Guyana’s oil wealth: learning to read reality between expectation and frustration

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 Guyana’s oil wealth: learning to read reality between expectation and frustration


OPINION BY : Hem Kumar October 2026

Guyanese were not unreasonable to expect that the discovery and production of oil would improve their lives. A country acquiring an extraordinary new source of public revenue should be able to offer its people more than impressive growth statistics. It should be able to improve their material security, expand their opportunities and provide better public services.

The question is not whether people expected too much. It is whether the expectations encouraged by political promises are being matched by measurable improvements in everyday life.

The central issue is distribution: how national wealth becomes household well-being, who benefits first, who waits, and who risks being left behind.

A richer country is not necessarily a more secure household

The scale of Guyana’s economic transformation is real. The World Bank reports that real GDP grew by 43.8 percent in 2024 and another 19.3 percent in 2025. Growth also extended beyond petroleum: the non-oil economy expanded by 14.3 percent in 2025. These figures establish that the boom is substantial, not imaginary. They do not establish that its benefits are reaching households evenly.

That distinction must anchor any honest discussion of expectations.

GDP measures economic production. It is not a payslip, a pension statement or a household budget. A growing economy and a financially strained family are not contradictory realities. Both can exist at the same time.

For the citizen, the meaningful questions are more immediate: Does my income cover essential expenses? Can I afford suitable housing? Can my children obtain a good education? Does the health service work when I need it? Can my small business compete fairly? Is my future becoming more secure?

The World Bank itself frames the challenge in these terms: poverty reduction will depend on translating rapid economic growth into stronger purchasing power for poor and vulnerable households and sustained job creation in the non-oil economy.

In other words, the transformation does not complete itself. Policy must make it happen.

When expectations become frustration

The argument in the supplied essay applies powerfully to Guyana: hope becomes fragile when promises outrun demonstrable results.

If citizens are repeatedly told that they live in an exceptionally prosperous economy, yet struggle to meet ordinary expenses, the distance between the public narrative and their private experience becomes politically consequential.

That does not mean every grievance proves that development has failed. It means that national success cannot be established simply by asking people to disregard their circumstances.

Food prices illustrate the problem. The World Bank reports that inflation picked up between March and June 2026, driven mainly by higher food prices amid weather-related supply disruptions, with fuel and transport pressures also contributing. It notes that higher food prices disproportionately affect poor and vulnerable households because food consumes a larger share of their budgets.

A household can therefore hear that the country is becoming richer while experiencing a tighter daily budget. Dismissing that tension as impatience does not resolve it.

Nor should “manage your expectations” become a polite instruction to accept exclusion. Realistic expectations require honesty from citizens, but they also require honesty from those exercising power.

Examine inequality—do not merely assert it

The concern that Guyana’s wealth gap is widening deserves serious investigation. However, a responsible editorial must distinguish between visible disparities, citizens’ experiences and a statistically demonstrated increase in inequality.

The World Bank has acknowledged the shortage of recent poverty data in its assessment of Guyana. That limits how confidently anyone can describe the precise distributional results of the oil boom.

The strongest argument is therefore not to substitute one unsupported certainty for another. It is to insist that a government presiding over extraordinary growth must demonstrate who is benefiting.

Visible prosperity at the top does not, by itself, measure the national wealth gap. Equally, impressive GDP figures do not disprove hardship below.

Guyana needs regularly published evidence showing:

  • How household incomes are changing after inflation.
  • Whether poverty is falling, and where deprivation persists.
  • How benefits differ across regions and income groups.
  • Who receives public contracts and how competitive those awards are.
  • Whether public spending produces reliable services rather than merely completed structures.
  • Whether small businesses and workers gain durable opportunities beyond temporary expenditure.

Without that evidence, debate becomes a contest between celebration and resentment rather than an examination of results.

A grant is not the same as a transformation

Fair analysis must acknowledge that the government has directed oil revenues toward public investment and household assistance. Its own explanation of the Natural Resource Fund identifies infrastructure, human-capital programs and cash grants among the uses of petroleum revenues.

These measures should be assessed, not dismissed. But announcing expenditure is different from demonstrating its effectiveness.

A cash grant may provide valuable immediate relief. The longer-term test is whether households become less dependent on relief because their earnings, services and economic opportunities improve.

Likewise, infrastructure can support development without automatically guaranteeing equitable development. The accountability questions remain: What problem does a project solve? At what cost? Who benefits? Who maintains it? What improvement can citizens verify?

A bridge should be assessed not only as a completed asset, but also by the access and opportunities it creates. A hospital should be judged not only by its building, but by the care patients can reliably receive.

That is the difference between spending wealth and converting wealth into well-being.

Hope requires a credible route from revenue to results

Guyana should reject both the promise that oil will solve everything and the fatalism that nothing can improve. Neither position demands enough evidence. Neither provides citizens with a useful standard for judging government.,

A more credible national conversation would connect each major promise to a baseline, a funded plan, a responsible institution, a timetable and a publicly reported result. Where progress is delayed, the explanation should be specific. Where a policy fails, correction should matter more than defending the announcement.

Citizens, for their part, should not have to choose between acknowledging economic growth and questioning its distribution. They can recognize genuine progress while demanding a fairer share of its benefits.

The lesson for Guyana is not that people should stop hoping. It is that hope should rest on a verifiable relationship between the wealth the country earns and the life its people can lead.

The government’s task is not merely to persuade Guyanese that prosperity is coming. It is to demonstrate, household by household and community by community, how prosperity is arriving.

Mr. President, Whose Decisions Are These?

 

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 Mr. President, Whose Decisions Are These?


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar October 2026

Ali’s CNN answers leave the central question unanswered: how freely does an oil-rich Guyana exercise its sovereignty?

President Irfaan Ali should know by now that an international interview is not a domestic public-relations exercise. CNN is not NCN. A question cannot always be answered by changing the subject, reciting achievements or wrapping an uncomfortable issue in the language of partnership.

Before CNN’s Jim Sciutto, the President faced a question that reaches beyond diplomatic pleasantries: how independent is Guyana when the interests of the United States are involved?

His answer, as quoted, was categorical: “I don’t see the U.S. as trying to force us, or trying to be a dominant force with Guyana.”

That is an assurance. It is not an explanation. And an explanation is precisely what this country requires.

The issue is not whether Guyana should maintain good relations with Washington. It should. The issue is not whether American investment, security cooperation or diplomatic support can serve Guyana’s interests. They can.

The issue is sovereignty: who makes the decisions, whose interests determine the outcome, and whether the Guyanese people are being told enough to judge the difference between cooperation freely negotiated and compliance quietly extracted.

President Ali cannot settle that question by announcing what he does not see. He must account for what his government has done.

An assurance is not an accounting

There is a convenient way to discuss foreign influence: look only for an explicit threat, a written ultimatum or a public command.

Under that narrow test, a government can insist that nobody forced it to do anything while declining to explain the pressures surrounding its decisions. But influence need not arrive as an order. The relevant questions are whether a foreign government sought a particular outcome, what leverage it possessed, how Guyana responded and what alternatives were considered.

Those are the questions President Ali must answer.

Were decisions taken because they advanced a clearly identified national interest? Were they taken to avoid displeasing Washington? Or did the government calculate that the political, diplomatic or economic costs of saying no were too high?

These possibilities are not interchangeable. Citizens deserve to know which applies.

The President’s declaration that he sees no coercion does not remove the obligation to disclose the circumstances in which consequential decisions were made.

The Cuban question cannot be waved away

Consider the concerns surrounding Cuban medical personnel.

The account of their departure raises serious questions about what changed, who sought that change and how the government assessed its consequences. If American pressure influenced Guyana’s arrangements with Cuba, the public is entitled to a direct explanation. If it did not, the government should establish the actual reasons rather than leave suspicion to fill the silence.

What arrangements were ended or altered? How many personnel were affected? What communications did Guyana receive from Washington? What options did the government consider? What provisions were made to protect the delivery of healthcare?

These are questions of administration and accountability, not merely foreign-policy symbolism.

Cuba’s longstanding relationship with Guyana gives the matter an additional moral weight. A government should not treat an established partner as disposable simply because another partner finds the relationship objectionable. Nor should it conceal a difficult decision behind language designed to make responsibility disappear.

There may be contractual, financial, regulatory or other explanations for changes to a medical program. If so, publish them.

But President Ali cannot reasonably ask the nation to accept an unqualified declaration of independence while withholding the information necessary to test it.

Friendship does not exempt any arrangement from scrutiny. Neither does American displeasure establish a sufficient reason to terminate one.

Deportees: whose obligations would Guyana assume?

The same demand for disclosure applies to any arrangement concerning third-country nationals whom the United States wishes to remove.

The essential distinction is between returning Guyanese citizens and accepting people who are not Guyanese. Those are different questions, with different implications.

What, precisely, has Guyana been asked to accept? What has it agreed to? Under what legal authority? Who would bear the costs? What protections would apply to the people transferred and to the communities receiving them? Could Guyana refuse particular cases?

Above all, what national interest would such an arrangement serve?

A government does not demonstrate independence merely by describing a decision as voluntary. It demonstrates independence by explaining its terms, defending its benefits and showing that it retained a meaningful ability to decline.

If there is no agreement, say so clearly. If negotiations exist, disclose their scope to the extent legitimately possible. If commitments have been made, the public should not have to reconstruct them from foreign announcements and scattered official remarks.

Guyana is a country, not an administrative convenience for another country’s immigration policy.

Wales: public money requires public justification

Then there are the reported concerns involving Lindsayca and the Wales Gas-to-Energy project, including the reported request for an additional US$102 million and claims of intervention by the United States Embassy.

Those reports require verification and a substantive official response. They should not be treated as established findings simply because they are politically explosive. But neither should their seriousness become an excuse for official evasion.

The questions are straightforward.

Was additional money requested? By whom? For what contractual purpose? What amount, if any, is properly due? What independent technical and financial assessments support the request? What representations, if any, did the embassy make?

An embassy may advocate for a company from its country. That advocacy does not establish the company’s entitlement to Guyanese public money.

The government’s duty is to the contract and the taxpayer—not to the nationality of the contractor or the diplomatic weight behind it.

If the administration is resisting an unjustified demand, it should explain and defend that position. If a payment is justified, it should publish the basis. If the matter is disputed, it should identify the dispute without pretending that public accountability must disappear until every disagreement is resolved.

A diplomatic relationship is not a substitute for a certified payment obligation.

The Chinese companies and the missing explanation

The questions raised about two Chinese companies and a deep-water-port project demand the same discipline.

Before conclusions are drawn, the government should establish the record: which companies were involved, what formal standing they held, whether they were removed or replaced, who made that decision and on what grounds.

Was there a procurement issue? A financing problem? A technical deficiency? A security assessment? A change in the project’s design?

Or did objections from an outside government influence the outcome?

These are materially different explanations. They cannot be blurred into a general claim that everything was done in Guyana’s interest.

If Washington requested the exclusion of Chinese participation, the public should know whether Guyana accepted that request and why. If Washington made no such request, the administration should correct the allegation with a clear account. Neither an American preference nor a Chinese commercial interest should determine Guyana’s decisions automatically. The governing standard must be demonstrable national benefit, established through a defensible process.

Oil wealth makes disclosure more urgent

At the center of this argument sits the oil-and-gas sector.

The question is not simply whether the United States exercises influence. It is whether Guyana possesses—and uses—the institutional strength to negotiate with powerful governments and corporations without confusing their interests with its own.

Diplomatic support must not purchase immunity from scrutiny. Investment must not purchase preferential treatment. Security cooperation must not become an unspoken obligation to accommodate unrelated commercial demands.

Nor should the government present every criticism of an American company as hostility towards the United States. A country can value a diplomatic relationship and still enforce a contract, reject a demand or insist on better terms.

That is not ingratitude. It is government.

Guyana’s wealth makes these distinctions more important, not less. The greater the resources at stake, the more exacting the obligation to explain who benefits, who pays and who decides.

Put the decisions on the record

President Ali’s CNN appearance should therefore be judged not by whether he remained composed or delivered a confident denial, but by whether he answered the underlying question.

On the account presented, he did not.

The corrective is not another speech asserting that Guyana is independent. It is a public accounting of the decisions now under challenge. Publish the relevant agreements, subject to narrowly justified redactions. Explain the policy changes. Identify the decision-makers. State what foreign governments requested and what Guyana accepted or refused. Put disputed expenditures before proper scrutiny.

The President need not disclose every confidential diplomatic exchange to provide a credible explanation. But confidentiality cannot become a blanket under which every politically inconvenient fact disappears. Nor must critics prove that Washington dictates every decision before they are entitled to question a particular one.

Accountability does not begin only after coercion has been conclusively established. It is the process by which citizens determine whether their government acted properly in the first place.

Mr. President, the question is not whether you see an American command. The question is whether the Guyanese people can see an independent decision.

Show them the record.

The King Comes to Guyana. He Must Not Leave Without Answering for Slavery.

 

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The King Comes to Guyana. He Must Not Leave Without Answering for Slavery.


OPINION BY : Hem Kumar October 2026

As Prince of Wales in February 2000, his  the last trip to Guyana

King Charles III arrives in Guyana on Thursday, October 29, for a two-day state visit—twenty-six years after his last trip here as Prince of Wales. He will meet President Mohamed Irfaan Ali at State House, attend a reception in the gardens, meet Indigenous leaders, visit the Botanical Garden, discuss British investment, and close his visit on the Georgetown seawall with talk of sustainable cities and mangrove restoration.

These engagements deserve civility. Guyana should receive the King as a guest. But Guyana should not receive him as though history were a finished chapter, conveniently closed before dessert.

The question that must follow Charles from State House to the seawall is simple: Will Britain apologize for slavery, and will it pay reparations?

Acknowledgment Is Not Apology

Buckingham Palace has said the King will “not shy away” from “the darkest days of our past.” But it has also made clear that he will not issue a formal apology for Britain’s role in the transatlantic slave trade. The British government, meanwhile, has ruled out reparations.

This is the central evasion.

Charles has expressed “personal sorrow.” He has called slavery an “atrocity which forever stains our history.” He has acknowledged that its “most painful aspects” continue to resonate. These are carefully calibrated phrases: morally polished, historically distant, and institutionally safe.

Acknowledgment says: This happened.
Apology says: We did this, and we are responsible.
Reparations say: Responsibility requires repair.

Charles is prepared to offer the first. He refuses the second and third. That is not moral leadership. It is the management of embarrassment.

The Excuse Does Not Excuse Him

The Palace says the King cannot apologize because he acts on the advice of his ministers, and the British government has not advised him to apologize or offer reparations.

That may explain his constitutional position. It does not absolve him of moral agency.

A monarch who has spent decades championing environmental causes, sustainable development, interfaith dialogue, and the Commonwealth could use his platform to say, plainly, that Britain owes an apology and a process of reparatory justice. If his convictions are as humane as his public image suggests, he can say so within the limits of his role.

Instead, the Palace frames slavery as “a matter for governments,” while the government treats it as a matter not to be addressed. That is not neutrality. It is a mutually convenient arrangement: the Crown preserves its dignity; the state preserves its wealth; the descendants of the enslaved are asked to accept remembrance without repair.

Britain Paid the Slave Owners

The refusal is especially obscene against Britain’s own historical record.

When Britain abolished slavery in the 1830s, it compensated slave owners—not the enslaved. The payout, equivalent to roughly £17 billion today, helped preserve fortunes built on human bondage. The people whose labor was stolen, whose children were sold, whose bodies were brutalized, and whose descendants still inherit the consequences received nothing.

Britain transported an estimated 3.2 million African people across the Atlantic. Its empire extracted labor, land, resources, and political sovereignty from the Caribbean and beyond. The Crown stood at the symbolic center of that imperial order.

Reparations are not charity. They are not “payback.” They are a debt.

Ali Has Named the Next Step

President Ali has not left the issue to diplomatic innuendo. Before Charles’s arrival, he said the King’s recognition of slavery as “the darkest days” was only the “first step.” Then he added: “Now, moving to the apology is the next step.

Ali has also stated the historical charge without euphemism: Britain “exploited the region,” “destroyed lives,” and “created underdevelopment.” That is not hostility toward Britain. It is an honest account of colonial extraction and its continuing effects.

His proposed approach is development-centered reparatory justice: concessional financing, debt relief, and investment in education, health care, technology, human capacity, and climate resilience. This is a serious framework. It recognizes that the damage of slavery cannot be repaired by a single payment—but neither can it be erased by calling reparations “aid.”

The Danger of a Polite Silence

Ali will almost certainly raise the issue privately when Charles sits with him at State House. He should. But the test is whether the demand survives the reception.

State visits are built for protocol. There will be flags, toasts, photographs, and carefully worded communiqués. There will be talk of partnership, investment, biodiversity, and the future. All of that has value. But none of it excuses silence about the past.

Guyana must not allow the King’s environmental agenda to become a substitute for historical accountability. He may admire the rainforest, praise mangroves, meet young climate activists, and discuss Iwokrama. He should also be asked why the country whose forests he praises must still negotiate for the resources needed to overcome underdevelopment created by the empire his ancestors presided over.

If President Ali raises slavery only to bury it beneath talk of investment and goodwill, he will have turned a historic opportunity into a photo opportunity. If he tells Guyanese citizens exactly what was requested—an apology, reparations, and concrete redress—he will have used the visit as it should be used.

What Guyana Should Demand

Guyana’s demand should be clear, dignified, and non-negotiable:

♦ A formal British apology for slavery, colonialism, and their enduring harms.

♦ A reparations framework developed with Caribbean governments and descendants of enslaved Africans.

♦ Debt relief and concessional financing for affected nations.

♦ Investment in education, health care, mental health, technology, and climate resilience.

♦ Full access to British and royal archives documenting slavery and colonial rule.

♦ A commitment that reparations will not be disguised as ordinary development assistance or new debt.

These measures align with President Ali’s stated framework, but they must remain explicitly tied to slavery. Reparations must not be diluted into a general development agenda that allows Britain to fund roads, clinics, or climate projects while quietly refusing to name the crime that made such redress necessary.

The Seawall Test

Charles’s final engagement in Guyana is scheduled for the Georgetown seawall, where he will meet participants in the Commonwealth Sustainable Cities Initiative Dialogue and hear about urban resilience and mangrove restoration.

The setting is symbolically perfect—and politically dangerous.

Guyana’s coastline faces erosion, flooding, and climate vulnerability. Those pressures are intensified by global systems of extraction that enriched colonial powers while leaving formerly colonized nations with weaker institutions, narrower fiscal space, and greater exposure to environmental shocks.

The King should not stand on that seawall and speak only of the future. He should be asked to confront the past that helped determine who has wealth, who has debt, who is vulnerable to climate disaster, and who must plead for adaptation financing.

Respect Requires Accountability

Guyana does not need Charles to perform grief. It needs Britain to accept responsibility.

The King may come to Guyana to celebrate sixty years of bilateral relations. But those relations cannot be fully celebrated while Britain refuses to confront the centuries of exploitation that preceded them. An apology would not erase slavery. Reparations would not restore stolen lives. But together, they would acknowledge a truth Britain has long preferred to manage rather than confront: that its prosperity was built partly on the suffering of Africans and Indians through the underdevelopment of their descendants.

Until Britain accepts that responsibility, its regret will remain what it has too often been: eloquent, polished, and unpaid.

Charles III: no apology, the new slavery

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 Charles III: no apology, the new slavery


OPINION BY : GHK LALL October 2026

King Charles III is poised to set foot on this former colonial-suffused soil.  May the best in Guyanese hospitality be extended to him and his retinue.  Now, I mop my brow.  It’s getting hotter and hotter.

A man has slapped me, flogged me, chained me, spat upon me, seized me from my home, terrorized the women, arrested the children.  Yet, he comes with a thin smile and a clammy palm to cross my threshold.  He calls himself a friend.  Should I embrace him?  I speak as one of the millions that perished, that struggled and suffered, that were tortured and maimed.

Should my descendants be forgiving of the royal descendant of a royal line that disrupted and savaged my line?  My line to humanity.  My line to life.  My line to that place of being an equal among men.  My descendants should forgive.  For that is godly.  In fact, the central attribute of the god that was taught to me against my will by my former masters. 

Mercy, grace, peace.  Let those be.  Even if this regal descendant cannot have the decency, cannot find the smallest degree of humanity in himself, to say three words.  Not I love you.  But simply: I am sorry.  We who know better, having traveled through minefield and tripwire, the overseer’s lash and the horse’s trample, must still say our own three words: I forgive you.  We should have the majesty of rising above King Charles III and leave him to live with the memory of the savagery of his no apology opportunity forfeited.

I shall not tarnish this painful homage to my ancestors and those of the Black race that reared me. Today, I shall speak of those who refuse because they still see Africans and Indians as rubbish.  Or, more sharply, what reinforces that sense of white superiority.  If that’s the sole remaining jewel in King Charles III’s crown, let him have it.  But I urge my fellow Guyanese to be of two receptions on this occasion of a royal visit.  At the official level, Pres Ali is encouraged to represent the best that Guyana and Guyanese have to offer. 

At the citizen level, let us all stand as silent silhouettes to honor the passage of the millions that succumbed to the most bestial afflictions that man has ever inflicted on man.  Like Banquo’s ghost in Shakespeare’s Macbeth, let that silence, those accusing shadows, be the greeting that haunts King Charles III.

He lives in the lap of luxury off the blood and tears of forebears long gone. H e is a prime beneficiary of the pain of peoples subject to the worst of brutalities that could be conjured.  War was declared against a people, and the most terrible atrocities were committed.  Apologies and remorse could be rightly expressed for the Jewish Holocaust that claimed six million. 

But not a word of regret can form itself in the mind, can force its way past the lips, can be said so that it can be heard for 15 million that went down into the ocean or on the plantation. 

It seems that there are gradations of men.  Like eggs in the supermarket, or fruits on the stand, there is what’s accepted, there’s what’s rejected.

King Charles III should be able to shake Pres Ali’s hand with a smile on his lips and a twinkle in his eye.  But what about his disposition when his line advances and there is Prime Minister Mark Phillips and Minister Juan Edghill?  An apology may entail admission of some responsibility.  But in the face of the defiance of no apology, it must be that Darwin’s Natural Selection just went into reverse gear. 

No apology signifies clinging onto inhumanity.  No apology represents barbarity at its most nauseating, at its infuriatingly lowest, and its unutterably vilest. 

Thus, a king condemns himself to the crown of low commoner.  King Charles III has to follow the counsel of his handlers and advisers.  He must also learn and grow into that role that is more than a king.  He must be a man.

Today, I write of the abomination of no apology.  I couldn’t even get to reparation.  Welcome to Guyana, Charles.  Arise from the knees.  Take the place I reserved, if only to touch the warmth of men of goodwill.

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Did the State Create a Maritime Hazard—Then Neglect to Fix It?

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Did the State Create a Maritime Hazard—Then Neglect to Fix It?


OPINION BY : Hem Kumar October 2026

The testimony emerging from the Commission of Inquiry into the sinking of the MV Barima continues to reveal a troubling pattern: functions that ought to be governed by clear rules, competent supervision, documented systems, and accountable public officers appear instead to have been left in a state of uncertainty.

The latest disclosure is extraordinary. Georgetown’s Lighthouse Department—the body associated with maritime communications and the historic navigational beacon at the entrance to the Demerara Channel—reportedly operates from a single room atop the Marriott Hotel.

Yet the attendant who gave evidence could not say whether the original Water Street lighthouse remained functional. Nor could he say whether a navigational beacon existed at the Marriott location.

That should not be treated as a minor administrative curiosity. It is a grave public-safety question.

A lighthouse attendant ought not to be uncertain about whether the beacon for which his department is known—and which mariners may rely on for safe navigation—is operating, where it is located, what its light characteristics are, or who is responsible for maintaining it. If this uncertainty exists at the operational level, the Commission must establish what, precisely, has been happening at the level of management, ministerial responsibility, procurement, oversight, and regulation.

The inquiry must now ask a hard and unavoidable question: did the State permit the construction of a high-rise hotel that obstructed, impaired, or compromised the light of an existing navigational facility, commit itself to a replacement safety system, spend public money to implement that solution, and then fail to ensure the solution was properly completed, certified, maintained, and operated?

If that is what occurred, this is not merely a lapse. It is a self-created public-risk problem compounded by official neglect.

 A Problem Foreseen Years Ago

The record indicates that the risk was not unforeseen.

Before the Marriott was constructed, concern was raised that the building’s height would obstruct the historic Georgetown Lighthouse’s navigational light. In 2008, it was reported that an environmental and social impact assessment recommended a beacon at the highest point of the hotel to compensate for that obstruction. The recommendation was apparently for a beacon with wider visibility and greater range.

By 2013, the then Works Minister, Robeson Benn, reportedly stated that an oscillating navigational light would be installed atop the Marriott. The public was told that the historic lighthouse would retain its light and continue its functions, including radio communication with vessels and vessel tracking.

Those were not casual assurances. They went directly to maritime safety.

But now, more than a decade later, the public is hearing evidence that Lighthouse Department personnel work from the hotel but cannot say whether a navigational beacon is present there. The historic lighthouse is said to no longer function as the guide for vessels entering and leaving the Demerara Channel. A former employee says she never worked from the Water Street tower, that it was not operating, and that access to it was no longer possible.

What happened between the environmental assessment, ministerial undertaking, and present-day uncertainty?

Was the replacement beacon installed? If so, when? Was it tested and commissioned? What are its light characteristics, nominal range, precise coordinates, and operational status? Does it meet the applicable standards for an aid to navigation? Was it properly recorded in official Notices to Mariners and nautical publications? Were domestic operators, pilots, fishing vessels, tug operators, commercial shippers, and international maritime authorities formally notified?

Or did Guyana permit a structure to interfere with a longstanding navigation aid without ever establishing a fully functional, transparent, and professionally managed replacement?

The Marriott Room Is Not the Issue

Let us be clear: there is nothing inherently improper about a maritime communications operation working from a modern building rather than an old lighthouse. The historic lighthouse could be preserved as a national monument while navigation is carried out through a modern light, radar, radio, automatic identification system, vessel-traffic service, or another properly regulated arrangement.

But modernization requires more—not less—clarity and accountability.

A room equipped with computers, a VHF radio, a telephone, and an antenna may be part of a functioning maritime-operation system. But the country needs evidence, not impressions.

What exactly is the function of the Marriott office? Is it a designated radio watch station? Does it operate continuously, and if so, under which watchkeeping procedures? Does it monitor specific VHF frequencies? Are transmissions logged? Who reviews those logs? Is it integrated with MARAD, the Transport and Harbors Department, port authorities, pilots, the Coast Guard, and emergency responders? What redundancy exists if the radio, electricity, antenna, internet, or telephone fails?

More fundamentally, what is the official navigational aid for entry into and exit from the Demerara Channel?

A country cannot afford to leave that answer to speculation, employee recollection, or a casual statement that the old lighthouse “is not functioning.” In a commercial river used by domestic and international traffic, safe navigation must rest on specified and verifiable aids, reliable communications, trained personnel, properly maintained equipment, and clearly assigned responsibility.

The Inquiry Must Follow the Money

The Commission should now pursue the costs factor with the same seriousness it applies to operational failures.

If public funds were spent to address the obstruction of the historic lighthouse by the Marriott, the public is entitled to know exactly how much was spent, who received the funds, what was procured, and whether Guyana received the functioning safety system for which it paid.

The Commission, Parliament, auditors, and the media should demand the records:

♦ The environmental and social impact assessment that identified the navigational risk.

♦ The development approvals, conditions, correspondence, and undertakings related to the Marriott project.

♦ The decision authorizing any relocation, modification, replacement, or decommissioning of the lighthouse function.

♦ Procurement files for beacons, lights, antennas, radios, power systems, marine communications equipment, installation works, maintenance, and security.

♦ Contracts, invoices, payment vouchers, inspection reports, acceptance certificates, warranties, and maintenance agreements.

♦ The cost of operating the Lighthouse Department from the Marriott, including rent, licenses, utilities, communications services, security, equipment, and any payments to the hotel or associated entities.

♦ Technical reports confirming whether a replacement beacon was installed and whether it remains operational.

♦ The operational manuals, duty rosters, radio logs, maintenance schedules, fault reports, and incident reports for the Lighthouse Department.

♦ Notices issued to mariners, published nautical data, and correspondence with international maritime bodies concerning the new or altered light arrangement.

These records should tell a simple story. Either government identified the risk, funded a solution, installed it, tested it, maintained it, and communicated it to mariners—or it did not.

There can be no acceptable middle ground where a vital navigational safeguard is funded on paper but uncertain in practice.

Who Was Responsible?

The inquiry must identify the officer, agency, or ministry with direct legal and operational responsibility for the system.

Was it MARAD? The Ministry of Public Works? The Transport and Harbors Department? A port authority? The developer? A contractor? Or did responsibility become scattered among multiple institutions until no one could be held answerable for the final outcome?

That is a familiar weakness in public administration: several agencies may be involved in approving a development, awarding a contract, managing infrastructure, regulating vessels, and responding to emergencies. Yet when a failure occurs, every institution claims only a limited role.

The country cannot accept that answer where navigation safety is concerned.

Someone had to ensure that a replacement beacon was installed before an obstructing structure was allowed to compromise the established light. Someone had to verify that it met the necessary standard. Someone had to ensure that maintenance was budgeted and performed. Someone had to know, at every point, whether the light was operational. Someone had to notify mariners if it was not.

If no one did, that itself is the finding.

A System Cannot Be Run by Uncertainty

The most disturbing aspect of the testimony is the impression of an essential public function existing without an intelligible operational architecture.

A lighthouse department cannot simply be a name attached to a hotel room. Its purpose must be defined. Its equipment must be known. Its personnel must understand their responsibilities. Its systems must be written down. Its records must be complete. Its management must be able to confirm, without hesitation, what lights and communications aids are operational, which are defective, who is repairing them, and when service will be restored.

The Commission’s work has exposed a succession of troubling questions about vessel operation, regulation, maintenance, supervision, emergency readiness, and official reporting. The Lighthouse Department evidence now raises another: was Guyana’s maritime-safety apparatus functioning in the manner required by law, professional standards, and common sense—or were key functions merely being carried along without serious scrutiny?

That question cannot be left hanging once the hearings conclude.

The Public Deserves Answers—and Corrective Action

The inquiry should recommend an immediate independent technical audit of all aids to navigation in the Demerara River and other major waterways. The audit should identify every operational light, beacon, buoy, radio facility, radar or monitoring system, power backup arrangement, and communication protocol; assess its condition; establish who is responsible; and publish an urgent corrective plan.

It should also recommend a full forensic review of the Marriott-related navigational arrangements, including approvals, commitments, procurement, expenditure, installation, testing, and ongoing maintenance

.If equipment was paid for but not delivered, installed but never commissioned, commissioned but not maintained, or allowed to become inoperable without timely replacement, those findings must be referred to the appropriate oversight and investigative bodies.

Guyana cannot wait for another maritime emergency to discover that essential safety systems were unclear, unverified, or neglected.

The question now confronting the State is stark: after allowing the Marriott development to create a foreseeable obstruction to a longstanding navigational light, did the authorities actually complete and sustain the alternative system they promised?

The Commission must demand the documentary proof. The country deserves no less.

 

Guyana’s New Security Pact Rests on a Foundation= Corruption Can Crack

 

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 Guyana’s New Security Pact Rests on a Foundation- Corruption Can Crack


OPINION BY : Hem Kumar October 2026

Guyana has entered a new phase of its relationship with the United States. On October 21, President Irfaan Ali and U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth signed a Joint Declaration for an Enhanced Defense Partnership at the Pentagon, promising deeper military cooperation, multidomain training, combined exercises, air-domain awareness, and joint action against narcoterrorism and trafficking.

The agreement is strategically important. Guyana faces an unresolved territorial threat from Venezuela, expanding transnational criminal networks, and increasing scrutiny of its oil-driven rise. Closer defense cooperation with Washington can strengthen deterrence, modernize the Guyana Defense Force, and improve Guyana’s capacity to monitor and protect its territory.

But the pact also creates a new national obligation: Guyana must become capable of protecting sensitive information. The recent U.S. arrest of a CIA contractor accused of leaking classified national-defense material, together with pending Florida litigation over the alleged misuse of confidential information in a major Guyana fuel-infrastructure matter, shows why this is not an abstract concern.

Guyana cannot build a serious security partnership on institutions that cannot reliably protect a procurement file, a commercial design, a defense communication, or an intelligence exchange.

The American warning

On October 23, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the arrest of Ian A. Brinksman, a 42-year-old government contractor who had provided services to the CIA. He was charged with unlawfully transmitting national defense information.

According to prosecutors, Brinksman held Top Secret clearance and allegedly accessed classified intelligence reports beyond the scope of his work. The FBI affidavit alleges that he repeatedly communicated with a romantic partner who operated a Substack publication, and that at least five articles published in 2026 contained information mirroring classified reports, some at the Top Secret level.

These are allegations. Brinksman is presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But the case demonstrates a basic truth about national security: the greatest danger often comes not from foreign hackers or enemy armies, but from trusted insiders with access, motive, and opportunity.

The U.S. response was immediate and forceful. The FBI arrested Brinksman after a search of his home; the Justice Department, FBI, and CIA all framed the alleged leak as a betrayal of public trust and a threat to intelligence sources, operations, and officers.

That is the standard Guyana must now confront. If the United States treats the compromise of classified information as a counterintelligence emergency, Guyana cannot treat information security as an afterthought

Guyana’s own precedent

Guyana does not need to look only to Washington for a warning. It already has a live example of how sensitive information connected to a major national project can become the subject of foreign litigation.

Curlew Midstream LLC and Playera Group Global LLC have sued former U.S. congressman Mark Green, lobbyist Marc C. Hebert, and the law firm Jones Walker LLP in Florida. The plaintiffs allege that Hebert, while representing Playera in its work with Curlew on a proposed fuel agreement with the Government of Guyana, misused protected trade information to help form Prosimos and related entities with Green to compete for a similar contract.

The lawsuit further alleges that Green and Hebert communicated with the Guyanese government about “issues” with Curlew, delaying the agreement. These are allegations in pending civil litigation, not judicial findings, and the defendants are entitled to the presumption of innocence.

Still, the case matters because it concerns the kind of information that can determine the outcome of a major national project: commercial strategies, technical concepts, negotiation positions, and proprietary material connected to fuel storage and processing infrastructure.

The alleged project was not peripheral. Curlew’s proposal involved a US$300 million tank farm and refining-related facility intended to process up to 30,000 barrels of crude daily and store 750,000 barrels of fuel. Such infrastructure bears directly on Guyana’s energy security, fuel prices, regional supply capacity, and strategic autonomy.

If confidential commercial information connected to such a project can be compromised or exploited, Guyana must ask what would happen to information connected to military logistics, border surveillance, radar coverage, counter-narcotics operations, or U.S. intelligence sharing.

NPTAB and the procurement problem

The Curlew matter also exposes a deeper institutional issue: Guyana’s procurement system cannot be separated from national security.

The National Procurement and Tender Administration Board is supposed to safeguard fair competition, protect confidential bid material, and ensure that public contracts are awarded on merit. Yet NPTAB has repeatedly faced concerns about procurement irregularities, incomplete records, and weak cooperation with oversight bodies.

In 2023, the Public Procurement Commission reported that NPTAB and procuring entities were not supplying documents needed for investigations. Earlier, the government announced a review of NPTAB staff to eliminate “skulduggery.”

Those concerns matter because procurement is not merely an administrative process. It is an information system. Bidders submit designs, pricing, technical specifications, financing structures, and commercial strategies. If that material leaks, is copied, or is selectively shared, competition is distorted and the public may pay more for inferior work.

A state that cannot protect proprietary designs in a fuel-farm bid cannot credibly promise to protect classified military plans, intelligence-source material, or sensitive bilateral communications. The problem is not only corruption. It is the absence of a disciplined information architecture

.Corruption is now a security risk

Guyana’s corruption problem has traditionally been framed as a fiscal and democratic issue. It is now also a counterintelligence issue.

Guyana ranks poorly on global corruption measures, and civil-society organizations have warned that elite capture, weak investigations, and inadequate institutional accountability continue to undermine public trust. Oil wealth has magnified the stakes. Large contracts, land allocations, infrastructure projects, fuel arrangements, and security services now involve sums large enough to make leaks, insider dealing, and influence peddling highly profitable.

This creates a dangerous political economy of information. A minister, adviser, procurement officer, security official, contractor, lobbyist, or intermediary may have access to information whose disclosure can produce contracts, political protection, cash, status, or foreign favour.

In such an environment, corruption becomes an attack surface. Criminal networks can buy information about patrols, ports, checkpoints, and enforcement operations. Foreign states can cultivate officials with access to strategic material. Domestic political actors can weaponize leaks for partisan advantage. Investors may withhold proprietary technology if they fear it will be passed to competitors.

The result is a country that is simultaneously richer and more exposed.

What the U.S. pact requires

The new defense declaration will increase the volume and sensitivity of information shared between Guyana and the United States. President Ali described the agreement as strengthening air-domain awareness, Guyana’s ability to monitor and respond to threats, and cooperation against narco-terrorist organizations and trafficking networks.

That means Guyana may handle material relating to:

  • Air surveillance and radar coverage.
  • Maritime domain awareness.
  • Military logistics and deployment planning.
  • Counter-narcotics and counter-trafficking operations.
  • Cybersecurity and communications systems.
  • Intelligence assessments and source protection.
  • Contingency planning related to external threats.

A leak in any of these areas could compromise personnel, expose operational methods, endanger intelligence sources, or weaken Guyana’s deterrence against Venezuela.

The United States will assess Guyana not only by its public statements, but by its ability to control access, vet personnel, secure communications, investigate breaches, and hold insiders accountable. If Georgetown cannot demonstrate those capacities, Washington may limit what it shares, route sensitive cooperation around Guyanese institutions, or treat Guyana as a partner whose strategic value is constrained by institutional risk.

The Venezuela factor

The defense pact cannot be understood apart from Venezuela’s continuing claim to the Essequibo. Caracas maintains its claim over roughly 160,000 square kilometers of Guyanese territory, while the International Court of Justice has not yet issued a final judgment.

In that context, information protection becomes a sovereignty issue. A leak involving air-interdiction planning, border patrols, U.S. liaison activity, military readiness, or emergency contingency plans could give an external adversary a strategic advantage

.Guyana would not merely lose a document. It could lose deterrence.

This is why the Brinksman case should be read in Georgetown as more than an American legal story. It is a preview of the kind of vulnerability Guyana must prevent within its own security architecture.

What Guyana must build

Guyana should not retreat from cooperation with the United States. It should use the partnership as the catalyst for a national information-security reform agenda.

A Protected Information Act

Parliament should enact a comprehensive law covering classified defense information, intelligence material, critical-infrastructure data, procurement confidentiality, commercially sensitive bid documents, and personal data held by the state.

The law must distinguish between legitimate secrecy and political concealment. It should punish unauthorized disclosure, theft, copying, solicitation, and reckless handling of protected information, while protecting genuine whistleblowers who expose corruption, illegality, or dangers to public safety through lawful channels.

Security vetting

No person should receive access to sensitive bilateral material without proper vetting. This should include criminal-record checks, financial-disclosure review, conflict-of-interest screening, foreign-contact assessment, and periodic reinvestigation.

Vetting must apply to military and police personnel, civil servants, contractors, consultants, translators, IT workers, and private-sector intermediaries—not merely to senior officials.

NPTAB reform

NPTAB needs digital tender files, access logs, encrypted submission systems, conflict-of-interest registers, independent technical evaluators, and mandatory reporting of suspected leaks.

A bidder whose proprietary design or commercial information is compromised must have a clear right to notification, investigation, and remedy. Without such protections, serious international firms will treat Guyanese procurement as commercially hazardous.

Counterintelligence capacity

Guyana needs a professional counterintelligence and insider-threat unit with a clear legal mandate. Its work should include leak investigations, personnel-risk assessment, financial-integrity checks, foreign-influence detection, and protection of bilateral defense information.

It must be independent enough to investigate powerful people. Otherwise, it will become another political weapon rather than a national-security institution.

Secure communications

Government cannot continue conducting sensitive business through personal phones, informal WhatsApp groups, private email accounts, and unsecured cloud storage. Officials handling defense, procurement, intelligence, energy, or critical-infrastructure matters need approved and monitored communications systems.

Contractual safeguards

Every defense-cooperation agreement should include a classified-information annex. It should specify who may access material, how it is stored, how personnel are vetted, how breaches are reported, and what remedies apply when either side fails to protect shared information.

The same standards should extend to energy, ports, cyber, telecommunications, and other critical-infrastructure agreements involving foreign partners.

Independent oversight

Parliament, the Public Procurement Commission, the Auditor General, and an independent national-security oversight body must be able to verify that secrecy is being used lawfully.

Oversight does not require publishing operational secrets. It requires proof that access is limited, records are maintained, breaches are investigated, and abuses are punished.

The choice before Guyana

Guyana is no longer a small state seeking modest assistance. It is an oil-rich country entering deeper military cooperation with the United States while facing external pressure from Venezuela, criminal networks, and intense competition for contracts and influence.

The Brinksman case shows that even the world’s most powerful security state can be undermined by one person with access and motive. The Curlew litigation shows that Guyana already faces allegations that confidential commercial information can be exploited in its most consequential infrastructure negotiations.

The lesson is uncomfortable: Guyana’s greatest security vulnerability may not be Venezuela’s claim to the Essequibo. It may be Guyana’s own inability to control information within its state.

If Guyana wants American trust, investor confidence, and public legitimacy, it must prove it can protect secrets from friends, rivals, contractors, lobbyists, lovers, and politicians alike.

Otherwise, Guyana will have signed a defense partnership it cannot securely operate—and will have invited deeper strategic entanglement without the institutional capacity to defend its own national interest.

Link to Brinkman’s Affidavit :👉

https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1468496/dl?inline&fbclid=IwVERDUAVL3CxleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBwZG9mAWZkaWQWURCKHM9f0wBjYQ2F3Nn2AE8Qgx5pV3NydGMGYXBwX2lkCjY2Mjg1NjgzNzkAAR4_wsflXJAEVDztEMluZZl7W0pU7938QxJOis3DJ_P8ONaYyrTq_2pOUbC-KA_aem_DcBHfvmKGzvbfSHMmEFuQw 

 

Law -abiding, not lawbreaking (seemingly)?

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  Law -abiding, not lawbreaking (seemingly)


OPINION BY : GHK LALL October 2026

Mr. Azruddin Mohamed must, of necessity, come to a hard stop.  He is Guyana’s Leader of the Opposition, not the leader of a rat pack.  He is a crucial component of the machinery that makes laws in Guyana.  Therefore, he cannot be numbered among the ranks that break the law in Guyana, from the appearance of what happened.  As connecting the dots seems to suggest.

Whatever Mr. Mohamed did before, however he operated, he should discard any idea that he still has that kind of immunity.  In his new environment, he so much as blinks and he sinks.  In his new role, whatever fancies he may have of himself as a freewheeler and a political mercenary with honorable in front of his name, it is imperative that sobriety and maturity hit home quickly.  The reports are of a tape in hand, a rank with plenty of new cash in hand and, once again, the government has the controlling hand.  For sure, he has much to prove, and is fighting for his life.  Not just the political one.  In the next instance, there is only one way to go about these challenges, and it must be the right way. 

No ifs, ands, or buts, Mr. Mohamed has to be of the straight way.  Purer than pure.  He either gets that in his head, or he loses his head.  

Because if he can be so recklessly adventurous, as Leader of the Opposition, as alleged, and with a gun pointed at his head, then there is no telling how much more he may be willing to risk as the head of this country.  Aside from its misleading narratives and mishandling of the national oil patrimony, the biggest black eye on the PPP Govt is corruption.  Both eyes to be precise, for it’s that bad.  No intro should be needed on what has been done to the Guyana Police Force.  A bastion of lawlessness while so-called bright government men prattle about what is law and who is lawful and how lawlessness has no place.  Switch back to Mr. Mohamed, currently Hon Leader of the Opposition.  If his hand is in the improper release of those surveillance tapes on his Kitty encounter, then how far could he be prepared to go as head of government, to get his way.  Or to get those who stand in his way, out of the way.  It is not the logic of political science; it is the wisdom of commonsense.

Guyanese are clamoring for change.  But from what to what?  From forces of darkness of known sleaziness to a new force for darkness of a dirtier kind.  It could be that Mr. Mohamed, having grown accustomed to the advantages of taking the circular path between two points, is loathe to let go of that outlook on life.  He sees that as his first option to solve the difficult developments in life.  Cut a corner to gain yardage.  Like who shot at whom?  Who shot first?  Who shot from the cover of dark, but now tries to hides that fact under more layers of darkness?  Mr. Mohamed, be he the Leader of the Opposition, or the chief governor, or a common citizen, has to grow to know the just way. 

He learns to take it and work with it, in spite of all of its restraints and the handicaps that it places on those who chart that type of course.  Or he learns not at all, is useless to Guyanese.

A law abider is not a thrill seeker.  A Leader of the Opposition is not a 9 to 5 job, then clocking out, and donning the robes of a night stalker.  One misjudgment brought him to what looks like within an inch of losing his life.  A follow-up mistake of seemingly unlawful proportions draws him closer to losing his freedom.  Again.  His head cannot be this hard.  Nor his ego this molded in stone.  Rushed judgment and rushed justice leave all Guyana locked in the same lost place.  Guyanese have had 60 years or more to find themselves, to chart a new path.  Mountains may not move.  Men do.

Yet, given this business about gunshots in the night, and surveillance tapes obtained and displayed, confirms that not one damn inch of clean territory has been gained.

Lawlessness is not overcome by more of what is unlawful.  Nor is enduring betterment had when the same instincts for the shortcut and the sweet and swift way are what is prized above all else. 

The worst thing, the last thing, that Mr. Mohamed should be about, is by his own conduct make PPP crimes look like not such a big deal after all.

Big Talk at the Marriott, Unanswered Questions on the Water

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 Big Talk at the Marriott, Unanswered Questions on the Water


OPINION BY : Hem Kumar October 2026

Ramsaroop sells a maritime future.Indar demands a maritime crackdown. Both must confront the credibility crisis at home. At the Marriott, Guyana is a maritime powerhouse in the making. At the MV Barima inquiry, the country is still being asked to explain the fundamentals. That is the gulf between the government’s conference presentation and the public’s demand for accountability

Peter Ramsaroop offers the vision: modern ports, Guyanese-owned vessels, shipbuilding, dry docking, regional distribution networks and maritime infrastructure serving future industries.

Deodat Indar supplies the enforcement message: Caribbean countries must unite against fraudulent vessel registrations and the illegal use of national flags. Guyana, he says, has itself been a victim.

One sells the opportunity. The other demands compliance.

Neither message should be allowed to float above the troubling questions emerging from Guyana’s own maritime system.

Ramsaroop’s vision needs more than a microphone

There is nothing objectionable about Guyanese owning ships, developing repair facilities or earning more from regional trade. Those are worthy ambitions.

The objection is to presenting ambition as an answer to questions about competence.

In the statement circulated about his conference appearance, Ramsaroop outlined six expansive priorities. But that statement supplied no implementation timetable, financing commitments, named project partners or measurable programme for strengthening the institutions on which those ambitions depend.

A list of opportunities is not an execution plan. A conference appearance is not proof of readiness. And the prospect of an oil refinery or an alumina plant does not, by itself, establish that either project has secured approval or financing.

Ramsaroop’s sales pitch invites a straightforward question:  what precisely, is the public being asked to believe has already been achieved?

If the argument is that Guyana has potential, few would dispute it. If the argument is that the country has established the regulatory and operational foundations of a world-class maritime hub, the government must produce the evidence.

The Barima inquiry makes that distinction impossible to ignore.

The inquiry is examining the foundations

The commission has heard evidence about the vessel’s emergency beacon, including reporting that it was unregistered and that identification during the emergency was consequently complicated.

It has also examined emergency planning. MARAD’s Emergency Operations Division coordinator acknowledged that no separate emergency response plan had been prepared for Transport and Harbors Department ferries; a broader plan was considered adequate for the Barima emergency.

Testimony further identified difficulty communicating instructions directly to responders at the scene.

These are not peripheral matters. Identification, planning and communication are the machinery through which a rescue response must function. Nor are they final findings against every official involved. The inquiry must establish the facts and distinguish individual decisions from institutional weaknesses.

But an unfinished inquiry does not make the evidence already heard politically irrelevant. It makes the government’s unqualified confidence harder to accept.

Before promising a commanding position in Caribbean maritime trade, officials should explain how the weaknesses raised in testimony are being investigated, corrected and independently tested.

Indar’s crackdown must reach his own doorstep

Indar’s warning about fraudulent registrations deserves to be taken seriously. So does the responsibility attached to his office.

He holds the portfolio responsible for MARAD, the maritime regulator. Public Works Minister Juan Edghill holds responsibility for the Transport and Harbors Department, the ferry operator. Their roles are distinct, but the inquiry brings both oversight chains into focus.

That distinction prevents responsibility from becoming a convenient blur.

Indar must answer for the regulatory oversight within his portfolio. Edghill must answer for the administration of the ferry operator within his. Neither should be permitted to shelter behind the existence of the other.

Indar cannot invoke the authority of government when demanding better maritime conduct across the Caribbean, then expect the responsibilities of government to disappear when Guyanese examine domestic performance.

The relevant questions are exacting:

  • What deficiencies were reported to the ministry?
  • When were they reported?
  • What corrective instructions followed?
  • Who was responsible for implementation?
  • What evidence demonstrates that the measures worked?

These are not allegations of criminal conduct. They are the minimum questions that ministerial oversight should be able to withstand.

Fraudulent flag registration and failures in ferry safety or emergency response are different matters. Evidence concerning one does not prove an offence in the other. The connection is credibility: a minister demanding compliance abroad must accept rigorous scrutiny at home.

No borrowed guilt—and no borrowed glory

Ramsaroop should not be assigned personal responsibility for operational decisions he did not make. Indar should not be declared criminally culpable without evidence establishing an offence.

But the government cannot demand those distinctions only when responsibility becomes uncomfortable.

If its representatives claim collective credit for Guyana’s transformation, they must also accept scrutiny of the institutions through which that transformation is supposed to occur.

They cannot collectivize the applause and compartmentalize the failures.

Ramsaroop’s responsibility in this debate is to substantiate the promotional claims. Indar’s is to account for regulatory oversight. Edghill’s is to account for the ferry operator. The inquiry’s responsibility is to establish what happened without political interference or premature conclusions.

The public’s responsibility is not to applaud on cue.

Put the evidence beside the promises

The government should publish a corrective-action program identifying the weaknesses established, the officials responsible for addressing them, the resources committed and the deadlines for completion. Where facts remain disputed, it should identify the dispute rather than bury it beneath confident language.

Civil society groups have already demanded administrative leave for Indar, Edghill and senior maritime officials pending the inquiry—a demand for safeguards and accountability, not a judicial finding of guilt.

Those demands cannot be answered by another investment presentation.

Guyana’s maritime future may be substantial. Its opportunities may be real. Neither proposition excuses evasiveness about present performance.

The indictment here is political, not a criminal verdict: grand claims are being advanced while fundamental questions remain unanswered.

Ramsaroop wants the country to believe it can build, own and lead. Indar wants the region to enforce the rules. Then demonstrate the competence to build. Establish the safeguards to own. Accept the scrutiny required to lead. And bring the promised enforcement home.

The Empty Chamber and the Half-Represented Nation

 

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 The Empty Chamber and the Half-Represented Nation


A Lesson in Inclusion Guyana Refuses to Learn

An opposition MP’s first obligation is not diplomatic politeness. It is to represent the people who elected her—even when doing so embarrasses the government. When given access to a visiting delegation, the appropriate response is not only to seek inclusion in a local meeting. It is to expose the pattern: opposition voices excluded from foreign delegations, opposition committees bypassed in executive engagements, and a National Assembly that has held only four sittings in its first 299 days. That is not “political correctness.” It is misrepresentation by omission. A parliamentarian who praises inclusion abroad while declining to confront exclusion at home and abroad leaves the central democratic defect untouched.

When We Invest in Nationhood General Secretary and MP Odessa Primus met a visiting delegation from Germany’s Bundestag, she asked a fair question: why were APNU and the Forward Guyana Movement not included? She praised the German parliamentarians for travelling as one delegation despite representing rival parties. She was right to do so.

But she stopped short of the indictment that mattered most.

Germany’s example exposed not merely the absence of two opposition parties from one meeting in Georgetown. It exposed a deeper national failure: Guyana’s democracy is increasingly performed in selective settings—diplomatic receptions, party meetings, press statements, and foreign engagements—while the institution created to make representation real, the National Assembly, is allowed to languish.

Four Sittings, One Indictment

The official record is devastating. Guyana’s Thirteenth Parliament held only four sittings in its first 299 days: November 3, 2025; January 26, 2026; February 2, 2026; and June 5, 2026. Four occasions in nearly ten months for 65 elected representatives to question ministers, debate the budget, expose corruption, defend constituents, and check executive power.

That is not a Parliament. That is a monument to avoidance.

And here lies the uncomfortable truth Primus did not confront: opposition MPs cannot credibly demand inclusion in a foreign delegation while remaining absent from the principal arena of national representation. A salary is paid to represent people, not merely to hold a title. If opposition members choose not to advocate for sittings of  the National Assembly, they must publicly state the specific grievance, the demand, and the conditions under which they will return. Anything less is not resistance. It is abdication dressed up as principle.

Resources Without a Stage

Primus also highlighted Germany’s public support for opposition parliamentary staff. Again, the point is valid. Opposition MPs need researchers, legal advisers, communications support, and administrative capacity to compete with a resourced executive.

But she framed the demand as though resources alone would enable the opposition’s “work program.” That argument collapses under its own weight. The work begins in Parliament. Staff can draft questions, motions, audits, and briefs—but only if there are sittings at which those instruments can be tabled and debated.

Asking for German-style support while Guyana’s legislature sits four times in thirteen months is like demanding a better-equipped courtroom while refusing to enter the courthouse. The first demand must be a functioning Parliament. The second is the resources to make parliamentary work effective.

The Foreign Face of Exclusion

Primus’s most serious omission, however, concerned Guyana’s own international representation. She praised the Germans for cross-party inclusion but failed to call out the fact that Guyana routinely sends delegations to international parliamentary and elected-representative forums as though the opposition does not exist.

The evidence is recent and public. Guyana’s delegation to the 153rd Inter-Parliamentary Union Assembly in Arusha, Tanzania, from October 5 to 9, 2026, was led by Speaker Manzoor Nadir and included government ministers Vindhya Persaud and Warren Kwame McCoy, along with a parliamentary official. No opposition MP was listed.

That delegation spoke for Guyana at a global assembly of nearly 700 parliamentarians from more than 130 countries—an assembly devoted to peace, democracy, human rights, and sustainable development. Yet the voters who elected WIN, APNU, and Forward Guyana Movement parliamentarians had no opposition voice in the room.

This is not representation. It is partisan monopoly wearing the national flag.

A Government Cannot Own the Nation’s Voice

A parliamentary delegation is not a PPP-C delegation. It is Guyana’s delegation. When only ruling-party MPs are selected to represent the country abroad, the government converts a national platform into a partisan reward system.

The consequences are not symbolic. International forums shape alliances, scrutiny, funding relationships, human-rights pressure, climate negotiations, and democratic norms. An opposition representative may raise issues a minister would prefer to leave unspoken: corruption, press freedom, Indigenous rights, extractive-sector accountability, judicial independence, or the hollowing out of parliamentary oversight.

Excluding opposition MPs does not merely deny them a plane ticket. It denies their constituents a channel of international representation. It tells thousands of Guyanese that their concerns are legitimate only when filtered through the governing party.

The Prosecutorial Charge

Let the charge be stated without euphemism.

The government bears primary responsibility for convening a functioning National Assembly and for ensuring that national delegations reflect the whole Parliament, not one party’s caucus. But the opposition is not without fault. If it believes Parliament is being manipulated, it must say so in the chamber, on the record, and before the public. If it believes its exclusion from international forums is unjust, it must name that exclusion whenever the opportunity arises.

Primus had that opportunity. She had German parliamentarians before her—visitors from a system where governing and opposition members share the same delegation. She could have said: “Guyana must practice at home and abroad the inclusion you have shown us today.”

She did not.

That omission matters. A parliamentarian who praises inclusion in a foreign delegation while declining to confront Guyana’s exclusionary practices—abroad and in international forums—has chosen diplomacy over duty. The public should not confuse courtesy with courage.

What Must Be Demanded

The remedy is not complicated. It requires political will and public pressure.

  • The National Assembly must adopt and publish a minimum sitting calendar, with regular ordinary sittings each month.
  • Opposition parties must either participate fully or publicly state the precise procedural grievance and the condition for ending their withdrawal.
  • International parliamentary delegations must include all parties in the National Assembly, proportionate to their seats.
  • The Speaker, not the governing party, should administer a transparent selection process for foreign delegations.
  • The composition, mandate, cost, and public report of every international delegation must be published before and after travel.
  • Opposition MPs must receive equitable institutional support for research, legal, communications, and constituency work, subject to audit.

The Standard Guyana Must Meet

Germany’s delegation offered Guyana a mirror. It showed that rival parties can share a national platform without surrendering their politics. It showed that opposition participation is not a favor granted by a governing party; it is a structural feature of democratic representation.

Guyana failed the test.

A Parliament that sits four times in thirteen months cannot scrutinize. Opposition MPs who absent themselves from the chamber cannot fully represent. A government that sends only its own members to international forums cannot claim to speak for the nation. And an opposition leader who sees these failures but names only the most convenient one is not practicing inclusion—she is practicing selective outrage.

The people of Guyana did not elect parliamentarians to attend receptions, collect per diems, issue statements, or praise foreign models from a distance. They elected them to work. The work begins in Parliament. It continues in international forums. And it demands that every Guyanese voter—government supporter or opposition supporter—be represented by the whole of their country, not merely by the party that happens to hold power.

—The Board

October 25, 2026 — The Day the People Reclaimed the Argument

 

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 Part I: October 25, 2026 — The Day the People Reclaimed the Argument


OPINION BY : Hem Kumar October 2026

A three-part series on democracy’s durability and the global methods of people power

We live in a world where virtue is treated as vice, and vice is dressed up as virtue. The honest person is endangered. The truthful journalist is endangered. The public servant who refuses corruption is endangered. The citizen who asks questions is branded an enemy. We have seen the canonization of thieves and the demonization of saints. We have watched public resources become private rewards, institutions become shields for the powerful, and patriotism become a costume worn by those who plunder the state.

But October 25 says: this inversion is not destiny.

October 25, 2026 was not simply a day of elections, protests, and political returns. It was a day when citizens across three countries reminded the world that governments are not rulers’ property. They are instruments created by human beings to serve human beings.

In Brazil, voters re-elected President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and defeated Flávio Bolsonaro, a Trump-aligned challenger, by 51.79 percent to 48.21 percent. In Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić conceded defeat after twelve to fourteen years of dominance, as a student-led movement converted two years of protest into an electoral majority. In Venezuela, opposition leader and Nobel Peace laureate María Corina Machado returned from nearly a year in exile, telling supporters, “I am here. With you.”

Together, these events formed a single democratic message: the power of the people is greater than the people in power.

A celebration, but not a victory lap

There is reason to celebrate. Brazil’s result showed that the far-right tide in Latin America is not inevitable, and that a broad political mobilization can turn an election into a referendum on democracy itself. Serbia’s outcome showed that a movement born in grief and outrage over corruption can become a disciplined political force capable of ending an entrenched regime.

Venezuela’s development was more symbolic than complete. Machado’s return lifted the spirits of a people demanding free elections and the release of political prisoners, but no election date has been set and the country’s transition remains unresolved. Still, her return demonstrated something essential: repression can silence a person temporarily, but it cannot permanently silence a people’s demand for freedom.

October 25 should therefore be celebrated with hope—but also with discipline. Democracy did not “win” everywhere that day. It showed that it can still fight, organise, vote, protest, and return from exile.

The people’s method: persistence

The common thread was not spontaneity. It was persistence.

Brazil’s campaign became an “extraordinary three-week political mobilization” that transformed the election into a confrontation over democracy and sovereignty. Serbia’s students endured two years of protests after the Novi Sad railway-station canopy collapse killed 16 people, turning a national tragedy into a movement against corruption, impunity, and democratic decay.

Their lesson is that people power is not a slogan shouted for one afternoon. It is a method: document the abuse, organize communities, maintain moral clarity, refuse intimidation, build alliances, and stay in the struggle long after the headlines move on.

The people’s method: voting with purpose

Brazil reminds us that elections remain one of democracy’s most powerful weapons when citizens use them deliberately. Lula’s victory was narrow, contested, and hard-fought, but it showed that voters can reject a politics of personality, grievance, and institutional destruction.

The Brazilian lesson for Guyana is not that one party or leader is a model. It is that citizens must treat every election as an accountability moment: a chance to judge not only promises, but records; not only ethnicity, but competence; not only slogans, but the protection of institutions, journalists, auditors, and public resources.

The people’s method: refusing fear

Serbia’s students faced a government that had been criticized for limiting press freedom and judicial independence, yet they built a nationwide movement around a nonpartisan demand to restore democracy and rebuild the economy.

That is the deeper lesson. Fear survives when people believe they are alone. It collapses when citizens discover that their neighbors share the same concerns. A student movement, a union, a church group, a professional association, or a community organization can become the bridge that turns private anxiety into public courage.

The people’s method: keeping hope alive under repression

Venezuela teaches the hardest lesson. Democracy can be wounded for years. Elections can be delayed, opponents exiled, journalists pressured, and institutions captured. Yet the desire for freedom can survive.

Venezuelans took to the streets demanding elections and political change in what was reported as the first nationwide opposition protest in nearly two years. Machado’s return came amid continuing uncertainty, but it gave a persecuted opposition a visible reminder that exile is not the end of the story.

For Guyana, Venezuela is not merely a neighboring cautionary tale. It is a warning that oil wealth, weak oversight, and concentrated power can corrode democracy—and a reminder that citizens must defend accountability before the damage becomes irreversible.

What October 25 means for Guyana

Guyana should not look at Brazil, Serbia, and Venezuela and conclude that democracy is guaranteed because elections occur. It should conclude the opposite: democracy survives only where citizens insist that public office is public trust.

Brazil proved that voters can defeat authoritarian politics. Serbia proved that organized youth can end entrenched rule. Venezuela proved that repression cannot permanently extinguish democratic aspiration.

Guyana’s task is to build that same civic confidence at home: protect independent journalism, demand transparent oil contracts and audits, strengthen independent institutions, organize across ethnic and class lines, and make corruption politically costly.

October 25, 2026 should be remembered as the day the world saw that democracy is not dead. It is contested—and, where people refuse to surrender, it is still capable of winning. One distinct lesson applies across democracies : “political leaders should not take voters or their mandate for granted.”  “Arrogance invites a reckoning; humility is the wiser choice” 

Next in this series: Part Two — How People Power Works: The Global Methods That Defeat Entrenched Power.