Beyond 2031: Who Can Hold Power Accountable in Guyana?

 Beyond 2031: Who Can Hold Power Accountable in Guyana?

From Skeldon to Wales – would this be the undoing  of the PPP tenure?

OPINION BY: Hem Kumar October 2026

The story is satisfying. It is also far too simple. It raises real questions about procurement, costs and accountability — but it does not establish its predicted electoral consequences, because it treats Guyanese politics as a machine where public frustration goes in and electoral defeat comes out, untouched by anything happening in Washington, Houston or the Pentagon.

The harder truth is this: the Gas-to-Energy project may disappoint Guyanese consumers without costing the PPP-C a single seat — and even a change of government in 2031 might change less than voters expect. The real question is not who wins the next election. It is whether Guyanese citizens, institutions and courts retain any meaningful power to demand results — from this government, from its successor, and from the foreign partners whose money and security cooperation now surround both.

What Guyanese Actually Live With

Before any grand theory of geopolitics, start with what happens when the lights go out.

GPL’s own managers, explaining the September 2026 outages, described a utility that can generate enough electricity but cannot reliably deliver it. “The reality is that the distribution system is now facing challenges,” said Kesh Nandlall, head of GPL’s Executive Management Committee — “feeders are now being overloaded, transformers are being taxed and overloaded (and) some people get voltage fluctuations.” Deputy Chief Executive Officer Bharat Harjohn was blunter: “Most of our feeders are tripping right now because of overloading conditions”. Peak demand hit 257 megawatts in early September against 265.6 megawatts of installed capacity — almost no headroom — and GPL says demand keeps “outpacing the development of the upgrades, and the introduction of the Wales Gas-to-Energy project” . A ministry official has told Guyanese plainly that blackouts will continue until power lines and substations are fixed .

This is happening in a country whose Natural Resource Fund recorded US$3.88 billion in petroleum receipts in the first nine months of 2026 — well above the original full-year forecast . The lesson is stark: large petroleum receipts do not automatically produce reliable electricity. GPL’s September explanation illustrates why additional generation alone cannot guarantee reliable service — distribution upgrades must also deliver, and on that front the utility was still catching up with demand it said was outpacing both its upgrades and the introduction of the Wales project itself.

Meanwhile, the arithmetic of Wales keeps moving:

The original Lindsayca-CH4 contract, signed in December 2022, was US$759 million .

In May 2026, after an adjudication process, the contract was raised by roughly US$97 million (12.8 per cent) to about US$856 million — with both sides dropping claims over past late-delivery penalties, though the government retained the ability to reinstate penalties if the revised delivery dates are missed .

In October 2026, reporting emerged of a reported request for US$102 million, with the claim — attributed to unnamed sources, unconfirmed by the US Embassy or the Office of the President — that the Embassy was backing the contractor’s push. It remains unclear whether the reported US$102 million would be additional to the May increase. An earlier April report described a US$250 million request, which should not be treated as an awarded or cumulative sum. President Ali confirmed only that Lindsayca had asked for more money and that the request “has not been discussed” .

And the timetable? President Ali originally expected completion by the end of 2023, and the plant was then due by the end of 2024. First power is now slated for the end of 2026 — roughly 57 megawatts — with full 300-megawatt output in 2027 and combined-cycle operation by June 2027. The Global Energy Monitor still lists every unit at Wales as under construction or pre-construction — nothing yet operating .

This is the on-the-ground reality behind every press conference: a distribution network GPL was describing as overtaxed as recently as September, a contractor returning for more money every few months, and a promised 50 per cent cut in electricity bills that the government now says is being delivered in phases — starting, tellingly, with communities served by solar and batteries rather than by the gas plant itself .

And here is the distinction the country cannot afford to miss: a plant producing electricity is not the same as a household paying less. Between the turbine and the meter stand transmission lines, distribution upgrades, system losses, and tariff calculations that should be published and open to challenge. If the savings evaporate in a distribution system that GPL was still racing to upgrade in September, “first power” will be a press release, not a deliverable. Households and small businesses may face real consequences along that chain — generator fuel through a blackout, spoiled stock, interrupted work — from generation to transmission to distribution to the final bill.

The Skeldon Analogy — Right and Wrong

The analysis causal leap does not hold. The claim that Skeldon “cost the PPP/C the 2015 election” is political shorthand, not demonstrated fact — the analyst has not shown that the factory, rather than any number of other factors, decided that election. Placing Skeldon beside the 2015 result proves nothing about causation — and neither does placing Wales beside 2031.

Voters do weigh delivery. But they weigh it against alternatives, against coalition politics, against the memory of the other side’s record, and against a simple question: is my life better than it was? Oil money flowing into infrastructure, transfers and public employment can offset a great deal of anger about blackouts. The PPP-C’s strategists understand this perfectly well.

Three outcomes, then, are genuinely possible — and honest analysis has to hold all three:

Wales delivers. The plant comes on stream in 2027, bills fall meaningfully, reliability improves — and the procurement and cost history still deserve scrutiny, because success does not retroactively justify opacity.

Wales disappoints, and the government survives. Delays, underperformance and a shortfall on the tariff promise impose real costs — and voters still return the PPP/C, judging it on other grounds. Dissatisfaction is not the same thing as defeat.

Voters change the government — and less changes than expected. A successor inherits the same contracts, the same loan, the same security arrangements. A change of party is not automatically a change in the underlying distribution of power.

The third possibility is where the conversation the country keeps avoiding actually begins.

What Washington Has Bought Into

Consider what the United States has actually taken on:

A direct financial stake in the project. In December 2024, the US Export-Import Bank approved US$526 million in financing to Guyana’s Ministry of Finance for the gas-to-energy project ; the loan agreement was signed the following month — though approval and signature are not the same as disbursement, and Guyanese have not been told exactly how much has been drawn. An American government bank is now a creditor of the Guyanese state on the strength of a project being executed by a contractor that keeps requesting more money.

It is a fair question — not an accusation, a question — whether that relationship makes it harder for Guyana to hold the line on cost. It is equally fair to note the countervailing possibility: that American lenders and policymakers also have reasons to favor successful delivery and rigorous oversight. Guyanese citizens, meanwhile, need clarity about repayment obligations and how they would be met if project revenues or savings disappoint.

A new security partnership. On October 21, 2026, President Ali and US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth signed a Joint Declaration for an Enhanced Defense Partnership at the Pentagon. The announcement describes sustained defense expertise, multidomain training, joint exercises with the GDF, strengthened air-domain awareness, and cooperation against narcotics trafficking, all in the shadow of Venezuela’s claim to Essequibo . The reporting does not establish basing rights or a mutual-defense guarantee, and it does not set out the declaration’s legal status, financial obligations or termination provisions — which is precisely why Guyanese are entitled to ask what the instrument itself says.

But its direction is clear: Guyana’s security posture is being built substantially in partnership with Washington.

A demonstrated appetite for converting oil into state leverage. In August 2026, the White House announced its Venezuela arrangement: a joint venture in which the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital takes a 35 per cent ownership stake, with — per the White House’s own account — 100-year rights over 17 oil fields holding 65 billion barrels of proven reserves, guaranteed purchase of 20 per cent of output at cost, US veto power over board appointments, and — in the U.S. government’s agreement with NABEP — governance under U.S. law and U.S. courts .

The announced arrangement demonstrates a willingness to combine government ownership, commercial access and foreign policy. It does not establish a template for Guyana.

None of this constitutes evidence of a plan to influence Guyana’s 2031 election — and this editorial does not allege one. What exists is a structure of relationships — financial, military, commercial — that could narrow the bargaining options of any future Guyanese government, of either party, before it enforces penalties against a well-connected contractor, renegotiates with ExxonMobil, or charts a course Washington dislikes.

Leverage does not have to be used to shape behavior; its existence is often enough. Whether it has been used is precisely what Guyanese should be able to find out: the government should disclose whether diplomatic representations have influenced payment decisions, procurement, or the enforcement of contractual remedies.       

Concentration of essential relationships can narrow options; the extent of that risk should be demonstrated, not assumed.

And here Guyanese history supplies the reason that question can never be dismissed as paranoia. In the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration, unwilling to accept another “Castro-type regime” in the hemisphere, ran a covert CIA campaign against Cheddi Jagan — funding the 1963 general strike, financing Forbes Burnham’s and Peter d’Aguiar’s parties, and pressing Britain to impose proportional representation, a voting system American officials expected would help dislodge Jagan. In December 1964, Jagan’s PPP took the largest share of the vote — 46 per cent, and 24 seats to the PNC’s 22 and the United Force’s 7 — but with no outright majority, the Governor invited Burnham to form a coalition government. The PPP then spent 28 years in opposition.

The irony is sharp: the party that was the target of a documented covert intervention now governs a country whose partnership with the intervening power is expanding by the year.

That history justifies demanding safeguards and disclosure. It does not establish a contemporary operation, and it does not relieve anyone alleging one of the obligation to produce evidence.

What Sovereignty Actually Means Now

Sovereignty is not a flag-raising ceremony. It is the practical capacity to make six decisions and have them count:

Can Guyana enforce its contracts? The May 2026 settlement dropped claims over past late-delivery penalties while retaining the right to reinstate them if revised milestones are missed . Guyanese deserve the justification for that bargain — and independent verification that the new deadlines are being met.

A country that cannot enforce a penalty clause against a major contractor is a country that negotiates everything twice.

Can Guyana see the numbers? Guyanese should have a single, reconciled, component-by-component account of what Wales has cost, what the EXIM loan covers, who bears each overrun, and what the ratepayer will pay for how long. Parliament should demand it monthly — and publish it.

Can the savings reach the bill? The promise was a 50 per cent reduction. The test is a real reduction on a published baseline and comparable consumption in 2027 — after transmission losses, after GPL’s upgrades, after tariff decisions. If it does not arrive, Guyanese should know exactly which link in the chain broke, and who is responsible for that link.

Can Guyana publish its commitments? The October 21 defense declaration was announced in a press release. Its legal status, financial obligations and exit provisions are not matters of operational secrecy; they are matters of democratic scrutiny. Sensitive operational details can be protected. The allocation of authority cannot be classified in a democracy.

Can Guyana diversify? The more that essential relationships — financing, security cooperation, major contracting — concentrate in one capital, the fewer options Guyana has in every negotiation. Guyana needs the strongest possible ties with Washington — and equally serious ties elsewhere, so that “no” remains an available word when it needs to be said.

Can Guyanese change course without permission? If in 2031 voters choose a different government, the world will learn what Guyanese sovereignty means by whether that government can renegotiate, investigate and enforce — within the law and within its treaty and contractual obligations, but effectively — or whether the machinery is now beyond the reach of elections.

The Bottom Line

The analyst is right that Skeldon and Wales rhyme. He is wrong that the rhyme has a guaranteed ending. He surely identifies a warning worth examining, not an election result already determined. Project failure demands accountability; whether Guyana’s institutions and voters deliver it remains an open question — and it is the only question that matters.

Guyana’s sovereignty will not be measured by how warmly Washington receives its leaders, or by how many megawatts eventually hum at Wales. It will be measured by whether Guyanese institutions can say no — to a bad contract, an improper request, or a failing government — and make that no count.

That is what is at stake between now and 2031. Not a prediction. A choice