Two Ambassadors, One Prize:

EDITORIAL

Guyana as Battleground in the US–China Great Power Contest

The 592 Guardian Editorial Board

May 2026

I.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TIMING WHEN TWO EMPIRES SPOKE

Within days of each other in May 2026, two of the world’s most powerful nations addressed Guyana directly — not through back channels or diplomatic cables, but through the public press, in signed op-eds crafted with evident care and deliberate purpose.

US Ambassador Nicole Theriot marked sixty years of bilateral relations with a warm tribute to partnership, shared history, and the promise of “deeper democracy.” Nine days prior, Chinese Ambassador Yang Yang published a sweeping defense of Beijing’s relationship with Georgetown, titled “Facts Speak Louder Than Words: The Real Story of China–Guyana Cooperation” — using detailed data and pointed language to firmly refute what she called “groundless accusations” by a US congressman about so-called “Chinese influence” in Guyana.

Two ambassadors. Two op-eds. One small nation sitting atop one of the most significant oil discoveries of the twenty-first century.

Coincidence is not a concept that applies to great power diplomacy. What Guyana witnessed in May 2026 was not two friends sending greetings. It was two empires — each with a hundred-year strategic horizon — publicly competing for the allegiance of a nation that has suddenly become indispensable.

Georgetown must read both documents not as tributes, but as bids. And it must read them with eyes wide open.

II.  THE AMERICAN BID: WARMTH WITH CONDITIONS

Ambassador Theriot’s op-ed is eloquent, warm, and genuinely appreciative of a partnership that has delivered real benefits to the Guyanese people. But diplomacy, like oil contracts, requires reading the fine print.

Just weeks before her anniversary tribute, Ambassador Theriot sat before a Guyanese television audience and delivered what can only be described as a threat dressed in diplomatic clothing. As the representative of the US Government, she declared it “incredibly dangerous” to start talking about renegotiation of the 2016 Stabroek Block Production Sharing Agreement with ExxonMobil — warning that doing so “sends a terrible signal to international investors all over the world.”

The numbers make the stakes plain. In 2024 alone, ExxonMobil, Hess, and CNOOC collectively earned US$8.4 billion in profits from Guyana’s Stabroek Block, while Guyana — despite owning the resource — received just US$2.6 billion. Under the 2016 PSA, 75 percent of oil produced is set aside for the international oil companies to recoup their investments, with only the remaining 25 percent split equally between Guyana and the consortium, alongside a mere 2 percent royalty.

The 2016 agreement prohibits the Government from imposing any windfall tax — and requires Guyana to pay Exxon’s corporate income tax liabilities out of its own share of profit oil.

What makes this position especially extraordinary is its sharp departure from prior US diplomatic posture. In April 2019, then-Ambassador Sarah Ann Lynch stated clearly that “it is within Guyana’s right to renegotiate the controversial Production Sharing Agreement” and that the US “certainly wouldn’t interfere with that.” Ambassador Theriot in April 2026 calls even thinking about renegotiation “incredibly dangerous” and “a very bad idea.” Same flag. Dramatically different instructions.

What changed? The scale of the discovery. With Guyana now producing nearly 900,000 barrels per day and the block proven to hold over 11 billion barrels, the stakes for ExxonMobil — and by extension for Washington — are existential. So serious is the US position that when Undersecretary for Economic Affairs Jacob Helsberg visited recently, though he chose softer language than the Ambassador, his meaning was identical: Washington will not countenance any maneuver that upsets the current arrangement.

III.  THE DOUBLE GAME IN PLAIN SIGHT

Ambassador Theriot assures Guyana that Washington stands “firmly” behind its territorial integrity, invoking Secretary Rubio’s 2025 visit to Georgetown as evidence of commitment. And yet, simultaneously, the United States has been engaged in one of the most consequential geopolitical pivots in the Western Hemisphere — a systematic re-engagement with Venezuela, the very nation whose territorial aggression against Guyana the Ambassador so eloquently condemns.

Following the capture of Nicolás Maduro by US forces in January 2026, a 50-million-barrel oil supply deal was announced with the remaining Venezuelan government, new hydrocarbons privatization laws were passed, and the US lifted sanctions on Venezuelan oil trade. By February 2026, OFAC had issued the broadest easing of Venezuela-related sanctions in years. Chevron mentioned Venezuela twelve times in its 2025 lobbying filings. White House meetings with oil executives about Venezuelan reconstruction investment followed days later.

Let the significance of this sink in. Washington’s security guarantee to Guyana and Washington’s commercial re-engagement with Venezuela are not contradictory policies in the minds of American strategists. They are complementary ones. The United States wants stable oil flows from both nations, leverage over both capitals, and the indispensable role of arbiter between them.

This is not cynicism. It is the most rational foreign policy imaginable — from Washington’s perspective. It is only naïve from Georgetown’s.

Washington’s ideal outcome is a Western Hemisphere in which it controls access to two of the region’s most significant oil jurisdictions — Guyana through commercial dominance and security partnership, Venezuela through post-Maduro reconstruction and investment. In that scenario, the United States is not Guyana’s partner. It is Guyana’s landlord

1v.THE CHINESE BID: INFRASTRUCTURE WITH STRINGS UNACKNOWLEDGED

Ambassador Yang Yang’s op-ed is a masterpiece of soft power framing. The facts she presents are largely accurate, and genuinely impressive. By the end of 2025, cumulative Chinese investment in Guyana had reached approximately US$13 billion, while bilateral trade totaled US$2.89 billion — more than double the previous year. Chinese companies built the Bharrat Jagdeo Demerara River Bridge, six regional hospitals now fully operational, and the China–Guyana Joe Vieira Friendship Park. Since 1993, over 300 Chinese medical professionals have treated more than 1.3 million Guyanese patients.

These are not phantom achievements. They are tangible contributions to Guyanese life, and they deserve honest acknowledgment just as the US contributions do.

But Ambassador Yang’s eloquence carefully omits what her government’s global track record makes impossible to ignore. In 2025 alone, developing countries owed China US$35 billion in BRI-related repayments — a record — with US$22 billion of that burden falling on the world’s 75 poorest nations. China’s outstanding overseas BRI debt has surpassed US$1 trillion, with infrastructure projects across multiple regions struggling to meet even interest payments.

Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port was also built under principles of “mutual benefit and win-win cooperation.” It was leased to China for 99 years after debt default.

Guyana is not Sri Lanka. Its oil revenues provide a cushion that most BRI recipients do not have. But a nation flush with new wealth is also a nation newly attractive to predatory partnership structures — and US$13 billion in cumulative Chinese investment, against a Guyanese GDP that was barely US$14 billion as recently as 2022, represents a level of economic penetration that warrants serious scrutiny.

Ambassador Yang’s article was triggered not by goodwill alone, but by a specific challenge: US Congressman Gabe Evans had publicly raised concerns about Chinese influence in Guyana. The fact that a sitting US congressman felt compelled to write about Chinese influence, and that the Chinese Ambassador responded within days through the Guyanese press, tells you everything about what Georgetown has become: a theatre of great power competition being conducted, politely but intensely, on Guyanese soil.

V.  CNOOC: THE SILENT PLAYER IN THE ROOM

There is a dimension of the China–Guyana relationship that Ambassador Yang’s lyrical op-ed does not address, and which Ambassador Theriot’s partnership language deliberately obscures: CNOOC — China National Offshore Oil Corporation — is a direct partner in the very Stabroek Block that Washington is so anxious to protect.

CNOOC holds a 25 percent stake in the Stabroek consortium alongside ExxonMobil and Chevron. This means that every barrel produced from Guyana’s most valuable oil asset flows simultaneously to American and Chinese state interests. The two powers publicly competing for Guyana’s geopolitical allegiance are already, quietly, business partners in Georgetown’s oil field.

The battle for Guyana’s allegiance is not merely political. It is a battle over who controls — and who profits from — the extraction of a finite and extraordinary natural resource.

VI. THE PROPOGANDA PARALLEL : READING BOTH OP-EDS TOGETHER

Placed side by side, the Theriot and Yang op-eds reveal a structural similarity that is both instructive and troubling for Guyanese readers.

Both ambassadors lead with history and friendship. Both marshal specific projects and achievements as evidence of benevolent partnership. Both invoke shared values — democracy and sovereignty in Theriot’s case, mutual respect and the Global South in Yang’s. Both are responding, at least in part, to the other power’s moves. And crucially, both are silent about the ways their respective nations’ interests diverge from Guyana’s own.

Theriot does not mention the lopsidedness of the Stabroek contract. Yang does not mention BRI debt diplomacy. Theriot celebrates Exxon’s community investment signs in Mabaruma without noting that Exxon earned US$4.7 billion from Guyana in 2024 alone. Yang celebrates the Demerara River Bridge without disclosing the full terms of the financing that built it.

Both documents are truthful in what they include. Both are strategic in what they omit. That is the definition of propaganda — not fabrication, but selective presentation in service of national interest.

VII.  THE GEOPOLITICAL TRAP: CHOOSING SIDES IN SOMEONE ELSE’S WAR

The deepest danger facing Guyana in this moment is not Venezuela’s territorial aggression, though that is real. It is not the lopsided oil contract, though that requires correction. It is the gravitational pull toward choosing sides in a US–China rivalry that Guyana did not start, does not control, and could be badly damaged by.

Washington wants Guyana firmly in the Western camp — a reliable partner against Chinese influence in the Caribbean and a secure platform for American energy interests. Beijing wants Guyana as a Belt and Road success story, a CNOOC-holding ally, and a demonstration that the Global South can build prosperity outside the US-dominated financial architecture.

Both wants are legitimate from their respective perspectives. Neither is primarily about Guyana’s wellbeing.

The nations that have fared best in this rivalry are those that have refused to be captured by either pole — that have taken infrastructure from China while maintaining security ties with the West, extracted investment from both without surrendering sovereign decision-making to either. Vietnam. Indonesia. Brazil, under its more strategically coherent moments. These are the models Georgetown should study.

Lord Palmerston settled the matter in 1848: nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests. Both Washington and Beijing operate on that doctrine. So must Georgetown.

VIII.  WHAT SOVEREIGN GUYANA LOOKS LIKE

Genuine sovereignty in Guyana’s current position looks like this:

It takes the US security guarantee seriously while refusing to become a wholly owned subsidiary of American foreign policy. It welcomes Chinese infrastructure investment while insisting on transparent loan terms, competitive bidding, and contractual protections against asset seizure. It renegotiates the Stabroek Block agreement toward terms that reflect the now-known scale of the discovery — not because it is anti-American, but because it is pro-Guyanese. It builds military and intelligence relationships with Brazil, the United Kingdom, India, and CARICOM alongside its American MOU. And it uses its Natural Resource Fund as a genuine sovereign wealth instrument, not a political tool.

It reads every op-ed published by a foreign ambassador — however eloquently written, however warmly intended — as what it is: a bid, not a gift.

One American ambassador said Guyana had every right to renegotiate its oil contract. Another called it “incredibly dangerous” even to raise the subject. One Chinese ambassador builds hospitals and bridges while her government’s BRI architecture has placed dozens of developing nations in unsustainable debt. The world’s most powerful nations have revealed, through these contradictions, that their relationship with Guyana is fundamentally transactional.

There is no shame in that. Transactional relationships can be enormously beneficial — if both parties understand the transaction clearly. Guyana must understand the transaction clearly.

IX.  A MESSAGE TO BOTH AMBASSADORS

To Ambassador Theriot: We value the sixty-year relationship. We honor the highway, the vaccines, the security partnership, and the genuine commitment to our sovereignty against Venezuelan aggression. We ask only that you extend to us the same honest respect you would give a true sovereign partner — including the acknowledgment that Guyana has every right, as your predecessor confirmed, to seek fair terms for its own natural resources.

To Ambassador Yang: We are grateful for the hospitals, the bridge, the medical brigades, and the trade relationship that has grown impressively. We ask only that you accompany those gifts with full transparency about loan terms, contract conditions, and the documented experience of other nations that walked the Belt and Road before us.

To both: Guyana is not a prize. It is not a theatre. It is not a demonstration project for your competing visions of world order.

It is a sovereign nation, newly wealthy, historically overlooked, and finally in a position to demand that the world treat it accordingly.

We intend to collect on that demand — from Washington and Beijing alike.

The 592 Guardian — Editorial Board

Georgetown, Guyana  |  May 2026

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

# A Man Who Has Forgotten: Ali, the Nimitz, and the Betrayal of Memory

Opinion | The 592 Guardian

There is a particular kind of political sin that does not announce itself with scandal or corruption. It arrives quietly, dressed in the language of progress and partnership, wearing a smile cultivated for cameras and handshakes. It is the sin of ingratitude — and President Irfaan Ali committed it in full view of the world when he stood aboard the USS Nimitz and beamed.

Let us be precise about what that image represents. The Nimitz is not a diplomatic vessel. It is not a hospital ship or a vessel of goodwill. It is among the most lethal instruments of power ever constructed by human hands — a floating airfield capable of projecting destruction to any corner of the earth. It is the embodiment of the very military-economic architecture that has strangled Cuba for over six decades, enforcing a blockade that has denied ordinary Cuban people medicine, food, and the basic dignities of modern life. To stand aboard it — not quietly, not reluctantly, but with visible pride and enthusiasm — is to make a statement. Whether Ali intended it or not, the statement was made.

And that statement lands like a slap across the face of every Guyanese who was kept alive, educated, or healed by the hands of a Cuban.

 What Cuba Did When No One Else Would

This is not nostalgia. This is not romanticism. This is recorded history.

When Guyana’s hospital wards were understaffed and its patients were dying for want of qualified physicians, it was not Washington that answered the call. It was Havana. Cuban doctors arrived in communities that had never seen a specialist, in regions where the nearest clinic was a day’s journey away. They did not come on short-term contracts with generous compensation packages. They came under the banner of solidarity — a word that has grown unfashionable in an era of transactional diplomacy, but which once meant something real.

When classrooms across this country sat empty for want of teachers, Cuban educators filled them. When Guyanese students had neither the finances nor the connections to access quality higher education, Cuban scholarships opened doors that would otherwise have remained permanently shut. The professionals produced by those opportunities — the doctors, engineers, teachers, and public servants who have contributed to this country’s development — are a living monument to what that partnership meant.

That relationship was built not on oil or military strategy or leverage. It was built on the simple, radical idea that a small nation should help another small nation because it is right to do so. Cuba asked for nothing that Guyana could not give. And for decades, Guyana benefited enormously from that generosity.

Now, the man who leads this country stands on the deck of the vessel most associated with the power that has tormented Cuba, and he poses for photographs.

 The Captured Head of State

There is a phrase in the language of postcolonial political analysis: state capture. It typically refers to the corruption of institutions by private interests. But there is another form of capture — subtler, more insidious — in which a leader becomes so thoroughly absorbed into the worldview, the ambitions, and the validation framework of a more powerful foreign patron that he loses the ability to see himself, his country, and its history through his own eyes.

Irfaan Ali has the look of a man so captured.

Watch how he performs on the international stage. Watch the eagerness to be seen in proximity to American military and economic power. Watch the carefully calibrated language that never discomforts Washington, never challenges the prevailing orthodoxies of the hemisphere’s dominant power. Watch how his government’s rhetoric has quietly drifted from the Non-Aligned tradition that once defined Caribbean and Caricom foreign policy, toward something that increasingly resembles client-state diplomacy dressed up as strategic partnership.

A leader grounded in his own history does not need to perform allegiance to the powerful. A leader who remembers where he came from does not need to be told that gratitude is a political value, not merely a personal virtue. A leader with a genuine foreign policy vision would know that the strength of small nations lies precisely in their ability to maintain relationships across ideological lines — to be friends with everyone without being owned by anyone.

But Ali does not appear to know this. Or if he knows it, he does not appear to care.

 Pragmatism Is Not the Alibi It Pretends to Be

The apologists will invoke pragmatism. They always do. They will say that Guyana must protect its oil wealth, that it faces real security threats, that aligning with the United States is a matter of national survival. They will speak of Venezuela, of regional instability, of the need for a powerful friend.

All of this contains a measure of truth. No serious analyst denies that Guyana’s security environment has changed dramatically with the discovery of oil, or that the country requires credible defence arrangements. The United States is a natural partner in that equation, and engagement with American military forces is not, by itself, a matter for condemnation.

But pragmatism is not a moral blank cheque. It does not erase obligation. It does not permit a government to court a new patron with such theatrical enthusiasm that it implicitly signals contempt for an old friend. It does not excuse the complete absence of any balancing gesture, any acknowledgment, any word of continued respect for the nation that staffed Guyana’s hospitals when Washington was indifferent to their condition.

If Ali’s government had paired its American engagement with even a quiet reaffirmation of Guyana’s relationship with Cuba — a statement, a visit, a diplomatic expression of continued solidarity — the Nimitz photograph would have read differently. It would have read as the act of a confident, balanced statesman navigating a complex world. Instead, it reads as the act of a man who has decided which side his bread is buttered on, and who no longer feels the need to pretend otherwise.

That is not pragmatism. That is opportunism. And in a region with a long memory of what opportunism costs small nations, it is a dangerous and shameful thing.

 Memory as a Political Obligation

There is a broader principle at stake here, one that extends beyond Guyana’s relationship with any single country

A nation that allows its foreign policy to be dictated entirely by present-tense power calculations — that discards old alliances the moment they become inconvenient, that forgets the names of those who stood with it in its hour of need — is a nation that cannot be trusted. It signals to every future partner: we will abandon you too, when the calculus changes. It hollows out the very concept of international solidarity, replacing it with pure transaction.

For Guyana — a small, developing nation navigating a world in which it is perpetually at risk of being overwhelmed by larger powers — this is not merely an ethical failure. It is a strategic one. The nations that earn respect in the international community are not those that grovel most effectively before the powerful. They are those that demonstrate consistency, principle, and the kind of moral seriousness that makes them reliable actors. Guyana once had a claim to that reputation. The Nimitz photograph puts it in question.

 The Image He Should Carry

President Ali would do well to remember a different image than the one now circulating from the Nimitz.

He should remember the image of a Cuban doctor in the Guyanese interior, treating patients who had no other option. He should remember the image of a Cuban teacher in a Guyanese classroom, shaping minds that would go on to build this country’s institutions. He should remember the image of a Guyanese student arriving in Havana on a scholarship, with nothing but promise and the generosity of a small island nation that asked nothing in return but solidarity.

Those images built Guyana. They deserve more than to be quietly retired the moment a more glamorous partnership becomes available.

A head of state who has forgotten this has not merely made a diplomatic misstep. He has revealed something about his character — about what he values, what he remembers, and what he is willing to discard when the lights are bright and the cameras are rolling.

In the end, how a leader treats those who helped him when he was weak tells you everything about who he is when he is strong.

On the deck of the USS Nimitz, Irfaan Ali told us exactly who he is

The 592 Guardian publishes independent commentary on Guyanese civic and political affairs.*

Oil Wealth Guyana’s and the Illusion of Independence (copy)

 

Sixty years after Independence, Guyana is once again being forced to confront an uncomfortable truth: political sovereignty without economic control is little more than a symbolic achievement. The warning delivered by Attorney-at-Law and Chartered Accountant Christopher Ram at the PNCR/APNU Independence Symposium should not be dismissed as partisan rhetoric. It is, in fact, a sobering diagnosis of a structural failure that has persisted across generations.

In 1971, Forbes Burnham declared that Guyana’s independence remained incomplete because its economic lifeblood—its natural resources—was controlled by foreign interests. That declaration justified the nationalisation of bauxite and signaled a broader struggle for economic self-determination. Today, despite unprecedented oil wealth and global recognition as one of the fastest-growing economies, the same fundamental question remains unresolved: who truly benefits from Guyana’s resources?

The answer, increasingly, is not the Guyanese people.

The 2016 petroleum agreement stands at the center of this contradiction. A 2 % ROYALTY, extensive tax concessions, and weak fiscal safeguards have produced an arrangement widely regarded as one of the most lopsided in the global oil industry. While production has surged and revenues have increased, the structure of the agreement ensures that a disproportionate share of value continues to flow outward. Reports that operators have already recouped their investments while accumulating profits exceeding Guyana’s national budget should alarm even the most optimistic observers.

This is not merely a contractual issue; it is a sovereignty issue.

A nation cannot claim meaningful independence while its most valuable assets are governed by agreements that limit its ability to negotiate, regulate, or fully benefit from its own wealth. Nor can it celebrate economic growth when that growth fails to translate into broad-based security for its citizens. Persistent emigration, limited local participation in high-value roles, and continued foreign dominance in key sectors such as gold, bauxite, and energy generation all point to a deeper imbalance—one that economic growth figures alone cannot conceal.

Equally troubling is the governance framework that allowed this outcome. The absence of robust parliamentary scrutiny, the lack of transparency surrounding critical agreements, and the continued delay in establishing a truly independent petroleum commission have collectively weakened the country’s bargaining position. Without strong institutions, even the most resource-rich nations can find themselves negotiating from a position of vulnerability.

The call for renegotiation of the petroleum agreement, therefore, is not radical—it is rational.

Circumstances have fundamentally changed since 2016. Guyana is no longer an unproven frontier basin; it is a major oil-producing state with demonstrated reserves and global strategic importance. Renegotiation, conducted professionally and grounded in international best practice, is both justifiable and necessary to ensure that the terms reflect current realities rather than past uncertainties.

However, renegotiation alone is insufficient. A comprehensive reset is required. This 

Guyana stands at a decisive moment. The country can either continue along a path where extraordinary wealth coexists with structural dependency, or it can assert a new model of governance that prioritizes national interest, transparency, and long-term prosperity.

History will not measure Guyana by the volume of oil it extracts, but by the extent to which that wealth transforms the lives of its people.

The question is no longer whether Guyana is rich in resources. The question is whether it has the political will to become truly independent.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

 

 

 

 

Another Warning, Another Performance — GuySuCo and the Politics of Pretence

President Irfaan Ali’s latest threat to “shake up” the management of GuySuCo lands with a familiar thud—loud in declaration, hollow in consequence. Guyanese have heard this refrain before. Heads would roll. Targets must be met.

Accountability is coming. Yet, year after year, failure persists, targets are quietly revised, and the same cycle of underperformance continues under the protective umbrella of political convenience.
Let us be clear: GuySuCo is not suffering from a sudden lapse in management discipline. It is drowning under a model that is politically engineered, structurally inefficient, and economically unsustainable. No amount of rhetorical posturing from the Executive can mask that reality.

The numbers tell a story the administration refuses to confront. In 2024, production collapsed to 6,739 metric tonnes against a 16,000-tonne target for the first crop. In 2025, even after targets were reduced, GuySuCo still failed—producing approximately 59,200 metric tonnes against a lowered 60,000 target, itself a retreat from an initial 80,000. This is not underperformance; this is systemic failure dressed up as progress.

And yet, billions more in taxpayers’ dollars continue to be poured into the corporation. The 2026 budget increases allocation yet again, with promises of “financial viability” and “long-term sustainability.” These phrases have now become ritualistic—recited annually, believed by few.
What exactly is being sustained? It is certainly not profitability. It is not efficiency. It is not competitiveness in a global sugar market that rewards innovation and punishes stagnation.
What is being sustained is a political apparatus.

GuySuCo has effectively become the country’s most expensive welfare program—one carefully maintained to preserve rural voting blocs while avoiding the political fallout of genuine reform. The administration speaks of employment numbers and community revival, but refuses to admit that these gains are being artificially propped up by state subsidies with no credible pathway to independence.

Even more troubling is the continued deflection of responsibility. When targets are missed, the blame is redirected—to management, to technical gaps, to external conditions. Never to policy. Never to the flawed governance model. Never to the political interference that industry insiders and critics alike have repeatedly identified as the root cause.

The President now signals “discussions” about ownership and “technical teams” waiting in the wings. But these are not new ideas—they are recycled talking points, deployed each time the pressure mounts. Without structural reform, without insulating the corporation from political control, without a transparent and commercially grounded strategy, these measures amount to little more than administrative reshuffling.

The truth is uncomfortable, but unavoidable: GuySuCo, as currently configured, is under water—and the tide is rising faster than the government is willing to admit.
Guyanese deserve honesty, not theatrics. If the industry is to be saved, it will require more than threats and press conference declarations. It will require political courage—the kind that prioritizes national interest over electoral arithmetic.

Until then, the cycle will continue: missed targets, renewed promises, and another round of warnings that lead nowhere.
The country is watching. And increasingly, it is no longer convinced.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

CARICOM’s Anti-Trump Protest Cost the Region Its Integrity

By endorsing a corruption-tainted candidate for the OAS, Caribbean leaders chose politics over principle — and the region’s citizens will pay the price

Georgetown, GuyanaMay 2026

There is a particular kind of that flourishes in the Caribbean — the kind that dresses itself in the language of democracy and sovereignty while quietly betraying both. CARICOM leaders demonstrated this hypocrisy in full view of the hemisphere when they threw their collective weight behind Albert Ramdin as Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS), a man trailing a cloud of serious corruption allegations from his own country, Suriname. They did so not because he was the best candidate for the hemisphere’s premier democratic body, but because he was not Donald Trump’s candidate.

The consequences of that choice deserve far more scrutiny than regional leaders are prepared to invite.

A Region Already Failing Its Citizens

The endorsement did not occur in a vacuum. Transparency International has documented what Caribbean citizens already know in their bones: CARICOM governments are failing them. Bribery significantly obstructs access to basic public services — health care, education, housing — with the heaviest burden falling on society’s most vulnerable. The International Corruption Perceptions Index records little meaningful progress in the region over the past decade. The private sector, too, has been indicted as a willing partner in this culture of corruption.

This is the context in which CARICOM leaders made their OAS decision: not as reformers seeking to clean up regional institutions, but as political actors calculating advantage. Their candidate of choice, Albert Ramdin, was not an antidote to the region’s corruption problem. He was, arguably, a symptom of it.

The Allegations Against Ramdin

During his five years as Suriname’s Foreign Minister, Ramdin accumulated a record that should have disqualified him from leading any institution charged with upholding democratic governance. Surinamese media and the country’s own Public Prosecution Service have documented his alleged involvement in multiple corruption scandals. The most damaging centres on his relationship with Xaviera Jessurun, who has since become an advisor in his OAS office.

Jessurun has been formally designated as a suspect by Suriname’s Attorney General in connection with fraud, embezzlement, money laundering, and forgery. She has been summoned to appear in court. Yet rather than distance himself from a figure under active criminal investigation in his own country, Ramdin brought her to Washington as a senior advisor. And when Suriname’s Foreign Minister Melvin Bouva publicly revealed that Ramdin had improperly issued Jessurun a diplomatic passport — a passport that allowed her to travel to Washington while legal proceedings against her remained active in Suriname — the Caribbean leaders who had vouched for Ramdin said nothing.

Their silence was not accidental. It was a choice.

Politics Dressed as Principle

CARICOM’s defence of its endorsement has centred on the claim that its leaders were protecting the OAS from the influence of Donald Trump, whose preferred candidate was Rubén Ramírez Lezcano. There is no question that Trump’s interventions in hemispheric affairs warrant resistance. But resistance to one problematic actor cannot justify installing another. The OAS exists to defend democracy and human rights across the Americas. Its Secretary-General must be a figure of unimpeachable integrity — or at minimum, one who has not been linked by his own country’s law enforcement to abuse of office.

CARICOM performed no meaningful investigation into the allegations against Ramdin before casting its votes. Reports from Surinamese media were available. The Public Prosecution Service’s actions were a matter of public record. The Foreign Minister’s statement about the diplomatic passport was documented. The leaders of the region’s most corrupt member states simply looked away.

The Cost Borne by Ordinary People

Perhaps the most troubling dimension of this episode is what it reveals about where Caribbean leaders place their priorities. Former Surinamese President Santokhi, a close ally of Ramdin, reportedly directed millions of US dollars toward securing Ramdin’s OAS appointment — funds that could have been directed toward poverty reduction, crime prevention, healthcare, and education in one of the hemisphere’s poorest nations. Whether those reports can be fully verified, the pattern they describe is one the Caribbean knows well: public resources quietly redirected to serve elite political interests.

This is the same pattern Transparency International has catalogued across CARICOM for a decade. The bribery that blocks a mother from accessing her child’s medical records, the corruption that diverts school funds into private pockets, the culture that allows the powerful to obtain diplomatic passports for allies facing criminal prosecution — these are not separate phenomena. They are expressions of the same institutional rot.

Guyana Must Answer for Its Role

Guyana’s government has not been transparent with its citizens about its position on the Ramdin appointment. The 592 Guardian calls on the Ali administration to state clearly: did Guyana support Ramdin’s candidacy? If so, on what basis? What due diligence, if any, was conducted into the allegations against him? The Guyanese people, who are themselves living under the burden of inadequate public services and unresolved institutional corruption, deserve a direct answer.

A government that cannot answer those questions credibly has no standing to lecture its citizens about accountability.

Integrity Cannot Be An Afterthought

The OAS under Albert Ramdin’s leadership begins its tenure under a shadow that CARICOM itself helped cast. The institution’s credibility as a guardian of democratic norms will be tested from its first day. Whether Ramdin can overcome the allegations that followed him from Suriname to Washington remains to be seen. What is already clear is that the Caribbean leaders who installed him chose political expediency over rigorous scrutiny, and dressed that choice in the language of regional sovereignty and anti-imperialism.

The citizens of this region — the ones waiting in corrupt queues for public services, the ones watching their governments’ development budgets evaporate into patronage networks, the ones who never had millions of dollars to spend securing anyone’s appointment to anything — deserved better from their leaders. They deserved due diligence. They deserved transparency. They deserved the truth.

Instead, they got Albert Ramdin.


𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

Parliament Is Not a Privilege. It Is a Duty.

And Everyone in That Chamber Has Failed It.

Guyana’s Parliament has not sat for more than 100 days. Let that settle. Not a scheduling hiccup. Not an administrative delay. A governance failure — sustained, deliberate, and inexcusable.

The sudden announcement of a June 5 sitting, arriving conveniently on the heels of pointed remarks from representatives of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, should not be met with relief. It should be met with fury. Because what it confirms is this: the machinery of Guyanese democracy does not move on constitutional obligation. It moves on diplomatic pressure. That is a humiliation dressed up as a concession.
Minister Gail Teixeira’s response — that the diplomats should have first “engaged the Government” — is as revealing as it is tone-deaf.

Parliamentary democracy is not a private arrangement to be managed behind closed doors by the politically convenient. It is a public institution. Constitutionally mandated. Non-negotiable. Its prolonged dormancy is not an internal matter to be shielded from outside eyes. It is a public failure to be answered to — by citizens first, and by international partners second.
But here is where this editorial must turn — because the Government cannot be allowed to stand alone in the dock.

The Opposition Has Questions to Answer Too.
One hundred days. Where was the thunder? Where were the emergency press conferences, the legal challenges, the sustained and relentless public pressure that this constitutional crisis demanded? The Opposition — including the lone seat of the Forward Guyana Movement — sounded alarm, yes. But alarm without escalation is just noise.

One must ask, plainly and without apology: if their emoluments had been withheld — if their salaries, allowances, and benefits had been suspended for every day Parliament failed to sit — would they have waited this long? Would the outrage have been so measured, so periodic, so politely contained?

The question answers itself.
Opposition members are not volunteers. They are elected representatives, paid from the public purse, entrusted with the sacred function of holding power accountable. If they treated this constitutional crisis with anything less than maximum urgency, they too have failed the people who sent them there. Silence in the face of institutional collapse is not opposition. It is complicity in slow motion.

The Deeper Crisis: A Parliament That Can Be Paused at Will
The most dangerous truth exposed by these 100 days is not that one party abused its power. It is that the system permitted it.

A Parliament that can be suspended at the political convenience of the executive is not a co-equal branch of government. It is a decorative institution — convened when useful, shuttered when inconvenient. That is not democracy. That is theatre.

And this theatre has played out against a backdrop of unprecedented national expenditure. Guyana is an oil-producing nation now, channelling revenues of a scale this country has never before managed. The Public Accounts Committee — the very body mandated to scrutinise how that money is spent — has been non-functional. Let us be direct: governance without scrutiny at this scale, with this volume of public funds in motion, is not just negligent. It is an invitation to plunder.
Governance without scrutiny is not governance. It is control.

The Reform That Must Now Follow
The resumption of Parliament on June 5 should not be celebrated. It should be the beginning of a reckoning. Because if history is any guide, this is not a correction — it is a recalibration. A temporary concession to external pressure, after which the status quo reasserts itself.
That cannot be allowed to happen again.

Guyana urgently needs — and the Opposition must now table — a Parliamentary Sittings (Fixed Schedule) Bill. Its purpose would be singular and unambiguous: to remove, permanently, the unilateral authority of any person, party, or executive to defer, delay, or dissolve parliamentary sittings at will.

The National Assembly must sit on a constitutionally fixed, publicly published roster. Not subject to ministerial discretion. Not contingent on political appetite.

Not moveable by Cabinet decree. The people’s business must be conducted on the people’s schedule — not the Government’s.
Such a Bill would do more than prevent future abuses. It would signal to every Guyanese citizen, and to every international observer, that this nation is serious about institutional governance.

That it does not require diplomatic nudges to honour its own Constitution.
Let the Opposition bring this Bill. Let them table it the moment Parliament reconvenes. Let every member — Government and Opposition alike — be forced to vote on whether they believe democracy should function inevitably or merely intermittently. Let that vote be on the record, in Hansard, for the people to judge.

The Standard Must Be Inevitability, Not Convenience
Guyanese must now move beyond outrage — because outrage without reform is just catharsis. What this moment demands is structural change, enforceable by law, binding on every administration that follows.

Democracy must not function when it is politically expedient. It must function because it cannot be stopped.

A Parliament that sits only when pressured is a Parliament that has already surrendered its purpose. A Parliament that sits on schedule, by law, regardless of who is in power — that is a Parliament worthy of the name.

Anything less is a betrayal. Of the Constitution. Of the electorate. Of the very idea of self-governance.
The people of Guyana did not elect a Parliament to meet at someone’s pleasure. They elected it to meet — period.

It is time to make that non-negotiable. In law. Without exception. Without delay.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

The Beijing Summits: Words Without Weight

BY: Staff— Writer

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣.         

Three men who between them command the world’s most formidable economies and the most lethal military arsenals met in Beijing. They talked. They posed for cameras. They issued statements. And when they left, the wars continued, the Strait of Hormuz remained contested, and the price of oil held its grip on the throats of ordinary people from Georgetown to Guangzhou.

That is the uncomfortable truth behind the diplomatic pageantry that unfolded in China’s capital this week — two separate summits, one involving the United States and China, the other China and Russia, both freighted with global expectation and both, ultimately, light on delivery.
To be fair, no serious observer of international affairs expects a single summit to resolve conflicts decades in the making. Agreements between sovereign states are forged through repetition, not revelation. But the world’s patience is not unlimited, and its tolerance for diplomatic theatre grows thinner with each body counted.

Tariffs, Trade and the Theatre of Trump

On the US-China front, the most pressing item for America’s corporate class was trade — and understandably so. Trump’s tariff war has rattled supply chains and stoked inflationary pressure far beyond American shores. Small, open economies like Guyana’s are not insulated from those tremors.

President Trump returned claiming victory: 200 aircraft to be purchased by China, agricultural products to follow. Beijing, notably, confirmed none of it. Whether these are genuine commitments yet to be formalised or political theatre for domestic consumption in Washington remains to be seen. What is certain is that no new trade agreement was announced, and the tariff war shows no signs of formal resolution.

For Guyana and the Caribbean region, this matters. The broader global trading environment shapes the conditions under which we sell our oil, attract investment, and manage our import bills. Instability at the top of the international economic order cascades downward. We do not have the luxury of watching from a distance.

Taiwan: The Collision Course Neither Side Can Afford

The most consequential exchange of the US-China summit may well have been President Xi Jinping’s unambiguous warning: Taiwan is “the most important issue in China-US relations,” and if mishandled, the two nations could “collide or even come into conflict.”
President Trump’s response was, by his standards, measured — urging Taiwan against seeking independence and signalling that America has little appetite for a war fought 9,500 miles from its shores. He has also reportedly withheld his signature from an US$11 billion arms sale to Taipei.

This restraint, if it holds, is not nothing. But restraint is not a policy. And the absence of clear red lines, binding commitments, or a framework for crisis management leaves a dangerous vacuum. One miscalculation — a naval incident, a provocation, an election — could ignite a confrontation that no subsequent summit could contain.

Russia, China and the Architecture of a New Order

The China-Russia summit produced more paperwork — reportedly over 20 agreements signed across energy, transport and international cooperation, with 20 more pending. More significantly, the two leaders signed a document calling for a “multi-polar world order” and “a new type of international relations,” explicitly positioning themselves against what they characterise as unilateral and hegemonic excess.

The language is pointed and deliberate. Russia, perhaps the most militarily and economically exposed of the three powers, finds in China both a market and a shield. President Xi, for his part, gains strategic depth and a counterweight to Western pressure.

But what was conspicuously absent from those 20-plus agreements was any document addressing the war in Ukraine — no ceasefire framework, no peace roadmap, no announced effort to end a conflict that has already claimed tens of thousands of lives and displaced millions. The multi-polar world order Xi and Putin envision apparently does not yet include a shared responsibility to stop a war that one of its architects started.

The Numbers Behind the Silence

The editorialising of summits should never lose sight of the human ledger. Across Gaza and the Russia-Ukraine theatre, an estimated 140,000 people have been killed. A further 8,000 are missing in Gaza. In the killing fields of Eastern Europe, 90,000 remain unaccounted for.

These are not statistics. They are sons, daughters, mothers, and fathers — consumed by conflicts that the three most powerful leaders on earth have, thus far, chosen to manage rather than end.
Neither Beijing summit produced an announced, immediate effort to halt either war.

What Beijing Told Us

The summits were not without value. The mere fact that Washington and Beijing sat across the table signals that both powers understand uncontrolled escalation serves no one. That both agree, at least in principle, that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open for the free passage of the 20 per cent of global oil supply that flows through it is a floor, not a ceiling — but it is a floor.

What Beijing told us, however, is that the world’s most powerful men are managing crises, not resolving them. They are preserving options rather than making choices. And in the space between managed tension and resolved conflict, people die, prices rise, and smaller nations absorb shocks over which they have no control.

For Guyana — a nation now firmly positioned in the global energy conversation — the instability of the Hormuz corridor, the volatility of global oil markets, and the uncertainty of great-power trade relations are not abstract concerns. They are budget lines, development timelines, and the cost of goods on the shelves of our people.

The Course Must Be Reset

The 592 Guardian is under no illusion that summits alone move mountains. But we insist on this: acknowledgement without action is not diplomacy — it is delay with better lighting.

The three leaders who gathered in Beijing this week carry between them the capacity to end both wars, stabilise energy markets, and chart a trading order that does not immiserate the Global South. Whether they possess the will to exercise that capacity is the defining question of this moment in history.


The 21st century is not yet lost. But it is being squandered, one carefully worded joint statement at a time.


𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

When the Algorithm Waits: The Six-Month Silence That Exposes Guyana’s AI Enforcement Illusion

Opinion | The 592 Guardian

There is a particular kind of deception that does not lie outright. It does not fabricate facts or invent events. It operates instead through selective emphasis — parading the gleaming face of progress while quietly shielding its contradictions from scrutiny. Guyana’s rollout of artificial intelligence in traffic enforcement has become a masterclass in exactly this kind of deception.
We are told that the system is sophisticated. We are told it is modern, efficient, and — most importantly — fair. And yet, 1,600 drivers identified by that very system as suspected violators waited six months to receive so much as a notification letter. Six months. In a world where artificial intelligence can scan a vehicle travelling at highway speed, cross-reference its plate against a national database, and generate an enforcement flag in fractions of a second, it apparently cannot send a letter in less than half a year.
That contradiction is not a minor administrative footnote. It is the story.

The Promise That Built the Narrative

To understand how deeply troubling this delay is, one must first appreciate the scale of what was promised — and what was sold to the Guyanese public.
AI-powered enforcement was not presented as a modest upgrade to existing traffic systems. It was framed as a transformational leap — a decisive break from the era of arbitrary roadside stops, inconsistent policing, and enforcement that depended too heavily on the discretion, and sometimes the appetite, of individual officers. The technology would be neutral. It would be tireless. It would see everything and treat everyone the same.

The language used in official communications about the system was careful but unmistakable in its ambition. Real-time detection. Automated flagging. Instant database integration. These were not the words of a department piloting a modest tool — they were the vocabulary of a government staking its modernization credentials on a technological promise.

That promise had real political currency. In a society where the belief that enforcement is selective — that who you know determines whether the law applies to you — remains deeply entrenched, the idea of a machine-driven system carried genuine appeal. A camera does not accept a handshake. An algorithm does not respond to a phone call. If the technology is what it claims to be, then the rules truly do apply to everyone.
That was the bargain offered to the public. The six-month silence is proof that the bargain was not honoured.

What Artificial Intelligence Actually Does — and Doesn’t — Explain

It is worth being precise here, because the government’s defenders will reach for a familiar rebuttal: that even with AI detection, downstream enforcement processes involve human steps that take time. Letters must be drafted, addresses verified, decisions reviewed. Technology, they will argue, does not eliminate the need for administrative procedure.

This argument is not entirely without merit. It is, however, entirely insufficient.
Artificial intelligence, at its core, is a tool for compressing time. It eliminates the bottlenecks that arise when human judgment must be applied to each individual case. A system that can flag 1,600 violators does not require 1,600 separate human decisions to generate 1,600 notification letters. That is, in fact, the entire point. A functioning AI enforcement system would have the capacity to automate the notification pipeline with the same efficiency it applies to detection. If such automation was not built in — if the detection engine was wired to a manual, paper-shuffling bureaucracy on the back end — then the system as deployed is not what it was described to be. It is a camera with a filing cabinet.

More pointedly: if the technology is capable of triggering enforcement responses on the spot — if, as has been suggested, it can interface in real time with officers in the field — then the claim that notifications to flagged drivers required six months of processing collapses under the weight of its own implausibility. You cannot tell the public that your system can alert a patrol officer to a flagged vehicle in motion, and then explain that generating a mailed notification to the same vehicle’s registered owner requires half a year.
One of these claims must give way. And the public is entitled to know which one.

The Silence That Speaks

Six months is not a delay. It is a decision.
In public administration, especially in matters of law enforcement, timelines are never purely accidental. Resources are allocated. Priorities are set. When an action that should be routine — notifying individuals that they have been flagged for a potential offence — takes six months to execute, it is because something, or someone, chose not to expedite it.
The question that follows from that observation is the one the government has been conspicuously reluctant to answer: what happened during those six months?

Who held the list of 1,600 flagged drivers? Who had access to it? Was it reviewed by anyone outside the technical enforcement team? Were any names removed before notifications were issued? Were any names added? Were the 1,600 who eventually received letters the same 1,600 originally flagged by the system — or had the list been quietly adjusted along the way?

These are not hypothetical concerns born of cynicism. They are the natural and reasonable questions that arise any time sensitive enforcement data is held in bureaucratic limbo without accountability or transparency. The longer the silence, the more weight those questions carry.
And they are carrying considerable weight.

The Whispers That Grow into Walls

Across Guyanese civil society, in the conversations that happen between citizens rather than in official briefings, a particular suspicion has taken root. It is not yet a verified allegation. It has not been confirmed by any whistleblower or official source. But it has spread with the stubborn persistence of ideas that feel intuitively true to the people who hold them.
The whisper is this: the delay was not administrative. The list required “scrubbing.” Certain names — names attached to individuals with the right connections, the right relationships, the right proximity to power — were quietly removed before the letters went out.

Again: this has not been proven. It may not be true. But the extraordinary danger of this moment is that, true or false, the suspicion is entirely plausible given what the public has been shown of how enforcement works in Guyana. And a government that has spent years promising a new, transparent, technology-driven era of equal treatment has done nothing — nothing — to proactively foreclose that suspicion.

No audit of the flagged list has been published. No independent verification of the notification process has been announced. No explanation for the delay that goes beyond vague administrative reference has been offered. In the vacuum of credible official explanation, the whisper does not merely survive — it thrives.
This is the corrosive power of perceived selective enforcement. It does not require proof to do its damage. It only requires the absence of transparency. And on that front, the government has been remarkably, perhaps recklessly, generous.

Artificial Intelligence Cannot Survive Artificial Fairness

There is a term that deserves wider circulation in this debate: artificial fairness.


Artificial fairness is what you get when you deploy a genuinely neutral technology — a system that, left to its own outputs, would apply the same standard to every vehicle that passes before its sensors — and then introduce human discretion back into the process after the fact. The detection may be real. The flagging may be real. But if what comes out the other end of the pipeline has been filtered through human judgment that is susceptible to influence, then the neutrality of the machine is merely cosmetic.


This is not a hypothetical risk. It is the specific vulnerability that the six-month delay has exposed. AI systems produce outputs. Those outputs then enter a human-administered pipeline. If that pipeline operates without transparency, without independent oversight, and without verifiable timelines, then the AI’s integrity guarantees nothing. You have simply moved the point of potential manipulation further downstream, where it is harder to see and easier to deny.

The administration has built its modernization narrative on the premise that AI enforcement represents a structural departure from the culture of discretion. But discretion does not disappear when a camera is installed. It migrates — to the person who controls the database, to the official who reviews the flagged list, to the bureaucrat who decides which letters go out and when. If those human nodes in the enforcement chain are not bound by the same transparency and accountability standards applied to the technology itself, then the system as a whole is no more trustworthy than its weakest human link.

Right now, that link is invisible, and it has been invisible for six months.

The Standard That Must Be Applied

What would credible AI-powered enforcement actually look like? It would look like this:
Detection events would be logged in a tamper-evident, time-stamped system that is subject to independent audit. The interval between a flag being raised and a notification being issued would be defined in advance, published publicly, and enforced consistently. Any deviation from that interval would require a documented justification, accessible to oversight bodies. The composition of any flagged list — who is on it, when they were added, and whether any names were ever removed — would be auditable by a body that is genuinely independent of the enforcement apparatus.

None of this is technically complicated. All of it is politically demanding. It requires a government willing to be held accountable not just to its own stated standards, but to external verification of whether those standards are being met.
The question before the Guyanese public is not whether AI enforcement is, in theory, a good idea. It may well be. The question is whether the specific deployment currently underway can be trusted — and whether the administration responsible for it is willing to do what trust requires.

At present, the evidence suggests the answer is no.

Modernization Is Not a Marketing Exercise

Guyana is at a genuine inflection point. The country’s economic transformation over the last several years has created real capacity for institutional modernization. Resources exist that did not exist before. The appetite for a more functional, more equitable state apparatus — particularly among younger Guyanese — is real and should not be squandered.

But modernization is not achieved by acquiring technology. It is achieved by building institutions capable of deploying technology in ways that genuinely serve the public interest. An AI camera on a highway is hardware. The culture that governs what happens to its outputs is the institution. And it is the institution — not the hardware — that determines whether the system produces justice or merely produces the appearance of it.

A country that installs cutting-edge detection technology and then subjects its outputs to an opaque, unaccountable, six-month human filtering process has not modernized. It has digitized its old habits. It has made them faster, more scalable, and — if the technology’s reputation for neutrality is successfully leveraged — considerably harder to challenge.

That is not progress. That is the old order in new clothes.

The Questions That Cannot Be Deferred

The administration owes the public answers. Not reassurances — answers. Specific, verifiable, documented answers to questions that are neither unreasonable nor hostile. They are the questions that any functioning democracy asks of its enforcement apparatus:

Why were the 1,600 flagged drivers not notified within days of being identified? What is the documented justification for the six-month interval?

Who had access to the flagged list between the time it was generated and the time notifications were issued? Was that access logged?

Were any names removed from the original flagged list before notifications were sent? If so, on what authority, under what criteria, and with what documentation?

What independent oversight body has visibility into the enforcement pipeline, and what are its powers to audit, challenge, or publicise its findings?

Until those questions are answered — publicly, specifically, and with supporting documentation — the rollout of AI-powered traffic enforcement cannot be accepted as the transparent, technology-driven modernization it has been presented as.

It remains, for now, a performance. An expensive, technically impressive, and politically convenient performance — but a performance nonetheless.

What Guyana Deserves

The people of Guyana deserve enforcement that is credible. Not enforcement that is claimed to be credible. Not enforcement that is credible in its technology while opaque in its administration. Credible in the full and demanding sense: where the rules apply equally, timelines are consistent and published, the data is protected from interference, and the institutions responsible for it are genuinely accountable to the public they serve.

That is not a utopian standard. It is the baseline expectation of a functioning rule of law. Other countries meet it. Guyana can meet it too.

But it will not be met by installing cameras. It will be met by the hard, unglamorous, politically costly work of building institutions that cannot be quietly negotiated with — where the algorithm’s output is as binding on the well-connected as it is on everyone else, and where the word “enforcement” does not carry an asterisk.

Anything less is not modernization. It is not efficiency. It is not justice.
It is digitized inequality — and it insults the intelligence of every Guyanese citizen who was told the machine would be different.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

THE AGGRESSOR IN THE MIRROR: How Washington Manufactures the “Cuba Threat” While Strangling a Nation

When the historical record is consulted honestly, only one country in this relationship has consistently acted as an aggressor — and it is not the one being blockaded.

When a senior U.S. government official stands before Congress, posts on official platforms, or declares to the world that Cuba represents a threat to American national security, they are not speaking truth. They are performing a function. That function — the deliberate inversion of historical reality — is not a matter of opinion. It is a matter of documented, declassified record.

The evidence has always been there for those willing to read it.

A Century of Intervention Before the Revolution

The United States never recognised Cuba’s Republic in Arms during its war of liberation against Spain. It actively intercepted patriotic expeditions carrying weapons and supplies essential to that struggle. When Spain was finally defeated, Washington intervened militarily, occupied the island by force, and stole the victory from the Cuban people who had bled for it.

The Platt Amendment of 1898 formalised what the guns had already established: Cuba as a protectorate, its sovereignty conditional on American approval. Repeated military interventions through the early twentieth century reinforced the point. Gunboat diplomacy was not a metaphor — it was policy.

When strongmen were needed to protect American commercial interests, Washington provided them. Gerardo Machado and Fulgencio Batista both enjoyed U.S. support while presiding over regimes responsible for thousands of deaths. The CIA actively advised Batista’s security apparatus and helped create the Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities — the BRAC — in the 1950s.

The monster was assembled in Washington’s workshops.

From Playa Girón to Operation Northwoods

The revolutionary triumph of 1959 triggered a response that can only be described as institutional panic. By 1960, President Eisenhower had approved a covert CIA plan to overthrow the new government. In 1961, CIA-trained mercenaries invaded at Playa Girón — the Bay of Pigs — and were defeated by people’s militias within 72 hours.

The defeat did not produce reflection. It produced escalation.

Operation Mongoose followed: a programme of economic sabotage, terrorist attacks, and more than 600 documented assassination attempts against Fidel Castro — nearly one every two weeks across three decades. Rebel gangs were organised, financed, and armed in the Escambray Mountains, sowing terror across the Cuban countryside.

The most chilling episode came in 1962 with Operation Northwoods, when the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff formally proposed carrying out attacks on American civilians and blaming Cuba — manufacturing a pretext for invasion. The document exists. It is declassified. It bears the signatures of the men who conceived it.

Terrorism With Impunity

In 1976, a Cubana de Aviación passenger aircraft was bombed over Barbados. All 73 people aboard were killed. Among them were 11 Guyanese victims. The mastermind, Luis Posada Carriles, lived out the remainder of his life free and protected in Miami. In 1997, simultaneous bombings struck Havana hotels, murdering Italian tourist Fabio Di Celmo. In total, more than 3,000 Cuban victims are still awaiting justice for acts of terrorism traced to networks operating from U.S. territory with the knowledge — and often the active support — of American intelligence services.

On October 6, 1976, Cubana de Aviación Flight 455 took off from Barbados en route to Jamaica. It soon disappeared from the radar screens. 

Biological warfare was also deployed. African swine fever was introduced in 1971, wiping out 40% of Cuba’s pig population. In 1981, a hemorrhagic dengue epidemic affected 350,000 people and killed 158, including 101 children.

These are not allegations. They are documented facts, available in the archives of the Church Committee, in declassified CIA files, and in the historical record that the United States government would prefer the world forget.

2026: The Energy Stranglehold

Against this backdrop, what is unfolding in 2026 is not a departure from pattern. It is its logical continuation — only now prosecuted with the tools of energy warfare.

Since January 2026, the Trump administration has imposed more than 240 sanctions against Cuba, including the interception of at least seven oil tankers bound for the island. An executive order signed on May 1st expanded restrictions across the energy, defence, mining, and financial services sectors. The effect has been devastating: Cuban energy imports have been slashed by 80 to 90 percent. Power outages now last up to 24 hours a day across more than half the island’s territory.

The blockade is total enough that Cuba’s aviation authorities have been forced to warn international airlines that jet fuel is no longer reliably available at nine airports across the island, including Havana’s José Martí International. Cuba’s Health Minister has warned of a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, stating that hospitals have been rendered helpless and that thousands of lives are at risk.

Public transport has stalled. Banks have reduced their hours. Rubbish collection has collapsed in Havana, leaving streets piled with waste. The cigar fair — a cultural institution — has been postponed indefinitely. The infrastructure of daily life is being systematically dismantled, not by the Cuban government’s failures alone, but by the deliberate application of external pressure designed to make life unliveable.

And still, the narrative being broadcast from Washington is that Cuba is the threat.

The Carrier at the Door

On May 20th, 2026 — Cuba’s Independence Day — the United States Southern Command announced the arrival of the USS Nimitz carrier strike group in the Caribbean, alongside destroyers and replenishment vessels. This followed a May 5th threat from President Trump to deploy the USS Abraham Lincoln to Cuban shores. SOUTHCOM’s announcement boasted of the carrier’s record of operations “from the Taiwan Strait to the Arabian Gulf.”

The same day, the Department of Justice unveiled an indictment of 94-year-old former Cuban President Raúl Castro on charges related to the 1996 shootdown of civilian aircraft. A Cuban-born U.S. congressman openly stated the indictment provides “the legal basis to go and remove” Castro from Cuba. Secretary of State Marco Rubio — whose family history with Cuba is well known — addressed the Cuban people directly in Spanish, backing the fuel blockade while blaming the resulting blackouts on Havana.

The choreography is deliberate. The legal instrument, the military presence, the media message — all deployed simultaneously, on Independence Day, for maximum psychological effect.

Who Benefits From the Narrative?

The construction of Cuba as a “threat” has never been a misperception. It has always been a function. When we ask who benefits, the answer is instructive.

The narrative justifies the blockade to a domestic audience that might otherwise question its legality and its humanity. It prepares psychological ground for military escalation, wearing down international opposition incrementally. It distracts from the acknowledged failure of more than six decades of regime-change policy that has produced neither the collapse of the Cuban government nor the liberation of its people — only their suffering. And it remains an extraordinarily effective mechanism for harvesting votes in South Florida, where a politically organised exile community has long exercised influence over U.S. foreign policy disproportionate to its size.

International law scholars have now begun to weigh in. Legal analysts at Just Security have noted that a campaign designed to force a change of government by cutting off an island nation’s essential fuel supply threatens — and in important respects already crosses — the boundaries of what international law permits, even in pursuit of ostensibly legitimate objectives.

The Record Does Not Lie

The 592 Guardian does not editorialize on behalf of any government. We editorialize on behalf of truth, of documented fact, and of the principle that the people of the Caribbean and the Global South deserve analysis that does not simply reproduce the framing of the powerful.

The historical record of U.S. actions against Cuba is not a matter of ideology. It is available in declassified files, in the Church Committee’s own reports to the U.S. Senate, in the archives of GlobalSecurity, in the records of trial proceedings, and in the testimonies of survivors. It describes, with the precision of a scalpel, which party in this relationship has consistently organised invasions, funded terrorist networks, poisoned livestock, bombed civilian aircraft, and now, in 2026, cut off the fuel supply of eleven million people while positioning an aircraft carrier off their coast.


The aggressor is not hidden. The aggressor is reflected clearly in the mirror of its own declassified record.


The question for the rest of the world — and particularly for Caribbean nations who understand what it means to have powerful neighbours — is whether we will have the clarity, and the courage, to say so plainly.

EDITOR’S NOTE:

Context & Background for Our Readers


To fully appreciate the gravity of what is unfolding between the United States and Cuba in 2026, readers deserve more than headlines. They deserve history. Because this crisis did not begin with Donald Trump, and it did not begin with any single act of defiance from Havana. It is the product of a relationship that has been defined, almost without interruption, by American dominance and Cuban resistance for well over a century.

The Root of the Antagonism: 1959

For most of the twentieth century, Cuba existed within the American sphere of influence as a virtual client state. American corporations owned vast tracts of Cuban land, its sugar industry, its utilities, and its hotels. The Batista dictatorship — brutal, corrupt, and sustained by Washington — kept that arrangement intact. When Fidel Castro’s revolutionary movement overthrew Batista on January 1st, 1959, it did not merely change a government. It broke an economic and geopolitical arrangement that Washington had treated as permanent.

The Eisenhower administration began planning a covert response almost immediately. What followed — the Bay of Pigs invasion, Operation Mongoose, the decades of assassination attempts, the economic embargo formalised in 1962 — was not a reaction to a military threat. Cuba has never invaded the United States, never bombed American cities, never funded insurgencies on American soil. The hostility was always, at its core, a reaction to economic and political independence.

The Cold War Framework and Its Convenient Legacy

Washington packaged its aggression in the language of the Cold War. Cuba’s alignment with the Soviet Union, formalised after the revolution, gave the United States the ideological framing it needed to justify extraordinary measures. The 1962 Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear war — genuinely so — and that moment has been used ever since to retroactively legitimise every act of economic warfare and covert destabilisation that preceded and followed it.

What is rarely noted in mainstream Western discourse is the sequence: it was the relentless pressure of American-backed sabotage, embargo, and invasion attempts that pushed Cuba deeper into Soviet alignment. The threat Cuba sought protection from was not hypothetical. It had already landed at Playa Girón.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Cuba entered what it called the “Special Period” — a catastrophic economic contraction that saw the Cuban economy shrink by more than 35 percent. Many in Washington anticipated that the revolutionary government would collapse within months. It did not. That survival, against all prediction, hardened both sides. For Cuba, it became a point of national pride. For Washington, it became an enduring humiliation that successive administrations have never fully processed.

The Clinton-to-Obama Arc:

Hardening, Then Thawing
The 1990s brought the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, which codified and entrenched the embargo in statute, making it nearly impossible for any president to lift unilaterally without Congressional approval. The legislation was partly triggered by Cuba’s shootdown of two aircraft operated by Brothers to the Rescue — the same incident now being used to justify the 2026 indictment of Raúl Castro. Washington framed it as an outrage. Havana maintained the aircraft had repeatedly violated Cuban airspace on provocative missions. The truth of that specific incident remains contested. The legislative consequences were not.

For the next two decades, the basic architecture of U.S.-Cuba relations remained frozen. Then, in December 2014, Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro jointly announced a historic diplomatic opening. Embassies were reopened. Travel and trade restrictions were partially eased. For a brief moment, it appeared the century-long antagonism might finally find a different expression.

That opening lasted less than three years.

The Trump First Term and the Rollback

When Donald Trump came to office in 2017, he began systematically reversing the Obama-era normalisation. By the end of his first term, Cuba had been redesignated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism — a designation the Biden administration controversially maintained, before partially reversing it in the final days of its tenure in January 2025.

The Biden years were marked by ambivalence. Meaningful reform of Cuba policy was perpetually postponed, caught between the administration’s stated values and the political calculus of Florida’s electoral importance. The terrorism designation remained in place for most of Biden’s term. Remittance restrictions continued. The fundamental structure of the embargo was untouched.

The Second Trump Administration and the Escalation to 2026

When Trump returned to office in January 2025, Cuba policy moved with unusual speed and ferocity. Cuba was immediately redesignated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Within days of taking office, Trump posted on Truth Social: “THERE WILL BE NO MORE OIL OR MONEY GOING TO CUBA — ZERO!” It was not rhetoric. It became operational policy almost immediately.

The mechanism chosen was energy strangulation. By threatening tariffs and secondary sanctions against any country or company that sold or transported oil to Cuba, Washington effectively weaponised Cuba’s dependence on imported petroleum. Venezuela — long Cuba’s primary oil supplier — had already been targeted through the kidnapping and removal of President Nicolás Maduro in early January 2026. Mexico, under pressure, ceased oil shipments. Tankers were intercepted at sea. By early February, Cuban airports were running out of jet fuel. Hospitals were losing power. Rubbish was piling in the streets of Havana.

Hurricane Melissa, which struck Cuba in late 2025 and caused widespread destruction, compounded a humanitarian situation that was already deteriorating rapidly. The United States offered a modest $6 million in humanitarian supplies — even as its own policies were the primary driver of the crisis those supplies were meant to address.

Where We Stand Today

By May 2026, the USS Nimitz carrier strike group is in the Caribbean. Raúl Castro has been indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice. A sitting American congressman has publicly stated that the indictment provides legal grounds for a military removal. The Secretary of State is broadcasting messages in Spanish to the Cuban people, framing a man-made energy catastrophe as the natural consequence of their government’s choices.

This is where more than sixty years of policy has arrived. Not at resolution. Not at the collapse of the Cuban government Washington has long sought. But at the edge of something more dangerous — a militarised confrontation that Caribbean nations, and all people of the Global South, have the clearest interest in preventing.

Understanding how we got here is not an academic exercise. It is the necessary foundation for any honest conversation about what comes next.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

Safekeeping or Silence? Ekaa Hrim, the Passport Question, and the Smell of a Cover-Up

BY: Staff— Writer

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣.   

Ekaa Hrim Quarry’s response to the allegations against it has the unmistakable odor of a cover-up in motion, not a company determined to confront wrongdoing. What began as serious complaints from 38 Indian workers about long hours, poor living conditions, low pay, and the handling of their passports is now being dressed up in the language of reassurance, bureaucratic process, and selective explanation. But the central question remains unanswered: if the passports were handed over voluntarily for safekeeping, why did it take intervention from outside the company to get them back? That is not how ordinary employer-employee “safekeeping” works; that is how pressure gets applied until the optics become too dangerous to ignore.

Even more troubling is the eagerness with which the company appears to be preempting the most sensitive parts of the inquiry. A worker has died. The company says it was a heart attack. Perhaps it was. But in a matter this serious, nobody with any sense of public responsibility should be rushing to wrap a final ribbon around a death that ought to be properly examined by the competent authorities. When a company is under scrutiny for possible exploitation, any attempt to present a cause of death as settled before the investigation is complete raises immediate suspicion. It is not transparency. It is narrative management.

And then there is the political choreography. In cases like this, power rarely announces itself bluntly. It shows up as delay, dilution, soft language, and official faces standing between the public and the truth. The Minister of Labour, in this instance, has been forced into the role of front-facing shield, the public buffer through which the matter is being processed and softened. That in itself should concern the country. If intervention was needed to return passports, then the problem was never administrative housekeeping. It was control. If workers had to complain before action was taken, then the system did not detect the abuse; it responded to pressure after the fact.

This is how these matters are so often buried: not by outright denial alone, but by procedural fog, managed statements, and the quiet hope that public attention will move on before accountability takes root. That cannot be allowed here. The allegations are too grave, the power imbalance too obvious, and the explanations too convenient. A company does not get to invoke “safekeeping” after documents are withheld. It does not get to pronounce on a cause of death as though it were the final medical authority. And it does not get to treat the ministry’s intervention as proof that the matter has been handled. If anything, the intervention proves the opposite: that without outside pressure, the workers’ complaints might have remained exactly where the powerful prefer such complaints to be—buried, diluted, and forgotten.

What is required now is not more performative calm. It is a transparent, independent, and uncompromising inquiry into every allegation raised by these workers. Anything less would confirm what many already suspect: that when the accused have access to power, the system bends first, and explains later.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.