An opposition mandate is not immunity from the law

592GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

An opposition mandate is not immunity from the law

OPINION BY : Hem Kumar October 2026

Randy Gopaul’s attack in his weekly column in Village Voice on GHK Lall rests on a dangerous proposition: that because Azruddin Mohamed is Opposition Leader, legal action against him must be political persecution, and criticism of his conduct must be an accommodation of tyranny. Neither conclusion follows. The issue is accountability—including the accountability of those who seek to hold the government to account.

Guyana remains a country governed by laws. The office of Opposition Leader carries constitutional importance, but it does not place its holder beyond investigation, regulatory oversight or judicial proceedings. Nor does an electoral mandate turn every personal legal dispute into a struggle for democracy.

Gopaul’s account blurs distinctions that matter. The closure of bank accounts is not the same thing as the government “seizing his banks.” The revocation of a cambio license is not, by itself, proof of political confiscation. Reporting on the Mohameds’ financial restrictions distinguishes between commercial-bank account closures and the Bank of Guyana’s revocation of their cambio licence. Those distinctions cannot simply be swept aside to produce a more dramatic narrative.

More importantly, the license revocation was challenged in court. In March 2026, the High Court dismissed the Mohameds’ application to overturn the Bank of Guyana’s decision. That does not settle every controversy involving Mohamed, but it directly undermines the suggestion that the regulatory action can simply be pronounced an unlawful act of political vengeance. There was a decision, a legal challenge and judicial scrutiny.

If Gopaul believes a particular authority exceeded its statutory powers, he should identify the decision, the applicable law and the alleged breach. That is an argument capable of being tested. A catalogue of grievances, however passionately delivered, is not a substitute.

The same discipline must apply to the criminal proceedings. Mohamed and his co-accused have reportedly been charged with illegal possession of a firearm, illegal possession of ammunition and attempting to pervert the course of justice. Those are allegations, not convictions, and Mohamed is entitled to contest them. But their existence cannot responsibly be reduced to the claim that the government is arresting him because it fears his political effectiveness. That conclusion requires evidence, not repetition.

Indeed, Gopaul’s central reasoning is circular: Mohamed is effective because he is being targeted, and we know he is being targeted because he is effective. Where is the independent evidence? Where are the polls he invokes? Where is the proof connecting each disputed enforcement action to an instruction to eliminate an electoral opponent?

Demanding that evidence is not defending abuse. It is refusing to replace one unproved allegation with another.

Gopaul also misreads the very passage he quotes. Lall’s observation that the government “doesn’t even have to lay a trap” is not an admission that it has laid one. It is a criticism of Mohamed’s judgment—a warning that an opposition leader can create avoidable difficulties through his own decisions. Gopaul turns that warning into an endorsement of persecution, then attacks the position he has constructed.

There is a fundamental difference between advising someone to surrender and advising him to exercise judgment. Discipline is not submission. Restraint is not cowardice. Observing the law is not kneeling before the government.

On Gopaul’s own presentation of Lall’s argument, the concern is that Mohamed should grow into his public responsibilities rather than allow his personal confrontations to define the office. That is a legitimate subject for commentary. An opposition leader’s conduct, priorities and use of his platform are not exempt from scrutiny merely because the government also deserves scrutiny.

Voters did not confer a mandate for a permanent personal feud. They entrusted an opposition with public responsibilities: scrutinising government, challenging policy, presenting alternatives and representing citizens. It is entirely reasonable to ask whether Mohamed’s conduct advances those responsibilities or allows his private battles to consume the political space that should belong to the public.

Nor is “intelligence gathering” a magic phrase that makes every method of obtaining information legitimate. The latest reported investigation concerns an alleged payment for police surveillance footage. Whether wrongdoing occurred must be established through evidence and lawful proceedings. But calling an activity opposition work does not answer the legal questions surrounding how it was undertaken.

The proper standard is consistent: the government must act within the law; police must respect rights; courts must assess the matters before them; and Mohamed must receive due process. Equally, Mohamed’s office cannot become a shield against lawful scrutiny. Neither political prominence nor electoral support establishes innocence or guilt.

It would be just as careless to declare every action against Mohamed lawful without examining it as it is to declare every action persecution. The defensible position is that specific decisions must be judged against their legal authority and the evidence—not against the political identity of the person affected.

Gopaul is entitled to defend Mohamed. He is not entitled to make criticism of Mohamed synonymous with complicity in oppression. Lall can demand better judgment from the Opposition Leader without endorsing a single abuse of state power.

The line worth defending is not between Mohamed and his critics. It is between public office and personal entitlement. Mohamed has a mandate to oppose the government—not an exemption from the law.