Investigative Report – 592guardian.com

𝐓𝐇𝐄 𝐒𝐇𝐀𝐃𝐎𝐖 𝐒𝐄𝐂𝐑𝐄𝐓𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐀𝐓: 𝐇𝐎𝐖 𝐆𝐔𝐘𝐀𝐍𝐀’𝐒 𝐌𝐈𝐍𝐈𝐒𝐓𝐑𝐘 𝐎𝐅 𝐍𝐀𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐀𝐋 𝐑𝐄𝐒𝐎𝐔𝐑𝐂𝐄𝐒 𝐌𝐀𝐘 𝐁𝐄 𝐄𝐍𝐆𝐈𝐍𝐄𝐄𝐑𝐈𝐍𝐆 𝐀 𝐂𝐎𝐌𝐏𝐋𝐈𝐀𝐍𝐂𝐄 𝐈𝐋𝐋𝐔𝐒𝐈𝐎𝐍 𝐀𝐇𝐄𝐀𝐃 𝐎𝐅 𝐓𝐇𝐄 𝐉𝐔𝐍𝐄 𝟐𝟎𝟐𝟔 𝐄𝐈𝐓𝐈 𝐕𝐀𝐋𝐈𝐃𝐀𝐓𝐈𝐎𝐍

May 10, 2026/in Investigative Report/by Editor

BY: Hem Kumar

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣

𝗪𝗛𝗔𝗧 𝗛𝗔𝗦 𝗛𝗔𝗣𝗣𝗘𝗡𝗘𝗗 — 𝗔𝗡𝗗 𝗪𝗛𝗬 𝗜𝗧 𝗠𝗔𝗧𝗧𝗘𝗥𝗦

𝙎𝙪𝙗𝙟𝙚𝙘𝙩: 𝘿𝙧. 𝙋𝙧𝙚𝙢 𝙈𝙞𝙨𝙞𝙧 | 𝙍𝙤𝙡𝙚: 𝘼𝙙𝙫𝙞𝙨𝙤𝙧, 𝙂𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙣𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝘼𝙜𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙮 𝙀𝙣𝙜𝙖𝙜𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩 | 𝙈𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙨𝙩𝙧𝙮 𝙤𝙛 𝙉𝙖𝙩𝙪𝙧𝙖𝙡 𝙍𝙚𝙨𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙘𝙚𝙨, 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖

𝙆𝙚𝙮 𝘿𝙚𝙖𝙙𝙡𝙞𝙣𝙚: 𝙅𝙪𝙣𝙚 2026 𝙀𝙄𝙏𝙄 𝙑𝙖𝙡𝙞𝙙𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝘿𝙚𝙘𝙞𝙨𝙞𝙤𝙣

𝗔𝗻 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗲𝗱𝗶𝘁𝗼𝗿𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗰𝗶𝘃𝗶𝗹 𝘀𝗼𝗰𝗶𝗲𝘁𝘆, 𝗹𝗲𝗴𝗮𝗹 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝗻𝗲𝗿𝘀, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗮𝘂𝗱𝗶𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘀

𝗦𝗨𝗠𝗠𝗔𝗥𝗬: 𝗪𝗛𝗔𝗧 𝗛𝗔𝗦 𝗛𝗔𝗣𝗣𝗘𝗡𝗘𝗗 — 𝗔𝗡𝗗 𝗪𝗛𝗬 𝗜𝗧 𝗠𝗔𝗧𝗧𝗘𝗥𝗦

The appointment of Dr. Prem Misir to the role of “𝗔𝗱𝘃𝗶𝘀𝗼𝗿, 𝗚𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗔𝗴𝗲𝗻𝗰𝘆 𝗘𝗻𝗴𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁” at the Ministry of Natural Resources is not, as it has been presented, an administrative upgrade. It is a strategic repackaging — one that serves two simultaneous purposes: it gives the international EITI Board the optical illusion of reform (a new title, a fresh mandate) while preserving operational control exactly where it has always resided — inside the Ministry.

In investigative terms, what we are looking at is a 𝗦𝗵𝗮𝗱𝗼𝘄 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝗿𝗲𝘁𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗮𝘁: a parallel administrative track installed above the official GYEITI Secretariat, designed to filter, manage, and where necessary, neutralize inconvenient data before it reaches independent auditors.

The timing is not coincidental. Guyana was referred to the EITI Validation Committee on March 19th. A second “Low” or “No Progress” rating in June 2026 risks triggering full suspension from the EITI. This appointment is the government’s firewall — designed to ensure the 2024 and 2025 data sets do not expose the same structural gaps that caused the 2023 suspension.

𝗪𝗵𝗲𝗻 𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝗰𝗮𝗻𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗴𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘀, 𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗴𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻 𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗺. 𝗢𝗿 𝗮𝘁 𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗶𝗺𝘂𝗺, 𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗴𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗶𝗿 𝘁𝗶𝘁𝗹𝗲.

𝗦𝗘𝗖𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡 𝗜: 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗠𝗘𝗖𝗛𝗔𝗡𝗜𝗖𝗦 — 𝗧𝗛𝗥𝗘𝗘 𝗪𝗔𝗬𝗦 𝗧𝗛𝗜𝗦 “𝗥𝗘𝗕𝗥𝗔𝗡𝗗” 𝗕𝗬𝗣𝗔𝗦𝗦𝗘𝗦 𝗧𝗥𝗔𝗡𝗦𝗣𝗔𝗥𝗘𝗡𝗖𝗬

1.𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗔𝗴𝗲𝗻𝗰𝘆 𝗙𝗶𝗿𝗲𝘄𝗮𝗹𝗹

Traditionally, the GYEITI Secretariat goes directly to the Guyana Gold Board, the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC), and the Guyana Revenue Authority (GRA) for raw data. Under the guise of “coordination,” state agencies may now have been instructed — formally or informally — to route all GYEITI-related data through the Advisor first.

This creates a pre-screening layer. Discrepancies, unreconciled figures, and gaps in reporting can be “smoothed out” before they ever reach the Independent Administrator. By the time the auditors see the numbers, the numbers have already been managed.

2. 𝗩𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗦𝗰𝗿𝗶𝗽𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴

With the June 2026 Validation looming, the EITI Board will conduct stakeholder interviews. A core function of the Advisor role is almost certainly the coaching of newer, more compliant civil society members — those who replaced the sidelined independent voices — on the “correct” narrative to present to international investigators.

This is not governance. This is choreography.

3. 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹 𝗜𝗺𝗺𝘂𝗻𝗶𝘁𝘆

By holding the title of “Advisor” rather than “National Coordinator,” Dr. Misir is no longer technically an officer of the GYEITI Secretariat. This insulation is deliberate. If the 2026 EITI Report contains errors, omissions, or unreconciled data, the Ministry can blame “administrative fragmentation” or Secretariat staff — while the Advisor, as a protected contractual entity, remains untouchable.

𝗔𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗵𝗮𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗯𝗲𝗲𝗻 𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗲𝗻𝗴𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗻𝗲𝗱. 𝗜𝘁 𝗵𝗮𝘀 𝗯𝗲𝗲𝗻 𝗮𝗿𝗰𝗵𝗶𝘁𝗲𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗱𝗶𝘀𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗲𝗱.

𝗦𝗘𝗖𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡 𝗜𝗜: 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗟𝗘𝗚𝗔𝗟 𝗘𝗫𝗣𝗢𝗦𝗨𝗥𝗘 — 𝗪𝗛𝗔𝗧 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗦𝗧𝗔𝗞𝗘𝗛𝗢𝗟𝗗𝗘𝗥𝗦 𝗦𝗛𝗢𝗨𝗟𝗗 𝗧𝗔𝗥𝗚𝗘𝗧

The following represent potential breaches of the 2023 EITI Standard and Guyana’s domestic administrative law framework:𝗘𝗜𝗧𝗜 𝗥𝗲𝗾𝘂𝗶𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝟭.𝟰 — 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗠𝗦𝗚’𝘀 𝗥𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁 𝘁𝗼 𝗢𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗲𝗲 𝗜𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻

The EITI Standard mandates that the Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) must oversee the implementation of the EITI process. The central legal question is this: Was the “Advisor, Government Agency Engagement” position created unilaterally by the Ministry, without the MSG reviewing or approving its Terms of Reference?

If the answer is yes — and all available indicators suggest it is — this constitutes a direct breach of the multi-stakeholder oversight mandate. It is not a procedural technicality. It is a structural violation.

𝗘𝗜𝗧𝗜 𝗥𝗲𝗾𝘂𝗶𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝟭.𝟭 — 𝗔𝗰𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗚𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗟𝗲𝗮𝗱𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗵𝗶𝗽

The EITI Standard requires the government to appoint a senior individual who is legally accountable for the accuracy of data submitted to the International Board. If the Minister holds nominal leadership and Misir operates as the operational Advisor, a critical gap opens: who is legally responsible when the data is wrong?

This ambiguity is not accidental. It is the point.

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗨𝗹𝘁𝗿𝗮 𝗩𝗶𝗿𝗲𝘀 𝗤𝘂𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻

Legal inquiries should focus specifically on whether the Minister exceeded his statutory authority by creating a role that functionally overlaps with — and potentially subordinates — the statutory duties of the GYEITI National Secretariat. If the Secretariat is a body established by law or regulation, and the Advisor role effectively supersedes its data-collection mandate, the Minister may have acted ultra vires — beyond his lawful powers.

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗔𝗰𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗜𝗻𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗔𝗰𝘁 (𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟭) 𝘃𝘀. 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝗿𝗲𝗰𝘆

Since the Commissioner of Information has remained non-responsive, the Advisor’s contract almost certainly operates as a private services agreement — shielded from standard civil service disclosure requirements.

The key distinction that must be established: Is Dr. Misir, a Public Officer subject to Guyana’s Integrity Commission Act, or a Contractual Consultant operating outside those accountability structures? The answer determines whether his contract, scope of work, and remuneration are subject to public disclosure — or deliberately hidden behind a procurement veil.

𝗦𝗘𝗖𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡 𝗜𝗜𝗜: 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗔𝗨𝗗𝗜𝗧 𝗧𝗥𝗔𝗜𝗟 — 𝗪𝗛𝗔𝗧 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗙𝗢𝗥𝗘𝗡𝗦𝗜𝗖 𝗔𝗨𝗗𝗜𝗧𝗢𝗥 𝗠𝗨𝗦𝗧 𝗧𝗥𝗔𝗖𝗘

The auditor’s task is to reconstruct the.𝗗𝗮𝘁𝗮 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝗶𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝗖𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗼𝗱𝘆

Four specific lines of inquiry should be pursued simultaneously:

1. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗧𝗲𝗿𝗺𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗥𝗲𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗚𝗮𝗽

Obtain the formal Scope of Work for the Advisor position. Examine it for language that grants authority to “review,” “vet,” “approve,” or “coordinate” data from GGMC, GRA, or the Guyana Gold Board. Any such language confirms the existence of a pre-screening layer that compromises the integrity of the audit trail.

2. 𝗕𝘂𝗱𝗴𝗲𝘁𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗢𝗿𝗶𝗴𝗶𝗻

Determine whether the Advisor’s remuneration is drawn from the GYEITI Secretariat’s allocated budget or from the Ministry of Natural Resources’ “Contracted Services” line. If the latter: he is a political agent funded through a discretionary ministerial budget, not a technical officer of the transparency body.

3.𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗠𝗲𝗺𝗼𝗿𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗮 𝘁𝗼 𝗦𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗔𝗴𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗲𝘀

Has any Internal Memorandum been issued to GGMC, GGB, or GRA instructing those agencies to copy or route GYEITI-related data transfers through the Advisor? Such a document, if it exists, is the single most damaging piece of evidence — it proves the firewall is operational, not theoretical.

4. 𝗢𝗯𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗲𝗿 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗔𝗱𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗼𝗿

IDoes the Advisor attend meetings between the Independent Administrator (the international auditors) and state agencies? His presence in those sessions — even as a passive “observer” — constitutes government overreach into what is legally required to be an independent reconciliation process. It is sufficient grounds to challenge the validity of any GYEITI Report produced under these conditions.

𝗦𝗘𝗖𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡 𝗜𝗩: 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗛𝗔𝗥𝗗 𝗤𝗨𝗘𝗦𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡𝗦 — 𝗙𝗢𝗥 𝗖𝗜𝗩𝗜𝗟 𝗦𝗢𝗖𝗜𝗘𝗧𝗬 𝗦𝗢𝗨𝗥𝗖𝗘𝗦 𝗢𝗡 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗚𝗥𝗢𝗨𝗡𝗗

When you approach the independent MSG members who have been sidelined, ask them directly:

Q1:𝗪𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗶𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗠𝗦𝗚 𝘀𝘂𝗯-𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗺𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗲 𝗺𝗲𝗲𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴𝘀?

Is it Secretariat staff, as it should be — or is the Advisor leading those sessions? If the latter, the MSG’s operational independence has been effectively captured.

Q2: 𝗛𝗮𝘃𝗲 𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝘀𝗲𝗲𝗻 𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁’𝘀 𝗦𝗰𝗼𝗽𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗪𝗼𝗿𝗸?

If the Ministry refused to table the Terms of Reference at an MSG meeting, they have likely already violated EITI Requirement 1.4. The refusal itself is evidence.

Q3: 𝗜𝘀 𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗿𝗲𝘀𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗶𝗻 𝘀𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗔𝗱𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗼𝗿?

His attendance in auditor meetings is not a neutral administrative courtesy. It is observable interference with the independence of the reconciliation process — and it should be formally documented and reported to the EITI International Secretariat.

Q4:𝗗𝗼 𝗚𝗬𝗘𝗜𝗧𝗜 𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗳𝗳 𝗻𝗼𝘄 𝗿𝗲𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁 𝘁𝗼 𝗵𝗶𝗺 𝗶𝗻 𝗮𝗻𝘆 𝗰𝗮𝗽𝗮𝗰𝗶𝘁𝘆?

Even an informal “dotted line” reporting structure — where Secretariat staff feel obligated to keep the Advisor informed before acting — functionally subordinates the technical body to a political appointee. Ask Secretariat staff directly, and off the record.

Q5:𝗪𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗮 𝗖𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘁-𝗮𝗽𝗽𝗿𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗱 𝗽𝗼𝘀𝘁?

If so, why was it not publicized through the Department of Public Information in the standard transparent manner? A Cabinet-approved position that bypasses public announcement raises immediate questions about what the government did not want publicly scrutinized.

𝗦𝗘𝗖𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡 𝗩: 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗕𝗢𝗧𝗧𝗢𝗠 𝗟𝗜𝗡𝗘 — 𝗪𝗛𝗔𝗧 𝗧𝗛𝗜𝗦 𝗔𝗟𝗟 𝗠𝗘𝗔𝗡𝗦

The Ministry of Natural Resources is attempting to satisfy the June 2026 Validation Committee by presenting the appearance of strengthened government engagement. The international optics are: new title, new energy, renewed commitment.

The operational reality is the opposite. A political gatekeeper has been installed to manage the narrative flowing into the EITI process — to ensure that unreconciled figures, unexplained discrepancies, and data gaps do not survive into the final report in the form that would trigger a second suspension.

The legal hook that could unravel this entire arrangement is EITI Requirement 1.4. If it can be demonstrated that this role was created without MSG knowledge, without MSG review of its Terms of Reference, and without MSG consent — then the government has not strengthened its EITI compliance. It has violated it. And the June 2026 Validation outcome should reflect that violation accordingly.

The question is no longer whether something is wrong with how GYEITI is being managed. The question is whether the evidence trail is strong enough to prove it to an international body before the window closes.

𝗧𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝘄𝗶𝗻𝗱𝗼𝘄 𝗰𝗹𝗼𝘀𝗲𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝗝𝘂𝗻𝗲.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮,𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

The Wales Watchdog Series: Part 111

April 29, 2026/in Investigative Report/by Staff Writer

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗗𝗼𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗔𝗴𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀: 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗟𝗲𝗴𝗮𝗹 𝗔𝗿𝗰𝗵𝗶𝘁𝗲𝗰𝘁𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 $𝟭𝟬𝟮𝗠 “𝗣𝗼𝗶𝘀𝗼𝗻 𝗣𝗶𝗹𝗹”

𝗕𝗬: 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝟱𝟵𝟮 𝗚𝗨𝗔𝗥𝗗𝗜𝗔𝗡 𝗜𝗡𝗩𝗘𝗦𝗧𝗜𝗚𝗔𝗧𝗜𝗩𝗘 𝗨𝗡𝗜𝗧

𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗚𝗔𝗧𝗘𝗞𝗘𝗘𝗣𝗘𝗥𝗦 𝗢𝗙 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗧𝗥𝗘𝗔𝗦𝗨𝗥𝗬

If Part I exposed the contractor’s checkered past and Part II mapped the offshore shell games, Part III uncovers the most disturbing layer of the Gas-to-Energy (GtE) project:

The Inside Job. A project of this magnitude requires robust legal defense to protect the national interest. Instead, The 592 Guardian has found that the lines between the “Defender of the State” and the “Counsel for the Contractor” were not just blurred—they were non-existent.

𝗧𝗛𝗘 “𝗗𝗢𝗨𝗕𝗟𝗘 𝗔𝗚𝗘𝗡𝗧” 𝗔𝗧𝗧𝗢𝗥𝗡𝗘𝗬: 𝗗𝗘𝗩𝗜𝗡𝗗𝗥𝗔 𝗞𝗜𝗦𝗦𝗢𝗢𝗡

At the center of this web sits Devindra Kissoon, the founding member of London House Chambers and the President of the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) Guyana. Our investigation into the UK “Paper Trail” and local High Court filings has confirmed a stunning conflict of interest that effectively “disarmed” the Government of Guyana (GoG) before negotiations even began.

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗙𝗶𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴𝘀:

• 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗼𝗿𝘁𝗶𝘂𝗺’𝘀 𝗔𝗿𝗰𝗵𝗶𝘁𝗲𝗰𝘁: As early as 2021, Kissoon and his firm were retained by the CH4-Lindsayca network. London House Chambers publicly boasts of representing the consortium to “secure” the natural gas plant deal.

• 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗚𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁’𝘀 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘀𝘂𝗹𝘁𝗮𝗻𝘁: Simultaneously, Kissoon has served as a prominent retained counsel for the Minister of Natural Resources and the state-owned Guyana Power and Light (GPL)—the very entity that must buy the power Lindsayca produces.

• 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗨𝗞 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗻𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻: Our forensic look at 𝗟𝗜𝗡𝗗𝗦𝗔𝗬𝗖𝗔 𝗗𝗘𝗩𝗘𝗟𝗢𝗣𝗠𝗘𝗡𝗧 𝗟𝗟𝗣 (𝗢𝗖𝟰𝟰𝟰𝟴𝟴𝟮)—the UK entity used to trigger the US$102M arbitration—shows it was registered on November 30, 2022. Kissoon, a UK-qualified barrister and “London House” principal, is alleged to have been instrumental in engineering this specific UK-based structure to “armor” the contractor against local Guyanese oversight.

𝗧𝗛𝗘 “𝗣𝗢𝗜𝗦𝗢𝗡 𝗣𝗜𝗟𝗟”: 𝗔 𝗥𝗜𝗚𝗚𝗘𝗗 𝗔𝗥𝗕𝗜𝗧𝗥𝗔𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡

The US$102.7 million loss wasn’t a failure of luck; it was a failure by design.

• 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗪𝗮𝗶𝘃𝗲𝗿: Sources indicate that during the formation of the contract, Winston Brassington (Head of the GtE Taskforce) specifically requested that the contractors grant a “waiver” to allow Kissoon to provide the legal opinion on the arbitration venue and dispute resolution clauses.

• 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝘀𝘂𝗹𝘁:The GoG essentially allowed the contractor’s lawyer to help write the rules for how the contractor could sue the GoG.

When the contractor triggered the Dispute Adjudication Board (DAAB) using the UK-Guyana Treaty, the government found itself trapped in a legal framework it had paid its own “double agent” to build. The result? A US$102,679,839 bill that taxpayers are now paying in installments, while the legal minds behind the deal remain insulated by high-level political connections.

𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗔𝗠𝗖𝗛𝗔𝗠 𝗩𝗘𝗡𝗘𝗘𝗥

By utilizing his position as AMCHAM President, Kissoon helped present the consortium as a “Tier-One American Engineering” powerhouse.

This polished, US-backed veneer effectively blinded Guyanese evaluators to the reality:that the entity was a debt-heavy vehicle with a history of FBI raids (via the CH4/Bellosta network) and shell-company maneuvers.

“𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘺 𝘶𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘈𝘮𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘯 𝘧𝘭𝘢𝘨 𝘵𝘰 𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘥𝘰𝘰𝘳, 𝘢 𝘉𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘩 𝘵𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘭𝘰𝘤𝘬 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘢𝘧𝘦, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘢 𝘭𝘰𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘺𝘦𝘳 𝘵𝘰 𝘩𝘰𝘭𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘬𝘦𝘺.”— 𝗜𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗱𝗲 𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲, 𝗠𝗶𝗻𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗿𝘆 𝗼𝗳 𝗟𝗲𝗴𝗮𝗹 𝗔𝗳𝗳𝗮𝗶𝗿𝘀

𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗚𝗨𝗔𝗥𝗗𝗜𝗔𝗡’𝗦 𝗩𝗘𝗥𝗗𝗜𝗖𝗧

The US$102M payout is the price of collusion. When the person advising the Ministry on how to protect the public purse is the same person advising the contractor on how to extract from it, the public loses every time. This was not a negotiation; it was a coordinated transfer of wealth.

This add-on to Part III serves as a “Financial Health Warning” for both local and diaspora investors. It unmasks the legal machinery that has turned a national project into a private enclave.

𝗔𝗗𝗗𝗘𝗡𝗗𝗨𝗠 𝗧𝗢 𝗣𝗔𝗥𝗧 𝗜𝗜𝗜: 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗞𝗜𝗦𝗦𝗢𝗢𝗡 𝗖𝗛𝗥𝗢𝗡𝗜𝗖𝗟𝗘𝗦

𝗧𝗵𝗲 “𝗠𝗮𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿 𝗞𝗲𝘆” 𝘁𝗼 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗪𝗮𝗹𝗲𝘀 𝗠𝗼𝗻𝗼𝗽𝗼𝗹𝘆

While the public sees Devindra Kissoon as a prominent attorney and the face of AMCHAM Guyana, The 592 Guardian has identified him as the “Master Key” that unlocks the Guyanese Treasury for the Lindsayca-CH4 consortium. His positioning is not merely a series of coincidences; it is a strategic occupation of every seat at the negotiating table.

1.𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗖𝗹𝗶𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗣𝗼𝗿𝘁𝗳𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗼: 𝗔 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗳𝗹𝗶𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗳 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗠𝗮𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗰𝗹𝗮𝘀𝘀 :To understand how the US$102.7M arbitration loss happened, one must look at the names on Kissoon’s ledger. He is simultaneously:

• 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘀𝗲𝗹 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿:

Representing the Lindsayca-CH4 consortium during the inception of the GtE project.

• 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘀𝗲𝗹 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗩𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗿𝘆: Serving as the personal legal representative for Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo (the chief architect of the GtE project).

• 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘀𝗲𝗹 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗕𝘂𝘆𝗲𝗿: Providing legal services to Guyana Power and Light (GPL)—the state entity forced to absorb the costs of the project’s delays.

• 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗚𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗸𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗳 𝗜𝗻𝘃𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁:

Operating as President of AMCHAM, where he “vets” incoming US and diaspora firms, effectively deciding who gets to play in the Wales arena.

2.𝗧𝗵𝗲 “𝗣𝗿𝗲𝗳𝗲𝗿𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗕𝗶𝗱𝗱𝗲𝗿” 𝗣𝗶𝗽𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲: Our investigation has uncovered that the current Expressions of Interest (EOI) for the Fertilizer and Gas Bottling plants carry the same “DNA” as the original power plant deal.

• 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗴𝘆: By incorporating these new entities as Private Companies rather than Public Corporations, Kissoon’s legal framework ensures they are exempt from the Public Procurement Act.

• 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗜𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗱𝗲 𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗰𝗸:This allows the government to bypass open competitive bidding and move directly to a “Preferred Bidder” status for Lindsayca—the same company currently holding the government hostage for an additional US$250M.

3.𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗗𝗶𝗮𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗿𝗮 𝗪𝗮𝗿𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴: 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟭𝟬% 𝗚𝘂𝗮𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗲 𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗽: To the Guyanese Diaspora looking to “invest in home,” beware of the fine print. The EOI documents—reportedly structured under Kissoon’s guidance—feature a 10% Guaranteed Annual Return.

• 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗽: This guarantee is not backed by the profits of the fertilizer plant (which doesn’t exist yet); it is backed by the Consolidated Fund.

• 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆: If the project fails or the contractor (Lindsayca) mismanages the funds—as they have in the Dominican Republic—the Guyanese taxpayer is legally obligated to pay the investors their 10%. You aren’t investing in a business; you are investing in a debt instrument that your own relatives in Guyana will have to pay back through taxes.

𝟰. 𝗥𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 “𝗦𝗵𝗶𝗲𝗹𝗱”

We have confirmed through UK Companies House records that the registration of LINDSAYCA DEVELOPMENT LLP was a surgical strike. By placing the entity in a jurisdiction with a favorable treaty, Kissoon provided the contractor with a “legal armor” that our local Attorney General’s chambers was either too incompetent or too complicit to challenge.

“𝘐𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 𝘫𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘴𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘭𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘭𝘢𝘱 𝘸𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘨𝘨𝘦𝘳 𝘢 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘣𝘢𝘳𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘢 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘤 𝘢𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘵. 𝘐𝘯 𝘎𝘶𝘺𝘢𝘯𝘢, 𝘪𝘵 𝘦𝘢𝘳𝘯𝘴 𝘺𝘰𝘶 𝘢 𝘴𝘦𝘢𝘵 𝘢𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘩𝘦𝘢𝘥 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦.”—

𝗘𝗱𝗶𝘁𝗼𝗿𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗕𝗼𝗮𝗿𝗱, 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟱𝟵𝟮 𝗚𝘂𝗮𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗮𝗻

𝗖𝗢𝗠𝗜𝗡𝗚 𝗡𝗘𝗫𝗧 | 𝗣𝗔𝗥𝗧 𝗜𝗩: 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗘𝗢𝗜

𝗘𝗫𝗣𝗢𝗦𝗘𝗗; 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗠𝗮𝗻𝘇𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗼 𝗪𝗮𝗿𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴, 𝗧𝗵𝗲 “𝗕𝗹𝗮𝗰𝗸 𝗕𝗼𝘅” 𝗼𝗳 𝗪𝗮𝗹𝗲𝘀: How the US$340M Fertilizer and Gas Bottling Deals are Being Hidden from Public Scrutiny. We will break down the specific terms of the EOI and why the “Private Entity” status is a death knell for transparency.

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗠𝗮𝗻𝘇𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗼 𝗪𝗮𝗿𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴—A side-by-side comparison of the failed DR project and the current Wales trajectory.

𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝟱𝟵𝟮 𝗚𝗨𝗔𝗥𝗗𝗜𝗔𝗡: 𝗛𝗮𝗿𝗱-𝗧𝗿𝘂𝘁𝗵. 𝗜𝗻𝘃𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗴𝗮𝘁𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁. 𝗬𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝗥𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁𝘀, 𝗚𝘂𝗮𝗿𝗱𝗲𝗱.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 — 𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.

The Wales Watchdog Series: Part 1

April 27, 2026/in Investigative Report/by Staff Writer

𝗜𝗡𝗧𝗥𝗢𝗗𝗨𝗖𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡 :

In the interest of transparency and national accountability, 𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 is embarking on the grueling task of unraveling the labyrinthine conundrum that has become the Gas-to-Energy project. What was birthed as a singular, unilateral vision—a project declared the largest and most impactful in our nation’s history—was inexplicably brought to life without the safeguards of a formal feasibility study. Even more alarming is the apparent absence of rigorous due diligence regarding the contractor, Lindsayca, whose checkered international record was seemingly overlooked. As the price tag balloons and the timelines shift, we are committed to deconstructing this complex web of financial maneuvers and procedural bypasses, ensuring that every Guyanese citizen is clued into the reality of how their future is being managed. We invite you to join us on this investigative journey as we demand the clarity and oversight that our treasury, and our people, deserve.

𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗣𝗥𝗘𝗠𝗜𝗦𝗘: 𝗔 𝗣𝗥𝗢𝗠𝗜𝗦𝗘 𝗢𝗡 𝗣𝗜𝗘𝗥 𝟭

In December 2022, the Government of Guyana (GoG) stood on the precipice of history, signing a $759 million USD contract with the Lindsayca-CH4 consortium. The promise was simple, yet seductive: a 300-megawatt power plant and Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) facility that would slash electricity costs by 50% by 2024.

But as the 2024 deadline crumbled, and as we stand in 2026 with a project total ballooning toward $1.1 billion USD, The 592 Guardian has pulled back the curtain on the “investigative vacuum” that allowed this deal to proceed. Our findings suggest that Lindsayca was never the “energy powerhouse” advertised, but rather a master of the 𝗘𝗣𝗖 𝗠𝗶𝗱𝗱𝗹𝗲𝗺𝗮𝗻 𝗠𝗼𝗱𝗲𝗹—Pl operating on high debt, low transparency, and a history of litigation.

𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗩𝗘𝗡𝗘𝗭𝗨𝗘𝗟𝗔𝗡 𝗚𝗘𝗡𝗘𝗦𝗜𝗦 & 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗛𝗢𝗨𝗦𝗧𝗢𝗡 𝗛𝗨𝗦𝗧𝗟𝗘

Lindsayca was born in 1995 as a family-owned engineering firm in Venezuela. When the brothers Hector and Jesus Fuentes Guimare moved operations to Houston in 2003, they didn’t export a legacy of massive turbine construction; they exported a Rolodex.

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝗱 𝗙𝗹𝗮𝗴𝘀 𝗜𝗴𝗻𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗱:

• The Gazprom Precedent: Before landing in Guyana, Lindsayca was embroiled in a $43 million USD dispute in Texas with Russian giant Gazprom. The allegations? Over-invoicing and under-performance on a gas compression plant. The pattern of “billing for the unbuilt” was established long before they touched Guyanese soil.

• The Debt Ratio: Independent financial audits from the 2016–2019 period—available during the bidding process—showed a company with staggering debt levels. Yet, the GoG’s evaluation committee deemed them “technically and financially sound” over world-class bidders like Guycan (Daewoo/Mitsubishi).

𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗦𝗛𝗘𝗟𝗟 𝗚𝗔𝗠𝗘: 𝗧𝗛𝗘 “𝗥𝗗” 𝗖𝗢𝗡𝗡𝗘𝗖𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡

Our investigation has tracked a sophisticated “internal procurement” loop. Lindsayca Guyana Inc. has not been purchasing critical materials directly from manufacturers.

Instead, invoices obtained by The 592 Guardian show a circular flow of funds:

1. Guyanese Taxpayer Dollars are paid to Lindsayca Guyana.

2. Lindsayca Guyana “purchases” materials from Lindsayca RD SAS (a shell entity in the Dominican Republic).

3. Lindsayca RD SAS—owned by the same Fuentes brothers—buys the materials with a massive markup, effectively “round-tripping” the profit into offshore accounts before a single turbine is fired.

“This isn’t infrastructure; it’s an extraction mechanism. They are self-supplying at a premium, then crying ‘insolvency’ to demand more money from the Guyanese treasury.” — Investigative Source, GTE Taskforce

𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗣𝗥𝗜𝗖𝗘 𝗢𝗙 𝗦𝗜𝗟𝗘𝗡𝗖𝗘: $𝟭.𝟭 𝗕𝗜𝗟𝗟𝗜𝗢𝗡 𝗔𝗡𝗗 𝗖𝗢𝗨𝗡𝗧𝗜𝗡𝗚

Today, the “Deal of the Century” has become a “Debt of the Century.” The math is cold and unforgiving:

• Original Bid: $759 Million

• Arbitration Loss (DAAB): $102.7 Million (Paid by you, the taxpayer, due to site-access failures).

• The New Demand: $250 Million (The current “shakedown” amount Lindsayca claims is needed to reach late 2026).

𝗧𝗢𝗧𝗔𝗟 𝗖𝗢𝗦𝗧: $𝟭,𝟭𝟭𝟭,𝟳𝟬𝟬,𝟬𝟬𝟬 𝗨𝗦𝗗

𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗚𝗨𝗔𝗥𝗗𝗜𝗔𝗡’𝗦 𝗩𝗘𝗥𝗗𝗜𝗖𝗧

The lack of due diligence by the Government of Guyana was not an “oversight”—it was a systemic failure. By bypassing established giants with proven track records for a firm with “shaky” financials and a history of legal warfare, the state has placed our energy security in the hands of a contractor that thrives on delays.

As the private jets ferry executives between Houston, the DR, and Georgetown at a cost of $70,000 USD per week, the Guyanese citizen is left holding a utility bill that isn’t shrinking—it’s subsidizing a Venezuelan-owned shell game.

𝗘𝗗𝗜𝗧𝗢𝗥’𝗦 𝗡𝗢𝗧𝗘: 𝗧𝗛𝗘 “𝗨𝗞 𝗠𝗔𝗡𝗘𝗨𝗩𝗘𝗥” & 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗨𝗦$𝟭𝟬𝟮𝗠 𝗕𝗜𝗟𝗟

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟱𝟵𝟮 𝗚𝘂𝗮𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗮𝗻 has uncovered a deliberate legal sequence that effectively “armored” the Gas-to-Energy (GtE) contractors against Guyanese oversight.

While the public was told this was an American-led project, the legal reality was engineered in the UK. On November 30, 2022—just 14 days before the contract was signed in Georgetown—the consortium registered 𝗟𝗜𝗡𝗗𝗦𝗔𝗬𝗖𝗔𝗗𝗘𝗩𝗘𝗟𝗢𝗣𝗠𝗘𝗡𝗧 𝗟𝗟𝗣 (𝗢𝗖𝟰𝟰𝟰𝟴𝟴𝟮) in the United Kingdom. This was not a coincidence; it was a tactical deployment.

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗲𝗾𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 “𝗣𝗮𝗽𝗲𝗿 𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗶𝗹”:

•𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟭𝟵𝟴𝟵 𝗧𝗿𝗲𝗮𝘁𝘆 𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗽: By using a UK entity, the contractor successfully invoked the 1989 UK-Guyana Bilateral Investment Treaty. This allowed them to bypass our national courts and “drag” the government into international arbitration via the Dispute Adjudication/Avoidance Board (DAAB).

•𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗨𝗦$𝟭𝟬𝟮.𝟳 𝗠𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗣𝗮𝘆𝗼𝘂𝘁: As of January 2025, the DAAB ordered the Government of Guyana to pay the contractor a staggering US$102,679,839 for site handover delays and remediation. Despite government claims of “confidentiality,” records show these payments—equivalent to billions of Guyanese dollars—are already being siphoned from the Consolidated Fund in installments through 2026.

•𝗭𝗲𝗿𝗼 𝗟𝗼𝗰𝗮𝗹 𝗧𝗮𝘅 :Because the entity is a UK Limited Liability Partnership (LLP), it operates as a “tax-transparent” vehicle. Combined with the UK-Guyana Double Taxation Agreement, the contractor is shielded from local withholding taxes. While Guyanese citizens fund the project, the profits are repatriated to Houston and London virtually tax-free.

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗕𝗼𝘁𝘁𝗼𝗺 𝗟𝗶𝗻𝗲: Our “putting people first” administration signed a contract that allowed a foreign entity to use a British flag as a legal shield. As a result, Guyanese taxpayers are now paying a US$100 million penalty to a company that, by design, contributes nothing back to our national treasury in taxes.

This concludes the first segment of our investigative series.

𝗦𝗧𝗔𝗬 𝗧𝗨𝗡𝗘𝗗 𝗙𝗢𝗥 𝗣𝗔𝗥𝗧 𝗜𝗜 : The Double Agents—The Legal Architects and the $102M Poison Pill.

𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝟱𝟵𝟮 𝗚𝗨𝗔𝗥𝗗𝗜𝗔𝗡: Hard-Truth. Investigative Report. Your Rights, Guarded.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 — 𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨

Wales Buses Expose Local Content Lie – Time to Burn It Down

March 26, 2026/in Investigative Report/by Staff Writer

A video hit FB this week: buses packed with Venezuelan migrants rolling up to Guyana’s Wales gas-to-energy site. Lindsayca ships them in while Guyanese watch from the fence. Local content? What a joke.

We’ve seen the Act enforced like scripture elsewhere. That $300M fuel farm? Dead over a shady consultant technicality. Multinationals rent 51% “Guyanese” certificates from insiders at premium rates. Elites cash in as landlords to foreign expats. Rules hit hard when big contracts are at stake.

But buses of migrants at a flagship project? Crickets. No tenders. No waivers shown. No “no local available” proof. Deadlines shift, excuses flow, and nationals compete with desperation labor. Double standard? It’s the whole damn game.

This isn’t oversight—it’s economic sabotage. Small man waits for skills training; migrants get bused in cheap. Insiders profit from ownership scams and rentals. When does enforcement touch the powerful, not just kill small deals?

Hard hits:

• Fuel farm axed for paperwork; Wales ignores buses. Why?

• Who waived Lindsayca? Names. Dates. Or admit the exemption scam.

• Locals sidelined in their country?

That’s not development—it’s colonization 2.0.

Government, Lindsayca: Answer or own the hypocrisy. Video’s viral. Truth’s out. Enforce equally or scrap the lie. Guyana First means ALL Guyanese, not rented certificates and migrant buses.

The 592 Guardian calls it: Local content’s a fraud for labor, a racket for the elite. Time to fix it—or watch trust burn.