The UN Must Not Mistake Credentials for Moral Clarity

 592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

The UN Must Not Mistake Credentials for Moral Clarity


OPINION BY: Staff Writer October 2026

The contest to select the next Secretary-General of the United Nations is not merely an exercise in diplomatic rotation. It is a test of whether the organization still understands the moral burden of its own office.

Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, Guyana’s former Foreign Minister and current Permanent Representative to the United Nations, is being presented as a potentially historic candidate: a woman, a Caribbean national and a person of Indigenous heritage who could break long-standing barriers at the pinnacle of the multilateral system.

Those distinctions matter. Representation matters. The Caribbean deserves serious consideration in global leadership. Women have been unjustly excluded from the UN’s highest office since the organization’s creation in 1945. 

 But history-making identity cannot exempt any candidate from scrutiny. The next Secretary-General must not simply possess diplomatic experience, regional backing and institutional relationships. That person must demonstrate sound judgement about authoritarianism, human rights, terrorism, democratic freedom and the equal value of civilian life—regardless of ideology, geography or geopolitical alliances.

On that score, Rodrigues-Birkett’s public record warrants direct and serious examination.

Praise for Castroism Cannot Be Ignored

In 2013, while serving as Guyana’s Foreign Minister, Rodrigues-Birkett moved a National Assembly motion marking four decades of diplomatic relations between Guyana and Cuba. In the course of that tribute, she praised Fidel Castro not only for his contribution to Guyana, but for what he had supposedly done “for humanity in general,” while extending wishes of long life and good health to Fidel Castro and Raúl Castro.

There is nothing improper about recognizing Guyana’s longstanding diplomatic relationship with Cuba or acknowledging Cuban assistance in health, education and other sectors. Small states routinely maintain practical relationships across ideological divides.

But there is a clear difference between diplomacy and adulation.

Fidel Castro did not merely lead a country under difficult circumstances. He presided over a one-party political system that denied citizens meaningful democratic choice, repressed dissidents, punished independent journalists, restricted civil society and criminalized political opposition. Human-rights monitors documented recurring arbitrary detentions and harassment of peaceful activists, including the Ladies in White, whose members were targeted precisely because they demanded dignity and freedom for political prisoners.

Any prospective UN Secretary-General should be able to distinguish humanitarian cooperation from the glorification of authoritarian rulers.

The office demands moral clarity. It demands a willingness to defend people against repression whether that repression comes from a military dictatorship, a communist state, an absolute monarchy, an occupying force, a militia or a Western-aligned government.

Moral Language Must Apply Evenly

Rodrigues-Birkett has also spoken sharply at the Security Council on Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. She has invoked genocide, mass atrocities, occupation, displacement and the duty to protect Palestinian civilians. Those concerns cannot simply be dismissed. The scale of civilian suffering, displacement and destruction in Gaza has horrified the world and demands serious legal, humanitarian and political scrutiny.

Yet the credibility of international diplomacy depends on consistency.

The October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault against Israel involved the deliberate killing, kidnapping and abuse of civilians. It included acts of terror that must be condemned without ambiguity. Hamas’s repression of Palestinians, its attacks on political rivals, and its use of civilian areas in warfare also belong within any honest discussion of Gaza’s tragedy.

A Secretary-General cannot afford selective outrage.

The UN’s chief diplomat must be prepared to defend Palestinian civilians while unequivocally condemning Hamas terrorism; to challenge Israel where international law may have been breached while affirming Israel’s right to exist and protect its population; and to recognize that no political grievance authorizes rape, hostage-taking, massacre or collective punishment.

When leaders reserve their strongest language for one side and appear muted toward atrocities committed by another, they weaken the very standards they claim to uphold.

A UN Office, Not an Ideological Prize

The Secretary-General is not intended to be an advocate for a bloc, a regional caucus or a fashionable ideological current. The position exists to defend the UN Charter, mediate conflicts, speak for civilians caught in war and uphold human rights even when powerful governments dislike it.

That requires more than procedural familiarity with the UN system. It requires independence.

Rodrigues-Birkett brings extensive diplomatic experience. She has represented Guyana at the UN, served in senior regional and international roles, and understands multilateral diplomacy at a level few candidates can match. CARICOM is entitled to promote a Caribbean candidate, and the region’s voice should not be treated as secondary in a process historically dominated by larger powers.

But Guyana, CARICOM, Security Council members and the wider international press should not treat her candidacy as beyond question merely because it is symbolically important.

The relevant question is not whether Rodrigues-Birkett is qualified on paper. She plainly has experience.

The question is whether her public record reflects the principled, universal and independent moral judgement needed to lead an institution that routinely confronts war crimes, political repression, terrorism, unlawful occupation and assaults on democratic freedoms.

The Questions She Must Answer

Before the Security Council advances any recommendation, Rodrigues-Birkett should be asked plainly:

⇒Does she stand by her praise of Fidel Castro as a benefactor of “humanity,” in light of Cuba’s record of political repression and denial of fundamental freedoms?

⇒Does she recognize the systematic persecution of Cuban dissidents, independent journalists and peaceful activists under the Castro system?

⇒ Does she unequivocally condemn Hamas’s October 7 atrocities, its hostage-taking and its deliberate targeting of Israeli civilians?

⇒ Does she accept that international humanitarian law binds Hamas and other armed groups as much as it binds the Israeli state?

⇒Can she demonstrate that her approach to human rights is universal rather than selective?

⇒Would she confront human-rights abuses by governments and movements politically aligned with her own regional or ideological partners?

These are not peripheral questions. They go to the core of the office she seeks.

A Higher Standard Is Required

The United Nations has endured years of declining public trust. Too often, it has appeared paralyzed before aggression, divided by great-power rivalry and compromised by member states that preach human rights abroad while suppressing them at home.

Its next Secretary-General should not deepen that crisis of confidence.

The world does not need another cautious manager of diplomatic language. It needs a leader who can speak consistently about liberty, civilian protection and human dignity—even when doing so is inconvenient to allies, regional partners or ideological sympathizers

Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett has every right to seek the position. CARICOM has every right to support her. But no candidate for the world’s most consequential multilateral office is entitled to immunity from scrutiny.

Historic representation is meaningful. It is not, however, a substitute for a principled record.

The UN must choose a Secretary-General who recognizes tyrants as tyrants, terrorism as terrorism and civilian suffering as equally intolerable—wherever it occurs, and whoever commits it.

 

Darkness Without Accountability: Guyana’s Power Crisis and the Price of Delay.

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

Darkness Without Accountability: Guyana’s Power Crisis and the Price of Delay.


OPINION BY: Staff Writer October 2026

Madagascar’s government removed an energy minister and later dissolved its cabinet when electricity and water failures ignited unrest. In Guyana, by contrast, the public has endured recurring blackouts while the Gas-to-Energy promise of cheaper, more reliable power has slipped years beyond its original deadline—and the national response has been more spending, more assurances, and still no clear personal accountability.

Madagascar’s electricity crisis offers a sobering lesson for Guyana: when a government cannot guarantee the most basic utility service, public anger does not remain confined to a technical explanation, a press release, or another promise of works to come.

There, persistent blackouts and water shortages sparked youth-led demonstrations. The government imposed curfews, dismissed its Energy Minister, and then dissolved the cabinet as the crisis deepened. Those steps did not solve the structural failures overnight, but they conveyed an essential principle: when essential services collapse, somebody in authority must answer. 

Guyana’s situation is different in circumstance, but the central question is uncomfortably similar: who is accountable when citizens are left in darkness almost daily?

The Wales Gas-to-Energy project was sold as the answer—a 300-megawatt development expected to improve reliability and support a 50 percent reduction in electricity tariffs. It was initially expected to deliver by the end of 2024. Yet the official schedule now places first power only at the end of 2026, with full combined-cycle operation projected for June 2027.

So Guyanese have not received the promised 50 percent reduction in electricity bills. Instead, many consumers are effectively experiencing what might be called a  100 percent reduction in electricity supply whenever their homes, shops, offices, equipment and livelihoods are cut off by outages.

That is not merely an inconvenience. It is lost production, spoiled food, damaged appliances, interrupted learning, disrupted health care, insecurity, unbearable heat, and mounting costs for every household and business compelled to purchase fuel, generators, batteries, inverters or other alternatives.

From deadline to delay

The issue is not whether a major power project can face technical challenges. It is whether a government that repeatedly advertised a 2024 delivery date can now treat a two-and-a-half-year delay as an ordinary adjustment—without a transparent accounting of responsibility, cost consequences, contractual remedies, or consequences for failures in project management.

Government statements now indicate that the initial gas turbine should be available by the end of 2026, while the full system is expected only in 2027. Moreover, the government has clarified that the long-promised 50 percent tariff reduction is tied to attaining at least 228 megawatts of GtE supply—not the limited initial power expected at year-end.

The public deserves direct answers:

⇒ Who approved the original timetable, and what evidence supported it?

⇒  What precisely caused the project to miss its 2024 delivery target?

⇒ What penalties, if any, have been imposed on contractors or project managers?

⇒ What additional costs—direct and indirect—has Guyana borne because reliable GtE capacity was not delivered on time?

⇒ On what published date can households and businesses reasonably expect the advertised 50 percent tariff reduction?

Until those questions are answered in documents, not slogans, Guyanese are being asked to bear the consequences of a project over which they had no control.

Another US$800 million

President Irfaan Ali has said the next six months will be critical, pointing to mandatory maintenance, generation overhauls, limited reserve capacity, and aged transmission and distribution infrastructure. He has also stated that GPL estimates close to US$800 million will be needed over five years to upgrade the transmission and distribution network alone.

That announcement should not pass without rigorous public scrutiny.

US$800 million is not a casual estimate. It is an enormous prospective public commitment—particularly when the country is already financing an overdue flagship energy project and citizens remain exposed to unreliable service. Yet the public has not been presented with a granular, independently reviewable scope showing how much is allocated to substations, feeders, transformers, dispatch systems, transmission lines, loss reduction, storage, maintenance, consultants, procurement, contingency, and project supervision.

Guyanese should not be asked to accept a US$800 million figure on faith while enduring daily shutdowns. If the grid’s deficiencies are sufficiently grave to require that scale of spending, then GPL and the Government must publish the engineering assessment, the project list, implementation timetable, procurement pathway, financing sources, performance indicators, and the names of those responsible for delivery.

The InterEnergy question

The InterEnergy Group consultancy raises an even more pressing issue. Government has publicly defended a proposed two-year arrangement with the Dominican Republic-based company at approximately US $15.6 million – in a no bid contract, describing its purpose as supervising projects, modernizing GPL’s management systems, overhauling the utility’s operations, and improving reliability and efficiency.

But that mandate demands measurable results—not broad language.

If customers continue to experience near-daily interruptions, the public is entitled to know:

⇒ What exact deliverables has InterEnergy been contracted to produce?

⇒ What reliability targets, outage-reduction benchmarks and reporting requirements apply?

⇒ Who measures performance, and will the results be published monthly?

⇒ What part of the US$15 million is for technical supervision, management reform, training, systems upgrades, or other work?

⇒ If the consultancy is meant to strengthen reliability, why has GPL not publicly set out its outage data, failure analysis, corrective-action program, and milestones for improvement?

A consultant cannot be paid millions merely to narrate a crisis that citizens experience every day. Its value must be demonstrated in a functioning system: fewer feeder trips, faster restoration, better reserve capacity, maintained generators, credible planning, and transparent reporting.

A question of leadership

The President’s stated plan is to stabilize the supply over six months through generation overhauls, additional capacity at critical points, and completion of the Berbice-Demerara interconnection.  Those may be necessary interventions. But necessity does not erase the fact that Guyana is being asked to endure another period of uncertainty after years of assurances that GtE would make power cheaper, cleaner and more dependable.

The country cannot build a manufacturing economy, attract energy-intensive investment, protect small businesses, or ask citizens to embrace a modernizing future while electricity remains a daily gamble.

Madagascar showed what happens when service failure becomes a national political crisis. Guyana should not wait for similar public desperation before embracing the standards that ought already to apply: full disclosure, independent oversight, enforceable timelines, contract accountability, named responsibility, and consequences when promises fail.

No nation becomes an energy powerhouse by issuing explanations during blackouts.

It becomes one by delivering power—reliably, affordably, and on time.

 

 

Night tortures -uneasy the heads wearing crowns

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

Night tortures -uneasy the heads wearing crowns


OPINION BY : GHK LALL October 2026

The spotlight is on KW’s October 1, 2026 editorial titled “Sleepless nights”.  What to make of this presidential confession?  Of his nocturnal torments, his dreamless nightmares.  The ghosts of 100 dead swirl around his head like a crown of nails.  Deserving, I think.  I shall try to be gentle, even though blood drips, oxygen stops.

Ten weeks after the MV Barima tragedy, the deceptions and deviations continue apace.  Three charged for murder.  The innocent paraded before the Stabroek Market, then made to march to the perp walk.  Such an injustice should strike the consciousness, reverse what valium tries to do.  Two months after the Commission of Inquiry has been sworn in, it is still trying to locate its compass and its propellor. Like the Mahdia Dorm Conflagration and its revealing COI, so the MV Barima aquatic suffocation and its COI that has sham marked on its face from the beginning. 

If there was any interest in honoring the dead, and justice for the impacted families, then several reflexive, irreversible, steps had to have occurred within a week of the tragedy.

An apology for the smirk and scorn of “noise.”  Those using that word should have resigned.  I differ with Kiskadee Watch about waiting for the evidence.  True men fall on their swords.  Damnit! There’s that Port Kaituma wharf and that new boat that was converted to a sport boat and love boat.  So, 100 were as good as doomed while the music played, the dancers gyrated.  Let’s there be no quibbling here.  Who honors their combat losses with the derisive contemptuousness of “noise?” 

The ministers should have resigned.  The Prime Minister should have gone voluntarily.  And the president in this instance has no claim on immunity.  If there is neither president nor prime minister, then there’s no cabinet.

Editors of the Kiskadee Watch: that’s taking responsibility (not slurs about “noise”).  Running oneself through is what eases the pangs of sleepless nights.  Too often the most pious and the most belatedly reflective are the most defective.  And self-destructive, too.  All these billions and all these crimes that have no owner.  Now, the conscience of the Guyanese people is savaged, the intelligence of Guyana’s indigenous belittled with “sleepless nights.”  Does anyone dance at a house of mourning amid the wrenching dirges of loss and pain?  Does anyone pretend at pain, when they were part of the plot that led to 100 dead, and a thousand beating their breasts, and a nation of a million asking: where is the responsibility?  Who will be man or woman enough to say, I am responsible?

Give seafarers a basket for a boat, and a toothpick and a feather for lifejackets to brave the ocean, and there is a recipe for tragedy.  In sleepless nights I hear an effort at sanctimoniousness that’s so risible, it incurs ridicule.  The parties have continued.  The charades live on.  Neither a protest nor a placard is needed when responsibility has to be taken, and there is always that ultimate owner.  The baton cannot be passed on, for there’s none other.  I think that the MV Barima catastrophe was both foreseeable and avoidable.  The condition and history of the boat.  How the same people now crying in the day and talking to some false god in the night misused those keeping that boat going. 

When they pulled rank and overloaded that boat.  When they added to its torturous and dangerous passages that took a few years too long before it collapsed under the weight of its own weakness and the might of the sea.

Last, I consider myself among the most sympathetic of individuals.  But when there’s a long, sordid, history of swearing to one thing (many things), then contradicting oneself, the best I can summon is distaste, but still a prayer.  Too many wrongs in this country can be rightly attached to government and leadership. 

From coverups of unsolved murders to character assassinations, from corruptions of words and budgets and oil money to the pathos of a gullible people.  If sleepless nights did happen, then their source, I think, could be much more than a boat with 100 poor dead people responsible. 

Guyana: Stop Sleepwalking Through Failure

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

Guyana: Stop Sleepwalking Through Failure


OPINION BY :Hem Kumar October 2026 

There is something profoundly disturbing about the ease with which Guyanese have been trained to accept mediocrity and  failure.

The lights go out. People curse GPL, post a complaint online, light a candle, start the generator if they can afford one, throw out spoiled food, and wait. The next day, another blackout comes. More appliances are damaged. Businesses lose money. Children cannot study. Patients and elderly citizens suffer in overheated homes. Families are forced to endure the indignity of living in a country overflowing with oil wealth but struggling to keep a bulb lit.

And still, too many Guyanese shrug.

They complain in private, whisper on minibuses, rage on Facebook, call radio programs, and then retreat back into the same helpless silence that has allowed incompetence to settle comfortably into public life.

That silence is not patience. It is permission.

For more than a month, Guyana has been subjected to serious and recurring electricity and water  failures; because when the power fails, the water stop flowing. These are not small inconveniences. Electricity is not a luxury reserved for the wealthy. It keeps food from spoiling, businesses functioning, classrooms productive, medicines refrigerated, medical equipment operating and homes safe. When a government, through its agencies and public utilities, cannot reliably provide electricity and water, it has failed in one of its most basic duties to the population.

Yet where is the national outrage equal to the offence?

Guyana is now an oil-producing state earning billions and boasting constantly about development, infrastructure, modernisation and transformation. Ministers fly abroad to tell investors that Guyana is the next great frontier. Government spokesmen speak grandly of growth figures, massive projects and a prosperous future.

But what kind of prosperity leaves citizens sitting in darkness?

What kind of transformation means shopkeepers must discard perishable goods because the power has failed again? What kind of economic miracle demands that small businesses buy generators, pay higher fuel bills, lose customers and absorb damaged equipment because public authorities cannot ensure a functioning electricity system? What kind of development leaves working families to sweat through the night while officials offer stale explanations and vague assurances?

A country can build shiny roads, erect towering hotels and announce billion-dollar contracts. But if it cannot consistently deliver electricity, clean water, public safety, functioning hospitals and reliable public services, it has not built development. It has built a public-relations campaign.,

The recent national response to the MV Barima disaster tells an even more troubling story. More than 100 lives were lost. More than 100 human beings—parents, children, relatives, workers, friends—were swallowed up by a tragedy that should have shaken the conscience of this country from coast to hinterland.

What followed should have been a sustained national demand for truth and accountability. Citizens should have demanded full disclosure of the circumstances, safety procedures, oversight failures, rescue arrangements, official communications, investigative findings and responsibility at every level.

Instead, the country was met with silence, delays and the familiar fading of public outrage. A group of young Guyanese held a silent protest against official silence. Their action carried a message the entire country should have heard: lives cannot be treated as statistics, and a government cannot simply wait for grief to evaporate.

But the wider public response remained painfully weak. Silence in Guyana is not a failure of courage. It is a failure of solidarity, and the government has priced it in.

That is the first half of the argument. The second half is about money. A government that lives on its citizens’ taxes lives on their consent. When services fail, it has to answer, because the next bill depends on it. 

Guyana’s government increasingly lives elsewhere. Oil revenue flows to the state from foreign operators, and the fiscal link between what the public pays and what the government can spend has weakened. A ruling party that does not need its citizens’ money has little reason to fear their patience running out. 

The result is what we are watching: ministers still in post eleven weeks on, salvage bids sitting for two weeks with no winner named, and a Commission of Inquiry now advertising for persons of interest to come forward while the Executive offers nothing of its own.

Put the two halves together and the picture is bleak. The tragedy is concentrated, so it does not unite the public. The state is insulated from public anger, so it does not need to respond. Each condition makes the other worse.

This publication does not conclude that nothing can be done. The young people who stood silently outside the Office of the President understood something their elders have not: when a grievance is not naturally shared, it has to be made shared. That is the work of organizing, of turnout, of testimony, and of a press that keeps the names of the dead in front of citizens who would otherwise move on. It is slow, and it is the only method that does not end with a colonel in front of the palace, as Madagascar’s did.

Here are the demands, and they are small enough that refusing them says everything:

♦Name the winning salvage bidder, publish all three bids, and give the Commission binding authority over how the wreck is raised.

♦Publish the Barima’s inspection and certification history, and the Coast Guard’s response timeline for the night of July 18.

♦Hold the Commission’s hearings in public, in full, on schedule.

♦Let the families, not the Ministry, choose who stands beside them.

That is the paradox of Guyana. People complain that politicians are arrogant, dismissive and insulated. They complain that ministers do not listen, public agencies do not answer, contracts are shrouded in secrecy, public money disappears into questionable schemes, and ordinary people are treated as an afterthought.

Then, when there is a moment to apply public pressure, too many disappear. They say they are tired. They say nothing will change. They say protest does not work. They say it is dangerous. They say they have jobs, families and responsibilities. They say someone else should take the lead.

But every excuse has a political beneficiary: the people already in power.

A government that meets no serious resistance will become increasingly comfortable with neglect. A minister who is never forced to account publicly will become more dismissive. A public corporation that is never confronted by organised consumers will continue to offer excuses in place of results. Every citizen who quietly adapts to failure helps create the conditions for its repetition.

This is not a call for violence. It is not a call to burn, loot, destroy or endanger another citizen. Those actions serve no public cause and usually give authorities an excuse to suppress legitimate dissent. This is a call for Guyanese to become citizens again.

Look at the world. In Serbia, the deaths of  16 people triggered sustained public agitation and relentless demands for accountability. Citizens did not allow official statements to close the matter. They maintained public pressure until the political consequences could no longer be ignored.

In Madagascar, thousands of young people have taken to the streets in response to recurring water and electricity failures. Their country, too, has endured political turbulence and severe state failures. The situation has had deadly and troubling consequences, and no sensible society should seek to reproduce that violence. But the lesson is unmistakable: citizens who refuse to be ignored can force government to confront its failures.

Guyana does not have to import chaos. It must import courage.

The country needs citizens who will stand outside GPL offices and demand real answers, not polished statements. It needs peaceful marches and pickets that last longer than one afternoon and cannot be managed away with a photograph and a promise. It needs consumer organisations to document losses, business groups to tally the cost of outages, legal advocates to test whether public authorities have met their duties, and journalists to pursue every claim until it is answered.

It needs churches, unions, youth organisations, professional bodies, parent groups and community associations to stop behaving as though public failure is somebody else’s problem.

Demand the outage data. Demand the names of the responsible decision-makers. Demand the maintenance records. Demand the generation-capacity figures. Demand a truthful explanation of why a petroleum-producing country cannot guarantee steady power. Demand deadlines that can be measured. Demand consequences when those deadlines are missed.

And above all, stop allowing political tribalism to weaken public outrage.

If you condemn blackouts only when the other party is in office, you are not defending citizens—you are performing for a political team. If you excuse failure because your preferred party holds power, you are helping to build the same system you claim to hate. Darkness does not ask whether a household is PPP, PNC, AFC, APNU, WPA, or politically unaffiliated. Spoiled food does not recognise party colours. A damaged refrigerator does not care who you voted for. A child trying to study in the heat does not benefit from partisan excuses.

This is where Guyanese must grow up politically.

The government should understand that people are watching, recording, questioning and organising. GPL should understand that citizens will not simply absorb losses while executives and officials hide behind technical jargon. Every minister should understand that a title is not a shield from accountability. Every agency should understand that public money comes with public obligations.

The age of accepting “we are working on it” must end.

Guyanese have endured too much and demanded too little. They have confused quiet suffering with resilience. They have mistaken political loyalty for citizenship. They have allowed themselves to be worn down until outrage is replaced by resignation.

But resignation is exactly what failure depends on.

The people of Guyana must wake up. Not tomorrow, after another blackout. Not after another avoidable tragedy. Not when another family loses income, another shopkeeper loses stock, another student loses study time, or another official tells the country to be patient.

Wake up now.

Organise peacefully. Speak loudly. Document everything. Demand answers. Return again and again until those entrusted with public power understand that the citizens of Guyana are no longer prepared to live in darkness—literal or political.

Because a people who sleepwalk through every failure should not be shocked when those in authority conclude that they can govern them without consequence.

A government that does not depend on its people’s money can afford to ignore their grief. It cannot afford to ignore their attention. Keep looking.

 

The Cuyuní Machine-Pt.III   The Price of a Clean Origin

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

 The Cuyuní Machine-Pt.III   The Price of a Clean Origin


 OPINION BY: Hem Kumar September,2026       

Washington’s Venezuelan gold rush has produced metal that no refiner will vouch for. Next door sits a gold sector that publishes little, measures less, and already leaks at the border. The Board asks what a clean Guyanese label is now worth.

The Warehouse

Seized from small operators and dressed up as enforcement

Half a year after the first Venezuelan gold was flown into the United States, a great deal of it has not been sold. The New York Times reported on September 28 that gold shipped by the trading house Trafigura, under a deal with Venezuela’s state miner Minerven, sits in storage. Any refiner that takes it must be able to certify, under international rules, that it has not financed gangs, environmental destruction or corruption. According to the NY Times, an executive of Asahi Refining mused at an industry gathering in London about whether his firm wanted to be the first refiner to announce publicly that it was receiving Venezuelan gold.

The NY Times also reported that the gold began moving before Trafigura had engaged an auditor or a risk consultant. Trafigura told the newspaper that its due diligence is ongoing and that its auditor has identified no illegal taxation, extortion or involvement of illegal actors at the sites it buys from. The Board draws no conclusion about Trafigura’s conduct. We draw one about incentives.

The NY Times report does not mention Guyana. It does not need to. It describes a market condition: a large quantity of Venezuelan gold that cannot presently be sold as Venezuelan gold.

The Ninety Percent Problem

The difficulty is not that Venezuela has no legitimate gold. It is that legitimate and illegitimate gold become indistinguishable once melted together. The Times found that at Minerven, whose two industrial mines are fenced and guarded specifically to keep criminality out, brigade miners working on company property hand a share of their output to the Tren de Guayana gang, and that another share goes to Minerven, which melts it with the gold sold to Trafigura. Payrolls seen by the NY Times indicate that Minerven declares only a fraction of the gold it sells.

If the most carefully ring-fenced supply chain in the country cannot keep its origin clean, the informal open-pit sites now being taken up by other investors will not. Julia Yansura of the FACT Coalition told the Times: “Around 90 percent of the gold produced in Venezuela is criminally produced.” In that setting, origin is less a fact about the metal than a fact about the paperwork.

Origin, in this trade, is less a fact than a document.

The Price of a Clean Origin

Gold is fungible; its paperwork is not. A bar a refiner can trace to a licensed, audited mine sells at the market price. A bar it cannot trace sells at a discount, or sits in a warehouse. Wherever that gap exists, someone will be paid to close it, and the cheapest way to close it is not to clean the metal but to change the label: blend it, re-document it, and export it under another jurisdiction’s name. That is among the oldest techniques in illicit gold.

The question for Guyana is whether the label on offer could be a Guyanese one.

Why Guyana Is the Obvious Neighbor

Part One of this series set out what is already on the record. A March 2026 report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime found that Guyana has become a gold source into Venezuela, with buyers paying a premium of roughly eight percent, moved along the Lethem–Boa Vista route and settled in part in cryptocurrency. The Cuyuní corridor, meanwhile, is subject to extortion by armed groups. Routes built to carry Guyanese gold into Venezuela are, by their nature, routes that connect the two supply chains. The Board’s question is whether metal or paperwork is moving the other way.

The timing sharpens it. Washington’s Legal Gold and Mining Partnership Act remains pending, and the NY Times reports that Democratic lawmakers have questioned the legality of the Trafigura deal and promised greater oversight if they win control of Congress in November.

If scrutiny of directly imported Venezuelan gold tightens, the incentive to route it through a neighbor with a friendlier label tightens with it.

The Brazilian Warning

Brazil has been here. Its gold problem was never only illegal wildcat mining; it was lawful-looking paperwork. Investigators and researchers there documented permits and “paper” operations used to give illegally extracted gold a legal origin, and in 2023 the country’s Supreme Court suspended the legal presumption of good faith that had allowed buyers to accept a seller’s declaration of origin. The lesson for Guyana is not that Guyana is Brazil. It is that a system which accepts a declaration of origin at face value invites the declaration to be written to order.

The Gap That Makes It Plausible

As Part Two reported, the government’s own organized-crime unit has estimated that about 15,000 troy ounces of gold a week are smuggled out of Guyana across the Suriname border. That is an unrecorded flow of enormous size, and it means the distance between what Guyana mines and what Guyana can prove it mines is already wide. The January 2026 crackdown, including the suspension of 107 Brazilian miners’ licenses, was aimed at a different flow.

Additional metal would not have to be hidden in a sealed system. It would have to be added to one that already leaks.

What This Piece Does Not Say

The Board holds no document showing that Venezuelan gold has been documented as Guyanese gold. The Times reporting establishes the incentive on the Venezuelan side; Part One establishes cross-border flows in the other direction. The link between them is a hypothesis, and this series will treat it as one until records say otherwise. Nor is the question an indictment of Guyana’s licensed dealers or its artisanal miners, most of whom operate lawfully. Part Two cautioned against blunt enforcement that harms them, and that caution stands.

What the Board Demands

The hypothesis can be tested with numbers the State already holds. The Board calls on the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission and the Guyana Gold Board to:

  • Publish monthly declared production and recorded exports, by dealer, from January 2025 to date, so that any change after March 2026 is visible.
  • State whether any export declaration or certificate of origin for Guyanese gold has been queried, refused or flagged by a foreign refiner or buyer since March 2026.
  • State whether the organized-crime unit has examined any overlap between the Suriname smuggling estimate, the Cuyuní flow and gold of Venezuelan origin.
  • Disclose how many suspicious transaction reports gold dealers, as designated reporting entities, have filed since March 2026 on gold of unverified origin.

The 592 Guardian intends to file access-to-information requests on each point and to publish the responses, or the silence. Part Four will test the hypothesis against whatever the numbers show.

— The Board

 

Sources

Anatoly Kurmanaev, Tyler Pager and Rebecca R. Ruiz, The New York Times, September 28, 2026 (Venezuelan gold; Trafigura -Minerven; Heeney Capital-Mercuria; Trafigura and FACT Coalition statements).

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, March 2026 report on Venezuela’s illicit gold markets, as cited in Part One.

Government organized-crime unit estimate of gold smuggled across the Suriname border, and January 2026 license suspensions, as cited in Part Two.

The Cuyuní Machine, Parts One and Two, The 592 Guardian.

 

 

 

MV Barima: Raise the Vessel Before the Truth Sinks

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  MV Barima: Raise the Vessel Before the Truth Sinks


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar October 2026

Weeks after bids were opened for the salvage of the MV Barima, Guyanese remain in the dark about who bid, what the operation will cost, when the vessel will be raised and whether the Commission of Inquiry can reach credible conclusions without examining the wreck itself.

The MV Barima is still underwater. But the questions surrounding it are rising rapidly.

Weeks have passed since bids were reportedly opened for the salvage of the vessel, yet the country has not been given a full public account of what has happened since. There has been no adequate disclosure of the bidders, the proposed salvage methods, the cost of the operation, the criteria for evaluating bids, the anticipated date of an award, or the timetable for raising the vessel.

At the same time, the Commission of Inquiry is proceeding. 

That creates a fundamental public-interest concern: how can Guyana be assured of a complete, credible and technically sound investigation if the vessel at the centre of the incident remains submerged and unavailable for proper forensic examination?

The MV  Barima is not merely a wreck to be removed from the water. It may be the most important physical witness in the entire matter.

It may hold evidence about the impact, the point and angle of collision, structural damage, navigational decisions, mechanical condition, communications equipment, safety systems, maintenance failures, crew procedures and whether the official account of events matches what actually happened.

Witnesses can forget. Records can be incomplete. Statements can be self-serving. But physical evidence has a way of contradicting convenient narratives. That is why the recovery of the MV Barima must not be treated as an administrative afterthought while a Commission of Inquiry presses ahead.

 “The vessel is not simply the subject of the inquiry. It may be the inquiry’s most important witness.”

The Public Is Still Waiting

The public has a right to know whether the salvage exercise is being pursued with the urgency, competence and transparency demanded by the seriousness of the incident. The concern is not that a salvage operation requires time. Marine salvage can be complex. Water depth, currents, weather, the vessel’s structural stability, environmental conditions, divers’ safety, equipment availability and the risk of further damage can all affect the pace of recovery.

But complexity is not a license for secrecy.

If there are technical problems, the Government should say so. If the procurement process has encountered difficulties, explain them. If bids were non-compliant, disclose that fact. If a contract has been awarded, identify the contractor, the contract sum, its qualifications, the scope of works, the expected completion date and the safeguards governing preservation of evidence. Silence invites suspicion.

And in a country where procurement controversy, opaque contracting and weak disclosure have become recurring public concerns, the Government should understand that citizens will not be reassured by general statements that “the matter is being handled.”

Handled by whom? Under what process? At what cost? Under what oversight? On what timetable? Those are the questions that matter.

“The Government cannot demand public confidence while withholding the information required to earn it.”

 An Inquiry Without the Wreck?

A Commission of Inquiry has an important role. It can compel evidence, summon witnesses, analyze documentation and make findings regarding responsibility, failures and recommendations for reform. But no inquiry should proceed as if testimony alone is enough.

The Commission must hear from crew members, port authorities, marine officials, vessel operators, technical personnel, witnesses and every agency with responsibility for safety, navigation, maintenance and emergency response. It must examine logs, communication records, maintenance documentation, certifications, crew rosters, navigational records, inspection reports and any available video or electronic data.

Yet none of that should remove the need for the vessel itself to be examined.

A proper investigation must ask whether the physical condition of the MV Barima can corroborate—or undermine—the testimony being presented before the Commission. It must determine what damage the vessel sustained, how that damage occurred, whether there were pre-existing structural issues, whether key equipment was functional and whether the wreck contains material evidence that has not yet been identified.

A Commission that reaches major conclusions before the vessel is raised risks producing an incomplete account. It may hear what people say happened without obtaining all available evidence of what actually happened.

This is not an argument against the Commission. It is an argument for a Commission that gets the full truth.

“An inquiry that cannot examine the central physical evidence risks becoming an inquiry into recollections, not reality.”

 A Procurement Matter and an Evidence Matter

The salvage of the MV Barima is both a procurement issue and an evidentiary issue.

It involves public funds. That means the public has a right to know whether the State is obtaining technical competence and value for money. Salvage contracts can be expensive, highly specialized and vulnerable to cost overruns, variations and delays. A poorly structured contract can leave taxpayers paying more while the vessel remains underwater and evidence deteriorates.

It also involves the preservation of possible evidence. That means the contractor’s competence cannot be measured by price alone.

The selected company must have demonstrated expertise in marine salvage, underwater recovery, wreck stabilisation, environmental protection, vessel handling and evidence preservation. Its work must be governed by a clear protocol that protects the integrity of the wreck and documents every stage of the recovery.

The State should not merely choose the lowest bidder. It must choose the bidder best equipped to perform a sensitive recovery without compromising the investigation

That requires transparent evaluation criteria and independent technical oversight.

If the contractor is selected solely through an opaque process, and the wreck is later damaged, altered or improperly handled during recovery, the country may lose evidence it cannot recover.

“The cheapest salvage operation is not necessarily the best one if it costs Guyana the evidence needed to establish the truth.”

Questions for the Authorities

The agencies and officials responsible should provide prompt, specific answers to the following questions.

To the Procuring Entity and Relevant Ministry

⇒ On what date were bids opened for the MV Barima salvage operation?

⇒ How many bids were received, and which companies, partnerships or consortiums submitted them?

⇒ What were the proposed prices, timelines and technical methods submitted by each bidder?

⇒ What procurement method was used, and under what statutory authority or procurement procedure?

⇒ Has a preferred bidder been identified or a contract awarded?

⇒ If a contract has been awarded, who received it, what is the contract value, what is the duration and what are the principal contractual deliverables?

⇒ If a contract has not been awarded, what specific issue is delaying the evaluation or award?

⇒ What qualifications and documented marine-salvage experience were required of bidders?

⇒ What weight was assigned to price, technical competence, equipment, safety record, environmental safeguards and evidence-preservation capacity?

⇒ Was any independent marine-salvage specialist involved in evaluating the bids?

⇒  Will the full bid-evaluation report, contract award information and eventual contract be publicly released?

⇒What is the projected total cost to taxpayers, including salvage, monitoring, security, technical inspection, transport, storage and environmental mitigation?

⇒ What measures will prevent contract variations, delay claims or unexplained cost escalations?

To the Commission of Inquiry

⇒ Has the Commission formally requested the urgent recovery of the MV Barima?

⇒ Does the Commission regard physical examination of the wreck as necessary to reaching final conclusions?

⇒ Will the Commission defer final findings until the vessel is raised and examined?

⇒ What evidence has been secured from the wreck site while the vessel remains underwater?

⇒ Has the Commission received expert advice on the risks of   deterioration, disturbance or loss of physical evidence over time?

⇒ Will the Commission appoint or retain independent marine engineers, salvage specialists, naval architects and forensic investigators?

⇒ Will the experts who inspect the wreck be independent of the vessel’s owner, operator, regulator, insurer, Government agencies and salvage contractor?

⇒ Will the Commission make the full technical inspection report available to the public?

⇒ Will the Commission revisit witness evidence if physical examination of the vessel reveals contradictions or new facts?

⇒ Will it identify and explain any limitation in its findings caused by the inability to inspect the vessel before hearings conclude?

To the Maritime and Safety Authorities

⇒ What was the certified operational condition of the MV Barima  before the incident?

⇒ When was the vessel last inspected, and by whom?

⇒ Were all required certifications valid at the time?

⇒ What maintenance records, defect reports and repair logs have been secured?

⇒ What navigational, communication and tracking data have been preserved?

⇒ Are there records of radio exchanges, distress calls, bridge communications, engine-room logs or other operational information?

⇒ What emergency-response procedures were activated after the incident?

⇒ Was the wreck site secured immediately to prevent disturbance, unauthorized access, loss of evidence or environmental harm?

⇒ What is the current condition of the vessel, and is there a risk that further deterioration will affect the recovery effort?

The Need for Independent Technical Examination

Once the vessel is raised, Guyana should insist upon an independent examination by suitably qualified professionals.

That examination should include marine engineers, naval architects, collision-reconstruction experts, surveyors, safety specialists and, where necessary, forensic investigators. The experts must not simply be persons selected because they are convenient to the Government or connected to agencies whose performance may itself be under review.

Their mandate should be public and specific. It should include examination of:

⇒ Hull damage, breach points and the direction of impact

⇒ Structural integrity before and after recovery

⇒ Engines, steering systems, propulsion and mechanical equipment

⇒ Navigation, radar, radio and communications systems

⇒ Safety equipment, emergency systems and lifesaving appliances

⇒ Maintenance records, certification history and outstanding defects

⇒ Electronic, navigational and operational data where recoverable

⇒ Any evidence relevant to the cause of the incident and the adequacy of the emergency response

The recovery process should also be documented thoroughly through photographs, video, chain-of-custody records and contemporaneous technical reports.

That is how public confidence is built: not with assurances, but with evidence that can be independently assessed.

“The country does not need another official narrative. It needs an evidence-based account that can withstand scrutiny.”

The Broader Governance Problem

The MV Barima matter is not occurring in isolation. It sits within a wider Guyanese pattern in which large expenditures, strategic projects and controversial public decisions often proceed with limited disclosure and little meaningful opportunity for citizens to test the claims being made in their name.

Guyana is no longer a country that can excuse weak governance by pleading poverty or scarcity. The country now controls unprecedented oil revenues. Public spending is expanding. Infrastructure plans are multiplying. Contracts are becoming larger, more complex and more consequential.

That makes transparency more urgent, not less.

The danger is that “development” becomes a word used to silence questions. Anyone who asks about procurement is accused of opposing progress. Anyone who seeks documentation is portrayed as obstructive. Anyone who demands independent scrutiny is told that Government must be allowed to work.

But scrutiny is not sabotage. Questions are not anti-development. Transparency does not delay progress; it protects progress from waste, corruption, incompetence and political favouritism. Guyana cannot build a durable future on a system where citizens are expected to applaud announcements but are denied the information needed to assess delivery.

“Oil wealth should have produced stronger safeguards, not a culture in which the public is asked to accept less information and more assurances.”

Raise the Vessel. Release the Facts.

The Government must act with urgency, but urgency must mean more than moving hearings forward and issuing occasional statements.

It must mean finalizing the salvage process transparently. It must mean identifying the contractor and publishing the essential terms of the contract. It must mean preserving the wreck as evidence. It must mean ensuring that independent experts examine it. It must mean giving the Commission the material it needs before it reaches final conclusions.

Most importantly, it must mean treating the Guyanese public as entitled to information rather than as spectators expected to wait quietly for official pronouncements

The MV Barima must be raised. The evidence must be secured. The procurement process must be explained.

The Commission must not be allowed to deliver a final report without confronting the question of whether it had access to the central physical evidence.

And every official, agency, operator or contractor found responsible for negligence, incompetence, misconduct or a failure of duty must face meaningful consequences.

Because if the vessel remains below the surface while the inquiry moves ahead above it, Guyanese may be left with a report—but not necessarily the whole truth. The country deserves better than a managed explanation.It deserves the facts.

 

The Patron’s Bargain

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA 

 The Patron’s Bargain


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar October 2026

What an American critique of Washington’s Venezuela policy tells Guyana about the price of being useful

A publication that sides with the Venezuelan opposition, and wishes America well, has now made the case that Washington’s Venezuela policy is failing on its own terms. The Free Press argues that nearly ten months after American forces seized Nicolás Maduro, Venezuelans remain under the authority of his former deputies, while Washington’s attention has moved to oil and gold. This Board does not adopt the Free Press’s politics. We read it because the critique comes from inside the tent, and because the structure it describes is one Guyana should study before it is asked to live inside it.

What the Free Press Says

The account, which we attribute to the Free Press and have not independently verified, runs as follows. Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president, is the de facto leader. She and President Trump have spoken of elections, but neither has offered a date, a plan for a credible vote, or an answer to who will be allowed to run. 

María Corina Machado, the opposition leader, remains in exile; her spokesman says she was refused entry three times last week. Washington holds enormous leverage over Rodríguez, the piece argues, yet has chosen to work with her in pursuit of deals.

The deals are the substance. The Free Press relays reporting by the New York Times that hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Venezuelan gold, mined in areas controlled by gangs and a corrupt military, is sitting in American warehouses because refiners cannot sell gold that funds criminal organizations. It cites Elliott Abrams, Mr. Trump’s first-term point man on Venezuela, for the observation that the administration has not demanded the release of all political prisoners or the return of exiled leaders, and that recovery and democracy have been pushed into an indefinite future. And it reports Mr. Trump telling the UN General Assembly that, to the victor, belong the spoils. The verdict is that the policy is both imperial and inept: investors avoid a country without the rule of law, and contracts signed today may not outlast the President who blessed them.

A patron’s favor tracks usefulness, not legitimacy. A client who forgets this has stopped asking what the favor costs.

Four Lessons for Georgetown

Usefulness outranks legitimacy. On the Free Press’s account, Ms. Rodríguez is protected because she takes instructions, not because Venezuelans chose her. Guyana’s government was elected, and the comparison does not turn on that. It turns on how a patron decides whom to favor. Washington’s criteria are Washington’s own. A government that assumes they coincide with its citizens’ interests has stopped checking.

When the stated purpose is resources, protection is a transaction. Mr. Trump’s spoils remark was made in public. Guyana is an oil state, and Secretary Rubio, standing beside President Ali in Georgetown, pledged consequences if Venezuela attacked Guyana or ExxonMobil. This Board noted then that the sentence protected a commercial asset as well as a border.

Protection from a power that openly names resources as the prize has a price. Guyanese are entitled to know what it is.

Tainted gold needs a clean exit. The Free Press’s point is that Venezuelan gold cannot be sold because its origin is the problem. Guyana is a gold-producing country with a documented smuggling record, which this Board has traced in its Cuyuní Machine series. A stockpile with no legitimate buyer creates an incentive to launder its origin, and export documentation is where origin is written down. We allege nothing here. We say the incentive exists, and that Parts Three and Four of that series test whether the paperwork resists it.

Arrangements outlive attention only if they are law. The Free Press warns that Venezuelan contracts may not survive Mr. Trump’s departure in January 2029, and that Venezuelans will come to resent the country that kept their unelected ruler in place. Both warnings apply at once with regards to Guyana. A framework that never came before the National Assembly, as with the third-country deportee arrangement, or a security memorandum whose data terms have never been disclosed, is fragile precisely because no legislature owns it.      The public will own the consequences without ever having been asked.

What We Are Not Saying

Guyana is not Venezuela, and we do not say otherwise. Its government is elected. The threat to the Essequibo is real, and a small country beside a larger one is entitled to seek strong friends. The Free Press piece is an opinion column, its account of the gold reporting is second-hand, and its endorsement of Ms. Machado is its own position, not ours. Our quarrel is not with engagement. It is with engagement conducted by announcement, where the terms surface after the decision.

The Test

The Free Press gives us a yardstick, and we propose to apply it. For any arrangement with Washington or its agencies, the public is owed the answers to five questions. Who proposed it, and when? What are the terms, including who borrows, who bears the risk, and what must be bought from whom? Was there a competitive process, and if not, under what exemption? Has the National Assembly seen it, and if not, why not? And which named officer answers for it when it fails?

The Board will apply this test to the most recent announcements on American financing and housing as soon as their terms are on the record.

If the answers are good, they can be published in a day. The speed with which an arrangement moves is not evidence of its merit. It is evidence of who is in a hurry, and the public should ask why.

— The Board

Sourcing note: Claims about Venezuela are attributed to the Free Press and to the reporting and commentary it cites (New York Times on gold; Elliott Abrams) and have not been independently verified by this Board. References to Guyana draw on the Board’s prior documentation.

Washington’s Echo Chamber: The Caribbean Must Not Trade Sovereignty for Access

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY INJOURNALISM♦GUYANA

Washington’s Echo Chamber: The Caribbean Must Not Trade Sovereignty for Access


OPINION BY : Hem Kumar October 2026

There is a political playbook now taking shape across the Caribbean and Latin America. It is presented in the language of partnership, security, prosperity, technology and collective action. It is wrapped in the vocabulary of fighting transnational crime, defending democracy, strengthening borders, protecting supply chains and resisting external coercion.

But beneath the attractive language lies a question that citizens of Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and the wider Caribbean must ask without fear or apology:

At what point does cooperation with the United States stop being cooperation and become compliance?

That question became impossible to ignore at the United Nations General Assembly when United States President Donald Trump announced that the world should replace the term “Artificial Intelligence” with “Superintelligence,” or “SI.” The term “artificial,” he argued, made intelligence sound fake. He said the United States would use “Superintelligence” and hoped the rest of the world would follow. 

Then Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar rose and publicly declared: “I want to agree with President Trump.” She endorsed the terminology and said, “We commit to that.”

The issue was never really AI versus SI. The issue was the reflex.

Pres.Trump and PM Bissesar

A prime minister of an independent Caribbean nation had been given a choice: treat an American president’s spontaneous preference as a position to be considered, debated and evaluated—or embrace it immediately before the world. The response sent a message far beyond technology. It suggested that Washington speaks, and Port of Spain echoes. That is not what sovereignty is supposed to look like.

Sovereignty Is Not Ceremony

A country does not become sovereign merely because it possesses a flag, an anthem, a passport, a coat of arms and a seat at the United Nations.

Sovereignty is the practical ability to make independent decisions. It means a government can listen to Washington, Beijing, London, Brussels, Caracas or any other capital, but still arrive at a position because it serves the national interest—not because a powerful country has announced its preference.

A sovereign country can cooperate. It can form alliances. It can seek military assistance, trade access, investment and intelligence support. It can agree with the United States when the facts and interests warrant agreement.

But it must also retain the ability to disagree. That is the test.

The problem is not that Trinidad and Tobago may share a position with the United States. The problem is a public display of uncritical alignment, particularly on an issue where there was no evident domestic policy process, scientific consultation, parliamentary discussion or CARICOM position.

A country that cannot pause before saying “we commit” to an American president’s terminology may eventually find it difficult to pause before committing to his foreign-policy priorities, his sanctions agenda, his security architecture or his geopolitical conflicts.

The Shield and the Strategy

This concern becomes more serious when placed alongside the US-led  Shield of the Americas initiative, launched in 2026 and expanded at the UN General Assembly. Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago are among the governments that have joined this hemispheric framework.

Its language sounds unobjectionable: stronger security, joint action against organized crime, economic resilience and greater cooperation among countries of the Americas.

Who could oppose fighting drug trafficking, firearms smuggling, money laundering, human trafficking, cybercrime and transnational criminal networks? No responsible government should. But citizens must distinguish between genuine crime-fighting cooperation and an arrangement that progressively turns regional governments into instruments for carrying out Washington’s security and diplomatic agenda.

The communiqué adopted under the Shield rests on three pillars:

♦ Economic cooperation.

♦ Security cooperation.

♦ Multilateral coordination.

That third pillar deserves the closest attention.

“Multilateral coordination” sounds harmless. In practice, it can mean that governments which should be independently assessing international questions begin to coordinate positions in the United Nations, the Organization of American States and other international bodies around a US-defined agenda. The danger is not always a formal order from Washington. It is often subtler.

It is the creation of a political environment in which smaller states learn that access, security assurances, investment opportunities and favorable diplomatic attention are connected to proving that they are “reliable” partners. A reliable partner gradually becomes one that does not embarrass Washington, does not challenge Washington and does not depart too far from Washington’s preferred line.

That is how sovereignty can be weakened without a single flag being lowered.

The Security Lever

The Shield of the Americas communiqué envisages coordinated action against 24 groups identified as narco-terrorist or foreign-terrorist threats, including potential sanctions, asset freezes, immigration restrictions and legal action against persons who knowingly provide support It also contemplates using the Organization of American States’ mechanisms under the Rio Treaty, or TIAR, to examine collective action against such groups.

That may sound like a narrowly focused anti-crime initiative. But regional citizens should understand what such a structure can become.

Once governments accept a common security framework, the central question becomes: who defines the threat? Will threats be defined independently by Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, CARICOM and other regional states on the basis of evidence, law and domestic interests? Or will the definition flow primarily from US intelligence assessments, US designations and US geopolitical priorities?

Those are not academic concerns.

Security designations carry consequences. They can affect banking, trade, shipping, investment, travel, insurance, remittances, immigration, digital platforms and cross-border commercial relationships. They can expose domestic companies and individuals to serious legal and financial consequences. They can also draw countries into conflicts whose origins, objectives and ultimate costs have not been fully explained to their own citizens.

Before Guyana signs on to any sanctions-orientated or security-related framework, the public has a right to know:

 ♦ Which organizations are being targeted.

 ♦ What evidence supports the designations.

 ♦ What actions Guyana has agreed to take.

 ♦ Whether Guyanese law authorizes those actions.

 ♦ Whether Parliament has been informed.

 ♦ What obligations are being assumed by Guyana’s police, military, intelligence, financial and immigration agencies.

 ♦ What protections exist for Guyanese citizens, businesses and institutions.

 ♦ What happens if Guyana concludes that a US-backed measure is not in its national interest.

Security cooperation without transparency can easily become security dependence.

Guyana’s Special Vulnerability

Guyana’s situation is more complicated than Trinidad and Tobago’s because Guyana faces a real and continuing threat from Venezuela over the Essequibo region.

That reality cannot be minimized.

Guyana is entitled to seek security partnerships. It is entitled to welcome diplomatic support from the United States. It is entitled to strengthen maritime surveillance, intelligence sharing, border monitoring, cybersecurity, coast-guard capacity and defense readiness. It is entitled to seek support for the protection of its offshore petroleum assets and its territorial integrity.

No sensible Guyanese should demand that the country isolate itself while Venezuela maintains an unlawful claim to more than two-thirds of Guyana’s territory.

But it is precisely because Guyana is vulnerable that Guyana must be careful.

A country facing a security threat can become so anxious for protection that it begins to mistake dependency for partnership. It can become reluctant to take any position that may irritate the power it believes is protecting it. It can become more concerned with demonstrating loyalty than defending policy independence.

That is the danger Guyana must avoid.

The United States may be an important ally in the defense of Guyana’s sovereignty. But Guyana must never allow the defense of its sovereignty against Venezuela to become the justification for surrendering its diplomatic sovereignty to Washington.

That would be a cruel irony: defending Essequibo from external control while allowing Guyana’s foreign policy to become externally managed.

Ali’s Washington Problem

President Irfaan Ali has enthusiastically emphasized Guyana’s expanding relationship with the United States. His government has highlighted deeper US-Guyana security cooperation, praised Trump’s leadership and presented Guyana as a committed partner in Washington’s hemispheric security initiatives.

Again, engagement is not the offense.

Guyana needs friends. It needs allies. It needs partners capable of helping it deter Venezuelan aggression and strengthen national security. The public concern is whether the Government is defining the terms of that relationship or merely accepting terms fashioned elsewhere.

When Guyana signs a US-led communiqué that includes “multilateral coordination,” the Government must explain what that means.

♦ Does Guyana retain its absolute freedom to vote independently at the United Nations?

♦ Can Guyana support Washington on the Essequibo controversy but differ with Washington on Cuba, Palestine, sanctions, trade disputes, climate financing, migration, development policy or relations with China?

♦ Can Guyana take a CARICOM position when that position differs from the United States?

♦ Can Guyana say no to a military, security, sanctions or intelligence proposal that it considers contrary to its law or interests?

♦ Or has Georgetown accepted the idea that being a “good partner” requires keeping step with Washington on every major issue?

Those questions cannot be dismissed as anti-American. They are pro-Guyana questions.

Partnership Is Not Obedience

A mature relationship between states is not built on obedience. It is built on clarity, reciprocity and mutual respect.

Guyana can say to Washington:

♦ “We value your support for Guyana’s territorial integrity.”

♦ “We welcome intelligence and security cooperation against shared threats.”

♦ “We will work with you against narcotics trafficking, illegal arms, money laundering and organised crime.”

♦ “We will defend democracy, international law and the right of states to live free from external aggression.”

But Guyana must also be able to say:

♦ “We will make our own decisions.”

♦ “We will not adopt every US priority as Guyana’s priority.”

♦ “We will not join conflicts without a clear Guyanese interest.”

♦ “We will not treat regional consultation as a replacement for Guyana’s independent judgment.”

♦ “We will not use national security as an excuse to avoid parliamentary scrutiny.”

♦ “We will not allow security cooperation to compromise the country’s non-negotiable right to think, speak and vote for itself.”

That is what equal partnership sounds like.

CARICOM Must Not Be Reduced

The Caribbean’s strength has always rested on its ability to act collectively while maintaining an independent voice. CARICOM countries are small, but they are not insignificant. They have moral authority, diplomatic experience and a long record of defending international law, decolonization, peace, climate justice and the rights of small states.

Guyana has historically been part of that tradition. 

♦ It is inconsistent for Guyana to demand respect for international law in the Essequibo controversy, then become silent when the same international-law principles are inconvenient for a powerful ally.

♦ It is inconsistent to argue that small states must not be bullied by larger powers, then allow Guyana’s positions to be moulded by the expectations of the hemisphere’s dominant power.

♦ It is inconsistent to call for a stronger multilateral system while joining arrangements that may reduce multilateral consultation to coordination behind Washington’s lead.

Guyana must work with the United States. But it must also work through CARICOM, the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the wider Global South. Its foreign policy cannot be reduced to a single axis.

Parliament and the Public

The Shield of the Americas communiqué may not itself be a binding treaty. It is described as a declaration of intention, not a ratified agreement that automatically creates enforceable legal duties.

But non-binding documents often become the foundation for binding actions.

They can lead to intelligence-sharing protocols, sanctions measures, policing agreements, military cooperation, financial restrictions, technology contracts, data-sharing arrangements, diplomatic commitments and OAS resolutions. The public may only discover the full implications after political commitments have already been made.

That is why Parliament must not be treated as an afterthought.

The Government of Guyana should place before the National Assembly:

 ♦ The complete communiqué and every annex, protocol and side agreement connected to Guyana’s participation.

 ♦ A list of the 24 groups referred to in the security component.

 ♦ A legal opinion on Guyana’s obligations and discretion under the arrangement.

 ♦ The financial, operational and staffing commitments required of Guyanese agencies.

 ♦ The terms governing intelligence sharing and personal-data protections.

 ♦ A statement of whether US personnel, equipment or operational assets will be stationed or deployed in Guyana.

♦ A clear explanation of how Guyana will preserve independent voting and diplomatic positions in international forums.

♦ The procedures through which Guyana may decline, amend or withdraw from proposed joint actions.

The public cannot defend national sovereignty if it is denied the information required to understand what has been agreed in its name.

The Real Playbook

The public should understand the playbook. 

♦ First comes the language of shared values: democracy, security, freedom, prosperity and sovereignty.

♦ Then comes the language of common threats: criminal networks, drugs, arms trafficking, hostile states, cyberattacks and foreign influence.

♦ Then comes the invitation to coordinate: intelligence-sharing, sanctions, border initiatives, digital standards, investment screening and common diplomatic positions.

♦ Then comes the expectation of political alignment: support the designation, vote for the resolution, adopt the terminology, repeat the talking point, endorse the priority and demonstrate reliability.

♦ Finally, independent disagreement begins to look like disloyalty.

That is how smaller states can be absorbed into the geopolitical agenda of a larger power—not necessarily through invasion, formal colonialism or public coercion, but through institutional habits, elite relationships, security dependence and the gradual normalization of agreement.

The result is an echo chamber. Washington speaks. Regional governments repeat. Citizens are told it is partnership.

 Guyana Must Speak for Guyana

The question is not whether Guyana should have relations with the United States. Of course it should. The question is whether Guyana will have a foreign policy of its own.

A country defending itself against Venezuela must be especially vigilant not to become overly dependent on any single foreign power. It needs strong friends, but it also needs options. It needs security support, but it needs constitutional accountability. It needs diplomatic partnerships, but it needs the confidence to disagree.

President Ali must therefore make clear that Guyana’s participation in the Shield of the Americas does not mean automatic alignment with Washington on foreign policy, sanctions, military action or UN voting.

♦ Guyana must cooperate where cooperation serves Guyana.

♦ Guyana must resist where resistance serves Guyana.

♦ Guyana must consult with its CARICOM neighbors before allowing foreign powers to shape the region’s collective agenda.

♦ And Guyana must remember that sovereignty is not measured by how loudly a government praises an ally. It is measured by whether, when the moment comes, that government can say:

Washington has spoken. Now Guyana will speak for Guyana.

 

The Commissioner Answers to the Court

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

 The Commissioner Answers to the Court


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar October 2026

This is a consequential ruling because it does more than settle a dispute between Christopher Ram and the Commissioner of Information. It begins to restore a legal mechanism that successive administrations allowed to lie dormant for fourteen years.

For fourteen years, Guyana’s Access to Information Act 2011 sat on the statute book like an unopened letter: enacted, available, and ignored by the very institutions meant to give it life. The promise was clear enough. Citizens would have a lawful avenue to seek records held by the State; public authorities would have duties to respond; and Parliament would receive annual reports showing whether the system was working. 

In practice, however, the law became an ornament. The office established to advance access to information produced no visible culture of disclosure. Ministries remained accustomed to silence. Annual reports required by law were not laid before the National Assembly. Citizens seeking records encountered delay, deflection, or refusal.

This week, Justice Nicola Pierre opened that long-neglected statute, read its plain words, and delivered a judgment of importance to every Guyanese who has ever been told that public information is unavailable, inconvenient, confidential by habit, or simply not the business of the public.

Her findings are direct. The Commissioner of Information is a “public authority” within the meaning of section 2 of the Act. He is therefore subject to the same statutory obligations of openness and accountability that the law imposes on other bodies holding public records.

That point should never have required litigation. Yet it did.

The Commissioner had sought to send applicant Christopher Ram back to the ministries or agencies believed to hold the documents, effectively arguing that Mr. Ram first needed a refusal from the original record-holder before he could approach the Commissioner. Justice Pierre rejected that position. The Act contains no such precondition. A citizen does not have to run a bureaucratic obstacle course before invoking the law.

The ruling matters because bureaucracies often make rights inaccessible not by repealing them, but by adding hurdles that Parliament never enacted. They require the wrong form, the wrong office, the wrong sequence, or an unofficial preliminary refusal. Every such invented condition turns a legal right into a favour granted at administrative discretion.

Justice Pierre has now made clear that the Commissioner cannot manufacture a barrier that the law does not contain.

The Reporting Duty Ignored

The judgment also addresses an issue that goes to the heart of whether the Access to Information Act has been functioning at all. Section 44 requires an annual report to be prepared on the operation of the Act and laid before the National Assembly. That report is not optional. It is not a public-relations exercise. It is the accountability mechanism Parliament built into the legislation.

Through such reports, Parliament and the public should have been able to see how many information requests were made, which agencies complied, where delays occurred, what exemptions were invoked, what appeals or complaints arose, and whether the system was expanding or failing.

Instead, not one such report has reached the National Assembly.

Mr. Ram’s request for these reports was dismissed by the Commissioner as an “absurdity” and an invitation to “self-oversee.” But the court correctly recognized the request for what it was: a request for existing records relating to the administration of a statute. The Commissioner was not asked to invent a document. He was asked to account for documents the law already required.

That distinction is fundamental. A public officer cannot evade a disclosure request by disparaging the purpose of the request or by treating a statutory obligation as though it were an unreasonable personal demand.

If no reports exist, that fact itself demands explanation. If reports were prepared but not tabled, the public is entitled to know who withheld them, why they were withheld, and whether the Minister responsible took any step to ensure compliance.

A Troubling Finding on Candour

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Justice Pierre’s ruling is her finding concerning the Commissioner’s candour about whether he had received the requests.

The judge described the situation as “particularly ironic and lamentable” in proceedings concerned with access to information. That language deserves close attention. Courts do not lightly comment on the candour of a public official. When they do, it reflects a serious concern about the reliability of the explanation offered.

The irony is stark. The official entrusted with facilitating access to public records was unable, or unwilling, to give a clear and straightforward account to the court about requests made to his own office.

Access to information depends on more than legislation. It depends on public officers keeping records, acknowledging correspondence, providing reasons, meeting deadlines, and acting honestly when challenged. An information regime cannot function where silence is routine and accountability must be extracted through litigation.

The Commissioner’s office ought to set the standard for administrative transparency. Instead, it has now become the subject of a court order compelling it to do what the law required all along.

What the Court Ordered

It is important to state exactly what the ruling does and does not accomplish.

Justice Pierre did not order immediate disclosure of every record sought. The court ordered the Commissioner to process and determine Mr. Ram’s three requests within sixty days. One of those requests concerns the taxes the Government pays on behalf of ExxonMobil and its partners—a matter of substantial public interest in a country whose oil revenues, fiscal arrangements, and petroleum concessions affect every household and future generation.

The Commissioner must now make a lawful decision. If he grants access, the documents should be disclosed in accordance with the Act. If he refuses access, or says that the records cannot be located after a thorough and diligent search, section 23 requires him to provide written reasons and to notify the applicant of the right to return to the High Court.

That is the next test.

A decision cannot be a vague letter, an oral explanation, or another exercise in administrative avoidance. It must identify the legal basis for any refusal. It must explain whether records exist, where they were searched for, what exemption is being relied upon, and why that exemption applies. The public is entitled to reasons, not reflexes.

The sixty-day period is therefore not a courtesy. It is a judicially reinforced deadline. The Commissioner must now demonstrate whether his office can perform the basic functions for which it has been publicly funded.

Government Must Explain Its Silence

The failure of the Access to Information Act is not the Commissioner’s failure alone. It is a Government failure.

Year after year, public funds have been allocated to an office connected to the administration of access-to-information law. Yet year after year, the mandatory annual reports were not laid before Parliament. This year’s budget again voted funds, but the public has heard no adequate explanation for why the central reporting requirement in section 44 went unmet for more than a decade.

That silence cannot continue.

A Minister answerable to the National Assembly for this statutory scheme must explain why Parliament was denied the reports the law required. Was the Commissioner instructed to prepare them? Were they prepared? Were they submitted to the responsible Minister? Were they rejected, delayed, misplaced, or ignored? What money was allocated, how was it spent, what staff and systems were in place, and what measurable work did the office perform?

These are not partisan questions. They are elementary questions of public administration.

Guyana cannot claim to embrace transparency while allowing a transparency law to remain dormant for fourteen years. Nor can it celebrate oil wealth and national development while citizens are forced into court merely to establish that the official responsible for information is himself subject to the Act.

A Precedent for Every Citizen

Christopher Ram deserves credit for taking the matter beyond protest and into the courtroom. Where public complaint had failed to awaken the system, litigation has now produced a binding judicial clarification.

He has secured more than a personal victory. He has established a working precedent for every Guyanese journalist, researcher, community group, taxpayer, trade unionist, student, civil-society organization, and ordinary citizen seeking to know how public power is exercised and how public money is spent.

The Commissioner is reachable. He is bound by the Act. He is answerable to the court.

That principle may seem obvious, but in Guyana it has had to be fought for. It is a first step toward converting access to information from a slogan into an enforceable civic right.

The importance of this moment lies not only in the records Mr. Ram seeks. It lies in what can follow: questions about contracts, tax concessions, environmental approvals, procurement awards, state lands, public spending, policy decisions, audits, regulatory enforcement, and the management of the country’s natural wealth.

A functioning access-to-information system changes the balance of power. It reduces the ability of officials to govern through secrecy. It equips citizens and journalists to test official claims against records. It gives Parliament, the courts, and the public a stronger basis on which to demand accountability.

The Demands Are the Law

The demands now before the Commissioner and the Government are neither radical nor unreasonable. They are obligations already written into Guyana’s law:

⇒ Determinations on all three of Mr. Ram’s requests within sixty days, with written reasons for every refusal or claim that records cannot be found.

⇒ The preparation and laying before the National Assembly of the overdue section 44 annual reports.

⇒ A full public account from the responsible Minister explaining why those reports were never tabled.

⇒ Clear disclosure of the resources allocated to the Commissioner’s office, the work performed, and the measures now being taken to ensure compliance with the Act.

⇒ A public, accessible process through which citizens can make requests, receive acknowledgements, track deadlines, and challenge refusals.

The court has opened the door. The Commissioner must now walk through it, and the Government must stop pretending that an enacted law can be ignored without consequence.

This judgment will mean little if it is read once, applauded briefly, and shelved beside the Act itself. The real measure of its significance will be found in the next sixty days: in the quality of the Commissioner’s decisions, in the candour of the Government’s explanations, and in whether Parliament finally receives the reports it was legally entitled to receive years ago.

For the first time in a long time, Guyanese have gained real ground in the struggle to obtain information from those who govern in their name. That ground must now be defended, widened, and used. The clock is running. We will publish the count.

— The Board

 

When Deportation Comes Home

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

 When Deportation Comes Home


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar October 2026

Paul LePage built much of his political identity on a hard-line view of immigration. As Maine’s governor, he helped normalize the language of suspicion—casting migrants as burdens, outsiders, and threats to public resources. He now tells voters that he supports “legal, but not illegal, immigration.”

Then the machinery he applauded came close to his own family.

LePage says his son’s father-in-law has a work permit, is in the United States legally, and is nonetheless facing deportation. He says the man is being removed because he comes from a country disliked by people in Washington. “That’s not right,” LePage declared. No, it is not 

But that is precisely the point many immigrant families have been making for years—often without a microphone, a campaign platform, or the political influence of a former governor running for Congress.

For too long, immigration has been discussed as an abstraction: “illegals,” “criminal aliens,” “the border,” “the invasion.” Such language is useful to politicians because it erases people. It turns parents, workers, students, spouses, caregivers, and longtime neighbors into a faceless problem to be solved by raids, detention centers, deportation flights, and armed agents.

LePage’s family connection has momentarily exposed the lie beneath the slogan.

A work permit does not guarantee safety. A person can be authorized to work, pay taxes, raise a family, obey the law, and contribute to a community—and still be rendered deportable by a change in policy, the withdrawal of a humanitarian protection, or the cold discretion of an immigration bureaucracy. In today’s America, “legal” status can be fragile, temporary, and politically contingent.

That should trouble everyone.

The distinction between “legal” and “illegal” immigration has long been deployed as a moral shortcut. It allows politicians to claim compassion while backing policies that cause fear and instability in immigrant communities. But immigration law is not a clean moral ledger. It is a maze of expiring permissions, pending applications, work authorizations, asylum claims, humanitarian protections, and bureaucratic delays. A person’s life can be upended not because he committed a violent crime, but because Washington changed the rules.

LePage now says enforcement should focus on gang members and serious criminals. That is a more defensible position than indiscriminate deportation. Yet it raises an unavoidable question: where was this concern when his own politics helped cultivate an atmosphere in which immigrant communities were broadly treated as suspect?

The painful truth is that mass enforcement does not remain neatly confined to the villains politicians invoke at rallies. It does not stop at the gang member or the violent offender. It reaches the father with a work permit. The grandmother who has lived in America for decades. The asylum seeker awaiting a hearing. The worker driving to a job. The young man who becomes a name in a news report after an encounter with armed immigration agents ends in death.

In Maine, the killing of Colombian immigrant Johan Sebastián Durán Guerrero by an ICE agent has shaken the public conscience. A 25-year-old man is dead. Questions persist about the circumstances of the operation, whether he was even the intended target, whether deadly force was necessary, and whether the public will ever receive a full and credible accounting.

That is the danger of an enforcement culture that treats immigration control as a license for escalation.

The rule of law does not mean that government may do whatever it wishes in the name of law enforcement. The rule of law means that government itself is bound by law—by due process, judicial orders, constitutional rights, limits on force, and the principle that no agency is beyond scrutiny.

When judges warn that immigration authorities are disregarding court orders, the danger is larger than immigration policy. It is a warning about executive power. A government agency that can ignore a judge, deport a person despite credible claims of danger, punish dissent, or operate without meaningful transparency is not protecting the rule of law. It is eroding it.

And the moral issue cannot be avoided.

No country is strengthened by humiliating vulnerable people. No democracy is made safer by treating human beings as cargo for third-country detention schemes, as statistics for political speeches, or as expendable targets in an enforcement campaign.

A nation that prides itself on liberty cannot selectively apply dignity only to those who possess the right passport, the right accent, the right political connection, or the right family tie.

LePage’s appeal for his relative should be heard. But it should not be heard only because it comes from Paul LePage.

It should be heard because every immigrant family deserves the same consideration: an individualized hearing, respect for due process, protection from arbitrary state power, and recognition that a person’s worth is not erased by an immigration file.

The real test is not whether political leaders can find compassion when deportation knocks on their own door. The real test is whether they can show that compassion before it does.