When Dissent Becomes “Riot”: Nandlall’s Dangerous Double Standard

592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITYIN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

When Dissent Becomes “Riot”: Nandlall’s Dangerous Double Standard


OPINION BY: Staff Writer–August 2026 

Government Cannot Criminalise Dissent by Rebranding It as Disorder

Attorney General Anil Nandlall, SC, is correct on one narrow but important proposition: the constitutional right to protest is not a licence for violence, intimidation, property damage, or the deliberate prevention of others from exercising their lawful rights. But that is not the real controversy.

The controversy is the Attorney General’s apparent attempt to transform legitimate public dissent, political confrontation, and inconvenient questions into evidence of “riotous” conduct and unfitness for leadership.

It is the unmistakable instinct to attack the messenger when the Government cannot, or will not, confront the message.

The recent protests surrounding Government outreach meetings, including those connected to public outrage and unanswered questions over the MV Barima tragedy, did not emerge from thin air. Citizens who assemble, chant, carry placards, demand accountability, and confront political leaders with uncomfortable questions are not automatically criminals, anarchists, or enemies of democracy. They are citizens exercising constitutional freedoms in a country whose political history has repeatedly demonstrated the necessity of public resistance when institutions fail to inspire confidence.

Silencing the voice of dissent?

A government that governs democratically must distinguish carefully between a peaceful protest that causes discomfort and a riot that causes unlawful harm. The former must be protected; the latter may properly be addressed under the law. But political office holders must not lazily collapse the two categories simply because they dislike the people protesting or the cause for which they assemble.                      Mr. Nandlall should know that constitutional rights do not become conditional upon the Government’s convenience.

The Insult Is Not a Legal Argument

The most disturbing element of the Attorney General’s intervention was not his citation of the law. It was his resort to personal insult—reportedly questioning whether Opposition parliamentary leader Terrence Campbell has “all his faculties intact.”

That statement is beneath the office of Attorney General.

The country’s chief legal officer is not merely another partisan commentator speaking in the heat of a political meeting. He holds a constitutional office. He is expected to advise the State with sobriety, defend the rule of law, and demonstrate the temperance that the Government claims its opponents lack.

If Mr. Campbell acted unlawfully, identify the conduct. Produce the video. State the statutory provision said to have been breached. Permit the police and the courts to address the matter fairly and independently. That is how a legal system works. But questioning a political opponent’s mental capacity, while offering no legal finding and no judicial determination, is not constitutional analysis. It is an ad hominem attack. It is political contempt dressed in legal language.

The Attorney General says Opposition leaders behave more “unruly” and “riotous” than their followers. The public is therefore entitled to ask: is this the standard of restraint, civility, and constitutional responsibility by which the Government wishes its own senior officials to be judged?

A Government cannot demand maturity from its critics while its highest legal spokesman descends into public ridicule.

The PPP/C’s Record Cannot Be Erased

There is a glaring inconsistency in the Attorney General’s lecture on proper protest. During the prolonged electoral crisis of 2020, the PPP/C—then in opposition—mobilised its members and supporters across Guyana and in the diaspora. Its leaders publicly condemned what they regarded as electoral wrongdoing, demanded the protection of the vote, protested outside public institutions, and confronted those whom they believed were undermining democracy.

Those demonstrations were politically consequential. They were loud, tense, emotional, and confrontational because the stakes were enormous. The PPP/C and its supporters did not sit quietly in their homes and wait for events to unfold. They took to the streets because they believed democracy was in danger.

Dr. Irfaan Ali, before his elevation to the Presidency, was himself visibly involved in those protests. Public footage from that period showed him in confrontational circumstances around police barriers. The Government cannot now pretend that forceful physical symbolism, angry crowds, obstructed movements, and heated exchanges are uniquely Opposition inventions—or proof that a person is incapable of national leadership. Nor can the country forget the history of disorderly and confrontational conduct in and around Parliament involving PPP/C parliamentarians and supporters over the years. Parliament, under successive administrations, has seen heated confrontations, disruptions, threats, invective, and conduct that no serious observer would hold up as a model of calm democratic debate.

That history does not excuse unlawful conduct by anyone today. It does, however, expose the rank hypocrisy of a Government that now speaks as though it has always represented quiet, restrained, police-approved dissent while every Opposition protest is a descent toward anarchy. The PPP/C did not become the governing party by remaining silent when it felt unheard.

It became Government in part because it understood the power of mass mobilization, public pressure, political protest, and the people’s collective refusal to accept what they regarded as injustice.

It cannot now deny those same democratic tools to others.

Rights Cannot Be Reserved for the Governing Party

The Attorney General invokes the principle that one person’s rights end where another person’s rights begin. That is a sound principle. But it must be applied equally. The right of Government supporters to attend a meeting is real. The right of political officials to speak is real. The right of citizens to gather nearby, protest peacefully, display placards, chant, question leaders, and express anger at the Government is equally real.

The task of the police is not to create a sterilised political environment in which Government meetings occur without criticism. Their task is to preserve public order while facilitating the lawful rights of all sides.

A protest need not be silent to be peaceful. It need not be polite to be lawful. It need not be convenient to those in office to be constitutionally protected

Citizens should not be told that they must protest only at a place approved by the State, at a time convenient to the Government, in a manner that cannot be heard, and under conditions that ensure no official is ever made uncomfortable. That is not meaningful freedom of assembly. It is managed dissent.

The Constitution does not protect only applause. It protects criticism. It protects opposition. It protects the citizen who refuses to smile while asking hard questions of those who wield public power.

The MV Barima Demands Answers, Not Diversions

The deeper issue is that the Attorney General’s remarks risk diverting national attention from the concerns that fueled the protest in the first place. The MV Barima tragedy is not a matter to be brushed aside through accusations of political mischief, unruliness, or opposition orchestration.

Whenever lives are lost, families are left grieving, and citizens believe the State has failed in its duty of care, there must be transparent, credible, and timely answers.

What caused the tragedy?                                                                              ◊  What safety systems were in place?                                                            ◊  Were warnings disregarded?                                                                      ◊  Were regulations enforced?                                                                        ◊  Was there an adequate emergency response?                                          Who bears responsibility for any failures?                                                ◊  What changes will be made to prevent another disaster?

These are not partisan questions. They are questions of human life, public safety, ministerial accountability, and the State’s fundamental duty to protect its citizens. Calling protesters “riotous” does not answer them. Questioning an Opposition leader’s faculties does not answer them. Threatening charges against unnamed citizens does not answer them.

The more the Government evades the substance of public concern, the more it strengthens the perception that it is interested in controlling the narrative rather than confronting the truth.

Law Must Not Become a Political Weapon

Mr. Nandlall cited the warning in Frank Hope v New Guyana Company Limited that uncontrolled freedom can lead to anarchy or totalitarianism. The warning is valid, but it has two sides.

Freedom without responsibility can become disorder. But State power without restraint can become repression.

The law must never be used as an instrument to punish people merely because their protests embarrass the Government, expose administrative failures, or create politically damaging images. Charges such as unlawful assembly, disorderly behaviour, obstruction, and riotous conduct carry serious consequences. They cannot be invoked casually, selectively, or as rhetorical weapons on a political programme.

If a crime occurred, investigate it impartially. Gather evidence. Charge those against whom there is a proper evidential basis. Respect due process. Let the courts decide guilt or innocence.

But do not first publicly pronounce an entire group unruly, criminal, or unfit for leadership and then seek to retrofit legal justification afterward. That approach reverses the constitutional order. It replaces evidence with political accusation and law with partisan convenience.

A society governed by law does not criminalise dissent. It prosecutes proven offences.

Leadership Requires Tolerance of Scrutiny 

The true test of leadership is not how one behaves among supporters. It is how one responds when citizens are angry, opposition voices are loud, and questions are hard.

The PPP/C Government now possesses the instruments of executive power: the Presidency, Cabinet, a parliamentary majority, the resources of the State, and the ability to communicate with the public every day. It should not be frightened by a small group of protesters or irritated into abandoning basic standards of democratic tolerance.

Those who hold power must develop a thicker skin than those who seek it.

The Attorney General should therefore reconsider the message he has sent. If he wants political leaders to act responsibly, he must set that example. If he wants respect for the Constitution, he must defend its protections even when they benefit persons he dislikes. If he wants public order, he must insist that the law is applied consistently—not harshly against opponents and generously toward governing-party activists.

Guyana has travelled too far, and suffered too much political division, to accept a future in which protest is treated as legitimate only when it serves the party in power ,

Vox populi, vox Dei.

The people have a right to speak. They have a right to demand answers. They have a right to assemble peacefully in the face of authority. And they have a right to expect that the Attorney General of Guyana will answer constitutional criticism with law, evidence, and reason—not insults.

 

The voice of the people is not riotous merely because it refuses to be silent.

 

A Letter Ali May Not Be Able to Answer

592 GUARDIAN ◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

ELECTORAL GOVERNANCE

A Letter Ali May Not Be Able to Answer

The Constitutional Hole at the Centre of Mohamed’s GECOM Campaign

592 GUARDIAN EDITORIAL BOARD – August 2026

Opposition Leader Azruddin Mohamed has now written President Irfaan Ali on the composition of the Guyana Elections Commission enough times that the letters have started to blur into one another. The latest, sent in the wake of The Carter Center’s statement on the GECOM impasse, asks Ali to give “urgent consideration” to appointing Mohamed’s three nominees — his own private attorneys, Roysdale Forde, Siand Dhurjon and Damien Da Silva — in place of the three sitting opposition-nominated commissioners. It is, by any reasonable count, his fourth or fifth attempt since June.

What has not changed across any of these letters is the assumption sitting underneath them: that this is a request Ali is capable of granting.

THE QUESTION THE LETTER TREATS AS SETTLED

Mohamed’s position rests on reading Article 161(3)(b) of the Constitution as attaching to an office, not a person. The Leader of the Opposition’s power to advise the President on GECOM appointments, on this view, belongs to whoever currently holds that title — so when the office changed hands from Aubrey Norton to Mohamed following the 2025 elections, the basis on which the three sitting commissioners were appointed changed with it.

University of Guyana law lecturer Neville Bissember has made this case seriously: the relevant constitutional language speaks of “the Leader of the Opposition” as a role, not a named individual, and a role that has been reconfigured cannot indefinitely bind the President to advice given by its previous occupant.

It is a real argument. It is not, however, the only one, and it is nowhere close to settled.

The competing reading draws on Article 161(6), which imports the removal protections of Article 225 into GECOM membership — the same protections that shield judges from arbitrary dismissal. On this view, a commissioner can only be removed for cause: infirmity, misbehaviour, the standard categories that apply to constitutional officeholders generally. 

A change in the opposition’s parliamentary arithmetic is not a recognised cause for removal. The sitting commissioners — Vincent Alexander, Charles Corbin and Desmond Trotman — have made exactly this argument in their own defence: that appointment created a personal constitutional tenure, not a leash held by whichever party leader happened to nominate them.

Both readings have been argued in good faith by people who understand the Constitution. Neither has been resolved by a court.

Mohamed’s letters to Ali do not acknowledge this. They proceed as though the “office not person” interpretation is simply correct, and as though the only obstacle to Ali acting on it is inattention or bad faith.

THE DEEPER PROBLEM: EVEN IF MOHAMED IS RIGHT, ALI MAY NOT BE ABLE TO SAY SO

This is where the letter-writing campaign runs into its real difficulty, and it is a difficulty that survives even a charitable reading of Mohamed’s constitutional argument. Legal opinion aired publicly in July concluded that there is, at present, no vacancy on GECOM for the President to fill — because nothing in the Constitution gives the President the unilateral authority to decide, on his own initiative, which of two competing constitutional interpretations governs.

That determination belongs to the courts.

Put plainly: Mohamed is not simply asking Ali to act quickly. He is asking Ali to resolve, by executive letter, a genuine and unresolved dispute about the meaning of Article 161(3)(b) — a dispute serious enough that it has produced dueling legal opinions in the national press for months.

Even if Ali agreed entirely with Mohamed’s reading, replacing sitting constitutional officeholders on that basis alone would be an act of constitutional interpretation the Presidency does not clearly have the standing to perform unilaterally. It would almost certainly invite the very litigation Mohamed says he is prepared to bring — except brought against the President, by the displaced commissioners, rather than by Mohamed against the President.

This changes what “no response” actually means. Ali’s silence need not be read as obstruction or political convenience, though it may be that too. It can just as easily be read as the more legally cautious course available to him: declining to adjudicate a live constitutional question that properly belongs before a judge, rather than acting on one party’s account of it and creating a fresh cause of action in the process.

WHAT THAT DOES TO THE LETTERS THEMSELVES

If this reading is right, the recurring letters to Ali were, in a meaningful sense, never going to work — not because the President is unresponsive, but because the request was addressed to an office that most likely cannot grant it. That reframes the entire exercise. A letter asking for something the recipient cannot lawfully give is not really a request for action.

It is a public record being built: evidence, for a later court filing or a later international appeal, that “urgent” correspondence was sent and ignored.

Whether or not that is Mohamed’s actual strategy, it is the practical effect. And it sits inside a pattern that is now difficult to miss. The same posture — treat a contested legal question as though it is obviously resolved, address the request to an authority who may not have the power to grant it, invoke the international community rather than the courts — has now appeared in Mohamed’s approach to the Region 10 impasse and in his legal team’s demand letter to the CCJ Registrar over Justice Anderson’s participation in his own extradition proceedings.

In each case, the domestic judicial remedy that could actually settle the underlying question — judicial review, injunctive relief, a constitutional motion — remains unused, while the letters multiply.

The answer the moment requires is a judicial one, not another letter to an office that has now been asked, repeatedly, to do something it may not be constitutionally positioned to do.

The GECOM commissioners’ dispute deserves an answer. Guyana’s electoral machinery cannot indefinitely run on a commission whose composition even its own members and the Chairperson herself have publicly disputed, and the country cannot deliver credible Local Government Elections while that dispute drags on unresolved.

But the answer the moment requires is a judicial one, not another letter to an office that has now been asked, repeatedly, to do something it may not be constitutionally positioned to do.

— The Board

 

The Hundred-Dollar Benchmark: How a State Bottle of Water Became a Pricing Instrument

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

The Hundred-Dollar Benchmark: How a State Bottle of Water Became a Pricing Instrument

ANALYSIS · PUBLIC UTILITIES & AVIATION

The 592 Guardian Editorial Board· August 2026

Banks DIH has set a suggested retail price of $100 for its 500ml Rainforest Waters. On its face this is a routine SRP announcement from the country’s largest beverage manufacturer. Set beside the timeline of the last five months, it reads differently: as the point at which a state-funded market entrant and a government-brokered pricing negotiation converged on a single number, in the same week, involving the same producers.

The question this newsroom has been asked, and the question worth answering carefully, is whether Guyana just watched government “expose” private-sector pricing manipulation in bottled water, and whether that opens a road toward price control by other means. The honest answer is narrower and, in some ways, more consequential: the evidence available does not support a manipulation-exposure story. It supports something more structural — a government that now holds two levers over the same handful of producers at once, and is using them together without ever having to legislate a price.

WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED, IN SEQUENCE

The timeline matters more than any single announcement.

Date

Event

16–19 March 2026

Minister Indar briefs the Georgetown Chamber and meets GMSA and water manufacturers on “100% local production” for bottled water. GMSA publicly welcomes the target.

27 July 2026

National Assembly approves GY$496.3 million, under GWI’s coastal water-supply budget, for a state-owned bottling plant.

Early August 2026

Opposition MP Ganesh Mahipaul publishes figures disputing the plant’s stated rationale.

Week of 10 August 2026

Banks DIH sets a $100 SRP for 500ml Rainforest Waters.

13 August 2026

PSC, GMSA, GWI and named producers — Blue Spring Waters, Clear Waters, Pure Waters, Aquafina and Banks DIH — reach agreement on a two-phase private-sector plan: PET preform standardisation and tax relief, to be submitted to Cabinet.

Two things follow from laying the dates out. First, the cost-reduction negotiation between the PSC and government predates GWI’s funded market entry by more than four months — it did not begin because a state competitor forced private producers to the table. Second, the producers named in the 13 August agreement are, by their own account, addressing price through cost inputs they control — PET preform costs, distribution margins, environmental tax and VAT — not through an admission that prior pricing was inflated. Reading the $100 SRP as proof of “manipulation exposed” requires attributing to GWI’s entry a causal force the public record does not establish, and skips past a negotiation that was already running on its own track.

THE NUMBERS GOVERNMENT’S OWN CASE DOES NOT SURVIVE

The stated rationale for the state plant is import substitution and national self-sufficiency. Opposition figures have put government’s own trade data against that claim: local producers — led by Blue Spring Waters and Clear Waters, with Banks DIH and Demerara Distillers Limited behind them — already supply an estimated 200,000 cases of bottled water a month. Estimated imports run at roughly 6,000 to 10,000 cases a month, a fraction of domestic supply. If the stated problem is import dependence, the scale of a GY$496.3 million state plant is difficult to justify against an import gap that small.

Set against that gap, the sums involved are lopsided in the other direction too. Banks DIH alone commissioned a GY$13.7 billion bottling and canning expansion at Thirst Park in January 2026 — roughly twenty-seven times the state’s allocation for its own plant. The state is not entering this market at a scale that competes on production capacity. It is entering at a scale that competes on price signal.

The state did not need to out-produce the private sector. It needed to out-price it for one SKU, once, in public.

A LEVER GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE TO LEGISLATE

This is the sharper version of the concern worth taking seriously. Guyana has no price-control statute in play here, no GNBS or CCAC order, no ministerial price directive that could be challenged, appealed, or reviewed. What it has is a state utility — GWI — funded to sell water in direct retail competition with the firms it also depends on for the negotiated cost-reduction plan now headed to Cabinet. Minister Indar has told the private sector directly that “we are not producing water to compete with you.” The GY$496.3 million allocation, and a $100 SRP appearing in the same window as a Cabinet-bound tax-relief negotiation, sit uneasily beside that assurance.

Call this what it structurally is: price-setting by market presence rather than by regulation. It achieves a public-facing outcome — a benchmark price the private sector visibly moves toward — without triggering any of the accountability mechanisms a formal price order would require. There is no statute to litigate, no regulator whose reasoning must be published, no appeal route for a producer who believes the benchmark is unsustainable relative to their actual costs. It is also, notably, harder to reverse than a regulation would be — a bad price control can be repealed; a state competitor with a sunk plant is a standing feature of the market.

This newspaper has previously documented that GNBS and CCAC, Guyana’s two nominal standards and consumer-protection bodies, have no statutory firewall separating them from ministerial direction, and no distinct protocol for auditing a state-owned competitor’s pricing the way they would audit a private one. That gap is precisely what makes this lever available. A government that wanted to set an informal price floor or ceiling in a sector with no independent regulator capable of contesting it would do more or less what has happened here: fund a state entrant, price it publicly, and let the market — and the news cycle — do the rest.

WHAT WOULD CONFIRM OR COMPLICATE THIS READING

Fairness to government’s stated position requires naming what is not yet established. Whether Banks DIH’s reduction is a durable repricing or a promotional SRP tied to the PET-preform and tax-relief negotiation remains to be seen once the Cabinet-bound proposal becomes public — it commits government to specific, checkable items: PET preform standardisation, and “recommendations on the lowering or removal of environmental tax and VAT.” If that VAT and levy relief materialises and private producers sustain lower prices independent of GWI’s benchmark, the more benign reading strengthens: this was supply-side cost reduction that happened to coincide with a state entrant, not price-setting by presence. If instead GWI’s plant becomes a standing reference price that private producers track without corresponding cost relief, the structural concern in this piece is confirmed by conduct, not just by sequence.

Whether GWI’s own $100 price is sustainable without the GY$496.3 million subsidy behind it is a separate and unresolved question. A subsidised state price that private producers cannot profitably match is not evidence that private pricing was inflated — it may simply be evidence that the state price is not real, in the sense that no unsubsidised producer could sustain it. Guyana has been here before, in the oil sector, where the state has both marketed its own resource and regulated the industry extracting it. Whether that precedent transfers cleanly to bottled water, or to other consumer sectors, is speculation this newspaper is not yet prepared to assert as established fact. It is, however, a precedent worth naming plainly: this is not the first time this government has occupied both sides of a market it also governs.

RECONCILING THIS WITH A FREE MARKET

The honest framing is not “does state entry violate free-market principles,” asked in the abstract. Guyana’s bottled water sector was never a textbook open market — a small number of producers, import-dependent packaging inputs, and now a state entrant funded outside any competitive process. The live question is narrower: is government entering as an ordinary market participant, or as a policy instrument wearing a market participant’s clothing, in a sector with no regulator equipped to tell the difference. On the record available now, the second reading has more support than the first — not because pricing manipulation was proven, but because the structural conditions that would make informal price-setting attractive, and undetectable, are already in place.

— The Board, The 592 Guardian

Paper Trail: The Warnings the MV Barima Carried for Eight Months

592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

Paper Trail: The Warnings the MV Barima Carried for Eight Months


INVESTIGATIVE OPINION— Staff Writer AUGUST, 2026

Two independent document sets — obtained separately by this newsroom and by Kiskadee Watch — now corroborate a single, damning record: mechanical and electrical defects aboard the MV Barima were formally reported, repeatedly marked urgent, and tracked in writing from November 2025 through March 2026. The question the paperwork cannot answer is what happened next.

A SECOND SET OF EYES ON THE SAME LEDGER

This newsroom has spent the past week working through a growing set of handwritten maintenance and defect reports concerning the MV Barima, obtained in stages and reviewed image by image, report by report. On August 12, Kiskadee Watch published its own account of a materially overlapping document trail — reports dated across the same November 2025 to March 2026 window, describing the same categories of failure: an out-of-service generator, a dangerously hot heat exchanger, a leaking exhaust, a burnt-out electrical panel, deteriorating batteries, and cooling equipment that could not keep pace with the machinery it served.

Two newsrooms working independently, from documents obtained through different channels, have now arrived at the same underlying record. That convergence matters. It moves this story from a single outlet’s disclosure to a corroborated institutional fact: the paperwork existed, it used the word “urgent” repeatedly, and it existed for months before July 18.

WHAT THE RECORD ACTUALLY SHOWS

Laid against each other, the two document sets describe the same vessel in the same condition, converging on a small number of dated incidents that recur across both trails:

  • November 28, 2025 — Port Kaituma landing: the vessel’s lights failed while alongside. A connecting wire inside the changeover panel between shore current and the generator had burnt out; a connector was described as completely burnt, making reconnection impossible without repair.
  • November 30, 2025 — No. 1 generator: reported out of service, its water pump non-functional, marked urgent, with a Shore Chief Engineer’s notation directing that the outstanding defect be addressed.
  • November 30, 2025 — port main-engine heat exchanger/cooler: running at approximately 197–203°F, well above a comparison engine’s normal range, marked urgent.
  • November 30, 2025 — starboard main-engine exhaust: leaking exhaust gases into the engine room during operation, welders requested, marked urgent by both the reporting party and the Shore Chief Engineer.
  • Through March 2026: continuing reports covering cooling-system and ventilation shortfalls, battery deterioration, and other mechanical and structural defects — extending the documented pattern to within roughly four months of the sinking.       

This newsroom’s own document set adds detail Kiskadee Watch’s report does not include: a formal report numbering sequence (2179, 2180, 2182, 2183) with at least one gap still unaccounted for; a five-day interval between the November 30 reports and their December 4 acknowledgment by the Shore Chief Engineer; a request that same period for an engine-room fan and air extractor, on the stated grounds that none existed at all and the space became “very hot” under load; and, from March 9, 2026, a wholly separate defect report addressed to the Marine Superintendent in Kingston — plumbing, a passenger toilet, a wheelhouse window, hatch repairs — signed by the vessel’s Captain, showing the pattern of documented deficiency was not confined to engine-room machinery and did not end with the winter reports.

 Not one report. Not one incident. A paper trail — urgent, dated, acknowledged, and running for the better part of a year.

WHAT THE PAPERWORK CANNOT TELL US

Kiskadee Watch’s reporting is careful on this point, and this newsroom shares that caution: the documents establish that defects were reported and flagged urgent. They do not, on their own, establish whether every defect was repaired, whether replacement parts were sourced and fitted, whether the vessel was formally recertified after each repair, or whether any specific unresolved defect directly caused the July 18 sinking. Those are causal questions for the Commission of Inquiry, not conclusions this record permits a newsroom to draw on its own.

What the record does establish, without requiring any inference, is that the concerns were not private, informal, or after-the-fact. They were written down, dated, routed through a chain of acknowledgment — Shore Chief Engineer, Central Work Shop electricians, the Marine Superintendent’s office — and in the most serious instances, marked urgent by more than one hand. Whatever the Commission ultimately finds about cause, it can no longer proceed on the premise that no one was warned.

WHY THIS BELONGS ALONGSIDE THE REGULATORY RECORD

This publication has already documented, through maritime scholar Robert C. Millington’s analysis, that Guyana’s statutory framework left a vessel the size of the MV Barima with fewer safety obligations than a small wooden boat — the “24-Metre Gap” — and that the Guyana Shipping Act’s Section 3(3) makes MARAD’s own Director the deemed legal owner of state-registered vessels, collapsing the line between regulator and regulated. The defect record now surfacing gives that structural critique a face: a vessel operating inside a weak statutory regime, generating a documented, urgent, repeated maintenance history, and continuing in passenger service regardless.

It also belongs beside the standing questions this newsroom has pressed since July 18 — the disputed overnight response window, the unilateral Commission appointments, the no-bid salvage contractor with a documented multi-jurisdiction litigation history, and the Declaration of Agreement circulated to grieving families before any inquiry had taken evidence. Each thread, standing alone, could be read as an isolated failure. Together, they describe an institutional posture: paperwork generated, warnings logged, and no visible mechanism that translated either into a vessel taken out of service.

WHAT WE ARE ASKING FOR

  1. MARAD and the Ministry of Public Works publish, in full, the repair and recertification record for every defect logged against the MV Barima between November 2025 and July 2026, including invoices, parts orders, and sign-off documentation.
  2. The Commission of Inquiry be given express authority — and instructed on the record — to subpoena the complete defect-report and maintenance file for the MV Barima from MARAD, the Transport and Harbors Department, and the vessel’s Shore Chief Engineer’s office, not the partial sets so far surfaced through the press.
  3. The Shore Chief Engineer and Marine Superintendent named in these records be called to testify on what action, if any, followed each urgent notation, under the protections and procedures the Commission’s mandate already provides.
  4. If you are holding a maintenance record, an inspection file, a photograph, or any other primary document bearing on the MV Barima’s condition before July 18 — whether from this vessel or any other in the Transport and Harbors Department fleet — this newsroom will review it. We publish what we can verify, and we protect our sources. Every document brought forward narrows the space in which this record can be disputed, minimized, or quietly closed.

 We are publishing what we have now, rather than waiting for a fuller set, because the public interest in this record does not keep. Seventy-three families have already buried their  bodies . Thirty more are still waiting. The paperwork that existed before July 18 belongs to them as much as it belongs to any inquiry, and it should not take a second newsroom’s independent disclosure for that to be treated as established fact.

— THE BOARD


The 592 Guardian is an independent accountability journalism outlet based in Georgetown, Guyana.

    

Procurement in the Shadows: When Tragedy Becomes Pretext

THE 592 GUARDIAN•ACCOUNTABILITY&INTEGRITY JOURNALISM • GUYANA

Procurement in the Shadows: When Tragedy Becomes Pretext


OPINION BY : Staff Writer -August 2026

What is unfolding in the aftermath of the MV Barima disaster is not merely administrative misjudgment—it bears the hallmarks of a procurement process that may have been fundamentally compromised from the outset.

At the center of the controversy is a simple but critical distinction: urgency does not justify opacity. In fact, under Guyana’s procurement framework, urgency demands the opposite—heightened accountability, strict documentation, and clear justification for any departure from open competitive tendering.

If, as the leaked documents suggest, the government had already solicited and received a detailed proposal from a specific foreign firm prior to issuing a public Request for Proposals (RFP), then the process begins to resemble what procurement law would characterize as a de facto single-source engagement—regardless of the later attempt to formalize it through an open invitation.

This is where the problem crystallizes.

Single-source procurement is not inherently unlawful, but it is tightly circumscribed. It must be justified on explicit grounds: extreme urgency, sole supplier capability, or national emergency conditions that make competitive tendering impractical. Even then, the law requires transparency—written justification, approval by the National Procurement and Tender Administration Board (NPTAB), and a clear audit trail.

None of that has been publicly demonstrated.

Instead, what appears to have occurred is a hybrid maneuver: a preferred contractor is quietly engaged and positioned, followed by the issuance of an RFP to create the appearance of competition.                  This is not compliance. It is procedural theatre.

The Expression of Interest (EOI) or RFP, in such a context, risks being reduced to a cosmetic exercise—a post hoc device designed to legitimize a decision that may have already been made.

If other firms are being invited to bid against a proposal that is already known, detailed, and internally assessed, then the playing field is not merely uneven; it is structurally tilted.

This raises serious legal and ethical concerns.

First, it undermines the principle of equal opportunity in public contracting. Firms that were not given early access are immediately disadvantaged, particularly in a highly technical operation requiring mobilization planning, cost modeling, and environmental safeguards.

Second, it exposes the State to potential bid protests and legal challenges, especially from international salvage operators who may view the process as predetermined.

Third, and most critically, it erodes public confidence in the integrity of the response to a national tragedy.

The government may argue that time was of the essence—and it was. A submerged vessel in 13–15 meters of water, in poor visibility and strong currents, presents both environmental and forensic risks. But urgency is not a loophole for selective engagement.

If anything, it strengthens the obligation to act within clearly defined emergency procurement protocols.

There is also a deeper contradiction at play. The administration initially signaled that the wreck site might be preserved as a memorial. That position has now shifted to full recovery—an operationally complex and sensitive undertaking. Such a reversal should have triggered even greater procedural rigor, not less.

What is required now is not defensiveness, but disclosure.

The government must state plainly whether this was treated as an emergency procurement; whether approvals were sought from NPTAB; whether multiple firms were invited prior to the RFP; and whether the Dutch firm was given any informational or timing advantage over potential competitors.

Absent those answers, the conclusion becomes difficult to avoid: that the procurement process was not designed to discover the best solution, but to validate a pre-selected one.

And that, in the context of lost lives, missing persons, and a nation demanding accountability, is not just a procedural failure—it is a moral one.

 

Editor’s Note:

Under Guyana’s Procurement Act, Cap. 73:05, public procurement is governed by core principles of transparency, competition, fairness, and accountability. The Act establishes open tendering as the default method of procurement, with alternative methods—such as restricted tendering or single-source procurement—permitted only under clearly defined and strictly justified circumstances.

Section 25 of the Act outlines the conditions under which restricted or sole-source procurement may be used, including situations of extreme urgency, national emergency, or where only one supplier is capable of performing the contract. However, even in such cases, the procuring entity is required to document the justification, ensure that the process remains as competitive as practicable, and secure the necessary approvals, typically through the National Procurement and Tender Administration Board (NPTAB).

Critically, the law does not permit a procuring entity to engage a preferred supplier in advance and subsequently issue a public tender merely to regularize or legitimize that prior engagement. Such conduct, if established, would undermine the integrity of the procurement process and may constitute a breach of both the letter and spirit of the Act.

Additionally, the Act and accompanying regulations impose obligations for equal access to information among bidders, proper record-keeping, and the avoidance of any practice that could give rise to an unfair competitive advantage. Any deviation—particularly in high-value, high-sensitivity contracts involving public safety or national emergencies—demands heightened scrutiny and full public disclosure.

In this context, the sequence of events surrounding the MV Barima salvage operation raises serious questions as to whether the procedural safeguards required under the Procurement Act were observed, or whether the appearance of competition was substituted for its lawful execution.

The Board

EMANCIPATION DAY 2026

THE 592 GUARDIAN♦ ACCOUNTABILITY JOURNALISM ♦ GUYANA

EMANCIPATION DAY 2026


While the Slavery Abolition Act started taking effect on August 1, 1834, full freedom for all enslaved adults in British Guiana was only achieved four years later on August 1, 1838


Emancipation Day in Guyana marks 188 years since August 1, 1838when chains were formally broken, but not entirely erased.

It is a day of remembrance, but also of reckoning. For while physical enslavement ended, the architecture of inequality, exclusion, and state imbalance has proven far more enduring. Too many citizens still navigate systems that marginalize, silence, or selectively empower.

Emancipation, then, remains unfinished business.

This year, the observance is shadowed by grief. The tragedy of the MV Barima lingers heavily across the nation, with families still waiting, still searching, still mourning.

Their pain reminds us that emancipation is not only about the past—it is about the dignity, value, and protection of life in the present.

This observance belongs to African heritage, but its meaning transcends ethnicity. Across Guyana, people of all backgrounds don traditional wear and participate in cultural celebration—not merely as ritual, but as recognition that freedom must be collective to be real. 

True emancipation demands more than memory; it requires confronting modern forms of capture—political, economic, and psychological—and insisting on justice that is visible, measurable, and shared.

Until then, the cry “free at last” remains not a declaration, but an aspiration.

The Commission Is Qualified. The Process Is Not Explained.

THE 592 GUARDIAN♦ ACCOUNTABILITY JOURNALISM · GEORGETOWN, GUYANA

 The Commission Is Qualified. The Process Is Not Explained.

President Ali names five credible experts to the MV Barima inquiry — and answers none of the questions his method has raised

By the Editorial Board

There is no serious case to be made against the competence of the five people President Irfaan Ali named on Sunday to the Commission of Inquiry into the capsizing of the MV Barima. On paper, this is as strong a panel as Guyana could plausibly assemble on short notice from within the Caribbean’s own bench of maritime and legal expertise. The problem is not who they are. It is that no one — not the President, not the Department of Public Information, not any minister — has said how they got there.

THE CREDENTIALS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE

Justice Godfrey Phillip Smith SC, the Commission’s chair, is a former Attorney General and Foreign Minister of Belize who went on to sit as a High Court judge and an acting Justice of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. He has appeared before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Caribbean Court of Justice, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and currently serves as CARICOM’s High-Level Representative for Law and Criminal Justice — a position to which regional Heads of Government, not Georgetown, appointed him. Colleagues across the Eastern Caribbean bar have described his judgments as fast, rigorous, and difficult to challenge on appeal.

Dr Andrzej Jasionowski brings the technical core the inquiry will need. A Polish naval architect and marine engineer with a doctorate in damaged-vessel hydrodynamics from the University of Strathclyde, he has spent three decades building the forensic tools — flooding simulation, capsize-time modelling, structural failure analysis — that maritime accident investigators rely on internationally.

Captain Hamada Fouda is a working Senior Maritime Surveyor and Compliance Auditor with the Maritime Authority of Jamaica, giving the Commission a regulator’s eye on vessel condition, certification, and compliance history — precisely the terrain the MV Barima’s maintenance record will require.

Nyree Dawn Alfonso, an Attorney-at-Law in Trinidad and Tobago with a stated specialisation in Admiralty and Maritime Law, has litigated shipping and port-authority matters before that country’s Court of Appeal. Maritime law is a narrow bar; her inclusion is not decorative.

Rear Admiral (Ret’d) Hayden Pritchard served as Chief of Defence Staff of Trinidad and Tobago and was the first officer of that country’s Defence Force to hold flag rank, with thirty-three years in uniform spanning naval operations and security.

None of this is filler biography. It is the strongest possible answer to anyone tempted to dismiss the Commission on grounds of competence. This news media will not make that argument, because the record does not support it.

WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT SAID

Competence, however, is a different question from process — and it is on process that the President’s Sunday announcement said nothing at all.

Guyanese were told, in a video statement to Facebook, that these five “have been carefully selected for their independence, technical expertise, and proven ability.” They were not told who did the selecting, on what criteria, following what search, or with whose advice. No terms of appointment have been published. No enabling legal instrument exists yet — the President himself said on Sunday that “the necessary legal instruments required to give effect to this decision are currently being formalised.

 Five names were announced to a nation in mourning before the legal document constituting the body that will investigate its worst peacetime disaster had even been drafted.

Five names were announced before the document creating the Commission had even been drafted.

This is not a small omission. A Commission of Inquiry derives its authority, and its credibility, from the instrument that creates it and the transparency of the process that populates it.

Guyana has, within the past week, watched a broad and unusual coalition — APNU, WIN, the Forward Guyana Movement, the Alliance For Change, the Vigilant Political Action Committee, and the Guyana Human Rights Association — converge on a single demand: that the composition of this Commission not be decided by the executive alone, and that whatever process was used be transparent enough to survive scrutiny.

The President’s answer to that demand, so far, has been to proceed regardless and offer no account of the process afterward.

THE QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN OPEN

This new outlet is raising the following questions directly to the Office of the President, the Ministry of Legal Affairs, and the Department of Public Information, and will publish their answers in full when received:

  1. Who identified these five individuals? Was a shortlist prepared, and if so, by whom — a ministry, an external search, personal recommendation, or a regional body such as CARICOM?
  2. Were any of the five approached or consulted before Sunday’s announcement, and if so, when did those conversations begin? The timeline matters: was this a decision made in the days after the tragedy, or one that had been under consideration on a longer horizon?
  3. Was any facilitator, search firm, or intermediary organisation involved in identifying or vetting candidates, and if so, who commissioned that work and what did it cost the public purse?
  4. What vetting was conducted for conflicts of interest — financial, professional, or personal — between any Commissioner and any party whose conduct the Commission may examine, including the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Public Utilities and Aviation, the Maritime Administration Department, and any private contractor connected to the MV Barima’s construction, refit, or the March 2026 rehabilitation tender?
  5. Why was the parliamentary opposition not consulted, given that the Leader of the Opposition has publicly confirmed he was not, and given that the National Assembly was scheduled to debate opposition motions on the same matter the following day?
  6. When will the legal instrument establishing the Commission be published, and will it include the selection process, the terms of reference in full, and the Commission’s funding and reporting arrangements?

None of these questions casts doubt on Justice Smith, Dr Jasionowski, Captain Fouda, Ms Alfonso, or Rear Admiral Pritchard. They cast doubt on a government that has, once again, treated the manner of its own decision-making as beneath explanation — even when the subject is the deadliest peacetime disaster in the country’s history, and even when the demand for transparency came not from a single opposition voice but from across the political spectrum and civil society alike.

Guyanese families are owed a Commission whose findings they can trust. That trust is built twice — once in the quality of the people asked to do the work, and once in the visible integrity of how they were chosen.

The President has, this week, answered only the first half of that obligation. This publication will keep asking about the second until he answers it too.

— The Board

OPEN LETTER

 

THE 592 GUARDIAN ◊ OPEN LETTER ◊· ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 

OPEN LETTER

To the President, Cabinet, Parliament, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Guyana Police Force, MARAD, and the People of Guyana

We write with urgency, anger, and sorrow over the MV Barima tragedy, a disaster that has left a trail of death, missing persons, shattered families, and a nation demanding answers. This is not a moment for managed optics, selective explanations, or insiders marking their own homework. It is a moment for truth, independence, and full public accountability.

The facts already disclosed are damning enough to justify immediate and uncompromising action. Official and media reports indicate major discrepancies in the manifest, questions about loading and oversight, arrests and criminal probes, and the removal of staff connected to the vessel’s management pending investigation. That alone is enough to show that this matter cannot be credibly handled by anyone whose office, decisions, or silence may be part of the chain of failure.

For that reason, we are demanding therecusal of all public officers who had any direct or indirect involvement, responsibility, supervisory authority, or institutional interest in the MV Barima matter. That includes officers involved in vessel loading, passenger registration, safety enforcement, manifest verification, emergency response, ministerial oversight, or internal administration. A public officer cannot sit in judgment over a system they helped operate, defend, or conceal.

We state this plainly: the public has no obligation to trust a process controlled by persons who may be compromised by proximity, loyalty, career interest, or prior decision-making. If the investigation is to mean anything, then it must be clean at the root, not merely polished at the surface. Independent maritime inquiry standards exist for precisely this reason: to preserve impartiality, prevent interference, and protect public confidence in the final findings.

Accordingly, we call for the following:

  1. Immediate recusal of all public officers with any connection to the MV Barima tragedy.
  2. Immediate preservation of all evidence, records, manifests, surveillance footage, communications, and response logs.
  3. Full independence for any commission of inquiry, with no political or administrative interference.
  4. Public disclosure of all findings, recommendations, and disciplinary or criminal referrals.
  5. Protection for witnesses, survivors, whistleblowers, and families from intimidation or pressure.
  6. A permanent overhaul of maritime safety, inspection, and manifest control systems to prevent a repeat of this catastrophe.
  7. Full open cooperation and communications with the Joint Opposition.

This tragedy is not merely an accident to be managed; it is a test of whether the state can tell the truth about itself. If officials implicated by duty or association remain anywhere near the process, then the inquiry risks becoming a shield for the system instead of a search for justice. That would be an insult to the dead, the missing, and every family now waiting for answers.

The people of Guyana deserve more than condolences and press conferences. They deserve accountability without interference, investigation without self-protection, and justice without delay.

Signed,

Concerned Citizens, Civil Society Advocates, and Defenders of Transparency and Accountability

Date: July 23 2026. 

The Power Of The People is Greater Than The People In Power

 

 

GRACE AND GRASPING: THE ACCOUNTABILITY DIVIDE

THE 592 GUARDIANIndependent Accountability Journalism

GRACE AND GRASPING: THE ACCOUNTABILITY DIVIDE


Starmer Exits with Honor; Norton Clings On Despite Ruin  The Editorial Board — The 592 Guardian


Two Leaders, One Standard

Politics is a brutal business. In mature democracies, leaders are held accountable — by their parties, by parliament, and ultimately by the voters. Sir Keir Starmer understood that. On 22 June 2026, just under two years after leading Labor from fourteen years in the wilderness to a historic landslide, Starmer announced his resignation as both Prime Minister and Labor Party leader.

He did not wait to be defenestrated. He left with his dignity intact.

The circumstances that drove him out were unsparing. His net approval rating had collapsed to negative sixty-six percent. His government lost Wales to Plaid Cymru for the first time in a century of Labor dominance. Cabinet ministers — including Health Secretary Wes Streeting — resigned before he did. When it became clear that Andy Burnham’s emphatic by-election victory had crystallized the parliamentary arithmetic against him, Starmer read the room and stepped aside. He did not require a formal vote of no confidence, a constitutional crisis, or an indignant press release from his own Central Executive Committee. He simply went.

Contrast that with Aubrey Norton. After presiding over APNU’s worst electoral result since 1957 — reduced to approximately eighteen percent of the national vote, supplanted as the main opposition by a newcomer party, WIN, that did not exist at the last election — Norton refuses to go. He has not merely clung to his position; he has announced his intention to contest the PNCR leadership again at the next Congress, while simultaneously ruling out the presidency. The logic, apparently, is that he will remain atop the apparatus of a collapsing party without having to face voters again. This is not statecraft. It is entrenchment.

The Anatomy of Norton’s Tenure

The record of Aubrey Norton’s leadership of the PNCR is not a matter of interpretation. It is documented devastation. Since he assumed the party leadership in December 2021, the PNCR has hemorrhaged senior figures at a rate that suggests not merely a personality clash at the top but a structural collapse of organizational confidence. Former parliamentarians, regional chairmen, and long-standing constituency executives have publicly abandoned Congress Place, with several crossing to the PPP/C ahead of the September 2025 elections — a political humiliation without recent precedent.

Amna Ally, the late former General Secretary who gave more than half a century to the PNCR, resigned with a letter urging Norton and his entire executive to “hang their heads in shame.” That is not the language of factional grievance. That is the verdict of institutional memory.

In the 2025 general and regional elections, APNU lost Region Ten — Linden, Norton’s own stronghold — to WIN. It lost majority control in Georgetown. It lost its historic position as the official opposition in the National Assembly. A party built over six decades of organizational discipline, forged in the era of Forbes Burnham, now commands less than one fifth of the national vote. And at the helm of this wreckage: a leader who insists he is needed to guide the “rebuilding process.”

The Central Executive Committee, to its considerable discredit, has provided cover. Its post-election statement reaffirmed “complete confidence” in Norton’s leadership while declining to address the electoral collapse or offer any diagnosis of failure. Its constitutional argument — that only a duly convened Congress can remove the leader — is technically accurate and morally evasive. Constitutionalism deployed as a shield against accountability is not principle. It is proceduralism in the service of power.

What Accountability Looks Like

Starmer did not lose a single election. He won one of the most commanding majorities in Labor’s history. Yet when his government’s failures became undeniable and his party’s confidence was withdrawn, he left. There was no hostage-taking, no constitutional manuevre, no announcement that he alone possessed the institutional knowledge required to steady a turbulent ship. He gave a speech, set a timetable, and stood aside.

That is what accountability looks like. It does not require the subject to celebrate his own departure. It requires only that he recognize that leadership is conditional on the confidence of those being led — and that when that confidence is gone, so is the mandate.

Norton appears to have arrived at the opposite conclusion: that the worse things get, the more indispensable he becomes. That the party’s crisis is not evidence of his failure but rather the proof of the chaos that would engulf it without his steadying hand. This is the psychology of incumbency untethered from results. It is the logic of every leader who has mistaken the apparatus of power for a personal inheritance.

Power, Patronage, and the Third-Term Manuevre

Norton’s persistence is troubling in isolation. It becomes more troubling when considered alongside what is now being discussed, with increasing urgency, in Guyanese political circles.

Reports reaching this Editorial Board — not yet independently verified and attributed here as credible political intelligence rather than confirmed fact — suggest that elements within the governing coalition are actively exploring whether opposition parliamentarians can be induced to support a constitutional amendment that would permit a third presidential term. If true, this would implicate the offices of President Irfaan Ali and Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo in what amounts to the targeted corruption of the legislature.

This is not without historical parallel. Jagdeo himself sought, through judicial channels, to clear the path for a third term during his own presidency — and was turned back by the courts. That attempt failed. The question now being raised is whether, with a fragmentary opposition, a weakened PNCR, and a National Assembly already made pliable by the erosion of meaningful check, a second attempt — this time through parliamentary means and financial persuasion — might succeed where litigation did not.

We are not in a position to name names or cite on-record sources at this stage. We are in a position to say this:

The allegation is specific, is circulating at senior levels, and deserves urgent and transparent denial from the Office of the President and the Vice President. The silence of the powerful is not innocence. It is a provocation to ask harder questions

 Lord Acton’s axiom has never required revision: power corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely. A government that has already accumulated substantial control over Guyana’s regulatory architecture, media environment, and patronage networks does not need a third term to become a threat to democratic governance. It is already one. A third term would simply formalize what is already structural.

The Broader Lesson for Guyana

The Starmer-Norton juxtaposition is not offered here as an exercise in comparative politics for its own sake. It is offered because Guyana’s political culture has normalized a relationship between leaders and power that most functional democracies would find unrecognizable. In Britain, a Prime Minister who won a landslide eighteen months ago resigned when his party lost confidence.

In Guyana, a party leader who oversaw the worst electoral collapse in his party’s modern history is positioning himself for another term at the helm — and the governing party is allegedly shopping for votes to extend presidential tenure beyond constitutional limits.

 

These are not unrelated pathologies. They are symptoms of the same disease:

A political class that has internalized the assumption that accountability is something that happens to other people. That electoral defeat is a condition to be managed rather than a verdict to be respected. That the constitution is an instrument to be navigated rather than a constraint to be honored.

 Guyana’s citizens — those who voted for APNU and those who did not, those who support the PPP/C and those who do not — deserve leaders who understand, as Keir Starmer apparently understood on the morning of 22 June 2026, that the people’s verdict is final.

Aubrey Norton has not learned this. If the third-term reports carry any truth, neither has the governing Party.

The Editorial Board

The 592 GuardianJune 2026

Land-gate, Sheepgate, Fowl-gate: Resign or Remain

THE 592. GUARDIAN. ACCOUNTABILITY JOURNALISM FOR GUYANA 

Land-gate, Sheepgate, Fowl-gate: Resign or Remain


The question has been put to me in no uncertain manner: should Pres Ali resign?  It’s my sabbath, so the answer will have to wait.  Also, let this much be said in the open-air: whatever the recommendations I offer my president, it would be for his ears only.  Having said that, there’s still my duty to the Guyanese people.  When the people ask questions, the people must get answers.

No one, neither man nor woman, should stick around when his name has become mud.  When there’s no basis, the claims are unfounded, then he must take the fight to the enemy.  Stick around and stick it to the wackos and sickos.  I did.  Pres Ali has a lot of land.  Means that there’s plenty mud for him to wade through when it rains.  Rocky ground when the heat arrives, the slush freezes.  Where could this lead: heaven or hell.  Moreover, Pres Ali has a ton of sheep, cows by the cargo plane, and shrimp by the seine full.  It’s a wonderful life when a man has a sweet weekend resort to retreat to, and listen to the grass grow.  But all those flocks of richly fed fowls and ducks, cows and sheep, tells me that Pres Ali has a considerable amount of manure to navigate around.  He may do so successfully.  But the odors, Mr. President.  Odors of that kind have a habit of clinging stubbornly.  Like secondhand cigarette smoke, that is also hazardous to health.  Including politicos.  Even presidents don’t have the proper level of immunity in such situations.

Resign in the wake (and stench) of Pres Ali’s Animal Farm.  Should he, or shouldn’t he?  Having myself managed with more than one PPP Govt-inspired witch-hunt, the president may try his luck.  I remind him of this one nonnegotiable condition: it would be better if he has no brooms lying around in secret compartments.  Those are dead giveaways and spur on the hunters to more raucous efforts.  I use the opportunity to remind Pres Ali and his posse of that old truism: what goes around comes around.  I warned he and his people: don’t mess with me.  Well, his own people now turn against he (and he against them) in a war of words, claims and counterclaims, over sheep, land, fowl and duck.  Guyana (and the PPP) has degenerated into a regular meat market.  Me, I still going to chuch, reading my Bible, keeping the faith.  Caution: Mock Maker! And a reckoning comes.  All those piety stops in off-limits houses represented the lows in political hypocrisy.  Using god, and recruiting some greedy pastors to sell their souls (and flocks), has payback.  Indeed, there’s a time for everything under the sun. 

There was a time when Mohamed Irfaan Ali and Azruddin Mohamed monopolized the laughter in Guyana.  Now, it seems, is their time for pointing fingers at one another, trading insults, and weeping.  There was a time when Dr. Ali’s people said that I am Mohamed’s people.  Now the same Mohamed alleges that Dr. Ali is that kind of people.  Land in Long Creek.  Lan-tun posts by the Linden Highway.  Lakes for a languid fish life.  The common denominator is the national leader.  According to him, the banks have his

back (loans).  According to him, he has the papers to drive some perverse people out of the press.  From storied English Literature, I use Lady Macbeth to remind Excellency All all the perfumes in Arabia will not sweeten this little hand.”  He has some sanitizing to do.  Capable of doing so, I think.  Must strive, deliver.

The question lingers.  Hints rejected.  Strongarm maneuvers tried.  Should he resign?  Should he stay and reign?  He does and he is shaggier than the sheep on that farm.  Bad when dry.  Worse when it is wet.  The smell that overpowers.  I am trying to give the president some subtle nudges on how to save face. 

The longer he sticks around, the greater the risk that there is nothing left to save.  A considerable amount of damage done.  It is time I leave.

THE 592. GUARDIAN. ACCOUNTABILITY JOURNALISM