THE BARRICADE IS THE MESSAGE

THE 592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY& INTEGRITY JOURNALISM ◊GUYANA

THE BARRICADE IS THE MESSAGE

What “Consultation” Actually Means to This Government


BOARD EDITORIAL— The Board · August, 2026

Walston Martins did everything right. He is the elected Chairman of the Buxton/Foulis Neighbourhood Democratic Council. He received an invitation to the government’s Model Village Initiative consultation at Melanie Damishana. He showed up.

He was pushed behind a police barricade and told he would be arrested if he did not comply — in his own jurisdiction, for the offence of standing where he was invited to stand.

By Martins’s account, the sequence began when police ordered a group of young women waiting nearby to leave the area outside a business opposite the venue. When Martins asked why, Assistant Commissioner of Police Mahendra Siwnarine allegedly told him to move behind the barricade or be arrested.

Martins refused on principle — he said he had broken no law and was standing within the territory his own council governs. The warning was repeated. He was, by his own account, effectively forced out.

This is one man’s account, on the record, and Martins says he intends to pursue the matter further. The 592 Guardian treats it as an attributed allegation, not yet an adjudicated fact. But it does not stand alone. It is the latest entry in a pattern this news media has been documenting for two weeks, and taken together, that pattern tells you something the government has not said out loud: these “consultations” were never built to hear from the public. They were built to be seen.

A WEEK OF BARRICADES

Consider what else happened in the same seven-day span.

On August 4, Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo held an outreach at Watooka House in Linden. Residents waited thirty minutes for a promised meeting that never happened. When opposition supporters and Region 10 residents pressed forward, barricades gave way. A six-hour standoff followed. The Vice President left under security escort without addressing the crowd he had promised to meet.

On the very next day August 5, in Koberimo village, Barima-Waini, Minister Juan Edghill’s own stop on the Region One outreach tour was met by a handful of mostly women holding placards — and a heavy police presence in flak jackets. Not a security detail sized to the moment. A show of force sized to deter it. Sending Edghill, one of the two ministers residents are demanding resign over the Barima disaster, into the region that lost the most people to that disaster, and greeting the women who came to meet him with body armour, is not caution.

It is a message about who the state expects trouble from — and it is not the minister.

On that same day, a Coast Guard patrol intercepted a speedboat carrying Opposition Leader Azruddin Mohamed near the Pomeroon Floating Base, bound for a peaceful protest in Moruca — inside the very region Edghill and Indar were touring. The government’s account calls it a routine documentation check. Mohamed’s account says the same vessel had passed the same checkpoint that same morning without incident, and that the demand for paperwork came only after a soldier took an interest in who was aboard.

He was turned back before he reached Moruca at all. On August 6, Walston Martins was barricaded out of a meeting he was invited to attend.

When the public shows up uninvited — or shows up invited but inconvenient — the state’s answer is flak jackets and a line of officers, not a conversation.

Four incidents in three days. Three different arms of the security apparatus — regular police, joint services, Coast Guard. Four different targets — a group of placard-holding women in a Region One village, an opposition leader headed to a protest, a crowd of Region 10 residents, a sitting NDC chairman.

One thread runs through all of them: when the public shows up uninvited, or shows up invited but inconvenient, the state’s answer is flak jackets and a line of officers, not a conversation.

THE ROADSHOW WAS NEVER ABOUT LISTENING

This newsroom has argued from the first day of the Model Village tour that its structure gives away its purpose. Daytime, weekday-only sessions that working people cannot attend. No online alternative, despite one being trivially available and far more inclusive than a bus tour through six regions. Local NDC governance structures that are, by the government’s own inaction, too broken in many communities to meaningfully receive village-level input in the first place.

Add now a fourth feature: security postures that treat elected local officials, protesting citizens, and even a handful of women with placards as threats to be contained rather than constituents to be heard.      Assistant Commissioner Siwnarine did not simply ask Martins to step back for crowd management. He is alleged to have threatened arrest against a sitting NDC Chairman who had done nothing unlawful, in the area his own council governs — while opposition supporters demonstrated outside.

In Koberimo, the flak jackets arrived before the trouble did, because in this government’s arithmetic, showing up with a placard is treated as the trouble.

You do not barricade the people you are consulting. You barricade the people you are performing for an audience without.

WHAT THE THEATRE IS COVERING FOR

Strip away the outreach branding and ask what these events are actually accomplishing. A predetermined infrastructure plan gets a photograph of a minister among residents. A government under sustained pressure over the MV Barima disaster — the unanswered questions about Commission of Inquiry appointees with undisclosed professional ties, the silenced witnesses, the six-month statutory clock now running against victims’ families — gets a news cycle about roads and recreation grounds instead.

An administration facing a second consecutive week of youth-led silent protest outside the Office of the President gets to point to a roadshow as evidence it is “people centered,” even as its own security forces make that phrase harder to say with a straight face by the day.

None of this requires believing in a grand unified conspiracy. It requires only noticing that every barricade this week has fallen on the same side: between the government and the people it says it is going out to meet.

WHAT WE’RE ASKING

The 592 Guardian renews, plainly, the questions this pattern demands answers to:

Why was an invited, elected local official prevented from attending a consultation in his own jurisdiction?

On whose instruction did Assistant Commissioner Siwnarine act?

Was the threat of arrest authorized, or improvised in the moment?

And if the Model Village Initiative is genuinely a listening exercise, why does listening keep requiring a barricade?

Martins says he is pursuing this further. We will be watching what “further” produces — and whether the government answers the question directly, or simply moves the roadshow to its next stop and waits for the story to move with it.

— The Board

 

Twenty Five Villages in a Week

THE 592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY&INTEGRITY JOURNALISM♦ GUYANA

TWENTY FIVE  Villages in a Week


Why the Model Village Tour Predates the Tragedy It Is Accused of Deflecting

August, 2026

Since the MV Barima tragedy, a comfortable theory has taken hold across sections of Guyana’s commentariat: that the Government’s sudden burst of village-level outreach — the roadshow of renders, works lists, and Cabinet visits now sweeping several regions across the nation  — is damage control.

A grieving nation, the theory goes, forced a government’s hand. Ministers scrambled. Announcements followed. On this reading, the Model Village Initiative is simply politics reacting to catastrophe.

This newsroom  does not accept that theory, and the arithmetic of the tour itself is why.

THE TIMELINE THAT DOES NOT FIT

Barima capsized on July 18. By the government’s own public rollout, the Model Village Initiative was on the road by August 3 — a gap of roughly two weeks between tragedy and travelling roadshow. In that window, government agencies would need to have conceived, designed, and rendered village-specific development plans for dozens of communities, in a presentable and — critically — salable format, and then coordinated the Cabinet-level logistics to deliver them on a multi-region tour.

This news media has tracked over twenty five individual village plans unveiled within the tour’s first week alone, with days such as Saturday’s six-stop schedule across Region Six. Each stop has arrived with its own site-specific concept renders — gateway signage, park redesigns, drainage and road works lists itemized down to the culvert and streetlight.

This is not boilerplate. This is bespoke design work, repeated across dozens of communities, deployed on a compressed multi-agency schedule.

Guyana has a recent, directly comparable precedent for what this class of work actually costs in time: Silica City. That flagship project’s design work was outsourced entirely — Guyana’s own housing planning authority, the Central Housing and Planning Authority (CHPA), did not have the in-house capacity for it — to a University of Miami team, beginning in 2021. From concept to design alone, that process ran over a year.

CHPA has since declined to disclose further detail on that work, citing proprietary material — itself consistent with a pattern of opacity this news outlet  has documented around Silica City’s delivery.

A single house design takes longer than three weeks. This tour has produced village plans, plural, at a rate no design authority in this country has ever demonstrated.

If a single showcase city required a foreign university team and more than a year to move from concept to design, the proposition that CHPA — an agency already burdened with its ordinary daily assignments — independently researched, designed, and rendered twenty -plus separate village packages in under three weeks does not withstand scrutiny.

Add to the design timeline the logistics of the tour itself: venue selection, security coordination, transport, multi-agency scheduling across six regions. In this publication’s  assessment, coordinating Cabinet and allied-agency teams at this scale is not a three-week undertaking. It is, at minimum, a three-month one.

Work of this volume and polish does not originate in the two weeks following a national tragedy. It originates before it.

IF THIS WERE DAMAGE CONTROL, IT WOULD LOOK DIFFERENT

The damage-control theory has a second, fatal weakness: it cannot explain the government’s own conduct on the ground.

This newsroom  has already documented the security posture accompanying this tour —

the barricading of Buxton/Foulis NDC Chairman Walston Martins at Melanie Damishana despite his holding a personal invitation.                  the breach at Watooka House.                                                                     the flak-jacketed police presence confronting placard-holding women at Koberimo                                                                                                            the Coast Guard interception of a boat bound for a Moruca consultation.

A government genuinely engaged in damage control — genuinely trying to calm a public still mourning Barima — does not deploy barricades against the very residents, and their elected local representatives, it claims to be courting. It de-escalates. It listens. It does not exclude.

That it has done the opposite is not an unfortunate enforcement error. It is a tell. A tour built to project responsiveness would not risk the optics of a chairman being threatened with arrest outside his own jurisdiction. A tour built to sell a predetermined outcome to a predetermined electoral map manages dissent instead of inviting it.

That is what this news media  has watched happen, village after village, for more than a week.

THE ADMISSION NOBODY WAS SUPPOSED TO NOTICE

Then came Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo, at Watooka Guest House in Linden, speaking of the government’s position being on “solid ground for 2030″ and “well positioned ahead of the 2031 elections.”                         The dates are not a slip. Guyana’s current constitutional term, following the September 2025 general election, parliament convened in November 2025,  runs five years to November 2030; a further three-month constitutional window separates the dissolution of Parliament from the convening of fresh elections. A government intending to exhaust that window in full arrives at 2031. Mr. Jagdeo’s arithmetic was, in that narrow sense, correct.

What it was not, was accidental. No one managing the fallout of a ferry disaster volunteers unprompted commentary on electoral positioning three to four years out. Damage control talks about drainage. It talks about housing. It does not talk about polling.

That the Vice President did — in the same outreach cycle, at the same podium built to look like consultation — is the clearest admission this government has yet offered that the map, and not the mourning, is what this tour was built around.

A REFERENDUM DRESSED AS A ROADSHOW

Put together, the evidence does not point to a government caught flat-footed by tragedy and improvising its way back into public favour. It points to a pre-existing electioneering apparatus — designed, rendered, and logistically sequenced well before July 18 — that Barima did not create and does not explain.

What Barima did was hand that apparatus a cover story: the convenient appearance of a government responding to grief, rather than a government executing a plan for the Local Government Elections that is functioning, in substance, as a referendum on its own standing ahead of them.

This publication  draws a distinction that matters: the initiative — the design work, the plans, the tour architecture — predates Barima and was not built in response to it.

Its current execution — the barricades, the exclusions, the heightened security — is a reaction, not to grief, but to the resistance this government did not anticipate meeting along the way.

QUESTIONS FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND CHPA

This newsroom renews and extends its formal request for disclosure:

  1. When did design and rendering work begin on the Model Village concept packages presented at each tour stop, and which entities — in-house or outsourced — produced them?
  2. What is the total budgeted cost of the Model Village Initiative’s design, rendering, and tour logistics to date, and from which budget line is it drawn?
  3. Does CHPA possess the in-house design and engineering capacity to produce forty or more village-specific development packages within a three-week window, without external contracting? If external contractors were engaged, who are they, and when were they retained?
  4. What instructions were issued to police units regarding the exclusion of Chairman Walston Martins and other local officials from consultation venues, and by whose authority?
  5. Will the Government commit to a public, region-by-region funding and delivery timeline for the works depicted in each village’s concept renders — the same standard of disclosure this news publication  has sought, and not received, on Silica City since 2022?

Until those questions are answered, this news media  will continue to call this initiative what the evidence shows it to be: not a government in mourning, but a government campaigning — on the public purse, under the cover of a national tragedy it did not plan, but has not hesitated to use. 

To borrow a title from out counterpart ‘Kaieteur ‘ – BLUNT, “This isn’t mere distraction or deflection—it is calculated deception, dressed as attention, targeting the elections.”

— The Board

Facing the Fire Together

THE 592 GUARDIAN•ACCOUNTABILITY & INTEGRITY JOURNALISM•GUYANA

Facing the Fire Together

BOARD EDITORIAL By Hem Kumar, Editor


 Agency, Consent, and the Case for Conditional Solidarity

There are truths about Guyana today that require no argument, only acknowledgment. The rising cost of living is not a talking point — it is what a mother in Georgetown calculates every time she stands at a market stall. The outward migration of skilled and unskilled Guyanese alike is not abstraction — it is the empty seat at a family table that used to be full.

The reliance of the wealthy on foreign goods and services, and the quiet relocation of officials’ own families and wealth to North America even as they preside over the systems the rest of the country is told to trust, are not rumors — they are patterns, observed and repeated, in an oil-rich era that promised otherwise.

These are lived truths. This editorial does not dispute a single one of them.

But truth, on its own, is incomplete without the question of agency. Governance is not a force that operates in a vacuum, imposed from above onto a people with no part in its continuation. It is sustained — reinforced, legitimized — by consent, and consent can be active or it can be passive.

At public outreaches and political engagements across this country, we see crowds gather, applaud, and reaffirm support for the very administrations presiding over the inequities so many, rightly, lament

That matters. It cannot be waved away.                                         And yet — this is not an indictment of the Guyanese people. It is an indictment of the conditions that manufacture their acquiescence.

To call for accountability from citizens without naming the mechanisms that constrain their choices would be dishonest.

Patronage networks that tie land, employment, and opportunity to political loyalty.

Ethnic mobilization that converts elections into referenda on identity rather than governance.

Information environments that reward loyalty and punish dissent.

These are not excuses offered on behalf of a passive electorate — they are the architecture within which “choice” is exercised.

A people who have survived under structures engineered to produce dependency are not, by that fact alone, complicit in their own condition. They are, in significant part, victims of circumstances not of their own making.

That distinction matters — and it is precisely why the answer cannot be resignation, from anyone, anywhere.

There is a temptation, particularly among those of us who observe from a distance, to translate frustration into judgment, and judgment into a verdict rendered from safety upon those who remain. That temptation must be resisted, and resisted first by us. No one — least of all those of us writing from the comfort of the diaspora — has standing to demand discomfort of others while seeking refuge from it ourselves.

If the call is for those at home to stop sitting and start standing, that same call must be answered by those abroad. It is not enough to send remittances that, however well-intentioned, can quietly reinforce the very dependency structures under critique. It is not enough to critique from a position that carries none of the daily risk borne by those who critique — or organize, or vote differently — while still living under the systems in question.

No one gets to stand outside the fire and issue verdicts on who is standing in it correctly.

This is the meaning of we are all in this together. Not a slogan, but a discipline. No one — not the citizen at home weighing loyalty against livelihood, not the diaspora member weighing comfort against contribution — gets to stand outside the fire and issue verdicts on who is standing in it correctly.

What, then, is the alternative to both resignation and unconditional charity? It is conditional partnership — solidarity with terms. In the local vernacular: we will not simply give you a fish ; we will teach you to fish.    Diaspora engagement, if it is to mean anything beyond ceremony, cannot be unconditional loyalty repackaged as remittance, nor can it be charity that asks nothing of its recipients and changes nothing in its givers.

It must be capacity-building: support for independent institutions rather than individuals, investment in civic and legal literacy, resources tied to demonstrated organizing rather than to silence bought through comfort. And it must be reciprocal — a partnership that asks as much discomfort of those who give as of those who receive.

This is not a theoretical posture. It has been tested. In the wake of the MV Barima tragedy, as a new and unprecedented Gen Z-led movement surfaced demanding accountability, the instinct among those of us in civil society who have done this work for years was not to co-opt it but to support it — to identify its ideological authors, consult experienced organizers on how structure could be offered without control, and extend a hand.

That hand offered guidance, mentorship, the accumulated experience of those who have organized and advocated in this country for decades.  The response was nothing silence.

 An outreach offering both editorial engagement and a seat at a multi-stakeholder table, was met with silence.

“That hand was extended three times — not merely for comment, but for a seat at the table where civil society, business, and government were already being convened. It was not once acknowledged.”

Another separate attempt was met with a request — specific and equipment-based: a drone, and a controller capable of producing high-quality YouTube footage, offered in exchange for footage of protest actions.

A street protest does not require broadcast-quality aerial video. It requires people, presence, and the will to stand where they can be seen. Every image of every protest to date has come from a phone in someone’s hand, and that has been enough. When guidance is met not with a question about strategy, sustainability, or structure, but with a request for equipment better suited to content production than to accountability, it is worth naming plainly what that reveals.

This is not raised as grievance. It is raised as diagnosis. A movement’s readiness to receive structured partnership is itself information — and what it reveals here is not a lack of good faith, but a gap in the very capacity that partnership exists to build. If the immediate need is not yet the ability to organize a sustained coalition but something more basic — coordination, communication, the infrastructure of trust — then that is the need to be met first, honestly, before anything more ambitious is proposed. Anything else is simply theater  in a different costume and   not advocacy. It is another version of the sitting-and-waiting this editorial has already named as the problem.

This is not without precedent. This nation did not arrive at independence because its forebears had the comfort of waiting for someone else to secure it on their behalf. They did not have the luxury of remaining seated. Whatever else separates that generation from this one, the standard they set was not comfort — it was risk, undertaken in common cause. That standard remains available to us. It has not expired.

No one can fight harder for a people than that people is willing to fight for itself — and no diaspora can stand indefinitely on behalf of those unwilling to stand with it. But the reverse is equally true: no one at home should be expected to stand alone while those abroad remain seated in safety, offering critique in place of contribution.

The trajectory of this nation will not be changed by complaint alone, nor by charity alone, nor by loyalty offered without condition. It will be changed when those at home and those abroad recognize the fire as shared — and choose, together, to face it.

“THEY POWER OF THE PEOPLE IS GREATER THAN THE PEOPLE IN POWER”

— The Board

The 592 Guardian  |  Accountability Journalism for Guyana

The Warning We Already Gave: Puerto Rico’s Water Crisis Is Guyana’s Preview—El Niño

THE 592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦ INTEGRITY JOURNALISM♦ GUYANA

 The Warning We Already Gave: Puerto Rico’s Water Crisis Is Guyana’s Preview—El Niño


OPINION— The Board
More than 180,000 customers across San Juan and its surrounding municipalities went without water this week — 48 hours at a time, on a rolling schedule — as Puerto Rico’s driest July in over 120 years collided with a strengthening El Niño. Governor Jenniffer González told residents Tuesday that “this situation is out of our hands,” attributing the crisis to weather conditions beyond government control.

“Nothing prevents this from worsening,” she said.
It is a familiar sentence. It is also, this newsroom argued in real time as the drought first took hold, an evasion.

A government does not lose control of a drought the day the reservoirs run low. It loses control months earlier, in the silence between the first forecast and the first policy response — and that silence is a choice, not a weather pattern.

 

We raised this warning for Guyana nearly two months ago. Puerto Rico is now showing us what happens when the warning goes unheeded.

WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS

Puerto Rico’s crisis did not arrive without notice. Meteorologists had been tracking a strengthening El Niño and below-average rainfall for weeks before the rationing order. National Weather Service meteorologist María Novoa García said this week that El Niño “continues to get stronger,” with rainfall over the next two to three weeks projected at least 50 percent below average.                                                              Nearly a quarter of the territory is already in severe drought.

Guyana’s own Hydrometeorological Service issued a comparable warning on August 4 — a Seasonal Outlook projecting up to 80 hot-spell days this year, nearly triple the historical average of 30, as El Niño conditions strengthen through at least October. Hydromet named Regions Four, Five, Six, Eight and Ten as bearing the brunt, and was explicit that the strain would extend beyond farms: reduced water availability for households, agriculture, and broader economic activity. This followed an earlier outlook in May flagging declining water levels in rivers, reservoirs and conservancies, and rising wildfire risk.

Both agencies did their job. Both gave their governments a lead time measured in months, not days. What differs is what happened next.

THE SILENCE WHERE A RESPONSE SHOULD BE
In Puerto Rico, the mechanisms exist on paper — hospital protocols, priority water-truck routing for the elderly, an association of health administrators publicly reassuring the public this week that “we do not improvise.”

The apparatus of response is visible, even if it arrived only once rationing became unavoidable.

In Guyana, as of this week, we can find no comparable public mobilization from the two agencies whose statutory job this is.    Guyana Water Inc.’s public communications remain occupied with routine connection guides and tariff schedules — nothing addressing conservation measures, contingency planning, or public guidance in light of Hydromet’s own warning.

The Ministry of Agriculture’s press output this week features rice-farmer relief grants, cassava yield milestones and coconut-industry progress — not a single conservation advisory to the farmers Hydromet explicitly flagged as most exposed.

This is not a new muscle the Ministry lacks: in a comparable 2018 dry-spell advisory, the Ministry’s own release carried the Chief Hydrometeorological Officer directly urging farmers to conserve water. That instinct is absent from this year’s response, even though this year’s forecast is more severe.

Instead, the government’s public-facing energy this month has gone into the Model Village Initiative — a multi-region consultation roadshow this news media has already documented as long on renders and photo opportunities, short on delivery timelines or funding disclosure.    

A government that can mobilize ministers and a touring convoy for a village-beautification listening tour, but not a single conservation notice from GWI or Agriculture as an 80-hot-spell-day forecast bears down, is telling the public where its priorities sit.

THE PATTERN, NAMED

We have covered this administration’s habit before: announce a directive, generate a headline, and let enforcement lapse into silence — a pattern this outlet has termed “bite with no teeth” in the context of unenforced policy commitments elsewhere. The dry-spell response fits the same shape, with one difference: this time the failure is not in enforcing a stated policy, but in stating one at all. There is no order to fall short of, because no order has been given.

Puerto Rico’s governor is not being praised in this piece — blaming the weather while a crisis was building for months is exactly the failure of foresight we are naming. The point of contrast is narrower and more damning for Guyana: San Juan’s government at least activated response protocols once the crisis was undeniable. Guyana has had the forecast since May, an intensified version of it since August 4, and — as of this writing — no visible activation of anything at all.

The dry season Hydromet warned of runs through at least October. The lead time has not expired. Neither has the silence.
The 592 Guardian will continue tracking GWI, the Ministry of Agriculture, and NDIA public communications for any conservation response as the dry season intensifies.

A Cherry-Picked Contractor

THE 592 GUARDIAN•ACCOUNTABILITY& INTEGRITY JOURNALISM• GUYANA

 A Cherry-Picked Contractor


BOARD EDITORIAL

What Paul Koole’s Record Means for the MV Barima Salvage


August, 2026

The Government of Guyana did not simply fail to run an open, competitive process for the recovery of the MV Barima. It went further: while publicly opening a bidding exercise to reassure grieving families that the process would be transparent, it had already privately invited a specific Dutch firm — Koole Onshore and Koole Offshore (KMS) — to submit a salvage proposal.

That much was established by Kaieteur News’s reporting on the no-bid invitation. What Kaieteur has now added, and what The 592 Guardian holds to be the single most damning piece of evidence produced in this entire tragedy, is who that firm is.

Paul Koole founder and owner of KMS

Paul Koole, the founder and owner of KMS and its extensive constellation of related entities, was arrested by Italian police in 2019 and held in custody following an Interpol alert originating from Nigeria, where he faced an embezzlement matter. His lawyer at the time called the arrest incomprehensible. Kaieteur’s research further documents a decade of entanglement — administrative battles with the Dutch state, trademark litigation with BMW, U.S. federal court discovery disputes, and a Dutch Supreme Court ruling that a financing structure tied to the broader Koole corporate family constituted deliberate tax abuse.

This is not a single blemish on an otherwise clean record. It is a pattern, documented across multiple jurisdictions and multiple courts, of a corporate operator whose dealings repeatedly attract the scrutiny of law enforcement, regulators, and rival counsel.

A government that wanted a clean recovery would have run a clean process. Instead it hand-picked, in secret, an operator with a rap sheet that spans three continents.

THE NO-BID INVITATION, RESTATED

Set aside for a moment who KMS is, and look only at how it was engaged. Kaieteur News reported that the Dutch firm was invited to submit a salvage proposal for the MV Barima days before any official publicly opened a competitive bidding process. That sequencing is not incidental. A bidding process opened after the preferred vendor has already been approached is not a bidding process — it is a formality staged for public consumption, run in parallel with a decision that had, in substance, already been made. This newsroom and others focused, understandably, on that procurement irregularity in isolation. It is now clear we were looking at only the first layer of the story.

WHO THE GOVERNMENT CHOSE

KMS is headquartered in the Netherlands and has recently established a base in Suriname specifically to mobilise staff and resources into Guyana. It has previously completed casualty-removal contracts for this government on the Demerara River — meaning the relationship predates the Barima disaster and predates this procurement entirely. That prior relationship is precisely what should trouble the public: it suggests a standing, informal channel between this administration and Koole’s operation, one comfortable enough to bypass competitive process when a new job arises.

The record on Paul Koole personally is not a matter of dispute or rumour. It is documented by a media outlet in his own country, Netherlands-based AT5, which reported his 2019 arrest and detention in Italy under an Interpol alert tied to a Nigerian embezzlement matter. Kaieteur’s research adds the wider corporate picture: the 2023 Fremantle Highway salvage, in which Koole purchased a fire-gutted vehicle carrier for a symbolic €1 and then fought the Dutch Environmental and Transport Inspectorate over whether the wreck was a vessel or hazardous waste, ultimately prevailing only after his own company’s initial legal filing was thrown out of the wrong court; the BMW trademark injunction that followed, which found decisively against Koole’s commercial handling of the salvaged cargo; and the Hoge Raad’s ruling that a financing vehicle connected to the Koole Tanktransport family of companies existed for no purpose other than artificially reducing Dutch tax liability.

None of this makes Koole unique in the high-risk, high-reward world of maritime salvage, an industry that inherently attracts aggressive operators willing to gamble on distressed assets. What it does establish, cumulatively, is that this is an operator with a documented history of skirting regulatory boundaries, litigating aggressively against oversight bodies, and structuring transactions to minimise legal and financial exposure.

That is precisely the profile a government should want nowhere near a vessel that is, right now, both a mass grave and a body of physical evidence in an active Commission of Inquiry.

TIMELINE: THE PATTERN BEHIND THE NAME

2011

EQT acquires majority stake in Koole Tanktransport via a Guernsey-based financing structure later ruled by the Dutch Supreme Court to constitute deliberate tax abuse.

Aug 2019

Paul Koole arrested by Italian police under an Interpol alert originating from a Nigerian embezzlement matter; held in custody pending possible extradition.

Jul 2023

The Fremantle Highway catches fire in the North Sea; one crew member dies. Koole purchases the wreck for €1.

Apr 2024

Dutch civil court rules Koole’s own emergency legal action against the State inadmissible on jurisdictional grounds — a setback in Koole’s fight to export the wreck.

Aug 2024

Dutch authorities and Koole reach a negotiated settlement reclassifying the wreck as a commercial asset rather than hazardous waste, clearing export.

2024

BMW obtains a Dutch court injunction against Koole over the commercial handling of salvaged vehicles, citing trademark and brand-integrity harm.

Recent

KMS establishes a Suriname base to mobilise into Guyana; is privately invited to salvage the MV Barima before a public bidding process opens.

WHAT IS AT STAKE IF THIS COMPANY GETS THE MANDATE

The MV Barima is not an ordinary wreck. It is the resting place of victims still unrecovered, and it is the single most important physical exhibit available to the Commission of Inquiry now examining why more than a hundred people died. Whoever raises that vessel controls, in the first instance, what the public and the Commission ever get to see of it — how it is handled, what is documented before it is moved, what condition its structure and cargo are in when it reaches shore, and what account of that process the public receives.

Handing that mandate, through a process already established to have bypassed open competition, to an operator with a documented history of contesting regulatory classification, litigating jurisdiction to his own advantage, and structuring outcomes to his commercial benefit, is not a technical procurement question.

It is a decision about who controls the evidence. A firm that has spent a decade fighting the Dutch state over what counts as hazardous waste, what counts as a vessel, and what counts as a fair price is not a neutral custodian for the physical remains of a disaster that this administration has every political incentive to see resolved quietly and quickly.

Whatever evidence is on that ferry does not surface by accident. It surfaces because the process demands it — or it does not surface at all

THE ADMINISTRATION’S EXPOSURE

This finding does not sit apart from the pattern The 592 Guardian has documented since the disaster: the undisclosed professional link between two Commission of Inquiry appointees; a Safety and Compliance Audit Team stacked with an official who has publicly dismissed those same conflicts as immaterial; a Commission Secretary appointed through a family channel traced to the same small island as the President’s own ancestry; a declaration of consent circulated to grieving families before any genuine consultation process began.

Each of these, on its own, could be argued away as coincidence, poor optics, or bureaucratic convenience. Together, and now joined by a no-bid invitation to a salvage contractor with an Interpol arrest and a Supreme Court tax-abuse finding on his record, they describe something else: an administration that, at every point of discretion available to it since July 18, has chosen the option that keeps control closest to itself and scrutiny furthest away.

We do not assert, because we cannot yet prove, that this administration selected KMS knowing precisely what Koole’s record contained. We do assert, on the documented facts now before the public, that it had every obligation to know, and that a competitive, transparent process — the kind government publicly claimed to be running — would have surfaced this record before any contract was signed, not after a newspaper found it.

The failure to run that process is the failure that matters. Everything Kaieteur has now uncovered about Paul Koole is what a due-diligence process exists to catch. Guyana did not have one. Or it had one only for show.

WHAT THE 592 GUARDIAN DEMANDS

  • The Government of Guyana immediately suspend the private invitation extended to Koole Onshore and Koole Offshore (KMS) pending full public disclosure of how and when that invitation was made, and by whom.
  • The competitive bidding process, if it is to retain any credibility, be re-run with full public visibility of all applicants, their ownership structures, and their litigation and regulatory history.
  • The Commission of Inquiry be given a formal, binding role in approving any salvage contractor, given that the vessel constitutes evidence directly relevant to the Commission’s mandate.
  • The Attorney General’s Chambers and the Ministry of Public Works publicly confirm or deny any prior contractual or informal relationship with KMS or Paul Koole predating the MV Barima disaster, including the Demerara River casualty-removal work referenced in Kaieteur’s reporting.
  • Any salvage contract entered into for the MV Barima include independently verified, publicly disclosed chain-of-custody protocols governing the recovery, documentation, and preservation of the vessel, its cargo, and any remains, before the vessel is moved or altered in any way.

 

— The Board

NO ROYALTY, NO RULES

THE 592 GUARDIAN ♦ ACCOUNTABILITY JOURNALISM ♦ GUYANA

NO ROYALTY, NO RULES


The Kurupung Uranium Project and Guyana’s Regulatory Blind Spot

 Opinion By: The Board  ·  August, 2026


THE STATE NEGOTIATES WHAT IT HAS ALREADY GIVEN AWAY

Company filings on the Kurupung Uranium Project confirm what this news-media has long argued about Guyana’s extractive governance: the royalty owed to the Government of Guyana from any future uranium production has not been fixed. It will be “negotiated at the time that application is made for a mining permit” — a negotiation that can be deferred indefinitely, since applications may be filed “at any time during the term of a PL.”

Read plainly, this means the State of Guyana currently has no claim to any share of a resource historically estimated at 20.6 million pounds of uranium, sitting under 92.2 square kilometres of Region Seven, until the holder of the prospecting licence decides the moment is right to ask.

The contractor sets the clock. The regulator waits for it to ring.

We have written before about the opacity surrounding how exploration rights to Kurupung changed hands — from LIA Industries Pte. Ltd. of Singapore to U92 Energy Corp. of Canada — without the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC) exercising any visible control over the transaction.

That finding stands. What follows extends it: the royalty vacuum is not an isolated omission. It is one symptom of a licensing framework that structurally cedes leverage to the licensee at every point where leverage should belong to the State.

PILLAR ONE: A ROYALTY WITH NO FLOOR

Guyana’s petroleum sector, for all its own well-documented deficiencies, at least operates within a negotiated framework anchored by precedent — the Stabroek Block production-sharing agreement, whatever its flaws, is a public, referenceable instrument.

Large-scale mineral mining under the Mining Act 1989 has no equivalent anchor. There is no statutory royalty rate for uranium. There is no benchmark percentage that GGMC or the Minister must not go below.

The rate is whatever is negotiated, whenever negotiation occurs, between the State and a single counterparty who has spent years — and by the time of application, potentially millions of dollars in drilling and evaluation — building the case for terms favourable to itself.

This is not a technicality. It means the government of Guyana’s return on a strategic, security-sensitive mineral is a function of negotiating leverage at a moment of the company’s choosing, not a matter of law.

 

PILLAR TWO: AN OFF-TAKE DEAL STRUCK WITHOUT THE REGULATOR IN THE ROOM

Before any royalty framework has been discussed, Gibraltar-based ROPA Investments Limited has already secured the contractual right to purchase up to 50 percent of the first 40 million pounds of uranium oxide produced from Kurupung — an option on 20 million pounds of production from a resource that has not yet cleared a mining permit, let alone entered production.

This news-media has previously established that ROPA and LIA Industries are related parties structured to present as arm’s-length counterparties in U92’s own acquisition filings.

GGMC was not a party to that transaction. It had no visibility into its terms and no opportunity to weigh how a privately negotiated off-take arrangement, agreed between related parties, might shape the economics of the very royalty the State will eventually sit down to negotiate.

A regulator that is absent from the deal that structures the resource cannot credibly claim to hold leverage over the value extracted from it.

PILLAR THREE: THE NATIONAL REPOSITORY THAT ISN’T REQUIRED TO RECEIVE THE DATA

GGMC describes itself, in its own institutional language, as the national repository for geoscientific data relating to Guyana’s mineral resources. The Mining Act 1989 does not build a mechanism equal to that mandate.

A prospecting licensee is obliged to submit work programmes and quarterly and annual operational reports. On relinquishment of licensed ground, the licensee must submit an evaluation report on the work undertaken. None of these obligations is the same undertaking as surrender of the underlying dataset — the drill logs, assay certificates, geophysical surveys, and resource modelling that constitute the actual commercial and scientific value of exploration.

The only point in the statute where “reports, analyses, and data resulting from investigations and studies” are explicitly required in full is at the application for a mining licence — the same discretionary juncture at which the royalty itself is negotiated.

Guyana’s only clear statutory mechanism for compelling both a royalty and a complete geological dataset from a uranium licensee is a single, optional filing that the licensee alone controls the timing of.

 

PILLAR FOUR: WHAT HAPPENS IF THE STATE SAYS NO

Consider the scenario a functioning regulatory framework should have already answered. GGMC and U92 sit down to negotiate a royalty rate. The company, having already sold forward an option on half its first 40 million pounds of production to a related party, has calculated its economics around a particular return threshold. GGMC, exercising the public interest it is charged to protect, holds out for a higher rate. Talks stall.

What then? The Mining Act offers no compulsory arbitration mechanism for this scenario, no statutory floor the Minister can fall back on, no default rate that applies absent agreement.

The Prospecting Licences run until 18th April 2027, extendable to 18th April 2029. The company can simply wait. It can let the clock run. If the licence lapses without a mining permit application ever being filed, the one statutory trigger that would have compelled surrender of the exploration dataset to the State never fires.

The company walks away — potentially still holding, through its corporate structure, a fully modelled uranium resource derived entirely from exploration conducted under a Guyanese state licence — while GGMC is left with quarterly activity reports and an evaluation summary.

No royalty. No enforceable claim to the data. No mining. And no accountability mechanism requiring anyone to explain why.

PILLAR FIVE: THE COMMUNITIES WHO WERE NEVER ASKED

None of the above accounts for the constituency this publication regards as the first and most fundamental stakeholder: the Indigenous and local communities of Region Seven. The Amerindian People’s Association has called for the Kurupung project to be halted outright, citing the total absence of public and community-level consultation before exploration rights were granted, transferred, and drilled against.

A regulatory framework that permits a foreign-held uranium resource to change corporate hands twice, secure a related-party off-take agreement, and commence a 5,000-metre drilling programme — all before Region Seven’s own residents have been meaningfully consulted — is not a framework failing at its edges. It is failing at its centre.

WHAT THIS NEWS-MEDIA DEMANDS

The pattern here is not new to readers of this news outlet’s ongoing accountability coverage: a regulator structurally absent from the transactions it is meant to police, a State whose return on a strategic mineral is deferred to a moment the extractor controls, and communities treated as an afterthought rather than a precondition. Kurupung differs only in the commodity — uranium is not gold, and the stakes of a genuinely opaque radioactive-minerals sector, in a country with no established uranium regulatory precedent, are of a different order entirely.

This publication calls on the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission and the Minister responsible for Natural Resources to state publicly, and without further delay:

Whether a minimum statutory royalty framework for large-scale uranium and radioactive-mineral production is under consideration, and if not, why not;

What legal instrument, if any, compels U92 Energy Corp. or its subsidiaries to surrender full exploration data to GGMC in the event the Prospecting Licences lapse or are relinquished without a mining permit application;

Whether GGMC was consulted on, or was even made aware of, the ROPA Investments off-take agreement prior to its execution; and

What steps have been taken, or will be taken, to conduct genuine community-level consultation with the Indigenous residents of Region Seven before any further drilling proceeds.

The people of Guyana own these minerals. The law, as it stands, has not yet caught up to that fact.

— The Board

The Weekday-Crowd Anomaly Deserves Answers

THE 592GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY &INTEGRITY JOURNALISM♦GUYANA 

The Weekday-Crowd Anomaly Deserves Answers


OPINION BY: Staff Writer

The Government’s Model Village consultations have produced an unmistakable political image: large, enthusiastic crowds gathered across the country to hear President Irfaan Ali, Cabinet members and senior officials outline plans and receive concerns from residents.

Public consultation is necessary. Citizens should have access to the people and institutions that make decisions affecting their homes, land, livelihoods, communities and futures. No fair-minded observer should object to Government going into communities and listening.

But the scale of the turnout—and, more importantly, the timing of these events—raises questions that cannot be dismissed by photographs, applause or celebratory press releases.

These are not weekend gatherings or evening town halls. They have largely been convened during ordinary working hours, when thousands of Guyanese are expected to be at offices, construction sites, farms, shops, factories, schools, public agencies, markets and private businesses. Yet substantial crowds have appeared, stayed for extended periods and engaged the President and Cabinet.

That is the anomaly.

Civil-society organisations understand the basic arithmetic of public participation. If one wants workers, parents, students, small-business people and ordinary citizens to attend a public forum, meeting, protest or demonstration, the event is normally arranged after the workday or on a weekend. The GenZ protest scheduled for 4:30 p.m. is an obvious example. Its timing is not accidental; it recognises that people must first complete their work obligations before they can exercise their civic rights.

Why then are state events capable of producing massive weekday crowds while independent civic initiatives must carefully accommodate people’s work schedules to secure even modest participation?

That question is neither mischievous nor partisan. It is a question of transparency, labour-market reality, institutional integrity and fairness.

No one should leap to the conclusion that every person at a Model Village event is unemployed, paid to attend, instructed to attend or politically mobilised. Crowds cannot, by themselves, establish any of those claims. Many people may be self-employed, retired, unemployed, underemployed, on shift work, conducting informal business, on leave, between jobs, or simply willing to sacrifice several hours to bring an issue directly to the attention of the President and Cabinet.

But those possibilities do not remove the need for explanation. They sharpen it.

If persons are taking unpaid time from work to attend, then the economic cost falls on households already managing the pressures of food, transportation, rent, utilities and other living expenses. If workers are being released with pay, particularly in the public sector, then taxpayers deserve to know the extent of that release and its cost. If private-sector employees are absent during productive hours, employers facing recruitment and labour-retention difficulties have a legitimate interest in knowing whether their workforce is being disrupted by state-sponsored daytime events.

And if attendance is facilitated—through public-sector release time, transportation, community networks, contractors, beneficiary groups, state agencies or political structures—then that too should be openly disclosed. Transparency does not weaken a Government that is confident in its public support. It strengthens the credibility of the process.

There is a second and still more troubling issue.

The roadshows have also become a venue for citizens to raise routine grievances: housing matters, land concerns, drainage, roads, employment, licences, welfare, community development and services that should ordinarily fall within the remit of ministries, regional administrations, neighbourhood democratic councils, municipal bodies and statutory agencies.

It may be politically effective for a minister or senior official to solve a problem in front of a crowd. But it is not good governance for citizens to believe that a travelling Cabinet is their most reliable pathway to administrative relief.

A functioning state does not require people to wait for the President’s motorcade, abandon a workday and stand in a crowd to obtain answers on matters that should be handled through permanent institutions. Citizens should be able to submit a complaint, receive acknowledgement, know which agency is responsible, obtain a timeline, monitor action and appeal delays or failures.

If a Model Village consultation is the only time an unresolved problem receives attention, then the roadshow is revealing the weakness of the institutions it is meant to complement.

The Government should therefore answer plainly:

◊ Why were so many consultations held during regular working hours rather than through a mix of evenings, weekends and after-work sessions?

◊ What was the verified attendance at each event, and how long did persons remain?

◊ Were public servants granted time away from work, and was that time paid?

◊ Were ministries, regional bodies, NDCs, contractors, state agencies, community groups or programme beneficiaries asked to encourage or facilitate attendance?

◊ Was transport, food, reimbursement, per diem, priority service or any other form of material support provided?

◊ How many persons attended with individual grievances rather than to discuss the Model Village programme itself?

◊ Which agencies had responsibility for those grievances before they reached the Cabinet roadshow?

Will Government publish an anonymised record of concerns raised, the responsible agency, the promised action, the deadline and the eventual result?

The Bureau of Statistics must also help clarify the broader labour-market picture. Headline unemployment figures alone cannot settle the question raised by large weekday crowds. The country needs regular, accessible data on underemployment, labour-force participation, informal employment, discouraged workers, working poverty and regional differences in employment opportunities.

Employers, too, have a perspective that should not be ignored. If the country faces a labour shortage in key industries, there must be some accounting of the productive hours lost when sizeable numbers of employees attend daytime public events.

The Government cannot celebrate full crowds while businesses quietly absorb disruptions, unless it is prepared to demonstrate that no such disruption occurred.

This is not an argument against consultation. It is an argument for consultation that respects the time, income and working lives of citizens—and for institutions that work every day, not only when the Cabinet arrives.

Government events should not be immune from the standards of accountability expected of civil society, private enterprise or any other public-facing institution. If civil society must schedule demonstrations and meetings after working hours to permit ordinary Guyanese to participate, then Government should explain how it secures remarkable weekday participation and at what cost.

The crowds may indeed reflect public enthusiasm. They may also reflect unmet needs, unequal access to public institutions, carefully facilitated mobilisation, or a labour market that is weaker and more precarious than official narratives suggest.

The public is entitled to clarity—not speculation, not slogans, and not staged impressions of success.

The Airline Ultimatum: A Government That Never Asked for Terms

THE 592 GUARDIAN ◊ACCOUNTABILITY&INTEGRITY JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

The Airline Ultimatum: A Government That Never Asked for Terms


President’s public pressure campaign against hinterland carriers omits a 2020 fare concession the industry says it already made — and a fuel cost curve his government never offset


By Hem Kumar, Editor ♦ August 2026

President Irfaan Ali used an outreach at Santa Rosa Secondary School in the Moruca sub-district this week to declare his government “is very disappointed” in the local aviation sector, accusing hinterland carriers of failing to lower fares despite years of state investmentThe remarks echoed a similar complaint Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo made at the National Toshaos Conference, where he charged that hinterland air operators had been “unfairly hiking” prices at residents’ expense.

Both officials framed the sector’s pricing as a moral failure — private operators declining to pass state generosity on to the public.

Neither addressed a fact the industry says is already on the record: local carriers reduced hinterland fares by roughly eight percent in 2020, at the government’s own request.

AN UNCONTESTED 2020 REDUCTION

Multiple hinterland aviation operators, speaking to this newsroom on background, independently corroborated that the 2020 fare reduction was made in direct response to a government request to the industry — not a unilateral gesture, and not, as far as any operator could confirm, tied to a written or renewed precondition that survives to today.

No operator contacted could identify a current, standing agreement obligating further reductions. No public statement from the Ministry of Finance, the Guyana Civil Aviation Authority, or Cabinet was found committing government to offset hinterland aviation’s operating costs — through fuel subsidy, duty relief tied to fare performance, or otherwise — in exchange for that 2020 concession.

A government that requested a fare cut once, received it, and offered no counterpart obligation in return is not owed a second cut on demand.

THE COST CURVE THE PRESIDENT DID NOT MENTION

The five years separating that 2020 reduction from this week’s rebuke were not stable ones for fuel-dependent transport. Guyana’s diesel price — the relevant input for much of the hinterland fleet’s ground and marine logistics, and a proxy for the volatility jet fuel has tracked over the same period — bottomed near GYD 145 per litre in October 2020 and climbed to roughly GYD 265 per litre by May 2022, an increase of some 80 percent at the peak before easing. Global Jet A-1 aviation fuel, the direct input for the aircraft actually flying hinterland routes, moved on a comparable trajectory over the period, per IATA and S&P Global Platts benchmarks.

A fare structure fixed in 2020 and never revisited would, on cost grounds alone, represent a real-terms reduction for the operators absorbing that fuel volatility with no compensating relief from the state.                        The President’s framing — that operators have declined to translate government investment into lower prices — omits this arithmetic entirely. It also omits any accounting of what “government investment” in the sector has consisted of, and whether that investment came with reciprocal obligations the industry failed to meet, or came with none at all.

A FAMILIAR PATTERN OF LEVERAGE NEVER TAKEN

This is not the first sector where Guyana’s government has extended concessions — tax holidays, duty waivers, state-facilitated financing — without securing binding commitments in return, then expressed public frustration when the resulting behaviour failed to align with its expectations.

The Guyana Manufacturing and Services Association faced a comparable public rebuke earlier this year despite operating under a similar concessionary regime. The pattern recurs: incentives granted without conditions attached, followed by executive displeasure when the incentivized sector behaves as any unconstrained private actor would.

Guyana has not renounced its status as a free market economy.              A government that wishes to compel fare reductions from private carriers has instruments available to it — negotiated route agreements, subsidy-for-fare-cap arrangements, service concessions with enforceable terms.

Public remonstration at a school outreach, paired with the suggestion that the Guyana Defence Force’s Air Corps might expand into cargo and passenger service as an implicit alternative, is not one of those instruments.

It is pressure applied in place of policy — and it shifts the burden of the government’s own unfinished negotiating work onto operators who, by the government’s own request, have already cut once.

WHAT REMAINS UNANSWERED

This newsroom was unable to locate any public record of a government commitment — fuel subsidy, duty concession tied to fare performance, or otherwise — offered to hinterland carriers as a counterpart to the 2020 reduction, or as an inducement for a further one now being demanded.

Until such a record surfaces, or the Ministry of Finance and the Guyana Civil Aviation Authority clarify what obligations, if any, currently bind the sector, the President’s public complaint rests on a claim of inaction the industry disputes which the fuel cost record does not support.

— The Board

The Barima Scandal: Governance by Secrecy, Theatre by Design

THE 592 GUARDIAN◊ ACCOUNTABILITY JOURNALISM◊ GUYANA

The Barima Scandal: Governance by Secrecy, Theatre by Design


OPINION BY: STAFF WRITER

If the leaked proposal now in the public domain is authentic—and there is every indication that it is—the Ali administration has crossed from questionable judgment into outright contempt for transparency.

The revelation that a Dutch firm, Koole Onshore and Offshore (KMS), was quietly invited to submit a proposal to raise the sunken MV Barima days before a public Request for Proposals (RFP) was issued is not a minor procedural irregularity.

It strikes at the heart of public procurement integrity. It raises a fundamental and uncomfortable question: was the tender ever meant to be competitive, or merely cosmetic?

This is not a routine infrastructure contract. This is a vessel lying on the seabed with human remains possibly still trapped inside—lives lost, families grieving, and a nation demanding answers. Every decision surrounding the recovery must be beyond reproach. Instead, what is emerging is a pattern of pre-selection, back-channel engagement, and administrative theatre dressed up as due process.

The timeline alone is damning. The MV Barima sank on July 18. By July 28, a foreign firm had already submitted a detailed, 13-page proposal at the government’s invitation—complete with methodology, timelines, and an $8 million price tag. Yet the official RFP was only issued on August 2.

The logical inference is unavoidable: the government had already begun narrowing its preferred outcome before opening the process to scrutiny

This is not how transparent governance operates. It is how outcomes are managed.

The government may argue that preliminary outreach is standard in complex salvage operations. That argument would carry weight if such engagement were disclosed, structured, and extended to multiple firms in a documented and equitable manner. But secrecy negates legitimacy. If other companies were similarly invited, the administration must say so—immediately and unequivocally.

Silence, in this context, is not neutrality; it is complicity.

More troubling is the moral dimension. Families of the deceased and missing have been led to believe that decisions are being taken with care, dignity, and procedural fairness. Instead, what they are now confronting is the possibility that critical decisions were being shaped behind closed doors while public assurances were being carefully staged.

The government cannot have it both ways—claiming transparency while operating in opacity.

The technical aspects of the KMS proposal—parbuckling, buoyancy-assisted righting, recovery in one piece—may well be sound. That is not the issue. The issue is whether the process used to arrive at that solution is legitimate, fair, and defensible.

Even the most technically competent plan becomes tainted when born out of a compromised process.

And there is a deeper danger here. The recovery of the MV Barima is not merely an engineering exercise; it is a forensic necessity.

The vessel may hold critical evidence for the Commission of Inquiry. Any perception that its recovery was pre-arranged risks undermining the credibility of the entire investigative process before it even begins.

This is how public trust erodes—not in dramatic collapses, but in a series of calculated shortcuts justified in the name of expediency.

The Ali administration must now answer, clearly and without evasion:

Who authorised the invitation to KMS?

Were other firms similarly engaged prior to the RFP?

What criteria were used to select KMS for early engagement?

And why was the public not informed?

Anything less than full disclosure will confirm what this episode already suggests—that governance is being conducted in the shadows, while transparency is performed in the spotlight.

The families of the dead do not need theatre. They need truth. The nation does not need managed optics. It needs accountable leadership.

And at this moment, both remain in short supply.

Editor’s Note:

Under Guyana’s Procurement Act, Cap. 73:05, public procurement is governed by core principles of transparency, competition, fairness, and accountability. The Act establishes open tendering as the default method of procurement, with alternative methods—such as restricted tendering or single-source procurement—permitted only under clearly defined and strictly justified circumstances.

Section 25 of the Act outlines the conditions under which restricted or sole-source procurement may be used, including situations of extreme urgency, national emergency, or where only one supplier is capable of performing the contract. However, even in such cases, the procuring entity is required to document the justification, ensure that the process remains as competitive as practicable, and secure the necessary approvals, typically through the National Procurement and Tender Administration Board (NPTAB).

Critically, the law does not permit a procuring entity to engage a preferred supplier in advance and subsequently issue a public tender merely to regularize or legitimize that prior engagement. Such conduct, if established, would undermine the integrity of the procurement process and may constitute a breach of both the letter and spirit of the Act.

Additionally, the Act and accompanying regulations impose obligations for equal access to information among bidders, proper record-keeping, and the avoidance of any practice that could give rise to an unfair competitive advantage. Any deviation—particularly in high-value, high-sensitivity contracts involving public safety or national emergencies—demands heightened scrutiny and full public disclosure.

In this context, the sequence of events surrounding the MV Barima salvage operation raises serious questions as to whether the procedural safeguards required under the Procurement Act were observed, or whether the appearance of competition was substituted for its lawful execution.

THE 592 GUARDIAN

Round One to the People — But the Government’s Pandora’s Box Isn’t Empty Yet

THE 592 GUARDIAN◊ ACCOUNTABILITY JOURNALISM ◊ GUYANA

BOARD EDITORIAL

Round One to the People — But the Government’s Pandora’s Box Isn’t Empty Yet


Georgetown, August, 2026

By: Hem Kumar, Editor

The Government of Guyana has, for the first time since the MV Barima went down on July 18, done something that looks like listening. On July 31, the Maritime Administration Department (MARAD) issued a formal Invitation for Expressions of Interest for the salvage of the vessel — an implicit reversal of Prime Minister Mark Phillips’s earlier public position that “conditions” were not favourable for recovery, and that additional divers were unlikely to change the outcome.

That reversal did not arrive on its own. It arrived after the Amerindian Peoples Association picketed the Office of the President. After a Gen Z-led coalition held a silent vigil outside the same building. After Opposition Leader Azruddin Mohamed stood in front of grieving families and offered, publicly and repeatedly, to fund and facilitate the vessel’s recovery at no cost to the Guyanese taxpayer. After editorial pages — this one included — asked, in print, what the Government was afraid a floated MV Barima would show.

Round one belongs to the people of Guyana. Sustained public pressure, not government initiative, forced this outcome. That much should be said plainly, and credited to the families, the protesters, and the civil society organisations who refused to let the vessel — and the seventy-two lives lost with it, and the thirty still missing — disappear from the news cycle.

But round one is not the fight. The manner in which the Government has chosen to deliver on its own concession raises questions serious enough that the applause should be brief.

A Process Built for Delay, Not Urgency

The EOI MARAD issued is not an emergency mobilisation. It is a standard competitive procurement instrument, complete with a submission deadline of Friday, August 14 — more than two weeks after the notice was published, and a couple of weeks after the Opposition Leader first made his offer.

APNU parliamentarian Ganesh Mahipaul has laid out what comes after that deadline: evaluation of submissions for responsiveness, shortlisting, evaluation of bids, contract award, execution of the agreement, mobilisation of equipment and personnel, and only then the issuance of a commencement order. By his estimate — and it is difficult to dispute the arithmetic — actual salvage operations are unlikely to begin before late August, and quite possibly not until September.

We Invest in Nationhood (WIN) has made the same point in different words: the Government “buckled under pressure of the people,” but chose a procurement path that leaves grieving families waiting even longer for the answers they were promised.

“If there was ever a case that justified emergency procurement, surely the worst maritime disaster in modern Guyanese history is one.” — Ganesh Mahipaul, MP

Mr Mahipaul’s underlying argument deserves to be stated in full, because it is not an emotional appeal — it is an institutional one. Guyana’s procurement law permits emergency and sole-source procurement precisely for situations where the public interest demands immediate action.

The 592 Guardian has documented, repeatedly and on the record, this same Government’s comfort with emergency and sole-source procurement mechanisms for projects far less urgent than the recovery of a vessel that is now the final resting place of Guyanese citizens and the single most important piece of physical evidence in the country’s worst maritime disaster.

If the mechanism was available for lesser matters, its absence here is not an oversight. It is a choice. And the Government owes the country an answer as to why it made that choice.

Every Week Underwater Has a Cost

That choice carries a price measured in something other than money. Mr Mahipaul’s warning about evidentiary decay is not alarmist; it is basic marine forensics.

Salt water corrodes mechanical systems, degrades electronic equipment, and alters structural evidence over time. The Commission of Inquiry — whose composition and independence 592 Guardian has already had cause to question — cannot examine what has dissolved.

Every additional week the MV Barima spends on the seabed is a week in which the truth the country was promised becomes a little harder to recover, whether or not that is anyone’s intention.

 

The Offer the Government Never Answered

It bears repeating, because the timeline matters: Azruddin Mohamed’s offer to fund and facilitate the vessel’s salvage through a reputable international marine contractor, at no cost to the taxpayer, was public for days before MARAD’s EOI appeared.

The Government did not accept it. It did not formally decline it. It said nothing — until it produced its own process, on its own timeline, under its own name.

Whatever the merits of running a competitive procurement in the ordinary course of government business, this was not the ordinary course of business, and the silence in the interval invites a question 592 Guardian is not alone in asking: was the delay about due diligence, or was it about who gets to be seen taking Guyana’s dead out of the water?

We do not know. Multiple theories are circulating in Georgetown — that the delay serves to let compromised evidence lose its evidentiary value; that a competitive process opens room for financial arrangements a direct, funded offer would have foreclosed; that the Government could not tolerate handing the Opposition Leader a visible, unanswerable moment of moral authority ahead of the next election.

The 592 Guardian has not verified any of these as fact, and we will not print them as such. But their circulation is itself a symptom of a deeper illness: a Government that has, through its own conduct on this file and others, exhausted the public’s willingness to extend it the benefit of the doubt.

That erosion of trust is not the invention of a hostile press. It is the cumulative result of a commission sworn in behind closed doors, a memorial consent form circulated to families before any genuine consultation began, and a Prime Minister who told the country recovery was unlikely days before his own government opened a tender to attempt exactly that.

Do It Right, or Don’t Claim the Credit

If the Government insists on being the one to raise the MV Barima — rather than accepting an offer that would have put a salvage vessel over that wreck site weeks ago — then it owes the country a process that matches the gravity of what it is recovering.

That means emergency procurement, not routine tender. It means a public, dated commitment to when operations begin, not a rolling estimate. It means transparent chain-of-custody protocols for whatever the vessel yields, developed in consultation with the Commission of Inquiry rather than announced to it.

Anything less turns an act that should carry the dignity the victims are owed into one more exhibit in a pattern the 592 Guardian has now documented for two weeks running.

This is not business as usual. It cannot be treated as business as usual by a Government that spent the first two weeks after July 18 getting the basic facts of its own disaster wrong, correcting them days later, and asking the country to wait for a process it does not yet trust.

Round Two

The people won round one. The Government’s hand was forced, and the vessel will, in principle, come up. But a Pandora’s box of procedural discretion remains open in this Government’s hands — the pace of the tender, the composition of the evaluation, the handling of whatever the wreck yields, and the still-unresolved question of whether the Commission of Inquiry tasked with making sense of it all is itself independent and impartial, given what this Guardian has already documented about its own commissioners.

‘Round two is the accountability fight that does not end when the vessel breaks the surface. It ends when every official whose conduct — before, during, or after July 18 — bears on culpability has answered for it, and it does not end a moment before the Commission of Inquiry delivers findings the public has reason to trust.

The families of the MV Barima are still waiting for closure the Government has had the power to accelerate since the day Azruddin Mohamed made his offer. Every day of procedural delay from here is a day this Government chooses, and a day it will have to account for.

— The Board