Skeldon Again: Between Promise and Proof
BY: Staffโ Writer
๐๐๐ 592 ๐๐ช๐๐ง๐๐๐๐ฃ.
A Dominican Republic-based company, the Rizek Group, is expected to commence cocoa cultivation on approximately 2,000 acres as early as August. Plans reportedly include the establishment of a processing facility, suggesting an intention to move beyond raw production into value-added output. Additionally, the Government has confirmed that multiple investorsโboth local and internationalโhave expressed interest in other ventures at Skeldon, including the possible revival of the sugar factory.
These are tangible developments. They signal that Skeldon, long dormant, is once again attracting attention.
However, beyond these facts lies a layer of rhetoric that deserves scrutiny.
There is, notably, little disclosure about timelines beyond the initial planting phase. Cocoa is not a short-term crop; it typically requires three to five years before yielding commercially viable output. A processing facility, if it materializes, will require further time for construction, certification, and integration into export markets. Yet these realities are largely absent from official pronouncements, creating the impression of imminent transformation where none can realistically occur.
This gap between announcement and outcome is not new. It reflects a broader pattern in which ambitious initiatives are publicly unveiled long before the groundworkโfinancial, technical, and logisticalโis fully established.
Compounding this skepticism is Skeldonโs own history.
Once heralded as a flagship modernisation project, the Skeldon Sugar Estate became one of the most costly and controversial failures in Guyanaโs agricultural sector. Technical flaws, poor performance, and eventual closure left thousands unemployed and eroded public trust. Any new initiative tied to this location must therefore overcome not only practical challenges but a significant credibility deficit.
To its credit, the current approach differs in key respects. This is not a return to state-driven sugar expansion, but an attempt at diversification through private investment. Cocoa, as a crop, offers a plausible alternative. Regional producers such as the Dominican Republic have demonstrated its viability, and global demand remains strong. In principle, the shift makes economic sense.
But principle alone does not guarantee success.
Critical questions remain unanswered: Is the soil at Skeldon suitable for large-scale cocoa cultivation? What mechanisms will ensure that local farmers benefit, rather than being sidelined by corporate operations? What are the terms of the investment agreements, and who bears the risk if these ventures falter?
Until these questions are addressed, the initiative remains more prospective than proven.
None of this is to suggest that the cocoa project should be dismissed. On the contrary, diversification of Guyanaโs agricultural base is both necessary and overdue. But the public has moved beyond accepting announcements at face value. After Skeldon, promises must be matched by measurable progress.
If planting does indeed begin by August, and if within the next year there is visible land preparation, crop establishment, and movement on processing infrastructure, confidence will grow. If not, this announcement risks joining a long list of initiatives that generated headlines but failed to deliver transformation.
The real issue, therefore, is not whether cocoa can succeed at Skeldon. It is whether the Government has learned from the pastโspecifically, that credibility is not built on declarations, but on disciplined, transparent implementation.
Until that proof emerges, Skeldon remains suspended between promise and proof.
๐๐๐ 592 ๐๐ช๐๐ง๐๐๐๐ฃ-๐๐ง๐ช๐ฉ๐ , ๐ผ๐๐๐ค๐ช๐ฃ๐ฉ๐๐๐๐ก๐๐ฉ๐ฎ, ๐๐ฃ๐ฉ๐๐๐ง๐๐ฉ๐ฎ ๐๐ฃ ๐๐ช๐ฎ๐๐ฃ๐ ๐ผ๐ฃ๐ ๐พ๐๐ง๐๐๐๐๐๐ฃ ๐๐๐ง๐จ๐ฅ๐๐๐ฉ๐๐ซ๐๐จ.โ โฆโ






















You must be logged in to post a comment.