Editorial – Page 8 – 592guardian.com

𝐋𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐁𝐞𝐲𝐨𝐧𝐝 𝐇𝐢𝐬 𝐌𝐞𝐚𝐧𝐬? 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐬 𝐑𝐚𝐢𝐬𝐞 𝐑𝐞𝐝 𝐅𝐥𝐚𝐠𝐬 𝐎𝐯𝐞𝐫 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐈𝐧𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫

April 29, 2026/0 Comments/in Editorial/by Staff Writer

𝐈𝐧𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐌𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐬 𝐖𝐚𝐧𝐭 𝐓𝐨 𝐊𝐧𝐨𝐰 ??

Serious and deeply troubling allegations are mounting against a traffic inspector stationed at Vreed-en-Hoop ,on the West Coast with multiple complaints pointing to what appears to be a stark disconnect between public service income and a visibly extravagant lifestyle.

Reports describe access to several high-end vehicles and a residence that, by all accounts, rivals or exceeds those of far more senior ranks within the Guyana Police Force. For a serving officer, this raises unavoidable and legitimate questions—questions that cannot simply be brushed aside or ignored.

But the concern does not end with appearances.

Public transport operators—minibus drivers and taxi operators trying to earn an honest living—are alleging what they describe as relentless and heavy-handed targeting. Vehicles reportedly clamped the moment they stop for passengers, enforcement actions carried out with unusual intensity, and a pattern that many say feels less like policing and more like pressure.

At the same time, allegations have surfaced suggesting that those in the officer’s immediate circle may not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny or enforcement—fueling perceptions of selective policing and abuse of authority.

These are not minor complaints. These are allegations that strike at the very core of fairness, integrity, and public trust in law enforcement.

Let us be clear: these claims remain unproven at this stage. However, the volume, consistency, and seriousness of the reports demand urgent and uncompromising scrutiny.

We are calling on the Police Service Commission, the Office of Professional Responsibility, and all relevant anti-corruption bodies to immediately initiate a thorough and transparent investigation into these matters. Silence or inaction will only deepen public suspicion and erode confidence in the system.

If these allegations are unfounded, let that be established swiftly and publicly. But if there is any truth to them, then decisive action must follow—without fear or favor.

The public is watching. And they are demanding answers.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮,𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

𝐆𝐨𝐯’𝐭 𝐌𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐬 𝐭𝐨 𝐄𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐢𝐬𝐡 𝐅𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐜 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐞𝐰 𝐔𝐧𝐢𝐭 — 𝐀 𝐒𝐭𝐞𝐩 𝐅𝐨𝐫𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐝, 𝐁𝐮𝐭 𝐒𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝐅𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐒𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐭

April 29, 2026/0 Comments/in Editorial/by Staff Writer

The Government’s plan to establish a dedicated forensic interview (FI) unit for child abuse victims signals a long-overdue acknowledgment of systemic gaps in the protection of vulnerable children. Human Services and Social Security Minister, Dr Vindhya Persaud, announced the initiative as part of a broader strategy to improve response time and access in abuse cases.

At present, forensic interviews — a critical component in securing evidence and protecting victims — are conducted by non-governmental organisations such as ChildLink and Blossoms Inc., with support from the Child Protection Agency (CPA). The State’s move to assume direct responsibility is, therefore, a welcome development.

However, while the creation of a forensic interview unit represents progress, it raises a deeper question: why has it taken this long, and why is the scope still so limited?

Forensic interviews are only one piece of a fractured system. The real deficiency lies in the absence of a fully integrated, dedicated investigative framework that follows each case from report to prosecution. As it stands, cases are passed between multiple actors — Child Protection Officers, police, medical personnel, NGOs — creating dangerous gaps where accountability can falter and critical evidence can be compromised.

A more effective model would see the establishment of a specialised investigative unit assigned to each case from the outset. That officer or team should be responsible for coordinating every stage — from securing timely medical examinations to liaising with child protection services and ensuring case files are meticulously prepared for the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).

Without that continuity, the system remains vulnerable to the very breakdowns the Minister herself acknowledged: inconsistent reporting, delays, and poorly prepared case files that can determine whether justice is served or denied.

Dr Persaud rightly highlighted the importance of precision in case documentation, noting that “what you write is how a case can go left or right.” Yet this only underscores the urgency of structural reform. Training alone cannot fix a system where responsibility is fragmented and diffused.

Equally concerning is the ongoing shortage of Child Protection Officers, a limitation that continues to undermine even the most well-intentioned programmes, including the Rapid Response initiative. A single officer in a region is not a solution — it is a stopgap.

The Government’s planned digital tracking system is another positive step, promising greater oversight of case progression. But tracking failures after they occur is not a substitute for preventing them through cohesive case management.

Child abuse cases demand urgency, sensitivity, and above all, consistency. Victims cannot afford a system where responsibility is shared but accountability is unclear.

There is also a growing concern about the extent of ministerial involvement in operational oversight. While accountability is critical, the system cannot function efficiently if it is being micro-managed at the political level. The Minister’s role should be to establish policy, ensure resources are in place, and conduct periodic audits to assess performance — not to track individual case movements or intervene in routine procedural matters. Effective child protection depends on empowering trained professionals to carry out their duties without undue interference, while holding them accountable through structured oversight mechanisms, not constant direct supervision.

If the Government is serious about reform, it must move beyond incremental fixes and commit to building a unified, end-to-end investigative mechanism — one that eliminates gaps, assigns clear responsibility, and ensures that no child’s case is left to drift between agencies.

Anything less risks perpetuating the very failures this new unit is intended to solve.

𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭 𝐒𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩 𝐨𝐫 𝐑𝐞𝐚𝐥 𝐑𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦? 𝐍𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐥𝐚𝐥𝐥’𝐬 𝐅𝐈𝐃𝐈𝐂 𝐅𝐚𝐜𝐚𝐝𝐞 𝐂𝐚𝐧’𝐭 𝐇𝐢𝐝𝐞 𝐆𝐮𝐲𝐚𝐧𝐚’𝐬 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐑𝐨𝐭

April 29, 2026/0 Comments/in Editorial/by Staff Writer

𝐁𝐘:𝐒𝐭𝐚𝐟𝐟 — 𝐖𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐫

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝟓𝟗𝟐 𝐆𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐝𝐢𝐚𝐧

In the glittering halls of the Grand Coastal Hotel, Attorney General Anil Nandlall, SC, preached the gospel of “stronger contract systems” to a captive audience of engineers, lawyers, and procurement officers. The three-day FIDIC workshop, he declared, is part of a “transformation agenda” to equip public servants for Guyana’s infrastructure boom. Contracts are being reviewed, performance bonds tightened, remedies sharpened—modern global standards to protect public coffers. Sounds impressive. Except it’s the same tired script from a government addicted to announcements over action.

Nandlall’s pitch lands flat against the backdrop of Guyana’s procurement scandals. Take the $100 million+ streetlights saga: 100,000 units promised nationwide, bids opened publicly at the National Procurement and Tender Administration (NPTAB) with 26 companies competing across four lots. Yet where are the audits? The geo-location checks proving lights actually work? The contractor performance reports? Public Works Minister Bishop Juan Edghill boasts 22,000 installed, but the trail goes cold—no transparent milestone verifications, no public blacklist enforcement, no evidence that payments matched deliverables. This isn’t weak contracts; it’s weak wills.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐏𝐫𝐨-𝐑𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐞: 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐬 𝐃𝐨 𝐌𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐞𝐫 (𝐁𝐮𝐭 𝐍𝐨𝐭 𝐄𝐧𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡)

No one disputes that Guyana’s contract toolkit is archaic. Decades-old templates invite ambiguity, disputes, and delays. FIDIC standards could impose clearer notice requirements, robust performance securities, and efficient dispute resolution—tools to make breaches costlier and execution swifter. Training public officers to wield them might reduce the low-hanging fruit of incompetence. Nandlall’s review of existing agreements aligns with President Ali’s modernization rhetoric, and in theory, it could align Guyana with global best practices.

But theory evaporates under scrutiny. Strong contracts don’t self-enforce. Blacklisted contractors morph into new shells via compliant proxies. Ministers “rescue” lagging projects by handing them to cronies over a rum punch. One firm scoops 10 contracts, capacity be damned, because the outcome was sealed long before bids hit the table. Nandlall’s expedition fixes none of this. It polishes the facade while the rot festers in enforcement gaps and political discretion.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐑𝐞𝐚𝐥 𝐂𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐫: 𝐇𝐮𝐦𝐚𝐧 𝐆𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐝, 𝐍𝐨𝐭 𝐏𝐚𝐩𝐞𝐫 𝐖𝐞𝐚𝐤𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬

Guyana’s procurement failures aren’t born of flimsy legalese—they stem from a culture where easy money trumps accountability. The Public Procurement Commission (PPC) flags nothing on streetlights despite the red flags. No-bid whispers persist despite tender announcements. Algorithms for evaluation and awards? Now that’s a conversation worth having: automated scoring, beneficial ownership scans, real-time capacity checks, geo-tagged proofs of work. Remove the “phone call” discretion that predetermines winners.

Yet even algorithms need incorruptible inputs. Without public dashboards tracking bids, awards, variations, and audits, they become black boxes for favoritism. Nandlall’s workshop ignores this. It trains officers but doesn’t arm citizens with data to hold them accountable.

𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐒𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐞𝐝: 𝐃𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐫 𝐁𝐞 𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐞𝐝

The 592 Guardian is watching. Every FIDIC-trained engineer, every reviewed contract, every “modernized” tender must now prove itself. Publish the streetlights contractor lists, payment schedules, and installation maps. Enforce the blacklists with teeth. Tie releases to verified geo-data and independent audits. Fail that, and this dog-and-pony show reveals itself as what it is: elite theater for a public footing the bill.

Guyana deserves systems that work, not sermons. Nandlall, the ball’s in your court. We’re clued in, and we’ll monitor every deliverable. Stingy enforcement won’t cut it anymore.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 ,

𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨. — ✦—

“A Deal Meant to Transform Guyana — That Transformed Everyone But Guyana”

April 18, 2026/0 Comments/in Featured, Editorial, Special Report/by Staff Writer

It was hailed as Guyana’s great energy awakening, a geopolitical handshake between Georgetown and Washington that promised power, prosperity, and progress. But as the Wales Gas-to-Energy project unravels, its legacy may be less “breakthrough” and more breakdown — the straw that broke the pony’s back.
When the Government of Guyana awarded the US $759 million bid (financed at roughly US $587 million) to the Lindsayca–CH4 consortium, it bypassed four lower proposals and catapulted the U.S. Export–Import Bank into Guyana’s largest sovereign energy financing ever. The narrative was sold with polished conviction: America would outperform China, ushering transparency, efficiency, and ethical business practice where Beijing’s shadow allegedly fell.
Yet in retrospect, the moral high ground looks suspiciously like a hill of sand. The U.S. “better partner” promise wasn’t born of goodwill — it was guerrilla economics, an ideological wage to usurp Chinese influence under the guise of partnership. In private, it was celebrated in Washington as a geopolitical victory, complete with claims of 1,500 new American jobs, U.S.-made turbines, and robust returns for investors. But beneath the gloss lay a darker calculus: advancement not of Guyana’s development, but of America’s strategic footprint, dressed up as benevolence.
The irony, of course, is that everyone was playing the same game — only from opposite ends of the table. U.S. actors pushed business policy as foreign diplomacy, while Guyanese powerbrokers treated diplomacy as private industry. The match was perfect; the motivations were identical; only the rhetoric differed.
The Price of Patronage
The Wales deal, lacking meaningful feasibility studies, was engineered for speed, not substance. EXIM Bank signed with eyes open — a move that defied its own internal protocols on project viability assessment. By the time signatures dried and champagne corks popped, the structure was already sinking under the weight of imaginative accounting and inflated valuation.
The result: a project that cost more, promised more, and delivered less. The mantra of “higher price equals superior performance” collapsed spectacularly; Guyanese contractors and political interlocutors enriched themselves in the short term while the nation’s long-term prospects dimmed.
In the local pipeline, Bharat Jagdeo’s fingerprints are everywhere — the familiar strategy of grand design meets selective execution. His political formula remains constant: big ideas, bold deliveries, and bigger beneficiaries. The Wales Gas-to-Energy project fits snugly into his playbook of transformative promises that terminate at the tender board, leaving citizens and institutions to mop up after the money stops moving.
The Crumbling Illusion
Months after the project’s ceremonial launch, the Guyana Power and Light (GPL) has quietly begun pivoting toward renewable energy sources — solar and hybrid grids — a subtle but unmistakable confession that confidence in the gas project has evaporated. Behind this tactical shift lies an unspoken truth: officials no longer expect Wales to deliver on its own claims of low-cost energy and national diversification.
For the government that once declared the undertaking “the defining infrastructure of a new Guyana,” this pivot is disastrous optics. It signals loss of faith — from state engineers to financiers — and reaffirms what the public suspected all along: that the energy revolution was more public performance than policy.
The Faustian Bargain
The Wales Gas-to-Energy scheme illustrates Guyana’s modern paradox — a resource-rich nation seduced by high diplomacy and corporate promise, yet regionally trapped by the very partners meant to rescue it. In this Faustian setup, EXIM’s billions became both carrot and leash, tethering Guyana to an American strategic agenda while marginalizing other bidders who might have offered competitive cost or tested technology.
The project was supposed to light the nation. Instead, it illuminated everything broken in government’s method of decision-making — the conflation of patriotism with patronage, of development with debt. A deal that was meant to transform Guyana ended up transforming everyone but Guyana: foreign financiers, local intermediaries, and political brokers.
The Moral of the Machine
When vision collides with vested interest, energy projects morph into fiscal fossils. The Wales venture now stands as Guyana’s white elephant — massive, immovable, and symbolic of excess masked as progress. What was billed as a new dawn of industrial independence has darkened into a contest of egos and external control.
So, as GPL turns its eyes to the sun and wind, perhaps it is fitting; after all, gas has proven too volatile when mixed with politics. The Wales saga teaches what every nation learns too late — that in the theater of development, the curtain always falls before the people get their share of light.
Appendix: The Numbers Behind the Rhetoric
Project Title: Wales Gas-to-Energy Project
Location: Wales Estate, West Bank Demerara, Guyana
Financing Structure:
•EXIM Bank (U.S.) loan financing: Approx. US $587 million
•Total project value / bid price: Approx. US $759 million
•Local fiscal exposure: Government of Guyana guarantees and indirect commitments through GPL and related subsidiaries.
Tender Overview:
•Initial bids submitted: Four confirmed consortium proposals.
•Lowest bid: Approximately US $520 million (rejected without detailed explanation).
•Selected consortium:
Lindsayca–CH4 partnership — a grouping with limited regional track record and controversial management figures with Venezuelan associations.
•Award rationale (official statement): Claimed superior “technical and logistical coordination,” though internal documents reveal scant feasibility modelling or lifecycle cost projections.
Contract Timeline:
•December 2023: EXIM initial credit terms negotiated through U.S. Embassy in Georgetown.
•February 2024: Cabinet approval amid expedited tender clearance.
•March 2024: Financing package finalized; signing ceremony held, followed by high-level U.S. press release touting job creation and American equipment exports.
•January 2025: Preliminary works begin on site; cost escalations recorded within first quarter.
•Late 2025–Early 2026: GPL initiates pivot toward renewables, citing “strategic diversification” and “load balance development priorities” — coded indicators of diminishing faith in gas-to-energy viability.
Discrepancies & Observations:
•Overvaluation margin: ~US $170–240 million above median bid range.
•Feasibility studies: None published; internal technical assessment still marked “preliminary.”
•Actual job creation figures: Less than 400 confirmed locally, according to labor registry data.
•Equipment sourcing: Over 85% U.S.-manufactured, matching EXIM’s domestic stimulus motive rather than Guyana’s cost efficiency.
These data points demonstrate the widening gap between financial narrative and project reality, underscoring the exposé’s central argument: the Wales Gas-to-Energy scheme was never about Guyana’s transformation — it was structured from inception to feed geopolitical ambition and insider profiteering. The figures — dry as they look — tell a poetic truth: in Guyana’s version of development, the math always exposes the myth.
The Wales Gas-to-Energy Scandal: By the Numbers
THE NUMBERS DON’T LIE
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
TOTAL BID: $759 MILLION
EXIM FINANCING: $587 MILLION
GOG BURDEN: $172 MILLION
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
BIDDING FARCE
$520M ← REJECTED (45% CHEAPER!)
$589M ← REJECTED
$642M ← REJECTED
LINDSAYCA-CH 4: $759M ← SELECTED
PROMISE vs. REALITY
┌─────────────────┬─────────────────┐
│ PROMISED │ DELIVERED │
├─────────────────┼─────────────────┤
│ 1,500 JOBS │ ~400 JOBS │ 74%
│ LOW-COST POWER │ COST EXPLOSION │ FAIL
│ US EQUIPMENT │ 85% US-MADE │ “WIN”
└─────────────────┴─────────────────┘
COLLAPSE TIMELINE
2024: EXIM signs, champagne flows
2025: Costs explode, work stalls
2026: GPL abandons ship → RENEWABLES
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
KEY TAKEAWAY: $759M bought geopolitics, not power.
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
SOURCE: Kaieteur News bid documents + GPL filings
KEY TAKEAWAY: Higher price ≠ Better performance. $759M bought geopolitics, not power.
SOURCE: Kaieteur News tender documents, GPL reports, EXIM Bank disclosures.
𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 — 𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨

𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐀𝐥𝐢’𝐬 ‘𝐅𝐢𝐫𝐬𝐭 𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐨𝐫𝐭’ 𝐇𝐲𝐩𝐞 𝐋𝐞𝐚𝐯𝐞𝐬 𝐎𝐮𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐒𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐧 𝐒𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐋𝐚𝐧𝐝, $𝟏.𝟒𝐁 𝐖𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐟 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐯𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐇𝐚𝐫𝐯𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐬”

April 14, 2026/0 Comments/in Editorial/by Staff Writer

𝘎𝘶𝘺𝘢𝘯𝘢’𝘴 𝘍𝘪𝘳𝘴𝘵 𝘚𝘰𝘺𝘢 𝘌𝘹𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵: 𝘞𝘩𝘰’𝘴 𝘙𝘦𝘢𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘧𝘪𝘵, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘞𝘩𝘰’𝘴 𝘗𝘢𝘺𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘉𝘪𝘭𝘭?

Guyana is about to ship its first official soya beans to Barbados, and President Dr Mohamed Irfaan Ali could not hide his pride. At the Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Industry and Commerce, he presented the move as a national milestone—proof that Guyana is “expanding agricultural production” and “strengthening regional food security.”

What he did not say is that the farm behind this export sits on State‑owned land, accessed by a 40‑plus‑kilometre road and a wharf built by the Government at a cost of more than $1.4 billion, and that the venture is run by a private consortium whose members are already well‑known, yet whose terms remain hidden from the public.

The real cost of the “first export”

Government records show that since 2022, over $1.4 billion has been spent on roads, wharves and related infrastructure in the Tacama–Savannah corridor to support large‑scale corn and soya production. In 2024, the Ministry of Agriculture openly budgeted $967.8 million just for the Tacama silo and drying complex alone, adding to the broader infrastructure tab.

𝘛𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘪𝘴 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘢 𝘮𝘰𝘥𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘴𝘶𝘣𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘺; 𝘪𝘵 𝘪𝘴 𝘢 𝘰𝘯𝘦‑𝘸𝘢𝘺 𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘧𝘦𝘳 𝘰𝘧 𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘤𝘢𝘱𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘭 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘰 𝘢 𝘤𝘰𝘳𝘳𝘪𝘥𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘯𝘰𝘸 𝘧𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘴 𝘢 𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘦‑𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦. 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘚𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘱𝘢𝘺𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘥 𝘢𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘵𝘴, 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘨𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘱 𝘱𝘭𝘢𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱𝘴, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘪𝘴 𝘵𝘰𝘭𝘥 𝘰𝘯𝘭𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘎𝘶𝘺𝘢𝘯𝘢 𝘪𝘴 “𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨” 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘪𝘳𝘴𝘵 𝘵𝘪𝘮𝘦.

State‑owned land, private leases

The Tacama–Savannah farmland is State‑owned and leased, not free‑hold. The Ministry of Agriculture has publicly advertised that over 25,000 acres in the intermediate savannahs are being leased to agro‑investors, with clauses for lease renewals and conditions for farmers operating in the area.

Among those named in the corn–soya project are Guyana Stockfeeds Ltd, Royal Chicken / Royal Animal Products, Edun Farms, SBM Wood & Dubulay Ranch, Bounty Farm Ltd, and NF Agriculture. Yet the Government has not disclosed lease terms, rental rates, or whether these companies enjoy preferential conditions over other applicants.

Private consortium, public subsidy

The grouping is repeatedly described as a private‑sector‑led initiative or “consortium.” The companies put up the working capital, equipment and management; the State puts up the road, the wharf and the enabling policy framework.

But that is not a PPP in the classic sense. There is no public‑sector equity stake, no clearly disclosed revenue‑sharing mechanism, and no published agreement showing how the Government recovers value from the $1.4B infrastructure. What exists instead is a one‑sided subsidy model: the taxpayers pay for the assets, the consortium reaps the export margins.

Unanswered questions behind the “first export”

President Ali’s announcement about exporting soya to Barbados has not closed the loop; it has opened a fresh set of questions the public deserves to see answered:

1.𝗟𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗹𝗲𝗮𝘀𝗲𝘀

•What are the lease terms (duration, rent, renewal clauses) for the State‑owned land underpinning the Tacama–Savannah soya–corn project? Are any of these companies paying below‑market rates, and on what basis?

2.𝗜𝗻𝗳𝗿𝗮𝘀𝘁𝗿𝘂𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗰𝗼𝘀𝘁‑𝗿𝗲𝗰𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘆

•How does the Government intend to recover or offset the $1.4B+ infrastructure spend? Are there user‑fees, wharf charges, or carve‑outs on export proceeds attached to this project? Or is this simply a straight‑up subsidy with no clawback?

3.𝗘𝘅𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁 𝘀𝘁𝗿𝘂𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗯𝗲𝗻𝗲𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗲𝘀

•Through which legal entity or joint‑venture is the soya being exported to Barbados, and who ultimately captures the export margins? Are small local farmers and contract growers guaranteed a fair share, or will the bulk of the value stick to the integrated corporate group?

4.𝗣𝗣𝗣 𝗼𝗿 𝘀𝘂𝗯𝘀𝗶𝗱𝘆 𝗺𝗼𝗱𝗲𝗹?

•Is this formally classified as a PPP, and if so, under what Cabinet‑approved framework or statute? If it is not a PPP but a subsidised private venture, why were these companies chosen without competitive tender, and what criteria guided the selection?

5.𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘀𝗽𝗮𝗿𝗲𝗻𝗰𝘆 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘀

•Why have the project agreement, MoU, land‑use contracts, and infrastructure‑access deals between Government and the consortium not been published? Will the State commit to releasing these documents in transparent, redacted form as part of its “open‑for‑business” narrative?

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗯𝗼𝘁𝘁𝗼𝗺 𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲

Guyana may be shipping its first soya beans to Barbados, and that is a moment worth noting. But that moment should not be allowed to paper over the fundamental imbalance: 𝘚𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦‑𝘰𝘸𝘯𝘦𝘥 𝘭𝘢𝘯𝘥, 𝘚𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦‑𝘣𝘶𝘪𝘭𝘵 𝘪𝘯𝘧𝘳𝘢𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘶𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘚𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦‑𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘥 𝘴𝘶𝘣𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘧𝘭𝘰𝘸𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘰 𝘢 𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘷𝘢𝘵𝘦‑𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵 𝘤𝘩𝘢𝘪𝘯 𝘸𝘩𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘮𝘴 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘢𝘪𝘯 𝘭𝘰𝘤𝘬𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘳𝘳𝘪𝘥𝘰𝘳𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘱𝘰𝘸𝘦𝘳.

𝗨𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗚𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗮𝗻𝘀𝘄𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝗶𝘁 𝗶𝘀 𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗮𝘅𝗽𝗮𝘆𝗲𝗿𝘀’ 𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝘀𝘂𝗯𝘀𝗶𝗱𝗶𝘀𝗲 𝗽𝗿𝗶𝘃𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗵𝗮𝗿𝘃𝗲𝘀𝘁𝘀, 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝗰 𝘄𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝗯𝗲 𝗹𝗲𝗳𝘁 𝘄𝗼𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘄𝗵𝗼 𝗶𝘀 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗽𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗮𝗶𝗻𝘀 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗚𝘂𝘆𝗮𝗻𝗮’𝘀 “𝗳𝗶𝗿𝘀𝘁 𝗲𝘅𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁” 𝘁𝗼 𝗕𝗮𝗿𝗯𝗮𝗱𝗼𝘀.

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝟱𝟵𝟮 𝗚𝘂𝗮𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗮𝗻 — has once again uncovered another instance of our Government’s sophisticated opacity, which we will continue to pursue in the furtherance of the Public Interest.

𝗦𝘁𝗮𝘆 𝗹𝗼𝗰𝗸𝗲𝗱 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟮.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 — 𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨

𝐖𝐡𝐨𝐬𝐞 𝐕𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧? 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐓𝐫𝐮𝐭𝐡 𝐁𝐞𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 $𝟏𝟐𝐌 “𝐅𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩” 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐤 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐚𝐠𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐚 𝐋𝐨𝐨𝐩

April 13, 2026/0 Comments/in Featured, Editorial/by Staff Writer

Last evening, the nation was treated to the familiar spectacle of state-aligned media cameras capturing “progress.” The headlines spoke of a “government commitment to recreation” and a “presidential vision for regional development.” But as is often the case with the current administration, the narrative is built on the erasure of two critical truths: who actually gave the land and who actually paid for the work.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐄𝐫𝐚𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐉𝐨𝐞 𝐕𝐢𝐞𝐢𝐫𝐚

The public is being subtly conditioned to view this as a government-built project. However, the foundation of this park was not a government initiative; it was a personal sacrifice.

• The Reality: The land—formerly part of Plantation Meer Zorgen—was a gift to the people of Guyana by Mr. Joseph Rudolph Vieira, AA (1920–2005).

• The Distortion: By rebranding the space as the “Guyana-China Friendship Park” and emphasizing “Government oversight,” the state media is effectively burying the legacy of a private citizen who donated his property for the public good long before the current political era.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 $𝟏𝟐 𝐌𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐒𝐢𝐥𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐧𝐞𝐫

While the mainstream media carries on about the “Government’s investment in Region 3,” they conveniently omit a staggering financial fact: The Guyanese taxpayer did not fund this $2.5 Billion (GYD) transformation.

• The Fact: This was an unconditional grant (a gift) from the People’s Republic of China.

• The Duplicity: State media frames the project as an achievement of the local administration’s “infrastructure trajectory.” In reality, the government acted as little more than a landlord for a project designed, funded, and largely executed by foreign partners.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐌𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚’𝐬 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐢𝐧 “𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐝𝐞 𝐓𝐡𝐞𝐟𝐭”

Why isn’t the $12,000,000 USD figure front and center? Because it weakens the “Great Leader” narrative. If the public realizes that the state is simply cutting ribbons on gifts from foreign powers and private citizens, the illusion of “unprecedented government spending” begins to crack

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐆𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐝𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐕𝐞𝐫𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭:

True leadership involves gratitude, not just photo ops. To credit the state for the “vision” of a park that Joe Vieira provided and China built is not just “bias”—it is a forensic distortion of history.

𝑇ℎ𝑒 592 𝐺𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 — 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦. 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ. 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒.

𝐋𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐁𝐞𝐲𝐨𝐧𝐝 𝐇𝐢𝐬 𝐌𝐞𝐚𝐧𝐬? 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐬 𝐑𝐚𝐢𝐬𝐞 𝐑𝐞𝐝 𝐅𝐥𝐚𝐠𝐬 𝐎𝐯𝐞𝐫 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐈𝐧𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫

“A Deal Meant to Transform Guyana — That Transformed Everyone But Guyana”

𝐖𝐡𝐨𝐬𝐞 𝐕𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧? 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐓𝐫𝐮𝐭𝐡 𝐁𝐞𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 $𝟏𝟐𝐌 “𝐅𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩” 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐤 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐚𝐠𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐚 𝐋𝐨𝐨𝐩

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