several arrests.

The Police Commander for Region 9, Mohamed Ally, when asked, said the operation was “not to my knowledge.”

Read plainly, that is a regional police commander disclaiming knowledge of an enforcement action inside his own command area — an action his own military counterparts say took place.

One of three things is true:

the operation didn’t happen as described,

the Commander was not briefed on an operation of clear public-safety relevance in his jurisdiction,

or he was briefed and is declining to confirm it.

None of the three is a reassuring answer, and each warrants a direct, on-record follow-up question to Commissioner Ally and to GDF Chief of Staff Brig. Omar Khan, rather than allowing the contradiction to stand unresolved.

A FAMILIAR PATTERN OF UNDER-ENFORCEMENT

Kanashen’s experience is not an isolated failure of one ministry or one commander. Guyana has for years operated an enforcement apparatus stretched far beyond its stated capacity: independent monitoring bodies have documented as few as eleven mines officers responsible for overseeing more than 12,000 small- and medium-scale mining concessions nationally. Against that backdrop, a Toshao’s repeated, documented, photographed complaints going unanswered for over a year is not an anomaly — it is the predictable output of a system with acknowledged gaps in staffing, technology deployment, and inter-agency accountability.

The distinction that matters for readers is between incapacity and unwillingness. Incapacity is a resourcing problem with a resourcing solution. Unwillingness — allowing cross-border mining incursions to continue because enforcement is inconvenient, poorly prioritized, or, in the worst case, tolerated by someone with an interest in looking away — is a governance failure of a different order, and one that meets the threshold for formal inquiry rather than another ministerial promise.

WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN NEXT

This news media is requesting, on the record, answers to four questions from the Ministry of Natural Resources, the GDF, and the Guyana Police Force:

First, what is the current operational status of the radar and aerial-surveillance capability referenced in the GDF’s August 2025 agreement with Colombia and the President’s October 2025 remarks on French assistance, and is any of it tasked to Region Nine?

Second, what specifically prevented the aerial overflight promised to Kanashen at last year’s National Toshao Council from being carried out in the twelve months since?

Third, did a joint operation resulting in arrests take place in the area last month, and if so, why was the Region 9 Police Commander unaware of it?

Fourth, what is the outcome of the earlier interception Ayaw described, in which a helicopter crew was reportedly brought to Georgetown — were charges filed, and against whom?

 A Toshao should not have to file the same report three times in fourteen months and be told, each time, to wait for different weather. Indigenous protected areas under Amerindian title are not ungoverned space by default; they are governed space where the governing institutions have, on this record, not shown up.
The Board

Kaieteur’s Baldeo Whitewash: An Editor’s Note on Ethics and Accountability

THE 592 GUARDIAN

ACCOUNTABILITY   •   TRANSPARENCY   •   GEORGETOWN, GUYANA

Kaieteur’s Baldeo Whitewash: An Editor’s Note on Ethics and Accountability


This is not a paean; it is a correction. Kaieteur News’ recent portrait of Albert Baldeo as the quintessential immigrant exemplar — a steady font of courage and civic devotion — collapses under a simple, unromantic fact: Baldeo’s public life is marked not only by service but by criminal conviction, incarceration, and the loss of his professional licence.

Those are not incidental footnotes to a life of triumph; they are central facts that materially reshape how the public should assess his record and any praise that ignores them is journalistic malpractice

 Immigrant stories of resilience matter because they teach accountability as well as aspiration. Calling someone a model of the immigrant spirit while eliding criminal culpability does a disservice to the communities who look to public figures for ethical leadership. The immigrant experience is not a shield against scrutiny; it is the reason scrutiny must be exacting. When a community elevates a leader, it deserves honesty about both the achievements and the missteps so that praise does not become a cover for the harms that followed.

Baldeo’s supporters will point to a life of public service — his roles as attorney, prosecutor, magistrate, and community advocate. Those public roles heighten the obligation to wrestle with his fall from professional grace. A conviction and subsequent imprisonment are not private failings; they are civic facts that diminish the moral authority required of those who once wielded the law on behalf of others.

Disbarment is a regulatory finding that a lawyer no longer meets the ethical standards of the profession. To omit those outcomes from a celebratory profile is to redact key context that readers need.

Good journalism adheres to two twin responsibilities: to celebrate civic achievement and to hold leaders to account. The balance between the two is not a matter of taste; it is the measure of press integrity.

Profiling must not become hagiography. When a news outlet elevates reputation over record, it abandons its duty to the public and to the very democratic values it purports to honor.

Kaieteur News has a long reach and a responsibility to the Guyanese and Caribbean diaspora. With that reach comes the duty to correct the record when omissions mislead. If the editorial choice was to emphasize redemption or community contributions, that should have been explicit and anchored to a full account of the legal findings and their consequences. Readers deserve transparent sourcing: the criminal judgment, the sentencing, the disciplinary order that resulted in Baldeo’s disbarment. Without it, the profile reads as advocacy dressed as journalism.

Communities can forgive, and societies must allow for rehabilitation. But forgiveness is earned, not assumed. Rehabilitation must be visible and accompanied by accountability. Reporting that blithely frames a convicted and disbarred former official as an unblemished exemplar risks normalizing the erasure of legal responsibility from public memory.

Kaieteur and other outlets should revisit the piece, publish a corrective or an addendum with the omitted facts, and explain the editorial rationale. Journalists who cover governance and community leadership must apply the same rigor to sources and backgrounding that they demand of public officials. 

Kaieteur News owes its readers a full, unvarnished record of Albert Baldeo’s public life, including his criminal conviction, imprisonment, and professional disbarment, not a sepia‑toned hagiography of “immigrant spirit.”

Anything less undermines both the craft and the civic trust that sustains it.

Editor’s Note: The Record We Cannot Ignore

Albert Baldeo is not only a former Guyanese magistrate and Queens district leader; he is also a convicted federal offender, sentenced to prison by the United States District Court for obstructing justice in connection with a straw-donor campaign finance probe.  In February 2015, Judge Paul Crotty in Manhattan federal court sentenced Baldeo to 18 months’ imprisonment on multiple counts of conspiracy to obstruct justice, alongside a US$15,000 fine and a term of supervised release.  He was found guilty of witness tampering and instructing “straw donors” to lie to or refuse cooperation with FBI agents investigating his 2010 New York City Council campaign contributions

The conviction did not arise from a private dispute; it was the result of a federal prosecution led by U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara, who described Baldeo’s conduct as intimidation and harassment deployed to thwart a lawful corruption investigation.  While Baldeo was acquitted of certain mail and wire fraud counts, the court entered judgment on multiple obstruction charges, and subsequent collateral attacks on that conviction have been rejected by the federal courts.  These are material facts that any profile presenting him as an exemplar of civic virtue must squarely confront.

Professional Discipline and Loss of Licence

Baldeo’s criminal record carried direct consequences for his standing as a legal practitioner.  In Matter of Baldeo, the Appellate Division, Second Department, addressed his discipline as a New York attorney, with the proceedings leading to his removal from the roll of attorneys authorized to practice.  Separately, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review lists “Albert Baldeo – New York – Disbarred – 9/30/14” among currently disciplined practitioners, confirming his disbarment in the immigration courts system.

Disbarment is not a mere administrative note; it is an institutional finding that an attorney has violated professional and ethical norms so severely that continued practice would undermine public trust in the justice system.  Any serious account of Baldeo’s “legacy” must acknowledge that his legal career ended not by retirement, but by sanction.

Campaign Finance and Regulatory Findings

Beyond the criminal case, Baldeo’s political activity attracted regulatory scrutiny from New York’s Campaign Finance Board.  In Campaign Finance Board v. Baldeo, the Board pursued enforcement action related to his City Council bid, addressing irregularities surrounding contributions and public funds.  Taken together with the federal obstruction judgment, this pattern underscores that Baldeo’s story is as much about the misuse of political processes as it is about representation of immigrant communities.

These records—federal judgments, appellate disciplinary decisions, and regulatory findings—are a matter of public law and policy, not partisan gossip.  For a newspaper committed to ethical journalism, they must anchor any narrative that touches his public career.

A Necessary Correction in the Public Interest

When Kaieteur News carries a piece that casts Albert Baldeo as a pure symbol of courage, resilience, and immigrant virtue, while omitting that he is a convicted felon who served federal prison time and has been disbarred, it presents readers with a dangerously incomplete portrait.  Immigrant communities, Guyanese readers, and the broader Caribbean diaspora deserve a standard of reporting that honors both service and accountability, especially where legal findings have registered human and civic harm.

This Editor’s Note is therefore appended to ensure that our record reflects the full arc of Baldeo’s public life: the offices he held, the communities he claimed to champion, and the criminal and disciplinary judgments that followed.  Future coverage of his activities will be guided by the principle that journalistic celebration must never come at the expense of truth, context, and the public’s right to know.

Papel, Please: A Reply to Freddie Kissoon on the President’s Farm

Papel, Please: A Reply to Freddie Kissoon on the President’s Farm

The 592 Guardian — July, 2026


Freddie Kissoon is back defending the President’s farm, and once again the defense rests less on documentation than on the character of the people asking for it. His latest column — reaching for John Compton’s banana farm, Jimmy Carter’s peanut farm, and Silvio Berlusconi’s football club as historical cover — deserves a point-by-point answer, because the precedents he cites don’t say what he thinks they say, and the number at the center of his piece doesn’t hold up either.

On Compton, Carter, and Berlusconi as precedent

Kissoon treats the mere existence of a head of government’s business interests as settling the matter. It doesn’t, and the comparison collapses on its own terms. Carter placed his peanut warehouse in a blind trust specifically to avoid the appearance of conflict — the opposite of concealment. Berlusconi’s business holdings were, in fact, one of the defining controversies of Italian politics for two decades, prompting later legislative attempts — imperfect ones — to regulate exactly this kind of conflict. Kissoon cites the exceptions as if they were the rule, and cites the controversial cases as if they were uncontroversial. If anything, the international record argues for disclosure regimes, not against scrutiny.

On “no one has produced evidence of state funds”

This inverts the actual question. The controversy was never solely about state funds — it is about acreage, provenance, and disclosure. Kissoon collapses three distinct accountability questions — how much land, how it was acquired, whether it was disclosed — into a single strawman he can declare unproven and then move past.

On the 70-acre figure

This is the load-bearing number in Kissoon’s entire column — “a mere 70-acre farm,” “modest farm,” repeated for emphasis. Satellite measurement work carried out for this publication arrived at approximately 155 acres, corroborating the opposition’s own estimate of roughly 150 acres — more than double what Kissoon asserts without citing any source. If that measurement holds, Kissoon is not editorializing about a settled fact. He is asserting a contested figure as settled, in the President’s favor, without evidence. That is the column’s central vulnerability, and it undermines everything built on top of it.

On Christopher Ram’s call for a Commission of Inquiry

Kissoon frames this as self-evidently absurd — a head of state “belittling himself” by submitting to scrutiny. But Commissions of Inquiry into a leader’s private financial dealings are not exotic mechanisms. They are a standard accountability tool precisely when self-disclosure is contested or incomplete — which, by the President’s own press conference, where no supporting documentation was produced, is exactly the situation here.

On the GHK Lall / Gold Board tangent 

This is the column’s weakest structural move: a lengthy attack on a critic’s past conduct at the Gold Board that, however accurate, does nothing to establish the acreage or disclosure facts about the farm itself. It is deflection dressed as rebuttal — discrediting the messenger on an unrelated matter rather than engaging the measurement dispute at all.

On “the President did not provide documents during his address”

Kissoon quotes this observation only to mock those making it as insatiable. He never actually contests its accuracy. That concession is worth naming plainly: the column accepts the core factual claim — that no documentation was produced — and then attacks the motives of whoever noticed.

The closing “papel” line

Kissoon’s final line preemptively frames any future skepticism as bad faith, regardless of what documentation eventually emerges.

That is not a defense of the President. It is an attempt to inoculate against all future scrutiny in advance — including scrutiny of numbers that, on the evidence so far, do not add up.

The 592 Guardian


The Wrong Question: Why the COI Debate Is Burying the One Thing That Matters

THE 592 GUARDIAN

Accountability Journalism for Guyana


EDITORIAL  By  Staff Writer 

The Wrong Question: Why the COI Debate Is Burying the One Thing That Matters


July, 2026

Kaieteur News’s Peeping Tom and Christopher Ram’s Kiskadee Watch letter have spent the past few days arguing past each other, and Guyana is worse off for it. One side insists a Commission of Inquiry cannot be conjured from suspicion alone. The other insists that in a captured institutional environment, suspicion is all a citizen will ever be permitted to have. Both are half right, which is the same as saying both are incomplete — and the debate between them has quietly become a substitute for the disclosure it was supposed to force.

We take no institutional pleasure in adjudicating a fight between a satirist and a chartered accountant. But the stakes here are not rhetorical. They concern whether a sitting Head of State’s acquisition of roughly 155 acres of state or formerly state-adjacent land, financed by mechanisms he has not detailed, developed under a permanent corporation-tax exemption his own government legislated for the sector he operates in, is a matter the public is entitled to verify — and through what mechanism.

WHERE PEEPING TOM IS RIGHT

The columnist’s core legal point survives scrutiny: a Commission of Inquiry is not a general-purpose instrument for resolving public curiosity. It is expensive, coercive, and traditionally reserved for matters where a prima facie case already exists — an identifiable incident, a specific transaction, a documented failure. Handing the machinery of the state to a fishing expedition, however well-intentioned, sets a precedent that could just as easily be turned against any successful Guyanese entrepreneur a future government wishes to harass. That is not a hypothetical concern in this country’s political history.

Peeping Tom is also correct that voluntary non-disclosure, standing alone, is not evidence of wrongdoing. The burden of proof runs from accuser to accused, not the reverse. A citizen does not forfeit that principle merely because the citizen in question happens to be President.

WHERE RAM IS RIGHT

But Peeping Tom’s framework only holds in a jurisdiction where the ordinary channels — the Integrity Commission, the Auditor General, an independent DPP, a functioning parliamentary oversight committee — are actually available to generate that prima facie case before a COI becomes necessary. Guyana’s institutional record over the past several years does not support the assumption that those channels are open. The Integrity Commission’s history of inertia on comparable matters, the six-year Public Accounts Committee audit backlog, the reduction in sectoral committee meetings, the pattern by which watchdog bodies have been either understaffed, underfunded, or stocked with appointees answerable to the very administration they are meant to scrutinise — these are not abstractions. They are the documented operating conditions of the state Ram is writing into.

Ram’s strongest point is not the COI demand itself. It is the one Peeping Tom’s rebuttal treats too lightly: the corporation-tax removal on agriculture and agro-processing, legislated by the President’s own government, does not merely raise a generic conflict-of-interest question.

It raises a specific, checkaItble one — whether the President declared his own agricultural holdings and recused himself from a decision that directly benefits them. That is not speculation dressed as a question. It is a request for a documented fact: was the declaration made, and was the recusal taken. Either the record shows it or it does not.

THE THIRD POSITION

The debate as currently framed offers Guyanese only two options: a COI that may or may not be warranted, or silence dressed as due process. Both outlets have missed a narrower, faster, and more defensible path that does not require resolving the abstract argument about what a COI is for.

The Integrity Commission already possesses, by statute, the authority to receive and examine the President’s asset declarations, verify the source of funds behind acquisitions, and confirm whether conflicts of interest were declared ahead of the corporation-tax decision.

That is not an extraordinary instrument requiring a prima facie threshold — it is the ordinary one, sitting idle. The Guardian’s position is that the Commission’s chair should be asked, on the record, whether that examination has occurred, and if not, why not.

If the Commission is, as its critics allege, structurally incapable of independent action, that failure should be documented publicly and specifically, not inferred rhetorically. A pattern of institutional refusal, established fact by fact, is itself the prima facie case a COI would eventually need — and it would be considerably harder for any administration to wave away than a satirical letter.

Separately, the specific documents Ram has requested — the loan agreements, the environmental permits, the financial statements — do not require a Commission of Inquiry to be produced. They require only that the President, or the financial institution involved, choose to release them. Nothing in Peeping Tom’s argument explains why that voluntary step should not happen now, regardless of whether a COI is ever appointed

The absence of disclosure may not be proof of wrongdoing, but neither is silence proof of innocence, and the President is the only person who can end the ambiguity by choosing transparency over assurance

WHAT WE BELIEVE, AND WHY WE ARE NOT STOPPING HERE

We are on record, and remain, in favour of independent verification over personal assurance — not as a rhetorical flourish, but as institutional practice.

ENODO Global’s forensic sentiment analysis of the public reaction to this controversy, and TIGI’s formal intervention on related transparency questions, both point to the same underlying deficit: a widening gap between what citizens are told and what they are shown.

There is more to this story than either Peeping Tom’s procedural caution or Ram’s satirical demand has yet surfaced — the chronology of the acquisition, the identity of the lender, the sequencing of the tax decision against the President’s declared interests, and the actual state of Integrity Commission practice on this file. We intend to pursue each of those threads on the facts, independent of which side of the COI argument they end up supporting.

Readers should expect follow-up reporting, not further commentary on the commentary.

— The Board

Foundations of Doubt: The Wales Concrete Scandal and the Case for an Immediate Halt

THE 592 GUARDIAN  ◊ Independent Accountability Journalism  ◊Guyana ◊ EDITORIAL / INVESTIGATIVE

Foundations of Doubt: The Wales Concrete Scandal and the Case for an Immediate Halt

Reports that turbine-supporting concrete at the Wales Gas-to-Energy site has failed to meet specification are not a footnote. They are a warning. Guyana has already paid once for ignoring the ground beneath this project — in arbitration, in silence, in blown deadlines. History offers a clear lesson about what happens when concrete failures under industrial structures are managed quietly instead of independently. The Guardian’s position: halt further pours and turbine-area works now, commission an independent forensic engineering audit, and bring in a firm with no stake in the outcome to verify what is actually in the ground.

THE 592 GUARDIAN — EDITORIAL BOARD

There is a particular kind of national silence that precedes disaster. It is not the silence of ignorance — someone always knows first. It is the silence that follows knowing: the quiet decision that a problem, once flagged, can be managed rather than disclosed. Kaieteur News reported on July 7 that project insiders and sub-contractors at the Wales Gas-to-Energy site have raised alarms over concrete piles and foundation pours for the 300-megawatt power plant and Natural Gas Liquids facility failing to meet required engineering specifications. Engineers consulted by that publication described what happens when turbine foundations do not hold: industrial gas and steam turbines operate at rotational speeds exceeding 3,000 RPM, and they are, in the words of one specialist, “incredibly delicate, highly engineered machines” utterly dependent on the integrity of what sits beneath them.

This is not a footnote to the Gas-to-Energy story. It may be its most consequential chapter yet — and the Guardian is treating it that way.

WHAT IS ACTUALLY KNOWN

Sources close to the project — described by Kaieteur as insiders and sub-contractors — say concerns center specifically on the concrete piles driven into the ground and the concrete poured for the foundations of both the NGL plant and the power plant itself. If accurate, this points toward failures in the Quality Assurance and Quality Control protocols of the lead Engineering, Procurement and Construction contractor, Lindsayca Guyana Inc., and raises an unavoidable question about the US$22 million Owner’s Engineer contract held by Engineers India Limited (EIL) — a mandate that explicitly includes reviewing designs, supervising construction quality, and flagging structural anomalies to the Government of Guyana.

It remains unclear whether EIL formally documented and escalated these testing failures. What is clear is that no government update to date — through the Office of the President, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Natural Resources, or the project Taskforce — has acknowledged any concrete strength or foundation issue at Wales. The public messaging has remained entirely promotional

This is a project that has already shown Guyanese taxpayers what opacity costs. The 592 Guardian’s readers will recall that Lindsayca-CH4 took the Government of Guyana to arbitration over delays and soil-condition disputes at this same site — and won, forcing a quiet payout of approximately US$82 million that the government did not disclose to the public.

   

This is a project that has already shown Guyanese taxpayers what opacity costs. The 592 Guardian’s readers will recall that Lindsayca-CH4 took the Government of Guyana to arbitration over delays and soil-condition disputes at this same site — and won, forcing a quiet payout of approximately US$82 million that the government did not disclose to the public. Soil and foundation problems at Wales are not new; they are, in fact, the one recurring technical thread that has followed this project since early construction. A concrete-quality failure emerging now, on top of that history, is not an isolated incident. It is a pattern.

THE PRECEDENT GUYANA SHOULD BE STUDYING

There is a comparison that fits precisely what has been alleged at Wales, drawn not from speculation but from engineering-failure literature: concrete that does not hold under an industrial power structure.

On November 24, 2016, a concrete cooling-tower platform under construction at the Fengcheng power station in Jiangxi, China, collapsed, killing at least 74 workers. Investigators later attributed the collapse to premature removal of formwork from concrete that had not been given adequate time to cure — a corner cut under schedule pressure, on a project racing to hit a completion deadline.

A near-identical failure occurred decades earlier and an ocean away: the 1978 Willow Island disaster in West Virginia, United States, where a cooling tower scaffold gave way because concrete poured the night before had not cured sufficiently to bear the load being placed on it. Fifty-one construction workers died. Both cases share the same root cause pattern now being alleged at Wales — concrete rushed, under-cured, or under-specified in service of a schedule — and both are studied today in engineering-failure literature precisely because they demonstrate how a QA/QC lapse that seems containable on paper becomes a mass-casualty event in practice.

Wales is not a cooling-tower scaffold. It is a combined-cycle power plant and NGL facility carrying rotating turbine machinery, pressurized gas systems, and per the government’s own stated plans for a subsequent phase, ammonia and urea production facilities proposed for the same industrial estate. A foundation that cannot bear its designed load does not merely risk cost overruns. It risks catastrophic mechanical failure in equipment spinning at speeds that convert a structural fault into flying debris, ruptured piping, and potential fire or explosion in a facility handling pressurized hydrocarbons. This is the trajectory the Fengcheng and Willow Island precedents warn against: not whether an accident is possible, but what it costs, in lives, when a known concrete concern is managed quietly instead of investigated openly.

THE FINANCIAL EXPOSURE GUYANA IS ALREADY CARRYING

Even setting aside the safety dimension, the fiscal case for a halt is straightforward. Guyana is the guarantor on a US$526 million EXIM Bank loan tied to this project, on top of a headline cost that has already climbed from a contracted US$759 million toward a total project figure north of US$2 billion. The country has already absorbed one arbitration loss tied to site conditions. Foundation remediation on a site of this scale — repiling, demolition and re-pour of turbine plinths, forensic testing of the roughly 9,300 piles reportedly driven and the 25,000 cubic metres of concrete required across the site — is not a rounding error. It is a multi-month, potentially multi-year exposure layered on top of a project already defined by delay and cost dispute. The public deserves to know that exposure now, not after equipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars has been mounted on foundations no independent party has verified.

A SHARED CALL FOR INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION

The Guardian is not alone in this call. Transparency International Guyana Inc. (TIGI), which has separately pressed for procurement and oversight accountability across Guyana’s major infrastructure and extractive-sector projects, has joined in urging that this matter be resolved through independent, verifiable means rather than internal assurance.

TIGI’s position is straightforward and consistent with its broader institutional mandate: where credible, sourced allegations touch on public safety and public money at this scale, the public interest is served only by a transparent process — an audit conducted by parties with no commercial or contractual stake in the outcome, with findings published in full, followed by whatever remedial action the findings require. TIGI has endorsed the pursuit of a definitive, independently verified answer on the condition of the Wales foundations, and has called on the Government of Guyana to treat that verification, and the solution that follows from it, as a public accountability obligation rather than an internal project matter.

THE GUARDIAN’S AND TIGI’S POSITION

Investigative journalism and transparent accountability does not exist to generate alarm for its own sake. It exists to force disclosure before disclosure becomes unavoidable — before an accident makes the public record for us. On the basis of the reporting to date, the documented history of soil and foundation disputes at this site, and the recurring pattern of non-disclosure that has characterized this project’s governance, the Guardian and TIGI are jointly calling for the following:

♦An immediate halt to further concrete pours and turbine-area construction works at the Wales site, pending independent verification of the structural integrity of foundations already in place

♦A full, independent forensic engineering audit of every concrete pile and foundation pour completed to date at Wales, covering both the power plant and NGL facility, with results published in full — not summarized — to the Guyanese public
♦Public disclosure of whether Engineers India Limited, as Owner’s Engineer, identified and formally reported any concrete testing failures to the Government of Guyana, and if so, when, and what action followed
♦That the Government of Guyana engage Bechtel Corporation — a firm with no prior contractual stake in this project and a global record in large-scale power and industrial construction — to conduct or independently verify the final structural analysis and to oversee any required remedial works, insulating the audit from the commercial and legal interests already entangled in this project through Lindsayca and EIL.

♦Full public accounting of the financial exposure created by any required remediation, including its impact on the EXIM Bank loan terms and the project’s already-inflated total cost
♦Parliamentary oversight of this matter through the Public Accounts Committee, given the Committee’s existing — and thus far obstructed — mandate to examine this project’s spending.

None of this requires proof of catastrophe. It requires only what any responsible government does when credible, sourced allegations about structural integrity emerge on a project of this scale: it stops, it checks, and it tells the public what it finds. The alternative — proceeding on the assumption that the allegations are wrong, without verifying that they are — is the exact posture that preceded Fengcheng and Willow Island. Guyana has the chance to choose differently. The Citizens will be watching whether it does.

The 592 Guardian will continue to report on the Wales Gas-to-Energy project as further information becomes available. Sources with direct knowledge of testing results, EIL correspondence, or QA/QC documentation from the Wales site are invited to contact the editorial desk in confidence.

The Green Mask Slips

THE 592 GUARDIANEDITORIAL · INVESTIGATIVE ANALYSIS

The Green Mask Slips: Guyana’s 2026 Environmental Performance Index Score Exposes the Gap Between Biodiversity Branding and Climate Reality

While the Ali administration markets Guyana abroad as a biodiversity partner and low-carbon development model, Yale’s 2026 Environmental Performance Index ranks the country dead last of 177 nations on climate change mitigation — the single steepest ten-year decline in the entire index.
Guyana ranks 151st of 177 countries in the 2026 Environmental Performance Index (EPI), published by the Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy in partnership with Columbia University — a score of 30.32, nearly 12 points below the Latin America & Caribbean regional average of 42.07, and 30th of 31 countries in the region. The figure has circulated widely in recent days, framed as proof that Guyana now trails even Haiti in environmental standing. That comparison is true on its face. But it is also the least interesting fact in the dataset.

The real story is not the overall rank. It is what sits beneath it: a country that performs credibly on the metrics tied to its standing forest, and catastrophically on the metrics tied to its oil economy. Those two facts sitting side by side, in the same government’s official messaging, in the same fiscal year, are the actual scandal — and they are Yale’s numbers, not ours.

The Number the Government Won’t Be Citing

Buried inside Guyana’s aggregate score is a single category result that deserves to be the headline: Guyana ranks 177th of 177 countries — dead last, full stop — on Climate Change Mitigation, the policy objective that measures a country’s trajectory on greenhouse gas emissions. Guyana’s score in that category is 3.67. Its ten-year change is -20.77, the steepest decline recorded for any country in the 2026 index — worse than Mongolia, worse than Laos, worse than any of the traditional laggards this ranking usually surfaces.
A related indicator, greenhouse gas emissions trend adjusted per capita, tells the same story from a different angle: Guyana scores 0.0, tied for the worst rank in the world (171st of 177), with a ten-year swing of -18.25. This is not a measure of how much a country emits in absolute terms — small, low-population states are structurally protected from that comparison. It is a measure of trajectory: whether a country’s per-capita emissions, adjusted for economic growth, are rising or falling. Guyana’s are rising faster, relative to its own growth, than almost anywhere else measured.

Forests: 36th of 177. Climate Change Mitigation: 177th of 177. Same country, same year, same government.

That divergence is the anomaly this report should be built around — not Guyana-versus-Haiti, but Guyana-versus-Guyana. On Forests, the country ranks a respectable 36th of 177, a score of 30.42 that reflects the genuinely low deforestation rate and the intact landscape integrity that has anchored every LCDS and carbon-credit pitch this government has made since 2009. The rainforest claim is not manufactured.

What is manufactured is the impression, cultivated in international forums and glossy biodiversity-partnership announcements, that this forest performance describes the country’s environmental trajectory as a whole. It does not. It describes one category out of twelve — and it is being used to paper over the worst-performing category in the entire index.

Reading the Category Breakdown

The table below sets out where Guyana’s 2026 EPI performance actually sits, category by category, against the field of 177 countries scored under this edition’s methodology (47 indicators across 12 issue categories, spanning three policy objectives: Environmental Health, Ecosystem Vitality, and Climate Change).

Category Guyana Rank Score 10-Yr Change
Overall EPI 151 / 177 30.32 -4.13
Climate Change Mitigation 177 / 177 3.67 -20.77
GHG Emissions Trend (per capita, adj. 171 / 177 0.0 -18.25
Forests 36 / 177 30.42 n/a

Source: Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy / Columbia University, 2026 Environmental Performance Index, epi.yale.edu. Regional average (Latin America & Caribbean): 42.07.

The pattern is unambiguous. Guyana’s ecosystem assets — the forest it did not build, only declined to destroy — are propping up an aggregate score that would otherwise sit even lower. Strip Forests out of the picture and weigh Guyana purely on the categories shaped by government policy choice — energy procurement, emissions trajectory, industrial permitting — and the picture is one of the worst-performing petrostates measured anywhere in the 177-country field.

The Con: Selling Biodiversity While Failing Climate

This publication has tracked, across the Wales Gas-to-Energy project, the Karpowership rate escalation from 7.06¢ to 9.5¢ per kWh, and the broader energy dependency thread, a pattern of procurement decisions that entrench fossil generation rather than displace it.

The 2026 EPI’s Climate Change Mitigation collapse is the statistical signature of exactly that pattern.

A country cannot credibly market itself as a biodiversity and low-carbon partner to sovereign wealth funds and COP delegations while its own emissions trajectory — independently measured, methodologically transparent, published by one of the most cited environmental research institutions in the world — is rated the single worst of any nation on earth.

The Long Creek estate controversy, the Former Presidents Benefits Bill, and the GPL-InterEnergy sole-source contract are, on their face, governance stories about land, money, and procurement law. The EPI data gives them an environmental dimension that has been largely absent from the public conversation: every one of those threads sits downstream of the same executive posture — extraction and consumption decisions made with minimal independent oversight, dressed in the language of climate leadership abroad.

What This Is Not

Fairness requires two caveats, both of which strengthen rather than weaken the case.    First, Yale’s own FAQ states plainly that EPI scores should not be compared across editions as a time series, because methodology and indicator counts change with each release — the 2026 edition uses 47 indicators across 12 categories and 177 countries, versus 58 indicators, 11 categories, and 180 countries in 2024. Any claim that Guyana has “fallen” some number of places since the last edition is not supportable from this data and should not appear in this publication’s coverage. The story is not a decline narrative. It is a snapshot — and the snapshot alone is damning enough.
Second, the Forests and land-use performance is real and should be stated as such without qualification. The case here is not that Guyana’s environmental record is uniformly poor. It is that the government’s public messaging leans entirely on the one category where performance is strong, while remaining silent on the category — climate mitigation — where performance is, by Yale’s own numbers, the worst measured anywhere in the world.

The Accountability Question

Every biodiversity partnership announcement, every ART TREES carbon-credit sale, every appearance at an international climate forum trades on the credibility of Guyana’s forest numbers. None of that messaging, to date, has had to answer for the 177th-place climate mitigation score sitting in the same index. That is the question this newsroom will be putting to the relevant ministries: how does a government reconcile marketing itself as a global biodiversity and climate partner while its own independently measured emissions trajectory is rated worst in class among 177 nations?

Guyanese taxpayers, and the international partners being asked to fund and endorse these biodiversity arrangements, deserve an answer grounded in the same data the government cites when the numbers run in its favour.
THE 592 GUARDIAN ACCOUNTABILITY INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM. GUYANA

Freddie Kissoon’s Farm Alibi: When “PR” Becomes a Euphemism for Evasion

 THE 592 GUARDIAN ♦ACCOUNTABILITY JOURNALISM ♦EDITORIAL RESPONSE

Freddie Kissoon’s Farm Alibi: When “PR” Becomes a Euphemism for Evasion


By the Editor  |  The 592 Guardian  |  July , 2026


Freddie Kissoon has produced, in “The president adequately farmed out his farm explanation,” not analysis but absolution.                                            It is worth reading closely, because it reveals more about the columnist’s method than about the controversy he claims to settle.

The tell is in his own headline. Kissoon does not argue that Ali answered the substantive questions raised about the Long Creek estate. He argues that Ali “got his PR right.” That is not a defense of the President’s conduct — it is a review of his messaging. Kissoon has, in effect, graded a performance and called it a verdict.

What Ali actually said — and didn’t.

By Kissoon’s own admission, the President’s account came without hard particulars. Ali claimed Mohamed had “exaggerated the size of the farm” by more than double its actual acreage, but did not state the actual acreage or name the financial institutions holding the loans he referenced. Ali had previously said, through a statement, that he was “willing to make” the alleged blackmail communications “public” for independent scrutiny — a commitment his Thursday address did not honor. Instead of the full texts, videos, or recordings, he offered only a paraphrased, vague fragment of a single message. Opposition figures have since published a list of fourteen direct questions — among them the acreage and acquisition dates — that remain unanswered.

Kissoon calls this “context.” A more precise word is omission.

The 140-acre sleight of hand.

Kissoon anchors his entire minimization (“is that a large farm?”) on a figure — 140 acres — that he attributes to “the private press,” without specifying which outlet or its methodology. This is worth pausing on, because it is doing real argumentative work: it lets Kissoon dismiss the story as a fuss over nothing.

But independent satellite measurement of the Long Creek estate puts the figure at approximately 155 acres — corroborating, not undercutting, the opposition’s original ~150-acre claim, and considerably larger than the number Kissoon uses to make the story shrink. If Kissoon wants to adjudicate acreage, the burden is on him to say whose 140 acres he is citing and how it was derived — not to borrow an unsourced figure because it flatters his conclusion.

What the numbers say Kissoon can’t.

Independent sentiment analysis compiled by ENODO Global gives the lie to Kissoon’s implicit claim that this controversy is a manufactured storm. Across the past 7 days, public discourse on the Long Creek acquisition registers 58% Negative Friction against just 15% Positive Resilience — and the gap between the administration’s official messaging and street-level sentiment runs to 50 percentage points, with grassroots discourse registering both a sharper negative valence (-62%) and a higher intensity (92%) than anything the government’s own communications have managed to counter. If this were, as Kissoon suggests, a fringe grievance nursed by a discredited opposition, the data would not show “Conflict of Interest” as the single largest driver of negative sentiment nationally, at 45%, ahead of “Regulatory Toothlessness” at 35%. Nor would “Institutional Integrity & Accountability” register 70% negative sentiment, or “Land Tenure & Resource Allocation” — the exact acreage dispute Kissoon tries to wave away — run 55% negative. The public is not confused about what matters here. It has already rendered a verdict Kissoon has not caught up to.

The character-assassination-as-argument problem.

Much of Kissoon’s piece is not about the farm at all. It is about Azruddin Mohamed’s wealth, his sanctions, his “laughable” standing to demand accountability. All of this may be true, and none of it is in dispute. But it is also irrelevant to the question of how a sitting president financed and built a multi-billion-dollar estate on a presidential salary.

Guyanese commentary does not require a spotless messenger to have a legitimate question. TIGI’s call for an independent probe did not originate with Mohamed’s credibility — it originated with the unanswered arithmetic of the President’s own disclosed income against the scale of what is now confirmed to exist on that highway. This is precisely why the “Elite Enrichment Perceptions” vector in the ENODO data runs 75% negative even as the messenger’s credibility is contested on other grounds: the public has separated the question of who is asking from the question of what is being asked. Tellingly, the street-level narrative — “Unequal Access and Grassroots Neglect” — commands 45% dominance in the broader discourse, nearly double the official narrative’s 25%. Kissoon’s column, whatever its intent, functions as an extension of that losing 25%.

“He will emerge unscathed” is not a prediction — it is a character reference filed before a single document has been produced.

 “He will emerge unscathed.”

This is the sentence that gives away the whole column. Kissoon is not predicting an outcome; he is prescribing one, and doing so before a single document has been produced, before a single loan has been named, before a single bank has confirmed anything. That is not journalism holding power accountable. It is a character reference filed on the President’s behalf, dressed up as commentary.

The 592 Guardian’s position is not that Ali is guilty of anything beyond what the record shows. It is that “he gave a good speech” is not the same as “he gave an account” — and the public, by a two-to-one margin against him in independent sentiment analysis, appears to already know the difference.

Kissoon has confused the two, and asked the country to do the same.

Sentiment analytics cited above are drawn from ENODO Global’s Forensic Analysis of President Irfaan Ali’s Long Creek Ranch (8 July 2026). Satellite acreage measurement is the Guardian’s own.

. 

The Guyana Chronicle Asks Guyanese to Take the State’s Word for It

THE 592 GUARDIAN ♦ OBJECTIVITY ♦ACCOUNTABILITY JOURNALISM FOR GUYANA 

EDITORIAL

The Guyana Chronicle Asks Guyanese to Take the State’s Word for It


A taxpayer-funded newspaper is defending the President’s finances by asserting a paper trail it has never shown the public — while demanding, of his accuser, exactly the transparency it will not practise itself.

By The 592 Guardian Editor-July  2026


The Guyana Chronicle wants Guyanese to believe a case has been made. It has not shown us the case — it has told us the case exists. On July 6 and 7, the state-owned paper published two pieces defending President Irfaan Ali’s ownership of a sprawling agricultural estate and private ranch at Long Creek, off the Soesdyke-Linden Highway, in response to allegations from Opposition Leader Azruddin Mohamed that the property, and its rapid development, cannot be reconciled with a presidential salary of roughly GY$3.7 million a month.

ASSERTION IS NOT DOCUMENTATION

Read the Chronicle’s defence closely and a pattern emerges: every load-bearing claim is asserted, not demonstrated. The property “predates” the presidency — no deed is reproduced, no date of acquisition given, no title search shown. The purchase is said to be “traceable through banking records and other official documentation” — which records, held by which institution, examined by which independent party, the reader is never told. The President “has made the declarations required” to the Integrity Commission — a body whose own record of proactive public disclosure is, on any honest accounting, one of the thinnest in the hemisphere. None of this has been shown. All of it has been asserted, by a paper the state itself owns and funds through the public purse.

 That is the detail worth sitting with plainly. The defence of the President’s private finances was published in an outlet financed by the very taxpayers whose scrutiny it is now trying to foreclose. Guyanese are being asked to fund the argument that they should stop asking how public office and private wealth intersect at Long Creek.  

That is not accountability journalism. That is the state marking its own homework and mailing citizens the invoice.

A FAIR POINT, TURNED INTO COVER

None of this excuses Azruddin Mohamed of his own obligations. A man facing an eleven-count federal indictment in the Southern District of Florida — accused, alongside his father Nazar, of a gold-smuggling and mislabelling scheme that prosecutors estimate cost the Guyanese state some US$50 million — inviting scrutiny of anyone else’s income is entitled to exactly the scrutiny he applies to others. If Mohamed wants the moral standing to demand the President’s books, opening his own is the fastest way to earn it.

But the Chronicle takes that fair point and turns it into cover for its own evidentiary emptiness. Two people can owe the public documentation at the same time. Pointing at one man’s indictment does not discharge the other’s obligation to show his work — least of all when the other is the sitting head of state, and the outlet demanding proof from his accuser is the government’s own newspaper.

WHAT EVEN THE FRIENDLY COVERAGE CONCEDES

It is worth noting what has already surfaced in reporting sympathetic to the President, because it undercuts the Chronicle’s own case for taking his word alone. The PNCR/APNU has pointed out that one of nineteen fraud-related charges brought against Ali before he assumed office concerned lands along this same Linden-Soesdyke corridor — charges later discontinued after he took office. Other outlets have reported the Long Creek arrangement involves a lease running to roughly GY$25 million annually, a figure that itself invites reconciliation against the scale of development described: poultry infrastructure for tens of thousands of birds, an electrical network with two transformers and roughly 6,600 metres of distribution line, a private road. None of these figures are drawn from Mohamed’s video. They are already in the public record, sitting unreconciled beside the Chronicle’s insistence that nothing here merits a second look.

THE REMEDY IS SIMPLE

If the paper trail is really there, the Chronicle does not need another editorial. It needs to publish the trail. Publish the deed. Publish the purchase or loan documentation. Publish the Integrity Commission filing, or press the Commission — which has for years resisted proactive disclosure to the public it serves — to release it. Reconcile the reported lease terms with the scale of the estate..

Anything short of that is not a rebuttal to Mohamed’s allegations. It is state media asking citizens to trust the government’s account of the government, written on the government’s dime.

Guyanese do not owe deference to assertions dressed as documentation — from either side of this fight. They are entitled to the actual papers, not a columnist’s word that the papers exist. Until the Chronicle produces them, its editorial proves only one thing: that state media can write “the record shows” in a taxpayer-funded font.                                   That is not accountability. It is a talking point wearing the costume of one.

— The 592 Guardian Editorial Board

THE STABROEK SURRENDER

THE 592 GUARDIANIndependent Accountability Journalism  ·  Guyana

EDITORIAL

THE STABROEK SURRENDER

Part IV of IV  ·  Pollute As Much As You Want


Pollute As Much As You Want, Provided You Can Pay For It


Guyana was promised zero flaring at the Stabroek Block. Instead, ExxonMobil has burned off more than a billion cubic feet of gas into the Atlantic sky, paid a fraction of what independent analysts say the pollution is worth, and won in court when Guyanese citizens tried to force a stricter permit. This is the enforcement gap at the heart of Guyana’s oil era — and the final installment of this series.

Parts I through III of this series traced the arithmetic of the 2016 Production Sharing Agreement (PSA), the stability clause that froze that arithmetic beyond Parliament’s reach, and the decommissioning liability Guyana is quietly pre-funding with no guarantee the money will still exist when it is needed. Part IV closes the series by asking a simpler question: when the Contractor breaks its own environmental promises, what actually happens?

The answer, on the public record, is: not very much

The Promise: Zero Flaring

When the Government of Guyana approved the environmental permit for the Liza Phase 1 project, it did so on the strength of a specific commitment. ExxonMobil’s own environmental impact assessment represented that the project could achieve zero non-routine gas flaring — that associated gas produced alongside crude oil would be captured and reinjected into the wells rather than burned off into the atmosphere. The Minister of Natural Resources at the time stated unequivocally that under no circumstances would there be flaring of the gas.

“That promise did not survive first production. Faulty compression equipment aboard the Liza Destiny FPSO caused ExxonMobil to begin flaring within weeks of the field coming online in December 2019, and it has continued in one form or another ever since.”

What the Satellite Data Shows

Independent verification, rather than company self-reporting, has driven most of what the public knows about the scale of the problem. Satellite monitoring compiled through the Every Last Drop project using SkyTruth data, cross-referenced with figures from the environmental rights organization Arayara Institute, documented 1,298 separate flaring events at the Stabroek Block between 2019 and 2023 alone, releasing an estimated à 1.32 million tons of CO2 — comparable to the annual emissions of roughly 287,000 cars. The analysis found the block’s flaring had made Guyana the second-largest gas-flaring emitter in the entire Amazon basin, trailing only Ecuador.

By July 2021, the Government’s own figures put cumulative flared gas at more than 15.1 billion cubic feet. That volume represents energy roughly equivalent to Guyana’s entire national electricity consumption for a year, burned into the sky rather than captured.

The Permit Was Weakened, Not Enforced

The regulatory response to this pattern was not tightening. It was loosening. In April 2021, environmental activists including Sherlina Nageer, using satellite evidence they had gathered independently, formally alerted the Guyana Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the scale of ongoing flaring. Within a month of that complaint, the EPA revised ExxonMobil’s environmental permit — not to strengthen the zero-flaring requirement, but to extend the allowable flaring period from three consecutive days to sixty.

– The Permit Modification (as reported by multiple independent outlets)

 

Following a 2021 activist complaint documenting extensive non-routine flaring, the EPA revised EEPGL’s environmental permit to extend the allowable continuous flaring window from three days to sixty days, without conducting a fresh Environmental Impact Assessment.

Citizens challenged the legality of that modification in court, arguing that a permit change of this magnitude, made without a new environmental impact review, was unlawful. In 2023, Chief Justice Roxanne George ruled in ExxonMobil’s favour, finding that it had not been proven the modified permit was causing additional adverse environmental effects, and that nothing in Guyanese law prevented the issuance of a modified permit on those terms.

“The government is basically saying: pollute as much as you want, provided you can pay for it.”

That assessment came from Dr. Vincent Adams, the former Head of Guyana’s Environmental Protection Agency and a thirty-year veteran of the US Department of Energy, responding to the court’s ruling. Dr. Adams has been a recurring, credible critic of the regulatory posture Guyana’s institutions have taken toward ExxonMobil throughout this series’ reporting, and his assessment of the flaring permit fits the broader pattern: technically lawful concessions, made in response to the Contractor’s operational failures, that leave the public paying the environmental cost while the Contractor pays a fee calibrated well below the damage.

The Fines Do Not Match the Harm

Guyana calculates flaring penalties under the Polluter Pays Principle set out in its 1996 Environmental Protection Act. The rate has increased over time — from US$30 per tonne of CO2-equivalent under the original permit, to US$45, and now to US$50 under the renewed five-year Liza 1 permit issued in 2025. By late 2021, the EPA confirmed it had collected approximately G$930 million, or roughly US$4.5 million, in cumulative flaring payments from ExxonMobil.

The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) found that figure hard to square with the scale of the pollution. Using a benchmark rate of US$75 per tonne — a level IEEFA characterized as more realistic — the organization calculated ExxonMobil should have paid closer to US$26 million for the flaring recorded through mid-2021: roughly six times what it had actually paid. ExxonMobil separately paid an US$8.4 million penalty in 2022, a sum that registers as a rounding error against a company that recorded tens of billions of dollars in global annual profit in the same period.

For comparison, when ExxonMobil flared gas on American soil, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Justice fined the company US$2.5 million in 2017 and required a further US$300 million outlay for pollution-control technology at its domestic facilities. Guyana’s cumulative flaring collections, spread across years and multiple incidents, remain a fraction of what US regulators extracted for a single enforcement action.

A Pattern Consistent With the Rest of the Series

Read against Parts I through III, the flaring record is not an isolated environmental footnote. It is the same structural imbalance this series has documented in the fiscal terms, the stability clause, and the decommissioning liability, now visible in environmental enforcement:

A Contractor whose commitments were not met, a regulator whose response was to relax the rule rather than enforce it, a judiciary that found the relaxation lawful, and a public that bears the atmospheric and reputational cost while the financial penalty remains, by independent estimate, a fraction of the damage.

The scale of what is now at stake is only growing. Stabroek Block output surpassed 918,000 barrels per day in February 2026, with the consortium targeting 1.7 million barrels per day by 2030 and ExxonMobil now seeking environmental authorization for a further 35-well exploration campaign running through 2033. Guyana’s environmental regulator has, for the first time, requested a cumulative impact study covering that new campaign alongside all other offshore activity — a modest but real acknowledgment that project-by-project review has not been sufficient. Whether that acknowledgment translates into enforcement, rather than another accommodation, is the question this series leaves the public, and the Government, to answer.

What The 592 Guardian Is Asking

In concluding this series, we are putting the following questions on the public record, to the Environmental Protection Agency, the Ministry of Natural Resources, and the Department of Energy:

  1. What is the current cumulative total, in both Guyana dollars and US dollars, that ExxonMobil and its partners have paid in flaring penalties since December 2019, broken down by year and incident?
  2. What analysis, if any, did the EPA conduct before extending the permitted continuous flaring window from three days to sixty days in 2021, and will that analysis be published?
  3. Does the Government consider the current US$50-per-tonne flaring penalty rate to reflect the actual environmental and climate cost of the emissions, and if not, what rate would it consider adequate?
  4. In light of the cumulative impact study now being requested for the proposed 35-well exploration campaign, will the EPA apply the same cumulative standard retroactively to the flaring record of the currently producing FPSOs?

We extend the Government and the Contractor an open invitation to respond in full; any response received will be published without alteration alongside this editorial.

This concludes The Stabroek Surrender. Across four parts, this series has examined the fiscal terms, the stability clause that locked them in place, the decommissioning liability Guyana is pre-funding without safeguard, and the flaring record that has outpaced enforcement. ,The throughline is consistent: a Government that entered a defining national contract from a position of weakness, and has since treated every mechanism for correcting that weakness — renegotiation, arbitration exposure, financial safeguards, environmental enforcement — as a fixed cost of doing business rather than a lever available to a sovereign state. The 592Guardian will continue reporting on the audit void and the question of government complicity in a future series.

— The Board, The 592 Guardian