A Court Divided Against Itself

THE 592 GUARDIAN•ACCOUNTABILITY•INTEGRITY JOURNALISM

ACCOUNTABILITY WATCH · REGIONAL JUDICIARY

A Court


Five of six CCJ judges accuse President Justice Winston Anderson of “dictatorial” rule and interference in case outcomes — and Guyana has more riding on this court than almost any other member state

THE 592 GUARDIAN  |  EDITORIAL BOARD  |  AUGUST,2026

THE Caribbean Court of Justice was built to be the region’s answer to a colonial anxiety: that Caribbean people should no longer have to sail their final appeals to London to receive justice. It was, in its founding promise, a court by the region, for the region — accountable to no imperial crown, answerable instead to the collective integrity of its own bench. That promise is now the subject of an internal reckoning its architects surely never anticipated.

Internal correspondence obtained and published by the Trinidad Express’s Sunday edition shows that five of the CCJ’s six sitting judges have formally challenged the leadership of its president, Justice Winston Anderson, accusing him of governing in a manner one judge bluntly called “dictatorial.”

The allegations are not about robes or bench jackets, whatever the paper trail’s origin point. They go to the marrow of judicial independence: panel composition, pressure on colleagues to align with predetermined outcomes, and a president who, by his own reported admission, told his colleagues early in his tenure that he did not see himself as “running a democracy.”

WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS

The dispute surfaced publicly through a dispute over a proposed judicial dress code — an administrative matter that, under ordinary governance, would merit little more than a committee memo. Instead, it became the occasion for judges to air grievances that had evidently been accumulating for months.

I have never seen before the level of dictatorship in the administration of a judiciary that I have witnessed at the CCJ in recent months.— Justice Chile Eboe-Osuji, in correspondence to fellow CCJ judges

Justice Peter Jamadar of Trinidad and Tobago went further, alleging in a detailed e-mail that he had experienced “an attempt to influence the opinions of colleagues that differed from yours in an authoritative manner” in relation to the Mohamed vs. MOHA, AG, and Magistrate extradition matter — a case with direct Guyanese relevance, given that the applicants in the underlying dispute are Guyanese nationals. Jamadar also cited concerns about “unreasonable timelines” imposed on judges reviewing a consolidated draft decision in the Jeremy Enriquez and Anand Ramlogan matter.

Justice Eboe-Osuji’s account of Barrow v. Caricom is, if anything, more serious still: he alleges that Anderson attempted, without prior consultation, to “single-handedly override judicial independence and long-standing CCJ conventions that guided how decisions are rendered when judges disagreed” — and that in the Mohamed matter, Anderson informed colleagues he intended to announce the court’s decision at a time and in a manner a “clear majority” had told him was inappropriate.

Justice Arif Bulkan — the CCJ’s Guyana-born judge — was among those who pressed for proper internal consultation before any policy went to the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission, and separately raised concerns about how a rigid dress code might disadvantage religious minorities on the bench. Justice Maureen Rajnauth-Lee invoked the lengthy, consultative process used under Anderson’s predecessor, Justice Adrian Saunders, as the standard against which the current president’s conduct should be measured — and found it wanting.

WHY THIS IS GUYANA’S FIGHT TOO

It would be a mistake for Guyanese readers to treat this as a Trinidad-datelined curiosity, distant from home. Guyana is not a peripheral member of the CCJ system — it is one of the court’s most exposed constituents.

Guyana accesses the CCJ in both of its jurisdictions. As a signatory to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, Guyana falls under the court’s Original Jurisdiction as a matter of treaty obligation — non-optional, structural. And Guyana is one of only five CARICOM states (alongside Barbados, Belize, Dominica, and Saint Lucia) that has gone further, replacing the London-based Privy Council with the CCJ as its final court of Appellate Jurisdiction.

When Guyanese litigants exhaust their domestic appeals — in constitutional matters, in criminal appeals, in commercial disputes — the CCJ is the last word. There is no jurisdiction above it to correct an error, and no further right of appeal if the court’s internal processes have been compromised.

That is precisely why Justice Jamadar’s warning deserves to be read in full by every Guyanese lawyer, judge, and civil society actor who has ever placed faith in this court: he described the risk as extending to “both our OJ and AJ jurisdictions, with implications for the jurisdictions that access this court for the delivery of justice services.”

That is not diplomatic language. That is a sitting judge, in writing, telling his colleagues that the confidence of an entire region’s justice-seeking public may be at stake.

The Mohamed extradition matter cited in Jamadar’s e-mail is not an abstraction for Guyana. It involves a Guyanese Leader of the Opposition and his father, contesting the validity of an Authority to Proceed — a case the CCJ dismissed on appeal on July 29, 2026.

If a judge with direct knowledge of that matter’s internal handling is on record alleging attempted interference in its outcome, Guyanese citizens are entitled to know whether the process that produced that judgment was sound, regardless of one’s view of the underlying merits.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY THE REGION IS OWED

What is notable — and to the credit of the five judges who signed their names to these concerns — is that this dissent did not stay silent for fear of institutional embarrassment.

Justice Eboe-Osuji explicitly called for the matter to be resolved internally “before things get out of hand,” before it became public.    It became public anyway, and the public is better for it.

The CCJ was conceived as a repudiation of unaccountable, distant authority. A regional court that cannot hold its own presidency accountable to the collegiate norms its judges swore to uphold does not escape that colonial anxiety — it reproduces it in a new form, homegrown and unexamined.

Guyana’s political class, its bar, and its civil society have a direct stake in demanding that the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission treat this matter with the seriousness it demands, transparently, and not as an internal personnel matter to be quietly managed.

This publication will continue to track this story and its implications for Guyanese litigants and for the region’s confidence in its own apex court.

The full internal correspondence, as obtained and published by the Trinidad Express (CCN Group), is available via the link accompanying this piece.— READ MORE:

https://1drv.ms/b/c/86ce3366cc1a852b/IQAHMCOQTsyfTI8Ibb6NNCliAZ_6LWfPy7WEq8WNHUkaCpo

— The Board

Soundproof Walls, Silent Ledger

592 GUARDIAN♦ ACCOUNTABILITY INTEGRITY JOURNALISM ♦GUYANA

Soundproof Walls, Silent Ledger


 EDITORIAL BY: Staff Writer

 How a Bank That Does Not Yet Exist Found Its First Client


 August, 2026

At Rose Hall on Saturday, President Irfaan Ali told Region Six residents that the government’s answer to noise complaints from bars and nightclubs is not enforcement. It is a loan.

Establishment owners, he said, should look to the Guyana Development Bank to finance soundproof enclosures, so that patrons who “want to hear the noise hard” can go inside while the neighbourhood is spared. It was offered as a small, practical fix to the top complaint raised at community consultations.                It is worth examining what else was on offer, and what was not.

A BANK LENDING BEFORE IT OPENS

The Guyana Development Bank Act 2026 passed the National Assembly on July 27 without opposition participation in the debate, MPs having withdrawn from the chamber over the MV Barima matter.

 

President Ali assented to the Act on July 30. Two weeks from now, a delegation led by Senior Finance Minister Dr Ashni Singh, Agriculture Minister Zulfikar Mustapha and Government Efficiency and Implementation Minister Zulfikar Ally is scheduled to return to Region Six to formally launch the bank.

That launch has not happened. There is no application process. No portal. No published lending criteria, no disclosed underwriting standard, no office where a Region Six business owner could walk in and ask a question.

 

The bank exists, at this writing, as a statute and a promise of up to $3 million in collateral-free, interest-free financing to small and medium enterprises. Yet the first specific lending purpose President Ali has attached to it, in his own words to residents, is bar and nightclub soundproofing.

Before this institution has disbursed a single dollar, its inaugural publicised use case has already been named for it by the Head of State, at a podium, ahead of its own opening.

WHAT SOUNDPROOFING DOES NOT TOUCH

Noise is the complaint residents are permitted to raise, and evidently the one the government is most comfortable answering, because it has a hardware solution. Foam panels and enclosed walls are a contractor’s job. The harder facts sitting alongside the noise are not.

Guyana’s own public health data describes a population with one of the earliest ages of first alcohol use in the Caribbean, and a share of heavy drinkers with diagnosable alcohol-use disorder. The 2019 Guyana Women’s Health and Life Experiences Survey found that 55 percent of Guyanese women have experienced some form of violence in their lifetime, and United Nations estimates place Guyana’s femicide rate as the highest per capita in the region. None of this is unique to licensed premises, but the global and regional literature linking alcohol venues to intimate partner and gender-based violence is not in dispute, and nightlife establishments are consistently identified within it as elevated-risk sites, not neutral ones.

“The first lending purpose named for this bank was not a farm, a shop, or a young entrepreneur’s idea. It was a nightclub wall.”

Then there is the matter the U.S. State Department has documented in successive Trafficking in Persons reports on Guyana. The 2024 and 2025 reports both record that traffickers have used social media to recruit workers for jobs including wait staff in bars and hotels, and that non-governmental organisations report traffickers are often middle-aged men who own or operate nightclubs.

The government’s own investigative caseload grew from 28 cases involving 25 suspects in 2022 to 77 cases involving ten named suspects in 2024. As recently as May of this year, two Cuban nationals were remanded by a Georgetown magistrate over an alleged trafficking operation in which a woman’s passport was confiscated on arrival, a debt of US$5,400 was imposed along with US$300 in monthly rent, and she was, according to the prosecution, forced into commercial sex work at a named city nightclub.

That case is active in the courts as this editorial goes to publication.

Set against that record, the government’s own posture toward bars has not always been to subsidise them. In 2018, a raid on a Georgetown strip club was framed publicly by the then Minister of Public Security as part of a deliberate campaign against trafficking and prostitution tied to such establishments, with liquor licence revocation floated as the enforcement tool of choice.

Whatever one makes of that episode, it establishes that Guyanese governments have, within recent memory, treated bars and nightclubs as sites requiring scrutiny — not sites qualifying for concessional state financing.

THE QUESTION ROSE HALL WAS NOT ASKED

None of this means every bar in Guyana is a trafficking front, and this editorial does not allege that any specific establishment named in the President’s remarks is implicated in any of the cases cited above. The point is narrower and, we think, harder to wave away: a public development bank is a finite pool of concessional capital, and every dollar of it directed at acoustic panelling is a dollar not directed at due diligence, at labour inspection capacity, at the enforcement infrastructure that the government’s own Trafficking in Persons cooperation with Washington says is still needed.

The soundproofing proposal was offered at Rose Hall as a response to a resident complaint about noise. It was not offered alongside any parallel announcement of stronger licensing checks, staff welfare verification, or trafficking screening for the same premises now being invited to apply for financing.

⇒We do not know, because it has not been disclosed, whether the Development Bank intends any due-diligence screen at all for applicants in this sector — something more than the standard SME underwriting that would apply to a farm-supply shop or a hairdressing salon.

⇒We do not know whether the ministries touring the country this month have discussed, internally, the same TIP-report findings cited here.

⇒We do know that the bank’s very first publicly named lending purpose, delivered by the President himself before the institution has opened its doors, was not a young entrepreneur’s idea, nor a woman-owned enterprise of the kind Dr Ali has repeatedly said the bank exists to support. It was a nightclub wall.

WHAT WE ARE ASKING

The 592 Guardian is submitting formal queries to the Office of the President and to the Guyana Development Bank’s transitional secretariat requesting:

(1) whether any due-diligence, licensing, or labour-welfare screening criteria specific to bars, nightclubs and entertainment venues have been developed for Development Bank applicants in this sector

(2) whether the Ministry of Human Services and Social Security or the Guyana Police Force’s anti-trafficking unit were consulted on the soundproofing proposal prior to its public announcement; and

(3) what mechanism, if any, will prevent Development Bank financing from reaching an establishment under active investigation or prosecution for trafficking-linked offences.

We will publish any response in full.

— The Board

THE BARRICADE IS THE MESSAGE

THE 592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY& INTEGRITY JOURNALISM ◊GUYANA

THE BARRICADE IS THE MESSAGE

What “Consultation” Actually Means to This Government


BOARD EDITORIAL— The Board · August, 2026

Walston Martins did everything right. He is the elected Chairman of the Buxton/Foulis Neighbourhood Democratic Council. He received an invitation to the government’s Model Village Initiative consultation at Melanie Damishana. He showed up.

He was pushed behind a police barricade and told he would be arrested if he did not comply — in his own jurisdiction, for the offence of standing where he was invited to stand.

By Martins’s account, the sequence began when police ordered a group of young women waiting nearby to leave the area outside a business opposite the venue. When Martins asked why, Assistant Commissioner of Police Mahendra Siwnarine allegedly told him to move behind the barricade or be arrested.

Martins refused on principle — he said he had broken no law and was standing within the territory his own council governs. The warning was repeated. He was, by his own account, effectively forced out.

This is one man’s account, on the record, and Martins says he intends to pursue the matter further. The 592 Guardian treats it as an attributed allegation, not yet an adjudicated fact. But it does not stand alone. It is the latest entry in a pattern this news media has been documenting for two weeks, and taken together, that pattern tells you something the government has not said out loud: these “consultations” were never built to hear from the public. They were built to be seen.

A WEEK OF BARRICADES

Consider what else happened in the same seven-day span.

On August 4, Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo held an outreach at Watooka House in Linden. Residents waited thirty minutes for a promised meeting that never happened. When opposition supporters and Region 10 residents pressed forward, barricades gave way. A six-hour standoff followed. The Vice President left under security escort without addressing the crowd he had promised to meet.

On the very next day August 5, in Koberimo village, Barima-Waini, Minister Juan Edghill’s own stop on the Region One outreach tour was met by a handful of mostly women holding placards — and a heavy police presence in flak jackets. Not a security detail sized to the moment. A show of force sized to deter it. Sending Edghill, one of the two ministers residents are demanding resign over the Barima disaster, into the region that lost the most people to that disaster, and greeting the women who came to meet him with body armour, is not caution.

It is a message about who the state expects trouble from — and it is not the minister.

On that same day, a Coast Guard patrol intercepted a speedboat carrying Opposition Leader Azruddin Mohamed near the Pomeroon Floating Base, bound for a peaceful protest in Moruca — inside the very region Edghill and Indar were touring. The government’s account calls it a routine documentation check. Mohamed’s account says the same vessel had passed the same checkpoint that same morning without incident, and that the demand for paperwork came only after a soldier took an interest in who was aboard.

He was turned back before he reached Moruca at all. On August 6, Walston Martins was barricaded out of a meeting he was invited to attend.

When the public shows up uninvited — or shows up invited but inconvenient — the state’s answer is flak jackets and a line of officers, not a conversation.

Four incidents in three days. Three different arms of the security apparatus — regular police, joint services, Coast Guard. Four different targets — a group of placard-holding women in a Region One village, an opposition leader headed to a protest, a crowd of Region 10 residents, a sitting NDC chairman.

One thread runs through all of them: when the public shows up uninvited, or shows up invited but inconvenient, the state’s answer is flak jackets and a line of officers, not a conversation.

THE ROADSHOW WAS NEVER ABOUT LISTENING

This newsroom has argued from the first day of the Model Village tour that its structure gives away its purpose. Daytime, weekday-only sessions that working people cannot attend. No online alternative, despite one being trivially available and far more inclusive than a bus tour through six regions. Local NDC governance structures that are, by the government’s own inaction, too broken in many communities to meaningfully receive village-level input in the first place.

Add now a fourth feature: security postures that treat elected local officials, protesting citizens, and even a handful of women with placards as threats to be contained rather than constituents to be heard.      Assistant Commissioner Siwnarine did not simply ask Martins to step back for crowd management. He is alleged to have threatened arrest against a sitting NDC Chairman who had done nothing unlawful, in the area his own council governs — while opposition supporters demonstrated outside.

In Koberimo, the flak jackets arrived before the trouble did, because in this government’s arithmetic, showing up with a placard is treated as the trouble.

You do not barricade the people you are consulting. You barricade the people you are performing for an audience without.

WHAT THE THEATRE IS COVERING FOR

Strip away the outreach branding and ask what these events are actually accomplishing. A predetermined infrastructure plan gets a photograph of a minister among residents. A government under sustained pressure over the MV Barima disaster — the unanswered questions about Commission of Inquiry appointees with undisclosed professional ties, the silenced witnesses, the six-month statutory clock now running against victims’ families — gets a news cycle about roads and recreation grounds instead.

An administration facing a second consecutive week of youth-led silent protest outside the Office of the President gets to point to a roadshow as evidence it is “people centered,” even as its own security forces make that phrase harder to say with a straight face by the day.

None of this requires believing in a grand unified conspiracy. It requires only noticing that every barricade this week has fallen on the same side: between the government and the people it says it is going out to meet.

WHAT WE’RE ASKING

The 592 Guardian renews, plainly, the questions this pattern demands answers to:

Why was an invited, elected local official prevented from attending a consultation in his own jurisdiction?

On whose instruction did Assistant Commissioner Siwnarine act?

Was the threat of arrest authorized, or improvised in the moment?

And if the Model Village Initiative is genuinely a listening exercise, why does listening keep requiring a barricade?

Martins says he is pursuing this further. We will be watching what “further” produces — and whether the government answers the question directly, or simply moves the roadshow to its next stop and waits for the story to move with it.

— The Board

 

Twenty Five Villages in a Week

THE 592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY&INTEGRITY JOURNALISM♦ GUYANA

TWENTY FIVE  Villages in a Week


Why the Model Village Tour Predates the Tragedy It Is Accused of Deflecting

August, 2026

Since the MV Barima tragedy, a comfortable theory has taken hold across sections of Guyana’s commentariat: that the Government’s sudden burst of village-level outreach — the roadshow of renders, works lists, and Cabinet visits now sweeping several regions across the nation  — is damage control.

A grieving nation, the theory goes, forced a government’s hand. Ministers scrambled. Announcements followed. On this reading, the Model Village Initiative is simply politics reacting to catastrophe.

This newsroom  does not accept that theory, and the arithmetic of the tour itself is why.

THE TIMELINE THAT DOES NOT FIT

Barima capsized on July 18. By the government’s own public rollout, the Model Village Initiative was on the road by August 3 — a gap of roughly two weeks between tragedy and travelling roadshow. In that window, government agencies would need to have conceived, designed, and rendered village-specific development plans for dozens of communities, in a presentable and — critically — salable format, and then coordinated the Cabinet-level logistics to deliver them on a multi-region tour.

This news media has tracked over twenty five individual village plans unveiled within the tour’s first week alone, with days such as Saturday’s six-stop schedule across Region Six. Each stop has arrived with its own site-specific concept renders — gateway signage, park redesigns, drainage and road works lists itemized down to the culvert and streetlight.

This is not boilerplate. This is bespoke design work, repeated across dozens of communities, deployed on a compressed multi-agency schedule.

Guyana has a recent, directly comparable precedent for what this class of work actually costs in time: Silica City. That flagship project’s design work was outsourced entirely — Guyana’s own housing planning authority, the Central Housing and Planning Authority (CHPA), did not have the in-house capacity for it — to a University of Miami team, beginning in 2021. From concept to design alone, that process ran over a year.

CHPA has since declined to disclose further detail on that work, citing proprietary material — itself consistent with a pattern of opacity this news outlet  has documented around Silica City’s delivery.

A single house design takes longer than three weeks. This tour has produced village plans, plural, at a rate no design authority in this country has ever demonstrated.

If a single showcase city required a foreign university team and more than a year to move from concept to design, the proposition that CHPA — an agency already burdened with its ordinary daily assignments — independently researched, designed, and rendered twenty -plus separate village packages in under three weeks does not withstand scrutiny.

Add to the design timeline the logistics of the tour itself: venue selection, security coordination, transport, multi-agency scheduling across six regions. In this publication’s  assessment, coordinating Cabinet and allied-agency teams at this scale is not a three-week undertaking. It is, at minimum, a three-month one.

Work of this volume and polish does not originate in the two weeks following a national tragedy. It originates before it.

IF THIS WERE DAMAGE CONTROL, IT WOULD LOOK DIFFERENT

The damage-control theory has a second, fatal weakness: it cannot explain the government’s own conduct on the ground.

This newsroom  has already documented the security posture accompanying this tour —

⇒the barricading of Buxton/Foulis NDC Chairman Walston Martins at Melanie Damishana despite his holding a personal invitation.                  ⇒the breach at Watooka House.                                                                     ⇒the flak-jacketed police presence confronting placard-holding women at Koberimo                                                                                                            ⇒the Coast Guard interception of a boat bound for a Moruca consultation.

A government genuinely engaged in damage control — genuinely trying to calm a public still mourning Barima — does not deploy barricades against the very residents, and their elected local representatives, it claims to be courting. It de-escalates. It listens. It does not exclude.

That it has done the opposite is not an unfortunate enforcement error. It is a tell. A tour built to project responsiveness would not risk the optics of a chairman being threatened with arrest outside his own jurisdiction. A tour built to sell a predetermined outcome to a predetermined electoral map manages dissent instead of inviting it.

That is what this news media  has watched happen, village after village, for more than a week.

THE ADMISSION NOBODY WAS SUPPOSED TO NOTICE

Then came Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo, at Watooka Guest House in Linden, speaking of the government’s position being on “solid ground for 2030″ and “well positioned ahead of the 2031 elections.”                         The dates are not a slip. Guyana’s current constitutional term, following the September 2025 general election, parliament convened in November 2025,  runs five years to November 2030; a further three-month constitutional window separates the dissolution of Parliament from the convening of fresh elections. A government intending to exhaust that window in full arrives at 2031. Mr. Jagdeo’s arithmetic was, in that narrow sense, correct.

What it was not, was accidental. No one managing the fallout of a ferry disaster volunteers unprompted commentary on electoral positioning three to four years out. Damage control talks about drainage. It talks about housing. It does not talk about polling.

That the Vice President did — in the same outreach cycle, at the same podium built to look like consultation — is the clearest admission this government has yet offered that the map, and not the mourning, is what this tour was built around.

A REFERENDUM DRESSED AS A ROADSHOW

Put together, the evidence does not point to a government caught flat-footed by tragedy and improvising its way back into public favour. It points to a pre-existing electioneering apparatus — designed, rendered, and logistically sequenced well before July 18 — that Barima did not create and does not explain.

What Barima did was hand that apparatus a cover story: the convenient appearance of a government responding to grief, rather than a government executing a plan for the Local Government Elections that is functioning, in substance, as a referendum on its own standing ahead of them.

This publication  draws a distinction that matters: the initiative — the design work, the plans, the tour architecture — predates Barima and was not built in response to it.

Its current execution — the barricades, the exclusions, the heightened security — is a reaction, not to grief, but to the resistance this government did not anticipate meeting along the way.

QUESTIONS FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND CHPA

This newsroom renews and extends its formal request for disclosure:

  1. When did design and rendering work begin on the Model Village concept packages presented at each tour stop, and which entities — in-house or outsourced — produced them?
  2. What is the total budgeted cost of the Model Village Initiative’s design, rendering, and tour logistics to date, and from which budget line is it drawn?
  3. Does CHPA possess the in-house design and engineering capacity to produce forty or more village-specific development packages within a three-week window, without external contracting? If external contractors were engaged, who are they, and when were they retained?
  4. What instructions were issued to police units regarding the exclusion of Chairman Walston Martins and other local officials from consultation venues, and by whose authority?
  5. Will the Government commit to a public, region-by-region funding and delivery timeline for the works depicted in each village’s concept renders — the same standard of disclosure this news publication  has sought, and not received, on Silica City since 2022?

Until those questions are answered, this news media  will continue to call this initiative what the evidence shows it to be: not a government in mourning, but a government campaigning — on the public purse, under the cover of a national tragedy it did not plan, but has not hesitated to use. 

To borrow a title from out counterpart ‘Kaieteur ‘ – BLUNT, “This isn’t mere distraction or deflection—it is calculated deception, dressed as attention, targeting the elections.”

— The Board

Facing the Fire Together

THE 592 GUARDIAN•ACCOUNTABILITY & INTEGRITY JOURNALISM•GUYANA

Facing the Fire Together

BOARD EDITORIAL By Hem Kumar, Editor


 Agency, Consent, and the Case for Conditional Solidarity

There are truths about Guyana today that require no argument, only acknowledgment. The rising cost of living is not a talking point — it is what a mother in Georgetown calculates every time she stands at a market stall. The outward migration of skilled and unskilled Guyanese alike is not abstraction — it is the empty seat at a family table that used to be full.

The reliance of the wealthy on foreign goods and services, and the quiet relocation of officials’ own families and wealth to North America even as they preside over the systems the rest of the country is told to trust, are not rumors — they are patterns, observed and repeated, in an oil-rich era that promised otherwise.

These are lived truths. This editorial does not dispute a single one of them.

But truth, on its own, is incomplete without the question of agency. Governance is not a force that operates in a vacuum, imposed from above onto a people with no part in its continuation. It is sustained — reinforced, legitimized — by consent, and consent can be active or it can be passive.

At public outreaches and political engagements across this country, we see crowds gather, applaud, and reaffirm support for the very administrations presiding over the inequities so many, rightly, lament

That matters. It cannot be waved away.                                         And yet — this is not an indictment of the Guyanese people. It is an indictment of the conditions that manufacture their acquiescence.

To call for accountability from citizens without naming the mechanisms that constrain their choices would be dishonest.

♦Patronage networks that tie land, employment, and opportunity to political loyalty.

♦Ethnic mobilization that converts elections into referenda on identity rather than governance.

♦Information environments that reward loyalty and punish dissent.

These are not excuses offered on behalf of a passive electorate — they are the architecture within which “choice” is exercised.

A people who have survived under structures engineered to produce dependency are not, by that fact alone, complicit in their own condition. They are, in significant part, victims of circumstances not of their own making.

That distinction matters — and it is precisely why the answer cannot be resignation, from anyone, anywhere.

There is a temptation, particularly among those of us who observe from a distance, to translate frustration into judgment, and judgment into a verdict rendered from safety upon those who remain. That temptation must be resisted, and resisted first by us. No one — least of all those of us writing from the comfort of the diaspora — has standing to demand discomfort of others while seeking refuge from it ourselves.

If the call is for those at home to stop sitting and start standing, that same call must be answered by those abroad. It is not enough to send remittances that, however well-intentioned, can quietly reinforce the very dependency structures under critique. It is not enough to critique from a position that carries none of the daily risk borne by those who critique — or organize, or vote differently — while still living under the systems in question.

No one gets to stand outside the fire and issue verdicts on who is standing in it correctly.

This is the meaning of we are all in this together. Not a slogan, but a discipline. No one — not the citizen at home weighing loyalty against livelihood, not the diaspora member weighing comfort against contribution — gets to stand outside the fire and issue verdicts on who is standing in it correctly.

What, then, is the alternative to both resignation and unconditional charity? It is conditional partnership — solidarity with terms. In the local vernacular: we will not simply give you a fish ; we will teach you to fish.    Diaspora engagement, if it is to mean anything beyond ceremony, cannot be unconditional loyalty repackaged as remittance, nor can it be charity that asks nothing of its recipients and changes nothing in its givers.

It must be capacity-building: support for independent institutions rather than individuals, investment in civic and legal literacy, resources tied to demonstrated organizing rather than to silence bought through comfort. And it must be reciprocal — a partnership that asks as much discomfort of those who give as of those who receive.

This is not a theoretical posture. It has been tested. In the wake of the MV Barima tragedy, as a new and unprecedented Gen Z-led movement surfaced demanding accountability, the instinct among those of us in civil society who have done this work for years was not to co-opt it but to support it — to identify its ideological authors, consult experienced organizers on how structure could be offered without control, and extend a hand.

That hand offered guidance, mentorship, the accumulated experience of those who have organized and advocated in this country for decades.  The response was nothing silence.

 An outreach offering both editorial engagement and a seat at a multi-stakeholder table, was met with silence.

“That hand was extended three times — not merely for comment, but for a seat at the table where civil society, business, and government were already being convened. It was not once acknowledged.”

Another separate attempt was met with a request — specific and equipment-based: a drone, and a controller capable of producing high-quality YouTube footage, offered in exchange for footage of protest actions.

A street protest does not require broadcast-quality aerial video. It requires people, presence, and the will to stand where they can be seen. Every image of every protest to date has come from a phone in someone’s hand, and that has been enough. When guidance is met not with a question about strategy, sustainability, or structure, but with a request for equipment better suited to content production than to accountability, it is worth naming plainly what that reveals.

This is not raised as grievance. It is raised as diagnosis. A movement’s readiness to receive structured partnership is itself information — and what it reveals here is not a lack of good faith, but a gap in the very capacity that partnership exists to build. If the immediate need is not yet the ability to organize a sustained coalition but something more basic — coordination, communication, the infrastructure of trust — then that is the need to be met first, honestly, before anything more ambitious is proposed. Anything else is simply theater  in a different costume and   not advocacy. It is another version of the sitting-and-waiting this editorial has already named as the problem.

This is not without precedent. This nation did not arrive at independence because its forebears had the comfort of waiting for someone else to secure it on their behalf. They did not have the luxury of remaining seated. Whatever else separates that generation from this one, the standard they set was not comfort — it was risk, undertaken in common cause. That standard remains available to us. It has not expired.

No one can fight harder for a people than that people is willing to fight for itself — and no diaspora can stand indefinitely on behalf of those unwilling to stand with it. But the reverse is equally true: no one at home should be expected to stand alone while those abroad remain seated in safety, offering critique in place of contribution.

The trajectory of this nation will not be changed by complaint alone, nor by charity alone, nor by loyalty offered without condition. It will be changed when those at home and those abroad recognize the fire as shared — and choose, together, to face it.

“THEY POWER OF THE PEOPLE IS GREATER THAN THE PEOPLE IN POWER”

— The Board

The 592 Guardian  |  Accountability Journalism for Guyana

The Warning We Already Gave: Puerto Rico’s Water Crisis Is Guyana’s Preview—El Niño

THE 592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦ INTEGRITY JOURNALISM♦ GUYANA

 The Warning We Already Gave: Puerto Rico’s Water Crisis Is Guyana’s Preview—El Niño


OPINION— The Board
More than 180,000 customers across San Juan and its surrounding municipalities went without water this week — 48 hours at a time, on a rolling schedule — as Puerto Rico’s driest July in over 120 years collided with a strengthening El Niño. Governor Jenniffer González told residents Tuesday that “this situation is out of our hands,” attributing the crisis to weather conditions beyond government control.

“Nothing prevents this from worsening,” she said.
It is a familiar sentence. It is also, this newsroom argued in real time as the drought first took hold, an evasion.

A government does not lose control of a drought the day the reservoirs run low. It loses control months earlier, in the silence between the first forecast and the first policy response — and that silence is a choice, not a weather pattern.

 

We raised this warning for Guyana nearly two months ago. Puerto Rico is now showing us what happens when the warning goes unheeded.

WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS

Puerto Rico’s crisis did not arrive without notice. Meteorologists had been tracking a strengthening El Niño and below-average rainfall for weeks before the rationing order. National Weather Service meteorologist María Novoa García said this week that El Niño “continues to get stronger,” with rainfall over the next two to three weeks projected at least 50 percent below average.                                                              Nearly a quarter of the territory is already in severe drought.

Guyana’s own Hydrometeorological Service issued a comparable warning on August 4 — a Seasonal Outlook projecting up to 80 hot-spell days this year, nearly triple the historical average of 30, as El Niño conditions strengthen through at least October. Hydromet named Regions Four, Five, Six, Eight and Ten as bearing the brunt, and was explicit that the strain would extend beyond farms: reduced water availability for households, agriculture, and broader economic activity. This followed an earlier outlook in May flagging declining water levels in rivers, reservoirs and conservancies, and rising wildfire risk.

Both agencies did their job. Both gave their governments a lead time measured in months, not days. What differs is what happened next.

THE SILENCE WHERE A RESPONSE SHOULD BE
In Puerto Rico, the mechanisms exist on paper — hospital protocols, priority water-truck routing for the elderly, an association of health administrators publicly reassuring the public this week that “we do not improvise.”

The apparatus of response is visible, even if it arrived only once rationing became unavoidable.

In Guyana, as of this week, we can find no comparable public mobilization from the two agencies whose statutory job this is.    Guyana Water Inc.’s public communications remain occupied with routine connection guides and tariff schedules — nothing addressing conservation measures, contingency planning, or public guidance in light of Hydromet’s own warning.

The Ministry of Agriculture’s press output this week features rice-farmer relief grants, cassava yield milestones and coconut-industry progress — not a single conservation advisory to the farmers Hydromet explicitly flagged as most exposed.

This is not a new muscle the Ministry lacks: in a comparable 2018 dry-spell advisory, the Ministry’s own release carried the Chief Hydrometeorological Officer directly urging farmers to conserve water. That instinct is absent from this year’s response, even though this year’s forecast is more severe.

Instead, the government’s public-facing energy this month has gone into the Model Village Initiative — a multi-region consultation roadshow this news media has already documented as long on renders and photo opportunities, short on delivery timelines or funding disclosure.    

A government that can mobilize ministers and a touring convoy for a village-beautification listening tour, but not a single conservation notice from GWI or Agriculture as an 80-hot-spell-day forecast bears down, is telling the public where its priorities sit.

THE PATTERN, NAMED

We have covered this administration’s habit before: announce a directive, generate a headline, and let enforcement lapse into silence — a pattern this outlet has termed “bite with no teeth” in the context of unenforced policy commitments elsewhere. The dry-spell response fits the same shape, with one difference: this time the failure is not in enforcing a stated policy, but in stating one at all. There is no order to fall short of, because no order has been given.

Puerto Rico’s governor is not being praised in this piece — blaming the weather while a crisis was building for months is exactly the failure of foresight we are naming. The point of contrast is narrower and more damning for Guyana: San Juan’s government at least activated response protocols once the crisis was undeniable. Guyana has had the forecast since May, an intensified version of it since August 4, and — as of this writing — no visible activation of anything at all.

The dry season Hydromet warned of runs through at least October. The lead time has not expired. Neither has the silence.
The 592 Guardian will continue tracking GWI, the Ministry of Agriculture, and NDIA public communications for any conservation response as the dry season intensifies.

A Cherry-Picked Contractor

THE 592 GUARDIAN•ACCOUNTABILITY& INTEGRITY JOURNALISM• GUYANA

 A Cherry-Picked Contractor


BOARD EDITORIAL

What Paul Koole’s Record Means for the MV Barima Salvage


August, 2026

The Government of Guyana did not simply fail to run an open, competitive process for the recovery of the MV Barima. It went further: while publicly opening a bidding exercise to reassure grieving families that the process would be transparent, it had already privately invited a specific Dutch firm — Koole Onshore and Koole Offshore (KMS) — to submit a salvage proposal.

That much was established by Kaieteur News’s reporting on the no-bid invitation. What Kaieteur has now added, and what The 592 Guardian holds to be the single most damning piece of evidence produced in this entire tragedy, is who that firm is.

Paul Koole founder and owner of KMS

Paul Koole, the founder and owner of KMS and its extensive constellation of related entities, was arrested by Italian police in 2019 and held in custody following an Interpol alert originating from Nigeria, where he faced an embezzlement matter. His lawyer at the time called the arrest incomprehensible. Kaieteur’s research further documents a decade of entanglement — administrative battles with the Dutch state, trademark litigation with BMW, U.S. federal court discovery disputes, and a Dutch Supreme Court ruling that a financing structure tied to the broader Koole corporate family constituted deliberate tax abuse.

This is not a single blemish on an otherwise clean record. It is a pattern, documented across multiple jurisdictions and multiple courts, of a corporate operator whose dealings repeatedly attract the scrutiny of law enforcement, regulators, and rival counsel.

A government that wanted a clean recovery would have run a clean process. Instead it hand-picked, in secret, an operator with a rap sheet that spans three continents.

THE NO-BID INVITATION, RESTATED

Set aside for a moment who KMS is, and look only at how it was engaged. Kaieteur News reported that the Dutch firm was invited to submit a salvage proposal for the MV Barima days before any official publicly opened a competitive bidding process. That sequencing is not incidental. A bidding process opened after the preferred vendor has already been approached is not a bidding process — it is a formality staged for public consumption, run in parallel with a decision that had, in substance, already been made. This newsroom and others focused, understandably, on that procurement irregularity in isolation. It is now clear we were looking at only the first layer of the story.

WHO THE GOVERNMENT CHOSE

KMS is headquartered in the Netherlands and has recently established a base in Suriname specifically to mobilise staff and resources into Guyana. It has previously completed casualty-removal contracts for this government on the Demerara River — meaning the relationship predates the Barima disaster and predates this procurement entirely. That prior relationship is precisely what should trouble the public: it suggests a standing, informal channel between this administration and Koole’s operation, one comfortable enough to bypass competitive process when a new job arises.

The record on Paul Koole personally is not a matter of dispute or rumour. It is documented by a media outlet in his own country, Netherlands-based AT5, which reported his 2019 arrest and detention in Italy under an Interpol alert tied to a Nigerian embezzlement matter. Kaieteur’s research adds the wider corporate picture: the 2023 Fremantle Highway salvage, in which Koole purchased a fire-gutted vehicle carrier for a symbolic €1 and then fought the Dutch Environmental and Transport Inspectorate over whether the wreck was a vessel or hazardous waste, ultimately prevailing only after his own company’s initial legal filing was thrown out of the wrong court; the BMW trademark injunction that followed, which found decisively against Koole’s commercial handling of the salvaged cargo; and the Hoge Raad’s ruling that a financing vehicle connected to the Koole Tanktransport family of companies existed for no purpose other than artificially reducing Dutch tax liability.

None of this makes Koole unique in the high-risk, high-reward world of maritime salvage, an industry that inherently attracts aggressive operators willing to gamble on distressed assets. What it does establish, cumulatively, is that this is an operator with a documented history of skirting regulatory boundaries, litigating aggressively against oversight bodies, and structuring transactions to minimise legal and financial exposure.

That is precisely the profile a government should want nowhere near a vessel that is, right now, both a mass grave and a body of physical evidence in an active Commission of Inquiry.

TIMELINE: THE PATTERN BEHIND THE NAME

2011

EQT acquires majority stake in Koole Tanktransport via a Guernsey-based financing structure later ruled by the Dutch Supreme Court to constitute deliberate tax abuse.

Aug 2019

Paul Koole arrested by Italian police under an Interpol alert originating from a Nigerian embezzlement matter; held in custody pending possible extradition.

Jul 2023

The Fremantle Highway catches fire in the North Sea; one crew member dies. Koole purchases the wreck for €1.

Apr 2024

Dutch civil court rules Koole’s own emergency legal action against the State inadmissible on jurisdictional grounds — a setback in Koole’s fight to export the wreck.

Aug 2024

Dutch authorities and Koole reach a negotiated settlement reclassifying the wreck as a commercial asset rather than hazardous waste, clearing export.

2024

BMW obtains a Dutch court injunction against Koole over the commercial handling of salvaged vehicles, citing trademark and brand-integrity harm.

Recent

KMS establishes a Suriname base to mobilise into Guyana; is privately invited to salvage the MV Barima before a public bidding process opens.

WHAT IS AT STAKE IF THIS COMPANY GETS THE MANDATE

The MV Barima is not an ordinary wreck. It is the resting place of victims still unrecovered, and it is the single most important physical exhibit available to the Commission of Inquiry now examining why more than a hundred people died. Whoever raises that vessel controls, in the first instance, what the public and the Commission ever get to see of it — how it is handled, what is documented before it is moved, what condition its structure and cargo are in when it reaches shore, and what account of that process the public receives.

Handing that mandate, through a process already established to have bypassed open competition, to an operator with a documented history of contesting regulatory classification, litigating jurisdiction to his own advantage, and structuring outcomes to his commercial benefit, is not a technical procurement question.

It is a decision about who controls the evidence. A firm that has spent a decade fighting the Dutch state over what counts as hazardous waste, what counts as a vessel, and what counts as a fair price is not a neutral custodian for the physical remains of a disaster that this administration has every political incentive to see resolved quietly and quickly.

Whatever evidence is on that ferry does not surface by accident. It surfaces because the process demands it — or it does not surface at all

THE ADMINISTRATION’S EXPOSURE

This finding does not sit apart from the pattern The 592 Guardian has documented since the disaster: the undisclosed professional link between two Commission of Inquiry appointees; a Safety and Compliance Audit Team stacked with an official who has publicly dismissed those same conflicts as immaterial; a Commission Secretary appointed through a family channel traced to the same small island as the President’s own ancestry; a declaration of consent circulated to grieving families before any genuine consultation process began.

Each of these, on its own, could be argued away as coincidence, poor optics, or bureaucratic convenience. Together, and now joined by a no-bid invitation to a salvage contractor with an Interpol arrest and a Supreme Court tax-abuse finding on his record, they describe something else: an administration that, at every point of discretion available to it since July 18, has chosen the option that keeps control closest to itself and scrutiny furthest away.

We do not assert, because we cannot yet prove, that this administration selected KMS knowing precisely what Koole’s record contained. We do assert, on the documented facts now before the public, that it had every obligation to know, and that a competitive, transparent process — the kind government publicly claimed to be running — would have surfaced this record before any contract was signed, not after a newspaper found it.

The failure to run that process is the failure that matters. Everything Kaieteur has now uncovered about Paul Koole is what a due-diligence process exists to catch. Guyana did not have one. Or it had one only for show.

WHAT THE 592 GUARDIAN DEMANDS

  • The Government of Guyana immediately suspend the private invitation extended to Koole Onshore and Koole Offshore (KMS) pending full public disclosure of how and when that invitation was made, and by whom.
  • The competitive bidding process, if it is to retain any credibility, be re-run with full public visibility of all applicants, their ownership structures, and their litigation and regulatory history.
  • The Commission of Inquiry be given a formal, binding role in approving any salvage contractor, given that the vessel constitutes evidence directly relevant to the Commission’s mandate.
  • The Attorney General’s Chambers and the Ministry of Public Works publicly confirm or deny any prior contractual or informal relationship with KMS or Paul Koole predating the MV Barima disaster, including the Demerara River casualty-removal work referenced in Kaieteur’s reporting.
  • Any salvage contract entered into for the MV Barima include independently verified, publicly disclosed chain-of-custody protocols governing the recovery, documentation, and preservation of the vessel, its cargo, and any remains, before the vessel is moved or altered in any way.

 

— The Board

NO ROYALTY, NO RULES

THE 592 GUARDIAN ♦ ACCOUNTABILITY JOURNALISM ♦ GUYANA

NO ROYALTY, NO RULES


The Kurupung Uranium Project and Guyana’s Regulatory Blind Spot

 Opinion By: The Board  ·  August, 2026


THE STATE NEGOTIATES WHAT IT HAS ALREADY GIVEN AWAY

Company filings on the Kurupung Uranium Project confirm what this news-media has long argued about Guyana’s extractive governance: the royalty owed to the Government of Guyana from any future uranium production has not been fixed. It will be “negotiated at the time that application is made for a mining permit” — a negotiation that can be deferred indefinitely, since applications may be filed “at any time during the term of a PL.”

Read plainly, this means the State of Guyana currently has no claim to any share of a resource historically estimated at 20.6 million pounds of uranium, sitting under 92.2 square kilometres of Region Seven, until the holder of the prospecting licence decides the moment is right to ask.

The contractor sets the clock. The regulator waits for it to ring.

We have written before about the opacity surrounding how exploration rights to Kurupung changed hands — from LIA Industries Pte. Ltd. of Singapore to U92 Energy Corp. of Canada — without the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC) exercising any visible control over the transaction.

That finding stands. What follows extends it: the royalty vacuum is not an isolated omission. It is one symptom of a licensing framework that structurally cedes leverage to the licensee at every point where leverage should belong to the State.

PILLAR ONE: A ROYALTY WITH NO FLOOR

Guyana’s petroleum sector, for all its own well-documented deficiencies, at least operates within a negotiated framework anchored by precedent — the Stabroek Block production-sharing agreement, whatever its flaws, is a public, referenceable instrument.

Large-scale mineral mining under the Mining Act 1989 has no equivalent anchor. There is no statutory royalty rate for uranium. There is no benchmark percentage that GGMC or the Minister must not go below.

The rate is whatever is negotiated, whenever negotiation occurs, between the State and a single counterparty who has spent years — and by the time of application, potentially millions of dollars in drilling and evaluation — building the case for terms favourable to itself.

This is not a technicality. It means the government of Guyana’s return on a strategic, security-sensitive mineral is a function of negotiating leverage at a moment of the company’s choosing, not a matter of law.

 

PILLAR TWO: AN OFF-TAKE DEAL STRUCK WITHOUT THE REGULATOR IN THE ROOM

Before any royalty framework has been discussed, Gibraltar-based ROPA Investments Limited has already secured the contractual right to purchase up to 50 percent of the first 40 million pounds of uranium oxide produced from Kurupung — an option on 20 million pounds of production from a resource that has not yet cleared a mining permit, let alone entered production.

This news-media has previously established that ROPA and LIA Industries are related parties structured to present as arm’s-length counterparties in U92’s own acquisition filings.

GGMC was not a party to that transaction. It had no visibility into its terms and no opportunity to weigh how a privately negotiated off-take arrangement, agreed between related parties, might shape the economics of the very royalty the State will eventually sit down to negotiate.

A regulator that is absent from the deal that structures the resource cannot credibly claim to hold leverage over the value extracted from it.

PILLAR THREE: THE NATIONAL REPOSITORY THAT ISN’T REQUIRED TO RECEIVE THE DATA

GGMC describes itself, in its own institutional language, as the national repository for geoscientific data relating to Guyana’s mineral resources. The Mining Act 1989 does not build a mechanism equal to that mandate.

A prospecting licensee is obliged to submit work programmes and quarterly and annual operational reports. On relinquishment of licensed ground, the licensee must submit an evaluation report on the work undertaken. None of these obligations is the same undertaking as surrender of the underlying dataset — the drill logs, assay certificates, geophysical surveys, and resource modelling that constitute the actual commercial and scientific value of exploration.

The only point in the statute where “reports, analyses, and data resulting from investigations and studies” are explicitly required in full is at the application for a mining licence — the same discretionary juncture at which the royalty itself is negotiated.

Guyana’s only clear statutory mechanism for compelling both a royalty and a complete geological dataset from a uranium licensee is a single, optional filing that the licensee alone controls the timing of.

 

PILLAR FOUR: WHAT HAPPENS IF THE STATE SAYS NO

Consider the scenario a functioning regulatory framework should have already answered. GGMC and U92 sit down to negotiate a royalty rate. The company, having already sold forward an option on half its first 40 million pounds of production to a related party, has calculated its economics around a particular return threshold. GGMC, exercising the public interest it is charged to protect, holds out for a higher rate. Talks stall.

What then? The Mining Act offers no compulsory arbitration mechanism for this scenario, no statutory floor the Minister can fall back on, no default rate that applies absent agreement.

The Prospecting Licences run until 18th April 2027, extendable to 18th April 2029. The company can simply wait. It can let the clock run. If the licence lapses without a mining permit application ever being filed, the one statutory trigger that would have compelled surrender of the exploration dataset to the State never fires.

The company walks away — potentially still holding, through its corporate structure, a fully modelled uranium resource derived entirely from exploration conducted under a Guyanese state licence — while GGMC is left with quarterly activity reports and an evaluation summary.

No royalty. No enforceable claim to the data. No mining. And no accountability mechanism requiring anyone to explain why.

PILLAR FIVE: THE COMMUNITIES WHO WERE NEVER ASKED

None of the above accounts for the constituency this publication regards as the first and most fundamental stakeholder: the Indigenous and local communities of Region Seven. The Amerindian People’s Association has called for the Kurupung project to be halted outright, citing the total absence of public and community-level consultation before exploration rights were granted, transferred, and drilled against.

A regulatory framework that permits a foreign-held uranium resource to change corporate hands twice, secure a related-party off-take agreement, and commence a 5,000-metre drilling programme — all before Region Seven’s own residents have been meaningfully consulted — is not a framework failing at its edges. It is failing at its centre.

WHAT THIS NEWS-MEDIA DEMANDS

The pattern here is not new to readers of this news outlet’s ongoing accountability coverage: a regulator structurally absent from the transactions it is meant to police, a State whose return on a strategic mineral is deferred to a moment the extractor controls, and communities treated as an afterthought rather than a precondition. Kurupung differs only in the commodity — uranium is not gold, and the stakes of a genuinely opaque radioactive-minerals sector, in a country with no established uranium regulatory precedent, are of a different order entirely.

This publication calls on the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission and the Minister responsible for Natural Resources to state publicly, and without further delay:

◊ Whether a minimum statutory royalty framework for large-scale uranium and radioactive-mineral production is under consideration, and if not, why not;

◊ What legal instrument, if any, compels U92 Energy Corp. or its subsidiaries to surrender full exploration data to GGMC in the event the Prospecting Licences lapse or are relinquished without a mining permit application;

◊ Whether GGMC was consulted on, or was even made aware of, the ROPA Investments off-take agreement prior to its execution; and

◊ What steps have been taken, or will be taken, to conduct genuine community-level consultation with the Indigenous residents of Region Seven before any further drilling proceeds.

The people of Guyana own these minerals. The law, as it stands, has not yet caught up to that fact.

— The Board

The Weekday-Crowd Anomaly Deserves Answers

THE 592GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY &INTEGRITY JOURNALISM♦GUYANA 

The Weekday-Crowd Anomaly Deserves Answers


OPINION BY: Staff Writer

The Government’s Model Village consultations have produced an unmistakable political image: large, enthusiastic crowds gathered across the country to hear President Irfaan Ali, Cabinet members and senior officials outline plans and receive concerns from residents.

Public consultation is necessary. Citizens should have access to the people and institutions that make decisions affecting their homes, land, livelihoods, communities and futures. No fair-minded observer should object to Government going into communities and listening.

But the scale of the turnout—and, more importantly, the timing of these events—raises questions that cannot be dismissed by photographs, applause or celebratory press releases.

These are not weekend gatherings or evening town halls. They have largely been convened during ordinary working hours, when thousands of Guyanese are expected to be at offices, construction sites, farms, shops, factories, schools, public agencies, markets and private businesses. Yet substantial crowds have appeared, stayed for extended periods and engaged the President and Cabinet.

That is the anomaly.

Civil-society organisations understand the basic arithmetic of public participation. If one wants workers, parents, students, small-business people and ordinary citizens to attend a public forum, meeting, protest or demonstration, the event is normally arranged after the workday or on a weekend. The GenZ protest scheduled for 4:30 p.m. is an obvious example. Its timing is not accidental; it recognises that people must first complete their work obligations before they can exercise their civic rights.

Why then are state events capable of producing massive weekday crowds while independent civic initiatives must carefully accommodate people’s work schedules to secure even modest participation?

That question is neither mischievous nor partisan. It is a question of transparency, labour-market reality, institutional integrity and fairness.

No one should leap to the conclusion that every person at a Model Village event is unemployed, paid to attend, instructed to attend or politically mobilised. Crowds cannot, by themselves, establish any of those claims. Many people may be self-employed, retired, unemployed, underemployed, on shift work, conducting informal business, on leave, between jobs, or simply willing to sacrifice several hours to bring an issue directly to the attention of the President and Cabinet.

But those possibilities do not remove the need for explanation. They sharpen it.

If persons are taking unpaid time from work to attend, then the economic cost falls on households already managing the pressures of food, transportation, rent, utilities and other living expenses. If workers are being released with pay, particularly in the public sector, then taxpayers deserve to know the extent of that release and its cost. If private-sector employees are absent during productive hours, employers facing recruitment and labour-retention difficulties have a legitimate interest in knowing whether their workforce is being disrupted by state-sponsored daytime events.

And if attendance is facilitated—through public-sector release time, transportation, community networks, contractors, beneficiary groups, state agencies or political structures—then that too should be openly disclosed. Transparency does not weaken a Government that is confident in its public support. It strengthens the credibility of the process.

There is a second and still more troubling issue.

The roadshows have also become a venue for citizens to raise routine grievances: housing matters, land concerns, drainage, roads, employment, licences, welfare, community development and services that should ordinarily fall within the remit of ministries, regional administrations, neighbourhood democratic councils, municipal bodies and statutory agencies.

It may be politically effective for a minister or senior official to solve a problem in front of a crowd. But it is not good governance for citizens to believe that a travelling Cabinet is their most reliable pathway to administrative relief.

A functioning state does not require people to wait for the President’s motorcade, abandon a workday and stand in a crowd to obtain answers on matters that should be handled through permanent institutions. Citizens should be able to submit a complaint, receive acknowledgement, know which agency is responsible, obtain a timeline, monitor action and appeal delays or failures.

If a Model Village consultation is the only time an unresolved problem receives attention, then the roadshow is revealing the weakness of the institutions it is meant to complement.

The Government should therefore answer plainly:

◊ Why were so many consultations held during regular working hours rather than through a mix of evenings, weekends and after-work sessions?

◊ What was the verified attendance at each event, and how long did persons remain?

◊ Were public servants granted time away from work, and was that time paid?

◊ Were ministries, regional bodies, NDCs, contractors, state agencies, community groups or programme beneficiaries asked to encourage or facilitate attendance?

◊ Was transport, food, reimbursement, per diem, priority service or any other form of material support provided?

◊ How many persons attended with individual grievances rather than to discuss the Model Village programme itself?

◊ Which agencies had responsibility for those grievances before they reached the Cabinet roadshow?

◊Will Government publish an anonymised record of concerns raised, the responsible agency, the promised action, the deadline and the eventual result?

The Bureau of Statistics must also help clarify the broader labour-market picture. Headline unemployment figures alone cannot settle the question raised by large weekday crowds. The country needs regular, accessible data on underemployment, labour-force participation, informal employment, discouraged workers, working poverty and regional differences in employment opportunities.

Employers, too, have a perspective that should not be ignored. If the country faces a labour shortage in key industries, there must be some accounting of the productive hours lost when sizeable numbers of employees attend daytime public events.

The Government cannot celebrate full crowds while businesses quietly absorb disruptions, unless it is prepared to demonstrate that no such disruption occurred.

This is not an argument against consultation. It is an argument for consultation that respects the time, income and working lives of citizens—and for institutions that work every day, not only when the Cabinet arrives.

Government events should not be immune from the standards of accountability expected of civil society, private enterprise or any other public-facing institution. If civil society must schedule demonstrations and meetings after working hours to permit ordinary Guyanese to participate, then Government should explain how it secures remarkable weekday participation and at what cost.

The crowds may indeed reflect public enthusiasm. They may also reflect unmet needs, unequal access to public institutions, carefully facilitated mobilisation, or a labour market that is weaker and more precarious than official narratives suggest.

The public is entitled to clarity—not speculation, not slogans, and not staged impressions of success.

The Airline Ultimatum: A Government That Never Asked for Terms

THE 592 GUARDIAN ◊ACCOUNTABILITY&INTEGRITY JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

The Airline Ultimatum: A Government That Never Asked for Terms


President’s public pressure campaign against hinterland carriers omits a 2020 fare concession the industry says it already made — and a fuel cost curve his government never offset


By Hem Kumar, Editor ♦ August 2026

President Irfaan Ali used an outreach at Santa Rosa Secondary School in the Moruca sub-district this week to declare his government “is very disappointed” in the local aviation sector, accusing hinterland carriers of failing to lower fares despite years of state investment. The remarks echoed a similar complaint Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo made at the National Toshaos Conference, where he charged that hinterland air operators had been “unfairly hiking” prices at residents’ expense.

Both officials framed the sector’s pricing as a moral failure — private operators declining to pass state generosity on to the public.

Neither addressed a fact the industry says is already on the record: local carriers reduced hinterland fares by roughly eight percent in 2020, at the government’s own request.

AN UNCONTESTED 2020 REDUCTION

Multiple hinterland aviation operators, speaking to this newsroom on background, independently corroborated that the 2020 fare reduction was made in direct response to a government request to the industry — not a unilateral gesture, and not, as far as any operator could confirm, tied to a written or renewed precondition that survives to today.

No operator contacted could identify a current, standing agreement obligating further reductions. No public statement from the Ministry of Finance, the Guyana Civil Aviation Authority, or Cabinet was found committing government to offset hinterland aviation’s operating costs — through fuel subsidy, duty relief tied to fare performance, or otherwise — in exchange for that 2020 concession.

A government that requested a fare cut once, received it, and offered no counterpart obligation in return is not owed a second cut on demand.

THE COST CURVE THE PRESIDENT DID NOT MENTION

The five years separating that 2020 reduction from this week’s rebuke were not stable ones for fuel-dependent transport. Guyana’s diesel price — the relevant input for much of the hinterland fleet’s ground and marine logistics, and a proxy for the volatility jet fuel has tracked over the same period — bottomed near GYD 145 per litre in October 2020 and climbed to roughly GYD 265 per litre by May 2022, an increase of some 80 percent at the peak before easing. Global Jet A-1 aviation fuel, the direct input for the aircraft actually flying hinterland routes, moved on a comparable trajectory over the period, per IATA and S&P Global Platts benchmarks.

A fare structure fixed in 2020 and never revisited would, on cost grounds alone, represent a real-terms reduction for the operators absorbing that fuel volatility with no compensating relief from the state.                        The President’s framing — that operators have declined to translate government investment into lower prices — omits this arithmetic entirely. It also omits any accounting of what “government investment” in the sector has consisted of, and whether that investment came with reciprocal obligations the industry failed to meet, or came with none at all.

A FAMILIAR PATTERN OF LEVERAGE NEVER TAKEN

This is not the first sector where Guyana’s government has extended concessions — tax holidays, duty waivers, state-facilitated financing — without securing binding commitments in return, then expressed public frustration when the resulting behaviour failed to align with its expectations.

The Guyana Manufacturing and Services Association faced a comparable public rebuke earlier this year despite operating under a similar concessionary regime. The pattern recurs: incentives granted without conditions attached, followed by executive displeasure when the incentivized sector behaves as any unconstrained private actor would.

Guyana has not renounced its status as a free market economy.              A government that wishes to compel fare reductions from private carriers has instruments available to it — negotiated route agreements, subsidy-for-fare-cap arrangements, service concessions with enforceable terms.

Public remonstration at a school outreach, paired with the suggestion that the Guyana Defence Force’s Air Corps might expand into cargo and passenger service as an implicit alternative, is not one of those instruments.

It is pressure applied in place of policy — and it shifts the burden of the government’s own unfinished negotiating work onto operators who, by the government’s own request, have already cut once.

WHAT REMAINS UNANSWERED

This newsroom was unable to locate any public record of a government commitment — fuel subsidy, duty concession tied to fare performance, or otherwise — offered to hinterland carriers as a counterpart to the 2020 reduction, or as an inducement for a further one now being demanded.

Until such a record surfaces, or the Ministry of Finance and the Guyana Civil Aviation Authority clarify what obligations, if any, currently bind the sector, the President’s public complaint rests on a claim of inaction the industry disputes which the fuel cost record does not support.

— The Board