The Ambassador’s Blind Spot

This entry is part 1 of 2 in the series ▶️
592 GUARDIAN ♦ACCOUNTABILITY&INTEGRITY JOURNALISM♦ GUYANA

The Ambassador’s Blind Spot


EDITORIAL◊GUYANA DEVELOPMENT BANK

BY: Staff Writer- August,2026

Singh Praised the Bank’s Discipline the President Had Already Abandoned

Sasenarine Singh, Guyana’s Ambassador to Belgium and the EU, used his column this week to praise President Irfaan Ali’s “will” in pushing the Guyana Development Bank into law, and to warn — in the abstract — that the $40 billion facility could collapse into the next GAIBANK if credit decisions ever became subject to political influence, such as “officials prioritising requests from Regional Chairpersons rather than on merit and the bankability of the project.”

Singh wrote that warning as a hypothetical. It was already out of date. The very day  before his column ran, President Ali stood before residents in Rose Hall, Region Six, and told bar and entertainment-venue owners to expect Development Bank financing to soundproof their premises — a specific sector, a specific use of funds, announced by the President personally, at a political roadshow stop, months before the Bank has a board, a lending policy, or an application process.

This is not adjacent to the risk Singh described. It is the risk Singh described, already realized, by the same president Singh’s column exists to praise.

AN AMBASSADOR, NOT AN ECONOMIST, AND NOT A NEUTRAL ONE

It is worth stating plainly what Singh is and is not. He is not an independent financial commentator assessing a policy on its merits. He is a sitting Guyanese ambassador — accredited to Belgium, the EU, and the OACPS — writing under his diplomatic title to build a partisan case for the head of the government that appointed him.

This is not the first time. In July, Kaieteur News called for his recall after he inserted himself into a domestic political dispute over the government’s handling of Region Two squall damage, on the grounds that an ambassador represents Guyana, not the party, and not the administration currently in office.

That distinction is not a technicality; it is the entire basis on which a diplomat is permitted to speak with the authority of the state rather than the authority of a faction. Singh has now set it aside twice inside a single month.

None of that would matter much if the substance of his column were sound. It is not.

THE GOVERNANCE ARGUMENT SINGH BORROWED, THEN ABANDONED

Singh’s strongest material is not his own. His warning about Section 5(2)’s discretionary lending language — the provision allowing loans “with or without collateral and with or without charging interest” — closely tracks a public warning from Kenrick Hunte, a former Guyanese ambassador, who argued in a letter to the editor that the same provision creates four distinct lending scenarios, and that reliance on the looser two would turn the Bank into “a welfare agency” rather than a functioning development institution, repeating the mistakes that sank GAIBANK.

Hunte made that argument as a critique. Singh borrowed its shape, then used it to build the opposite conclusion — that the Bank’s guardrails simply need to be “constructed early,” as though early construction were still possible, and as though the President himself were a neutral party to that construction rather than the person already making unilateral allocation decisions in public.

Singh’s own numbers undercut him further. He cites the Bank of Guyana’s 2025 non-performing loan ratio — 1.5 percent, against a 4.9 percent Caribbean average — as evidence of the discipline this new institution inherits. That figure describes the existing commercial banking sector operating under existing prudential regulation.

It describes nothing about an institution with no board, no published lending criteria, and a president who has already begun naming sectors and use cases from a podium.

WHAT THE TIMING ACTUALLY SHOWS

Singh’s column never mentions that the Bill passed the same sitting the opposition boycotted in protest over the MV Barima disaster — a maritime tragedy still without a resolved accountability process. He does not mention that the Bank remains, as of this writing, a statute and a launch date: no portal, no office, no application window. And he does not mention Rose Hall, where the President personally directed a category of prospective borrowers toward the Bank’s future financing — bars and entertainment venues, for soundproofing — a sector Guyana’s own police force and the U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in Persons reports have repeatedly identified as a recurring site of labor and sex trafficking risk, most recently in the pending Magic City Nightclub matter now before the courts.

Singh asked the country to trust that “the country must demand” discipline of this Bank going forward. The country does not need to demand anything hypothetically. It needs an ambassador willing to report what has already happened, rather than one auditioning to have written the government’s press release before the government did.

WHAT WE ARE ASKING FOR

This outlet renews, in this context, the disclosure requests already put to the Office of the President and the Bank’s future secretariat:

  1. Whether soundproofing financing for bars, taverns, or entertainment venues will carry any safeguarding, licensing-compliance, or anti-trafficking due-diligence conditions, and who will verify compliance.
  2. Under what legal authority a not-yet-operational Bank — with no board, no published lending criteria, and no application process — is being publicly committed by the President to specific borrowers and specific uses of funds.
  3. Whether any establishment currently under investigation, charge, or licence review — including those connected to the pending May 28 Magic City matter — would be eligible to receive Development Bank financing under this initiative.

Ambassador Singh’s column asked Guyanese to trust that discipline would come later. Rose Hall is the record of what came first.

— The Board

Court Denies VAMED’s Injunctions, But Guyana Still Hasn’t Answered the Novation Question

THE 592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY&INTEGRITY JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

ANALYSIS


Court Denies VAMED’s Injunctions, But Guyana Still Hasn’t Answered the Novation Question


The High Court’s Thursday ruling in the VAMED Engineering dispute is being read by some as vindication for the contractor. It is not. A closer look at what Justice Renita Singh actually ordered — and what the Government still refuses to say — tells a different story


On Thursday, Justice Renita Singh of the High Court delivered a ruling in the dispute between the Ministry of Health and VAMED Engineering GmbH that has already been mischaracterized in parts of the public conversation as a setback for the Government. The record says otherwise. Justice Singh denied VAMED’s application for conservatory orders that would have restrained the Ministry from taking possession of or occupying the Guyana Pediatric and Maternal Hospital (GMPH) site at Ogle and the New Amsterdam Hospital Campus, from expelling VAMED’s personnel or subcontractors, and from enforcing a EUR14.9 million performance bond.

VAMED’s fallback request — that conservatory relief remain in force pending an expedited inter partes hearing or the constitution of a Dispute Adjudication Board or Arbitral Tribunal under clause 21 of the contracts — was refused as well. The court found that VAMED had not demonstrated the urgency required for interim relief.

What Justice Singh did order was narrower and more balanced than VAMED’s public statement suggested. Both parties — not VAMED alone — were directed to preserve the fifty-two containers of equipment on the GMPH site, without opening or interfering with them. Only VAMED’s own security personnel may access the site, and only for the sole purpose of securing those containers.

The Ministry was separately ordered to preserve all contractor documents, property designs, plans, and intellectual property. By consent of Attorney General Anil Nandlall and VAMED’s counsel Nigel Hughes, the site crane is to be returned to VAMED. Critically, these preservation orders expire the moment an Arbitration Tribunal is appointed. This is a holding measure, not a judgment on the merits of either party’s claim.

THE NUMBERS BEHIND THE CLAIM

VAMED’s arbitration claim, filed as a statement of claim on July 27, 2026, seeks approximately EUR45.53 million. Of that figure, only EUR19.15 million is described as certified payments already approved for work completed. The balance is composed of variations, indexation, additional works, and other contractual entitlements — categories that are, by their nature, contested rather than settled. The Government’s own supervising engineer has separately estimated Guyana’s indebtedness to VAMED at approximately EUR37.94 million, a figure that sits meaningfully below VAMED’s claim and suggests the two sides disagree less about whether money is owed than about how much, and for what.

The underlying contracts are now a matter of public record: a EUR149 million Design-and-Build agreement dated June 8, 2022, for the GMPH facility at Ogle, and a EUR150 million agreement dated July 12, 2023, for the New Amsterdam Hospital Campus in Region Six — together, EUR299 million in public commitment for two hospitals that remain unfinished more than four years after the first contract was signed.

On completion, the two sides are not close to agreement. VAMED maintains that GMPH is 67 percent complete. A Government official, speaking to Demerara Waves, put the figure closer to 50 percent, and added a detail that will matter before an arbitral tribunal: that VAMED has not shipped or installed any biomedical equipment at a facility now a year past its original deadline, and that all subcontractors on the project have been released. If accurate, this is not a minor discrepancy.

A gap of that size between the contractor’s own completion claim and the Government’s — on a project already the subject of a multimillion-euro payment dispute — is exactly the kind of fact an arbitral tribunal exists to resolve, and this newsroom takes no position on which figure is correct.

WHAT THE GOVERNMENT’S REBUTTAL SAYS — AND DOES NOT SAY

The Ministry of Health has rejected VAMED’s public account as a “misleading narrative” that omits the contractor’s own performance failures. In its fuller statement, the Government maintains it has remained committed to completing both hospitals given their strategic importance, that it acted in good faith throughout, and that payments under a Design-and-Build contract are properly tied to measured, approved works rather than to the passage of time alone. It states that the Notices of Intention to Terminate, issued on June 2, 2026, followed extensive contractual correspondence over many months documenting delays, missed milestones, and inadequate mobilisation of resources — and that VAMED was given numerous opportunities to remedy these deficiencies before the Ministry exercised its contractual rights.

This is a more procedurally careful defense than the Government’s initial public posture suggested, and it deserves to be weighed on its own terms rather than dismissed. If the documented correspondence trail the Ministry describes holds up before an ICC tribunal, it materially strengthens the Government’s position on the question of who breached first.

But a defense built carefully on milestones and mobilization is conspicuous for what it leaves out. This news outlet asked, in February, whether a Deed of Novation had been executed transferring the Ogle and New Amsterdam contracts from VAMED Engineering to the successor entity now marketing itself in Guyana as VAMED+WWH, following the April 1, 2025 sale of VAMED’s international project business to the WWH Group — a sale VAMED’s own corporate website confirms took place.

We asked whether Performance Bonds and Advance Payment Bonds had been re-issued in the successor’s name, and whether UK Export Finance and Sweden’s export credit agency had authorized any transfer of the financing facilities underwriting these projects. Five months, a Ministerial statement to the National Assembly, an ICC arbitration filing, and two rounds of detailed public rebuttal later, none of those questions has been answered. Not confirmed. Not denied. Simply absent, in a rebuttal otherwise willing to engage on nearly every other point of contention.

A government capable of a paragraph-by-paragraph defense on contractual performance is not a government that forgot to mention novation. The silence is a choice, and it is the same choice that has now persisted across a change of government minister’s statement, an arbitration filing, a High Court hearing, and a written press rebuttal.

Whether that silence reflects an unresolved legal status the Government does not wish to admit to, or simply institutional carelessness about the corporate mechanics underlying a EUR299 million commitment of public and export-credit money, the public still does not know, in law, who the Government’s counterparty actually is.

WHERE THIS LEAVES THE PUBLIC

Thursday’s ruling should not be read as either side’s win. VAMED sought real, substantive protection from the court and was refused on every count save the narrowest possible preservation of disputed property — property whose ownership Justice Singh herself described as being in dispute. The Government avoided a more damaging injunction but has not yet had to answer, under oath or under parliamentary questioning, the single question this publication first raised in February: does a Deed of Novation exist.

Both parties will have their opportunity to present evidence on payment and performance before an ICC tribunal, and that process should be allowed to run its course. But the novation question does not require an arbitral tribunal to answer. It requires a government prepared to name the office responsible for tracking corporate ownership changes on a state infrastructure project financed substantially by sovereign export-credit borrowing, and to put a Deed of Novation — or its absence — on the record. Five months of silence on a question this simple is not an oversight. It is a pattern.

This publication takes no position on which party’s account of performance or payment is accurate; that determination belongs to the ICC tribunal. Figures cited above are drawn from Justice Singh’s ruling, court reporting, VAMED Engineering’s public statements, the Ministry of Health’s public rebuttal, and VAMED’s own corporate disclosures.

Politics Grows Up When Someone Actually Does the Reading

THE 592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY&INTEGRITY JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

 Politics Grows Up When Someone Actually Does the Reading


A Response to “Guyana Deserves Better Politics: Beyond the Noise, the Likes and the Political Circus”


By The Board♦ August, 2026

A Guyana Chronicle  commentary is circulating this week under the Crossfire column — instructing Guyana’s political opposition to stop chasing likes, start reading the Budget documents, dissect the supplementary financial papers, and study the Commission of Inquiry into the MV Barima disaster instead of holding placards.

The advice is not wrong. It is simply describing, almost word for word, the work that has already been done — not by WIN, not by APNU, and not by the author of that piece.

It has been done by this newsroom.

The column asks for exactly the kind of scrutiny it never once demonstrates.

 

WHAT “STUDYING THE COI” ACTUALLY LOOKS LIKE

The piece urges the opposition to “study the COI, the MARAD findings and processes, the regulatory framework… the procurement and maintenance history of the maritime fleet.”

Fair enough. Here is what that study has already surfaced, on the public record, weeks before this editorial’s publication date.

The Commission’s own attorney-commissioner, Nyree Dawn Alfonso, has a documented prior professional association — through her own firm’s case record — with a lawyer who is now a sitting Cabinet minister.

The CoI’s Secretary is the nephew of a former senior PPP official.

The government’s own “Safety and Compliance Audit Team,” announced days after the tragedy, includes an official who has spent years as a paid MARAD consultant reviewing the very agency he was appointed to audit.

MARAD itself disclosed back in 2022 — after an earlier fatal incident — that it had six certified marine surveyors for more than two thousand vessels, and was still advertising an unfilled surveyor vacancy months before the Barima went down.

A retired U.S. Navy officer’s legal analysis of the Shipping Act has identified a regulatory loophole — the “24-Metre Gap” — that left a vessel the size of the Barima with fewer statutory safety obligations than a small wooden boat.

None of that came from a press release. It came from reading the documents — case records, CVs, gazette notices, procurement histories — the same documents the commentary insists nobody in Guyana’s political class is willing to open.

THE CONTRACTOR NOBODY ASKED ABOUT

Then there is the salvage contractor. The government quietly invited a Dutch firm to recover the wreck before any public bidding process opened — the same wreck that is itself physical evidence in an active inquiry into 73 deaths.                                                                                    That firm’s owner has a 2019 Interpol arrest record out of Nigeria, a Dutch Supreme Court finding of deliberate tax abuse tied to his corporate group, and an unrelated trademark dispute with BMW over salvaged vehicles. A commentary genuinely concerned with “procurement, expenditure, and national priorities” might have found that detail more useful than a paragraph about Facebook likes.

READINESS IS NOT AN OCCASION

The column singles out the Barima tragedy as proof the opposition should trade placards for policy substance — while ignoring that the same government it defends mobilized the GDF Coast Guard, the Police Marine Unit, and joint services within minutes to secure a Vice President facing a political protest at Watooka House, on a day and location the government itself had scheduled.

The Barima’s distress call, by the documented and still-uncorrected public timeline, went unanswered by a rescue vessel for roughly seven hours.

That is not a question of noise versus substance. It is a question of where the state’s readiness goes when the emergency isn’t the Vice President’s afternoon.

WHOSE POLITICS IS ACTUALLY IMMATURE

The piece frames its critique as concern for Guyana’s democratic maturity at 60 — disagreement without destruction, policy over personality, parliament over performance. Those are reasonable standards. They would be more persuasive from a byline willing to attach a name to them, and from an outlet willing to apply the same standard of documentary rigor to the government it consistently declines to scrutinize as it applies, in the abstract, to an opposition it has already decided is unserious.

Demanding a minister’s recusal on a documented conflict of interest is not “political thuggery.” It is the plain application of the same accountability standard the commentary claims to want.

♦ Asking why a legally compromised contractor was handed a no-bid mandate over evidence in a fatal-disaster inquiry is not chasing likes.       ♦ Asking why a rapid-response apparatus exists for a Vice President’s protest but not for seventy-three passengers taking on water is not political theatre.

It is the Budget-document, contract-reading, institution-strengthening work the column claims to be pleading for — already published, already on the record, and conspicuously absent from the piece’s own account of what “serious politics” requires of the government it does not name.

Guyana does not need a lecture on political maturity from a piece that cannot bring itself to look at the ministry it is defending as closely as it looks at the opposition it is scolding.

If growing up means reading the documents, strengthening the institutions, and following the money — this newsroom will keep doing exactly that. The invitation to join us remains open.

— The Board

Seats, Not Substance

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY&INTEGRITY JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

Seats, Not Substance


EDITORIAL BY: Staff Writer— August 2026

A question about oil revenue, a dismissive reply, and what both reveal about how power is actually exercised in Guyana

 A SIMPLE question travelled across social media this week: how much money is Guyana actually making from its oil industry? It was posed by Azruddin Mohamed, Leader of the Opposition, whose own legal and political circumstances remain, by any measure, unsettled and contested. But the question does not belong to the man who asked it. It belongs to every Guyanese citizen with a stake in how the nation’s resource wealth is accounted for and disbursed.

This Board has not been shy about the questions surrounding Mr. Mohamed’s own conduct, nor about the criminal allegations he faces — allegations that, notably, implicate the same governing apparatus he now positions himself against. Those matters are serious and remain before the appropriate authorities. They do not, however, disqualify a straightforward question of public accountability from deserving a straightforward answer.

THE REPLY THAT MATTERED MORE THAN THE QUESTION

What has struck this Board is not the question itself, but the character of the response it drew. Among the replies, one — from a commenter identified as Andy Rampersaud — dispensed with the substance entirely:

“This man don’t understand he don’t have no power in parliament, he don’t have enough seats.”

Andy Rampersaud, in a social media comment

Set aside, for a moment, who said it and about whom. Read as a statement of political principle, it is one of the more revealing sentences to circulate in Guyanese public discourse this year.         It does not dispute the question. It does not defend the government’s record on oil revenue transparency. It simply asserts that a question from a numerically weak opposition need not be answered at all — that legitimacy in Guyanese politics flows from seat count, not from the substance of what is asked or the public’s right to know it.

That is, in a sentence, the operating logic this Board has warned consistently against  under a different name: governance by arithmetic. A majority in the National Assembly is treated not as a mandate to govern accountably, but as a release from the obligation to answer at all.

Opposition, on this logic, is not a check on power — it is a formality to be tolerated until the numbers change.

AN UNCOMFORTABLE MIRROR

It is worth asking, in this Board’s view, why this dynamic feels newly visible now. For years, an opposition built substantially around PNC support was met with a similar dismissiveness — one this Board suspects was never only about seat count, but also about which Guyanese communities that party has historically represented. Questions raised by that opposition were, too often, treated as tribal noise rather than legitimate scrutiny.

Mr. Mohamed’s rise complicates that old pattern, whatever one makes of the man. His base draws support across communities that have not traditionally rallied behind the PNC, which makes Rampersaud’s dismissal harder to read as simple ethnic reflex — and forces a more uncomfortable question into view: was the dismissiveness ever really about ethnicity at all, or was ethnicity merely the language available to describe a deeper contempt for opposition as such?

This Board offers that reading cautiously, as interpretation rather than settled fact — voter motivation is not something any commentator can verify from a comment thread. But the pattern is suggestive enough to name: if a minority-coded opposition and a numerically-weak but multi-ethnic opposition draw the same reflexive dismissal, the common denominator may not be ethnicity. 

It may simply be an entrenched belief that opposition, of any composition, has no standing to demand answers.

THE DEMAND THIS MOMENT INVITES

Guyanese citizens do not need to resolve their views on Azruddin Mohamed the man to insist on an answer to the question he raised. Nor should they need to wait for the next election cycle to demand that a governing majority account for the nation’s oil revenue in specific, auditable terms.

A parliamentary majority is a mandate to govern. It has never been, and must never be treated as, an exemption from having to explain.

The real challenge this moment poses is not to any one politician. It is to every Guyanese who has assumed that dismissing an opposition voice was simply the way politics works here — and to ask, plainly, whether that assumption has ever served the public interest, or only ever served the comfort of whoever currently holds the seats. — The Board

A Court Divided Against Itself

THE 592 GUARDIAN•ACCOUNTABILITY•INTEGRITY JOURNALISM

ACCOUNTABILITY WATCH · REGIONAL JUDICIARY

A Court


Five of six CCJ judges accuse President Justice Winston Anderson of “dictatorial” rule and interference in case outcomes — and Guyana has more riding on this court than almost any other member state

THE 592 GUARDIAN  |  EDITORIAL BOARD  |  AUGUST,2026

THE Caribbean Court of Justice was built to be the region’s answer to a colonial anxiety: that Caribbean people should no longer have to sail their final appeals to London to receive justice. It was, in its founding promise, a court by the region, for the region — accountable to no imperial crown, answerable instead to the collective integrity of its own bench. That promise is now the subject of an internal reckoning its architects surely never anticipated.

Internal correspondence obtained and published by the Trinidad Express’s Sunday edition shows that five of the CCJ’s six sitting judges have formally challenged the leadership of its president, Justice Winston Anderson, accusing him of governing in a manner one judge bluntly called “dictatorial.”

The allegations are not about robes or bench jackets, whatever the paper trail’s origin point. They go to the marrow of judicial independence: panel composition, pressure on colleagues to align with predetermined outcomes, and a president who, by his own reported admission, told his colleagues early in his tenure that he did not see himself as “running a democracy.”

WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS

The dispute surfaced publicly through a dispute over a proposed judicial dress code — an administrative matter that, under ordinary governance, would merit little more than a committee memo. Instead, it became the occasion for judges to air grievances that had evidently been accumulating for months.

I have never seen before the level of dictatorship in the administration of a judiciary that I have witnessed at the CCJ in recent months.Justice Chile Eboe-Osuji, in correspondence to fellow CCJ judges

Justice Peter Jamadar of Trinidad and Tobago went further, alleging in a detailed e-mail that he had experienced “an attempt to influence the opinions of colleagues that differed from yours in an authoritative manner” in relation to the Mohamed vs. MOHA, AG, and Magistrate extradition matter — a case with direct Guyanese relevance, given that the applicants in the underlying dispute are Guyanese nationals. Jamadar also cited concerns about “unreasonable timelines” imposed on judges reviewing a consolidated draft decision in the Jeremy Enriquez and Anand Ramlogan matter.

Justice Eboe-Osuji’s account of Barrow v. Caricom is, if anything, more serious still: he alleges that Anderson attempted, without prior consultation, to “single-handedly override judicial independence and long-standing CCJ conventions that guided how decisions are rendered when judges disagreed” — and that in the Mohamed matter, Anderson informed colleagues he intended to announce the court’s decision at a time and in a manner a “clear majority” had told him was inappropriate.

Justice Arif Bulkan — the CCJ’s Guyana-born judge — was among those who pressed for proper internal consultation before any policy went to the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission, and separately raised concerns about how a rigid dress code might disadvantage religious minorities on the bench. Justice Maureen Rajnauth-Lee invoked the lengthy, consultative process used under Anderson’s predecessor, Justice Adrian Saunders, as the standard against which the current president’s conduct should be measured — and found it wanting.

WHY THIS IS GUYANA’S FIGHT TOO

It would be a mistake for Guyanese readers to treat this as a Trinidad-datelined curiosity, distant from home. Guyana is not a peripheral member of the CCJ system — it is one of the court’s most exposed constituents.

Guyana accesses the CCJ in both of its jurisdictions. As a signatory to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, Guyana falls under the court’s Original Jurisdiction as a matter of treaty obligation — non-optional, structural. And Guyana is one of only five CARICOM states (alongside Barbados, Belize, Dominica, and Saint Lucia) that has gone further, replacing the London-based Privy Council with the CCJ as its final court of Appellate Jurisdiction.

When Guyanese litigants exhaust their domestic appeals in constitutional matters, in criminal appeals, in commercial disputes — the CCJ is the last word. There is no jurisdiction above it to correct an error, and no further right of appeal if the court’s internal processes have been compromised.

That is precisely why Justice Jamadar’s warning deserves to be read in full by every Guyanese lawyer, judge, and civil society actor who has ever placed faith in this court: he described the risk as extending to “both our OJ and AJ jurisdictions, with implications for the jurisdictions that access this court for the delivery of justice services.”

That is not diplomatic language. That is a sitting judge, in writing, telling his colleagues that the confidence of an entire region’s justice-seeking public may be at stake.

The Mohamed extradition matter cited in Jamadar’s e-mail is not an abstraction for Guyana. It involves a Guyanese Leader of the Opposition and his father, contesting the validity of an Authority to Proceed — a case the CCJ dismissed on appeal on July 29, 2026.

If a judge with direct knowledge of that matter’s internal handling is on record alleging attempted interference in its outcome, Guyanese citizens are entitled to know whether the process that produced that judgment was sound, regardless of one’s view of the underlying merits.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY THE REGION IS OWED

What is notable — and to the credit of the five judges who signed their names to these concerns — is that this dissent did not stay silent for fear of institutional embarrassment.

Justice Eboe-Osuji explicitly called for the matter to be resolved internally “before things get out of hand,” before it became public.    It became public anyway, and the public is better for it.

The CCJ was conceived as a repudiation of unaccountable, distant authority. A regional court that cannot hold its own presidency accountable to the collegiate norms its judges swore to uphold does not escape that colonial anxiety — it reproduces it in a new form, homegrown and unexamined.

Guyana’s political class, its bar, and its civil society have a direct stake in demanding that the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission treat this matter with the seriousness it demands, transparently, and not as an internal personnel matter to be quietly managed.

This publication will continue to track this story and its implications for Guyanese litigants and for the region’s confidence in its own apex court.

The full internal correspondence, as obtained and published by the Trinidad Express (CCN Group), is available via the link accompanying this piece.— READ MORE:

https://1drv.ms/b/c/86ce3366cc1a852b/IQAHMCOQTsyfTI8Ibb6NNCliAZ_6LWfPy7WEq8WNHUkaCpo

— The Board

Exxon•Guyana Profit Sharing Pennywise-Pt III

 THE 592 GUARDIAN ACCOUNTABILITY INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM

Exxon•Guyana Profit Sharing Pennywise-PtIII


OPINION BY: GHK LALL– August 2026

The Exxon juggernaut rolled, had a great second quarter 2026.  Guyana had a hand in the company’s numbers, with its teeny-weeny 900,000 barrels a day.  The big news from this side of the Americas is that Exxon has been repaid to the penny its US$55 billion investment

Thanks for the jumpstart, all those projects humming, all those barrels churning out day after day.  Soon, Guyana will be in that exclusive club: a million barrel a day oil producer.  But at what a cost!  What has been straight with Exxon and this PPP Govt?  What can be trusted when no one can speak straight, give that sense of comfort, because their words ring of reliability?  It is against this backdrop that I offer a stripped-down version of what 50:50 profit sharing could look like.  To put my money where my mouth is, this is where I stand.

Please give a look at this barebones scenario in which I use one barrel of oil.  For purposes of conversation, the price is US$100 a barrel.  From production of one barrel of oil there’s revenue of US$100.  Gross revenue it is called.  I warn that from here on the wicket gets sticky.  There is that beast-an 800-pound gorilla-in the room and at the head of the table.  It is what’s called OPERATING EXPENSES

Given Guyana’s history in the last six years with oil, with Exxon’s accounting, my expectations are low.  By such time that Exxon’s world-class number crunchers are done with Operating Expenses, US$100 is not US$100.  It is not US$90 nor US$80 nor US$70.  I stake my ground, draw my line.  Guyana will be lucky if it ends up with Gross Oil Revenue of US$100 minus Operating Expenses at US$65.  I see it as being more at around US$60 in Net Oil Revenue. 

This is the magic, mystery, and monstrosity of Operating Expenses.  I pause for a moment.

Recall I’m dealing the hand that Exxon itself has displayed to this country.  Strange postures.  Evasive language.  Shadowy numbers.  Recall a maagah US$214 million in audit findings and those two glaring developments associated with it.  By some mysterious hand, US$214 million fell to US$3 million overnight.  Second, that relatively small amount of US$214 million (for Exxon) has been held up for several years now.  No comment from me on this.  I don’t have to say one word, since both the US$214 million and years speak for themselves. 

Now let this be said: I think that Exxon may think nothing of taking care of bumps in its way whenever money is involved.  Even when the amount of money is minute.  Now think of what to expect when billions are in play.  When Operating Expenses mutate into a monster that is turned into a weapon against Guyana’s interests.

Having said very clearly where I am, and how I envision 50:50 profit sharing will materialize, I return to Net Oil Revenue now standing at US$60.  It has to be divided in two.  Exxon gets US$30 and Guyana collects US$30.  The Guyana Government gets an opportunity to expound on the Exxon relationship and the trusted partnership. 

The Guyanese people should be happy.  All’s well that ends well.  Not so fast, folks.  There is that lovely consideration that is not going away, and which no Guyanese should forget.  Who pays Exxon’s taxes?  Guyana does. 

However that is schemed, whatever the form it takes, no matter how spun or swung, this is set in stone: Guyana pays Exxon’s taxes.  Or to put it better still: Exxon does not pay a dime of the taxes that it incurred.  Immediately this could be seen for the imbalances that are embedded.

Exxon has Guyana over a barrel (no pun) with Operating Expenses.  Then, Guyana is under the gun with the taxes and that farce about tax certificates.  Conclusion: In my single barrel presentation, this much should be obvious: Guyana’s US$30 (half cut) and Exxon’s US$30 (whatever that percentage) are not the same

It shouldn’t surprise, therefore, that the 50:50 profit sharing language of Exxon is so studiously, so painfully, careful.  Think of what’s afoot.— The 592 Guardian

Soundproof Walls, Silent Ledger

592 GUARDIAN♦ ACCOUNTABILITY INTEGRITY JOURNALISM ♦GUYANA

Soundproof Walls, Silent Ledger


 EDITORIAL BY: Staff Writer

 How a Bank That Does Not Yet Exist Found Its First Client


 August, 2026

At Rose Hall on Saturday, President Irfaan Ali told Region Six residents that the government’s answer to noise complaints from bars and nightclubs is not enforcement. It is a loan.

Establishment owners, he said, should look to the Guyana Development Bank to finance soundproof enclosures, so that patrons who “want to hear the noise hard” can go inside while the neighbourhood is spared. It was offered as a small, practical fix to the top complaint raised at community consultations.                It is worth examining what else was on offer, and what was not.

A BANK LENDING BEFORE IT OPENS

The Guyana Development Bank Act 2026 passed the National Assembly on July 27 without opposition participation in the debate, MPs having withdrawn from the chamber over the MV Barima matter.

 

President Ali assented to the Act on July 30. Two weeks from now, a delegation led by Senior Finance Minister Dr Ashni Singh, Agriculture Minister Zulfikar Mustapha and Government Efficiency and Implementation Minister Zulfikar Ally is scheduled to return to Region Six to formally launch the bank.

That launch has not happened. There is no application process. No portal. No published lending criteria, no disclosed underwriting standard, no office where a Region Six business owner could walk in and ask a question.

 

The bank exists, at this writing, as a statute and a promise of up to $3 million in collateral-free, interest-free financing to small and medium enterprises. Yet the first specific lending purpose President Ali has attached to it, in his own words to residents, is bar and nightclub soundproofing.

Before this institution has disbursed a single dollar, its inaugural publicised use case has already been named for it by the Head of State, at a podium, ahead of its own opening.

WHAT SOUNDPROOFING DOES NOT TOUCH

Noise is the complaint residents are permitted to raise, and evidently the one the government is most comfortable answering, because it has a hardware solution. Foam panels and enclosed walls are a contractor’s job. The harder facts sitting alongside the noise are not.

Guyana’s own public health data describes a population with one of the earliest ages of first alcohol use in the Caribbean, and a share of heavy drinkers with diagnosable alcohol-use disorder. The 2019 Guyana Women’s Health and Life Experiences Survey found that 55 percent of Guyanese women have experienced some form of violence in their lifetime, and United Nations estimates place Guyana’s femicide rate as the highest per capita in the region. None of this is unique to licensed premises, but the global and regional literature linking alcohol venues to intimate partner and gender-based violence is not in dispute, and nightlife establishments are consistently identified within it as elevated-risk sites, not neutral ones.

“The first lending purpose named for this bank was not a farm, a shop, or a young entrepreneur’s idea. It was a nightclub wall.”

Then there is the matter the U.S. State Department has documented in successive Trafficking in Persons reports on Guyana. The 2024 and 2025 reports both record that traffickers have used social media to recruit workers for jobs including wait staff in bars and hotels, and that non-governmental organisations report traffickers are often middle-aged men who own or operate nightclubs.

The government’s own investigative caseload grew from 28 cases involving 25 suspects in 2022 to 77 cases involving ten named suspects in 2024. As recently as May of this year, two Cuban nationals were remanded by a Georgetown magistrate over an alleged trafficking operation in which a woman’s passport was confiscated on arrival, a debt of US$5,400 was imposed along with US$300 in monthly rent, and she was, according to the prosecution, forced into commercial sex work at a named city nightclub.

That case is active in the courts as this editorial goes to publication.

Set against that record, the government’s own posture toward bars has not always been to subsidise them. In 2018, a raid on a Georgetown strip club was framed publicly by the then Minister of Public Security as part of a deliberate campaign against trafficking and prostitution tied to such establishments, with liquor licence revocation floated as the enforcement tool of choice.

Whatever one makes of that episode, it establishes that Guyanese governments have, within recent memory, treated bars and nightclubs as sites requiring scrutiny — not sites qualifying for concessional state financing.

THE QUESTION ROSE HALL WAS NOT ASKED

None of this means every bar in Guyana is a trafficking front, and this editorial does not allege that any specific establishment named in the President’s remarks is implicated in any of the cases cited above. The point is narrower and, we think, harder to wave away: a public development bank is a finite pool of concessional capital, and every dollar of it directed at acoustic panelling is a dollar not directed at due diligence, at labour inspection capacity, at the enforcement infrastructure that the government’s own Trafficking in Persons cooperation with Washington says is still needed.

The soundproofing proposal was offered at Rose Hall as a response to a resident complaint about noise. It was not offered alongside any parallel announcement of stronger licensing checks, staff welfare verification, or trafficking screening for the same premises now being invited to apply for financing.

We do not know, because it has not been disclosed, whether the Development Bank intends any due-diligence screen at all for applicants in this sector — something more than the standard SME underwriting that would apply to a farm-supply shop or a hairdressing salon.

We do not know whether the ministries touring the country this month have discussed, internally, the same TIP-report findings cited here.

We do know that the bank’s very first publicly named lending purpose, delivered by the President himself before the institution has opened its doors, was not a young entrepreneur’s idea, nor a woman-owned enterprise of the kind Dr Ali has repeatedly said the bank exists to support. It was a nightclub wall.

WHAT WE ARE ASKING

The 592 Guardian is submitting formal queries to the Office of the President and to the Guyana Development Bank’s transitional secretariat requesting:

(1) whether any due-diligence, licensing, or labour-welfare screening criteria specific to bars, nightclubs and entertainment venues have been developed for Development Bank applicants in this sector

(2) whether the Ministry of Human Services and Social Security or the Guyana Police Force’s anti-trafficking unit were consulted on the soundproofing proposal prior to its public announcement; and

(3) what mechanism, if any, will prevent Development Bank financing from reaching an establishment under active investigation or prosecution for trafficking-linked offences.

We will publish any response in full.

— The Board

Exxon-Guyana profit sharing: the dollars

THE 592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY&INTEGRITY JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

Exxon-Guyana profit sharing: the dollars


OPINON BY: GHK LALL—AUGUST, 2026

The issue is more moolah, some more dinero, for Guyana.  A straight up, fair shuffle, 50:50 profit cut of 100 percent oil revenues minus 2 percent royalty and operating expenses.  Just when Guyanese started to feel good about themselves, started drooling about extra oil money and having a party, I must be the bad guy and bruk up de party.

I brace for more than La Nina.  I’m bracing for a Texas drought, followed by a Texas blackout.  Talk Texas.  Think Exxon.  These guys didn’t get to the top of the oil world by being cowpokes.  They may sound sweeter than Jimmy Stewart. 

Whoever is smart in Guyana had better take my advice:

They are deadlier than a rattler in the bed; and Freddy Krueger under it.  From here, it gets nastier.

Exxon had a good second quarter for 2026.  Remember the date: July 31, 2026.  It will rate in Exxon lore as one of its better days in recent years.  Now Guyanese, remember this: July 31, 2026 represented something else: the first glimpses of yet another lurking Guyana tragedy.  For Exxon, it was:

US$14.5 billion in earnings

US$23.6 billion operating cash flow

US$17 billion plus in Free Cash Flow

Great news for Exxon.  With the following two small throwaway bones for Guyana:

900,000 daily production barrels

FPSO #Five projected to add 250k barrels

Amidst big, beautiful numbers for Exxon, that was the recognition for Guyana.  Chief Darren Woods gave himself a fat pat on the shoulder: Exxon broke a record in recouping its investment in Guyana so early. Another big raise pending.   However, not one goddamn word (or number) from Super Chief Woods about when Guyana gets closer to the much-vaunted 50:50 profit sharing from 100 percent net oil revenues.  The cost bank is empty.  Hence, it follows automatically that the profit-sharing formula changes from:

(100-75-2)/2 to:

(100–2)/2  (Net oil revenues divided by two)

When it was Moneyman Neil Hansen’s turn to share good cheer on July31st, he went overboard. He converted to his best imitation of a Talmudic scholar.  Smooth and sophisticated.  Profound as a Renaissance Man.  He threw in the oil deal.  He noted operating costs.  He went from the general to the specific, after first going all over the world. 

I do Mr. Hansen a favor, add to his luster: behold another Bharrat Jagdeo disciple.  Money-boss Hansen went around in circles, without moving his feet.  And even when he did get around to admitting it, his energy level was alarmingly low. 

Guyana should be in line for a 50:50 profit share.  Profit share of what, Mr. Hansen, that’s the million-dollar question I table?  Specifically, of what is left from the money— revenue when Exxon is done with it?  Answer it, please.  Thanks to Mr. Hansen, Guyanese have a clue of where the wind blows.

According to Mr. Hansen, Exxon’s share of oil in the Stabroek Block will decline.  Like hell, it will.  Exxon will not allow that to happen.  Seven projects already approved.  Projects eight and nine have been cleverly sprayed by Exxon into Guyana’s air (and Guyanese ears)

Listen for 10 and 11.  Money.  Money.  Money.  As in billions of US dollars.  As in the Guyana cost bank reborn and owned by Guyana.  

Meanwhile, when Guyanese pressed their most trusted partner on when their fair and full 50:50 profit share begins, that’s when Mr. Alistair Routledge donned his mask, fastened his earplugs, and disappeared.  He spoke cagily.  Was denser than the Dead Sea; both sea and scrolls.  The man who spoke brightly about Exxon’s world-class accounting systems is suddenly talking an altogether different language. 

World-class, too, I assure everyone.  ‘Next year.  Prices.  Acceleration.  Significantly increase.  What do those mean?

Finally, I arrive at Dr. Bharrat Jagdeo.  For six years he danced with Exxon on all oil issues.  Now, he has a problem.  He ran out of dancefloor.  Equal profit share, remember that, doc?  No answer.  Explanation A: Dr. Jagdeo is now practicing medicine.  He lost interest in oil.  In part three, how all of this is shaping up.

THE BARRICADE IS THE MESSAGE

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THE BARRICADE IS THE MESSAGE

What “Consultation” Actually Means to This Government


BOARD EDITORIAL— The Board · August, 2026

Walston Martins did everything right. He is the elected Chairman of the Buxton/Foulis Neighbourhood Democratic Council. He received an invitation to the government’s Model Village Initiative consultation at Melanie Damishana. He showed up.

He was pushed behind a police barricade and told he would be arrested if he did not comply — in his own jurisdiction, for the offence of standing where he was invited to stand.

By Martins’s account, the sequence began when police ordered a group of young women waiting nearby to leave the area outside a business opposite the venue. When Martins asked why, Assistant Commissioner of Police Mahendra Siwnarine allegedly told him to move behind the barricade or be arrested.

Martins refused on principle — he said he had broken no law and was standing within the territory his own council governs. The warning was repeated. He was, by his own account, effectively forced out.

This is one man’s account, on the record, and Martins says he intends to pursue the matter further. The 592 Guardian treats it as an attributed allegation, not yet an adjudicated fact. But it does not stand alone. It is the latest entry in a pattern this news media has been documenting for two weeks, and taken together, that pattern tells you something the government has not said out loud: these “consultations” were never built to hear from the public. They were built to be seen.

A WEEK OF BARRICADES

Consider what else happened in the same seven-day span.

On August 4, Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo held an outreach at Watooka House in Linden. Residents waited thirty minutes for a promised meeting that never happened. When opposition supporters and Region 10 residents pressed forward, barricades gave way. A six-hour standoff followed. The Vice President left under security escort without addressing the crowd he had promised to meet.

On the very next day August 5, in Koberimo village, Barima-Waini, Minister Juan Edghill’s own stop on the Region One outreach tour was met by a handful of mostly women holding placards — and a heavy police presence in flak jackets. Not a security detail sized to the moment. A show of force sized to deter it. Sending Edghill, one of the two ministers residents are demanding resign over the Barima disaster, into the region that lost the most people to that disaster, and greeting the women who came to meet him with body armour, is not caution.

It is a message about who the state expects trouble from — and it is not the minister.

On that same day, a Coast Guard patrol intercepted a speedboat carrying Opposition Leader Azruddin Mohamed near the Pomeroon Floating Base, bound for a peaceful protest in Moruca — inside the very region Edghill and Indar were touring. The government’s account calls it a routine documentation check. Mohamed’s account says the same vessel had passed the same checkpoint that same morning without incident, and that the demand for paperwork came only after a soldier took an interest in who was aboard.

He was turned back before he reached Moruca at all. On August 6, Walston Martins was barricaded out of a meeting he was invited to attend.

When the public shows up uninvited — or shows up invited but inconvenient — the state’s answer is flak jackets and a line of officers, not a conversation.

Four incidents in three days. Three different arms of the security apparatus — regular police, joint services, Coast Guard. Four different targets — a group of placard-holding women in a Region One village, an opposition leader headed to a protest, a crowd of Region 10 residents, a sitting NDC chairman.

One thread runs through all of them: when the public shows up uninvited, or shows up invited but inconvenient, the state’s answer is flak jackets and a line of officers, not a conversation.

THE ROADSHOW WAS NEVER ABOUT LISTENING

This newsroom has argued from the first day of the Model Village tour that its structure gives away its purpose. Daytime, weekday-only sessions that working people cannot attend. No online alternative, despite one being trivially available and far more inclusive than a bus tour through six regions. Local NDC governance structures that are, by the government’s own inaction, too broken in many communities to meaningfully receive village-level input in the first place.

Add now a fourth feature: security postures that treat elected local officials, protesting citizens, and even a handful of women with placards as threats to be contained rather than constituents to be heard.      Assistant Commissioner Siwnarine did not simply ask Martins to step back for crowd management. He is alleged to have threatened arrest against a sitting NDC Chairman who had done nothing unlawful, in the area his own council governs — while opposition supporters demonstrated outside.

In Koberimo, the flak jackets arrived before the trouble did, because in this government’s arithmetic, showing up with a placard is treated as the trouble.

You do not barricade the people you are consulting. You barricade the people you are performing for an audience without.

WHAT THE THEATRE IS COVERING FOR

Strip away the outreach branding and ask what these events are actually accomplishing. A predetermined infrastructure plan gets a photograph of a minister among residents. A government under sustained pressure over the MV Barima disaster — the unanswered questions about Commission of Inquiry appointees with undisclosed professional ties, the silenced witnesses, the six-month statutory clock now running against victims’ families — gets a news cycle about roads and recreation grounds instead.

An administration facing a second consecutive week of youth-led silent protest outside the Office of the President gets to point to a roadshow as evidence it is “people centered,” even as its own security forces make that phrase harder to say with a straight face by the day.

None of this requires believing in a grand unified conspiracy. It requires only noticing that every barricade this week has fallen on the same side: between the government and the people it says it is going out to meet.

WHAT WE’RE ASKING

The 592 Guardian renews, plainly, the questions this pattern demands answers to:

Why was an invited, elected local official prevented from attending a consultation in his own jurisdiction?

On whose instruction did Assistant Commissioner Siwnarine act?

Was the threat of arrest authorized, or improvised in the moment?

And if the Model Village Initiative is genuinely a listening exercise, why does listening keep requiring a barricade?

Martins says he is pursuing this further. We will be watching what “further” produces — and whether the government answers the question directly, or simply moves the roadshow to its next stop and waits for the story to move with it.

— The Board

 

Twenty Five Villages in a Week

THE 592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY&INTEGRITY JOURNALISM♦ GUYANA

TWENTY FIVE  Villages in a Week


Why the Model Village Tour Predates the Tragedy It Is Accused of Deflecting

August, 2026

Since the MV Barima tragedy, a comfortable theory has taken hold across sections of Guyana’s commentariat: that the Government’s sudden burst of village-level outreach — the roadshow of renders, works lists, and Cabinet visits now sweeping several regions across the nation  — is damage control.

A grieving nation, the theory goes, forced a government’s hand. Ministers scrambled. Announcements followed. On this reading, the Model Village Initiative is simply politics reacting to catastrophe.

This newsroom  does not accept that theory, and the arithmetic of the tour itself is why.

THE TIMELINE THAT DOES NOT FIT

Barima capsized on July 18. By the government’s own public rollout, the Model Village Initiative was on the road by August 3 — a gap of roughly two weeks between tragedy and travelling roadshow. In that window, government agencies would need to have conceived, designed, and rendered village-specific development plans for dozens of communities, in a presentable and — critically — salable format, and then coordinated the Cabinet-level logistics to deliver them on a multi-region tour.

This news media has tracked over twenty five individual village plans unveiled within the tour’s first week alone, with days such as Saturday’s six-stop schedule across Region Six. Each stop has arrived with its own site-specific concept renders — gateway signage, park redesigns, drainage and road works lists itemized down to the culvert and streetlight.

This is not boilerplate. This is bespoke design work, repeated across dozens of communities, deployed on a compressed multi-agency schedule.

Guyana has a recent, directly comparable precedent for what this class of work actually costs in time: Silica City. That flagship project’s design work was outsourced entirely — Guyana’s own housing planning authority, the Central Housing and Planning Authority (CHPA), did not have the in-house capacity for it — to a University of Miami team, beginning in 2021. From concept to design alone, that process ran over a year.

CHPA has since declined to disclose further detail on that work, citing proprietary material — itself consistent with a pattern of opacity this news outlet  has documented around Silica City’s delivery.

A single house design takes longer than three weeks. This tour has produced village plans, plural, at a rate no design authority in this country has ever demonstrated.

If a single showcase city required a foreign university team and more than a year to move from concept to design, the proposition that CHPA — an agency already burdened with its ordinary daily assignments — independently researched, designed, and rendered twenty -plus separate village packages in under three weeks does not withstand scrutiny.

Add to the design timeline the logistics of the tour itself: venue selection, security coordination, transport, multi-agency scheduling across six regions. In this publication’s  assessment, coordinating Cabinet and allied-agency teams at this scale is not a three-week undertaking. It is, at minimum, a three-month one.

Work of this volume and polish does not originate in the two weeks following a national tragedy. It originates before it.

IF THIS WERE DAMAGE CONTROL, IT WOULD LOOK DIFFERENT

The damage-control theory has a second, fatal weakness: it cannot explain the government’s own conduct on the ground.

This newsroom  has already documented the security posture accompanying this tour —

the barricading of Buxton/Foulis NDC Chairman Walston Martins at Melanie Damishana despite his holding a personal invitation.                  the breach at Watooka House.                                                                     the flak-jacketed police presence confronting placard-holding women at Koberimo                                                                                                            the Coast Guard interception of a boat bound for a Moruca consultation.

A government genuinely engaged in damage control — genuinely trying to calm a public still mourning Barima — does not deploy barricades against the very residents, and their elected local representatives, it claims to be courting. It de-escalates. It listens. It does not exclude.

That it has done the opposite is not an unfortunate enforcement error. It is a tell. A tour built to project responsiveness would not risk the optics of a chairman being threatened with arrest outside his own jurisdiction. A tour built to sell a predetermined outcome to a predetermined electoral map manages dissent instead of inviting it.

That is what this news media  has watched happen, village after village, for more than a week.

THE ADMISSION NOBODY WAS SUPPOSED TO NOTICE

Then came Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo, at Watooka Guest House in Linden, speaking of the government’s position being on “solid ground for 2030″ and “well positioned ahead of the 2031 elections.”                         The dates are not a slip. Guyana’s current constitutional term, following the September 2025 general election, parliament convened in November 2025,  runs five years to November 2030; a further three-month constitutional window separates the dissolution of Parliament from the convening of fresh elections. A government intending to exhaust that window in full arrives at 2031. Mr. Jagdeo’s arithmetic was, in that narrow sense, correct.

What it was not, was accidental. No one managing the fallout of a ferry disaster volunteers unprompted commentary on electoral positioning three to four years out. Damage control talks about drainage. It talks about housing. It does not talk about polling.

That the Vice President did — in the same outreach cycle, at the same podium built to look like consultation — is the clearest admission this government has yet offered that the map, and not the mourning, is what this tour was built around.

A REFERENDUM DRESSED AS A ROADSHOW

Put together, the evidence does not point to a government caught flat-footed by tragedy and improvising its way back into public favour. It points to a pre-existing electioneering apparatus — designed, rendered, and logistically sequenced well before July 18 — that Barima did not create and does not explain.

What Barima did was hand that apparatus a cover story: the convenient appearance of a government responding to grief, rather than a government executing a plan for the Local Government Elections that is functioning, in substance, as a referendum on its own standing ahead of them.

This publication  draws a distinction that matters: the initiative — the design work, the plans, the tour architecture — predates Barima and was not built in response to it.

Its current execution — the barricades, the exclusions, the heightened security — is a reaction, not to grief, but to the resistance this government did not anticipate meeting along the way.

QUESTIONS FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND CHPA

This newsroom renews and extends its formal request for disclosure:

  1. When did design and rendering work begin on the Model Village concept packages presented at each tour stop, and which entities — in-house or outsourced — produced them?
  2. What is the total budgeted cost of the Model Village Initiative’s design, rendering, and tour logistics to date, and from which budget line is it drawn?
  3. Does CHPA possess the in-house design and engineering capacity to produce forty or more village-specific development packages within a three-week window, without external contracting? If external contractors were engaged, who are they, and when were they retained?
  4. What instructions were issued to police units regarding the exclusion of Chairman Walston Martins and other local officials from consultation venues, and by whose authority?
  5. Will the Government commit to a public, region-by-region funding and delivery timeline for the works depicted in each village’s concept renders — the same standard of disclosure this news publication  has sought, and not received, on Silica City since 2022?

Until those questions are answered, this news media  will continue to call this initiative what the evidence shows it to be: not a government in mourning, but a government campaigning — on the public purse, under the cover of a national tragedy it did not plan, but has not hesitated to use. 

To borrow a title from out counterpart ‘Kaieteur ‘ – BLUNT, “This isn’t mere distraction or deflection—it is calculated deception, dressed as attention, targeting the elections.”

— The Board