Archive for category: Featured

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

The Selective State

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What a Collapsing Cuba Reveals About the Anatomy of a Functioning State — and Why Abundance Is No Guarantee Against the Same Disease

OPINION BY: Hem Kumar–September,2026

There is a phrase making the rounds among diplomats in Havana that deserves a longer life than a single dispatch: “authoritarian anarchy.” It describes a state that has retained, almost undiminished, its capacity to repress political expression, while every other function of government: health, education, public order, basic service delivery — quietly comes apart.

The security apparatus gets fuel when nothing else does. The prisons are staffed when the hospitals are not. The state, in other words, has not disappeared. It has simply chosen, function by function, what to keep and what to let go.

Cuba’s collapse is its own story, produced by seven decades of one-party rule, a foreign oil cutoff, and a sanctions regime with no real precedent. Guyana’s condition is not that. This editorial board has no interest in flattening the distance between a country running out of everything and a country awash in more capital than it has ever had to govern. The comparison being drawn here is not of circumstance. It is of method — a diagnostic test that travels well precisely because it does not depend on scarcity to work. Ask of any state: which functions is it keeping sharp, and which is it letting atrophy? The answer tends to say more about a government’s actual priorities than anything in its own communications.

WHAT GETS MAINTAINED

Consider the Ministry of Health’s contract nurse payroll, which this board has tracked as it left nurses unpaid for months at a stretch — not for lack of money, but for lack of a functioning administrative pipeline to move it. Set that against Guyana Water Inc.’s entry into commercial bottled water production, a function the state stood up with evident speed and no apparent difficulty, even as its regulatory mandate over household sanitation infrastructure remains legally unresolved.

One function; paying the people who deliver frontline care — sits idle. Another; a state enterprise entering a profit-generating consumer market it also regulates — moves without friction. The capacity clearly exists. It is a question of where it gets pointed.

The same asymmetry shows up in the constitutional architecture itself. Commissions with standing constitutional mandates — the Judicial Service Commission, the Police Service Commission, the Public Service Commission, the all important Public Procurement Commission — sit in states of appointment limbo or contested composition for years at a time, GECOM’s own commissioner dispute under Article 161(3)(b) being only the most visible instance.

This board has already named that pattern elsewhere: a bite with no teeth. Cuba’s diplomats would recognize the shape of it, even if they would not recognize the country.

A third instance is more pointed still. The MV Barima disaster produced, in its aftermath, an extraordinary mobilization of state capacity — a Commission of Inquiry, a salvage tender, ministerial resignations under pressure, a formal wreck-status process. What it has not produced, months on, is a resolved answer to the far more basic question the disaster raised: whether the vessel’s own defect and repair paper trail was ever acted upon before the sailing– that killed its passengers. The state moved fast and visibly on containment and process. It has moved far more slowly on the underlying function those processes exist to serve.

THE REPARTO PROBLEM, APPLIED WITH CAUTION

The Foreign Affairs piece that prompts this editorial describes something Cubans call reparto — a divvying up. As the state opened limited space for private enterprise, the gains flowed disproportionately to those with proximity to power, while the majority absorbed the costs of an economy in retreat. Regime insiders positioned themselves at the front of a very narrow door.

The result was not broad prosperity but a widening gap between a small class of winners and everyone else — inequality manufactured in real time, alongside institutional hollowing, not despite it.

This board has been building, in a separate and more extensively sourced piece, the case that Guyana is watching its own version of that mechanism take shape — not from scarcity, as in Cuba, but from abundance. A new domestic wealthy class, without precedent in this country’s history, forming in the oil era through proximity to the ruling party rather than through the broad-based lift oil revenue was supposed to provide. We will not rehearse that argument’s evidence here; it deserves its own reckoning, on its own terms, and is forthcoming.

What is worth naming now is the structural kinship: whether a state is retreating under pressure or expanding under windfall, the same mechanism — concentrated capture through access, thin distribution to everyone else; can operate underneath very different weather.

The direction of the economy does not determine who captures its gains. Proximity to power does.

THE PRICE OF DELAY

The strongest argument in the Foreign Affairs analysis is not really about Cuba’s politics at all. It is about time. Institutional decay left unaddressed does not stay a temporary condition — it calcifies into the baseline any future government has to build on. A hospital system allowed to hollow out for long enough stops being a hospital system in need of repair and becomes, instead, the new normal a country has quietly accepted. The same logic applies to a state that lets its constitutional commissions sit vacant, or that responds to a fatal ferry disaster with process rather than accountability, or that permits a new class of insiders to consolidate gains while the mechanisms meant to check that consolidation remain unfunded, understaffed, or unconsulted.

Guyana has an advantage Cuba does not: resources, and time that has not yet run out. But advantages of that kind are not self-executing.

Capacity not spent on the functions that matter now does not sit in reserve, waiting to be spent later. It is capacity a country has simply chosen not to build.

Cuba’s ruins are the argument for urgency in a country running out of everything. Guyana’s oil wealth should be the argument for urgency in a country that has, for once, no excuse.

— The Board

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

Guyana Is Feeding Exxon’s Profits. The Public Deserves the Full Truth.

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The New York Times is right to identify Guyana as a major source of ExxonMobil’s expanding global profits. What the newspaper does not say bluntly enough is that this outcome was not inevitable. It arose from a production-sharing agreement negotiated before the full scale of the Stabroek Block was known, then defended by successive governments even after the basin ceased to be a speculative frontier and became one of the most prolific offshore petroleum provinces on earth.

Guyana’s oil wealth is immense. So is the disparity between the value extracted from its seabed and the share that reaches the Guyanese people under the existing arrangement.

 The question is not whether ExxonMobil should earn a profit. Companies invest to earn returns. The question is whether Guyana’s leaders have made a serious, sustained effort to ensure that the country’s people receive a fair and growing share from a national patrimony that has turned Exxon into one of the petroleum industry’s great success stories.

Exxon’s Guyana Windfall

Guyana has become central to ExxonMobil’s future. The Stabroek Block has delivered repeated discoveries, massive recoverable-resource estimates, rapid production growth and a pipeline of developments capable of generating revenue for decades.

That is why the New York Times’ framing matters. Guyana is not an incidental asset in Exxon’s global portfolio. It is a crown jewel. It is a low-cost, high-volume offshore province in the Western Hemisphere, offering Exxon production growth, shareholder value and long-term cash flow at a time when large, commercially attractive discoveries are increasingly difficult to find.

The oil beneath Guyana’s waters has helped Exxon strengthen its balance sheet, expand output and project confidence about its future. Yet the country from which this wealth is extracted remains burdened by inadequate infrastructure, unequal access to opportunity, rising living costs, weak public services and serious concerns about whether oil wealth is being translated into broad national development.

It contradiction is at the heart of Guyana’s oil story.

A Contract Built for Risk

The 2016 Production Sharing Agreement was signed when the Stabroek Block was still presented as a frontier petroleum province with geological, financial and operational uncertainty. At that stage, the argument was that generous terms were needed to attract capital and compensate the company for risk. But that risk argument has collapsed under the weight of events.

The basin has been de-risked by repeated discoveries, appraisal work, production history, infrastructure development and the accumulation of geological data. What was once a high-risk exploration gamble has become a proven petroleum system with multiple producing projects, further development potential and a resource base that has transformed Guyana’s economic outlook.

Yet the fiscal terms associated with the early stage of uncertainty remain effectively frozen in place.

Under the present arrangement, the contractor group can recover up to 75 percent of petroleum revenue as cost oil. The remaining 25 percent is classified as profit oil and split equally, leaving Guyana with 12.5 percent of gross petroleum revenue from profit oil during the maximum cost-recovery period. Added to that is the 2 percent royalty, bringing Guyana’s effective gross share in that phase to about 14.5 percent.

This is the central fact that must not be obscured by impressive revenue totals.

Guyana can receive billions of dollars and still be receiving a poor deal relative to the scale, certainty and profitability of the resource. Large sums do not automatically mean fair terms. A country can be richer than before while still receiving far less than it reasonably should from its own patrimony.

The Tax Fiction

The arrangement becomes even more troubling when one considers taxes. Guyana is required to treat Exxon and its partners as though they have paid income taxes, but the tax obligation is met from Guyana’s own share of profit oil. Put plainly, the State uses a portion of its own petroleum entitlement to discharge the contractor’s tax liability.

The companies receive a tax certificate. The State records tax revenue. But Guyana does not receive an additional cash payment from the contractor equal to a normal corporate income-tax contribution

This is why Guyanese must reject superficial claims that the country receives royalty, profit oil and taxes as though these are entirely separate streams of new revenue. The tax arrangement is not a bonus layered on top of Guyana’s oil share. It is an obligation met out of Guyana’s own entitlement.

That is not merely an accounting issue. It goes to the heart of the public’s ability to understand what Guyana actually receives.

Sanctity Is Not Surrender

For years, the Government has answered calls for renegotiation with a single phrase: “sanctity of contract.”

Contracts matter. A country cannot casually disregard legal obligations, seize private rights or rewrite agreements by decree without consequences. Investor confidence, the rule of law and national credibility require governments to act responsibly.

But sanctity of contract is not a doctrine for national silence.

It does not prevent Guyana from writing ExxonMobil and its partners. It does not prohibit the Government from inviting them to discussions. It does not bar Guyana from requesting voluntary amendments, seeking improved fiscal terms for future developments, strengthening local-content commitments, demanding more disclosure, revisiting environmental safeguards or negotiating better protections for the people.

A contract can be respected while its parties are asked to return to the table. Indeed, the agreement itself allows for amendments by mutual consent. The issue, therefore, is not whether Guyana can unilaterally force Exxon to accept new terms without legal risk. It is whether the Government has demonstrated the political will to make the case for change, formally approach the companies and place the national interest at the center of the discussion.

There is a profound difference between being legally constrained from unilateral action and being politically unwilling even to ask.

The Silence After 2022

There is another question that requires urgent attention: the public disclosure of exploration results.

The last widely publicized discovery declaration from Exxon in the Stabroek Block was in 2022. Since then, Guyanese have watched drilling activity, appraisal work, project expansion and production growth in a basin already known to be extraordinarily rich in hydrocarbons.

No responsible observer should claim that every well drilled must produce a new commercial discovery. Exploration wells can be dry. Appraisal wells may confirm or narrow an existing discovery. Some hydrocarbon encounters may require more testing before their commercial significance can be determined. Other results may not justify a separate development announcement.

But four years without publicly declared new discoveries in a de-risked, oil-rich basin is not a trivial matter. It is a transparency issue of the highest national importance.

The public should not be asked to accept a policy of silence while the operator possesses an increasingly detailed understanding of the country’s offshore resources. The public needs more than celebratory announcements when production targets are met or new floating production vessels are sanctioned. Guyanese need a full account of what has been drilled, what has been found and what has been reported to the State.

If wells were dry, say so. If hydrocarbons were encountered but require appraisal, say so. If new accumulations were discovered and incorporated into existing development areas, say so. If prospects were tested and found to be non-commercial, say so.

Silence is not transparency. It cannot become the operating principle for the management of Guyana’s oil patrimony.

The Data Belongs to Guyana

This brings the country to the most fundamental question of all: who owns the granular exploration and well data generated from Guyana’s offshore petroleum resources?

ExxonMobil may have financed exploration. It may have deployed the rigs, geological expertise, seismic technology, engineering capacity and capital. But the petroleum belongs to Guyana. The seabed belongs to Guyana. The resource information derived from drilling into Guyana’s offshore block is not merely corporate intelligence. It is information about the country’s national patrimony.

The Government must therefore state plainly:

⇒ What well data has Exxon submitted to the State since 2022?

⇒ What seismic, drilling, logging, pressure, core, fluid and appraisal data does Guyana hold? 

⇒ Which wells encountered hydrocarbons, and what was the classification of each encounter?

⇒ Which finds are commercially viable, awaiting appraisal, considered contingent or judged non-commercial?

⇒ Has Guyana received updated estimates of recoverable resources across the Stabroek Block?

⇒ Are any discoveries, extensions or new reservoirs being incorporated into existing projects without distinct public disclosure?

⇒ What information is protected for a legitimate period of commercial confidentiality, and when will it be released?

⇒ Does the regulator have the technical capacity and institutional independence to interpret the data it receives?

The answer cannot be that Guyanese must wait indefinitely for Exxon to decide what information is suitable for public release.

 A Test of Government

The Government’s responsibility is not to serve as Exxon’s public-relations shield. Its duty is to protect Guyana’s sovereign interests, demand full compliance with the law and ensure that the country’s citizens understand the value of the assets being extracted in their name.

A government that continuously defends an inherited contract while refusing even to make a formal case for improvement sends a damaging message: that the terms negotiated at the beginning of the oil era are beyond public challenge, regardless of how much the basin has changed.

That is not prudent statecraft. It is an abdication of the State’s bargaining responsibility.

The question is not whether Exxon has behaved like a corporation seeking profit. It has done what multinational oil companies do: pursue advantageous terms, recover investment quickly, protect commercial information and maximize shareholder returns.

The question is whether Guyana’s leaders have acted with the same determination on behalf of Guyanese citizens.

Guyana Must Demand Answers

The country does not need reckless unilateral action. It needs transparency, competence, independent oversight and a Government willing to use every lawful avenue available to improve Guyana’s position.

That means placing the full exploration record before the relevant State institutions. It means ensuring independent technical review of well and seismic data. It means public reporting that distinguishes between exploration wells, appraisal wells, dry holes, hydrocarbon shows, contingent resources and commercially viable discoveries. It means a national conversation about whether the fiscal terms of 2016 remain acceptable in a basin whose wealth is now beyond serious doubt.

And it means rejecting the false claim that respecting a contract requires Guyana to remain silent.

ExxonMobil’s success in Guyana is undeniable. The New York Times is correct to say that Guyana is feeding the profits of America’s largest oil company. But the real national question is whether Guyana is receiving the information, the leverage and the courage required to protect its own future.

Who owns the granular well data on Guyana’s patrimony? If Guyana has not surrendered its sovereignty, then Guyana owns it—and the Guyanese public deserves to see what Exxon has found beneath the country’s waters.

This is not simply an economic failure; it is a failure of empathy and public duty. ExxonMobil operates in a country whose offshore wealth is reshaping its global fortunes. It cannot credibly celebrate partnership while remaining indifferent to the conditions under which ordinary Guyanese live, or while resisting calls for greater transparency, fairness and a more meaningful contribution to national development.

But the greater responsibility rests with the Government of Guyana. Governments are elected to defend the people—not to recite “sanctity of contract” as though it ends every conversation about fairness. Respect for contracts does not require surrender of sovereignty. It does not prevent the State from writing Exxon, demanding answers, seeking voluntary improvements, insisting on fuller disclosure, or placing the legitimate concerns of citizens on the negotiating table.

The Government’s continued refusal even to test Exxon’s willingness to revisit aspects of an agreement negotiated before the full value of the Stabroek basin was known is a troubling display of intransigence. A State that will not fight for better terms, better disclosure and stronger protections cannot credibly claim it has exhausted its responsibility to the people.

Guyana deserves more than oil announcements, production records and ceremonial promises. It deserves empathy from Exxon, resolve from its Government, and a leadership prepared to fight—openly, lawfully and relentlessly—for every Guyanese.