Skeldon Again: Between Promise and Proof

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BY: Staff— Writer

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣.   

A Dominican Republic-based company, the Rizek Group, is expected to commence cocoa cultivation on approximately 2,000 acres as early as August. Plans reportedly include the establishment of a processing facility, suggesting an intention to move beyond raw production into value-added output. Additionally, the Government has confirmed that multiple investors—both local and international—have expressed interest in other ventures at Skeldon, including the possible revival of the sugar factory.

These are tangible developments. They signal that Skeldon, long dormant, is once again attracting attention.

However, beyond these facts lies a layer of rhetoric that deserves scrutiny.

There is, notably, little disclosure about timelines beyond the initial planting phase. Cocoa is not a short-term crop; it typically requires three to five years before yielding commercially viable output. A processing facility, if it materializes, will require further time for construction, certification, and integration into export markets. Yet these realities are largely absent from official pronouncements, creating the impression of imminent transformation where none can realistically occur.

This gap between announcement and outcome is not new. It reflects a broader pattern in which ambitious initiatives are publicly unveiled long before the groundwork—financial, technical, and logistical—is fully established.

Compounding this skepticism is Skeldon’s own history.

Once heralded as a flagship modernisation project, the Skeldon Sugar Estate became one of the most costly and controversial failures in Guyana’s agricultural sector. Technical flaws, poor performance, and eventual closure left thousands unemployed and eroded public trust. Any new initiative tied to this location must therefore overcome not only practical challenges but a significant credibility deficit.

To its credit, the current approach differs in key respects. This is not a return to state-driven sugar expansion, but an attempt at diversification through private investment. Cocoa, as a crop, offers a plausible alternative. Regional producers such as the Dominican Republic have demonstrated its viability, and global demand remains strong. In principle, the shift makes economic sense.

But principle alone does not guarantee success.

Critical questions remain unanswered: Is the soil at Skeldon suitable for large-scale cocoa cultivation? What mechanisms will ensure that local farmers benefit, rather than being sidelined by corporate operations? What are the terms of the investment agreements, and who bears the risk if these ventures falter?

Until these questions are addressed, the initiative remains more prospective than proven.

None of this is to suggest that the cocoa project should be dismissed. On the contrary, diversification of Guyana’s agricultural base is both necessary and overdue. But the public has moved beyond accepting announcements at face value. After Skeldon, promises must be matched by measurable progress.
If planting does indeed begin by August, and if within the next year there is visible land preparation, crop establishment, and movement on processing infrastructure, confidence will grow. If not, this announcement risks joining a long list of initiatives that generated headlines but failed to deliver transformation.

The real issue, therefore, is not whether cocoa can succeed at Skeldon. It is whether the Government has learned from the past—specifically, that credibility is not built on declarations, but on disciplined, transparent implementation.

Until that proof emerges, Skeldon remains suspended between promise and proof.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

Silicon Valley Dreams, Structural Deficits: A Reality Check for Guyana.

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BY: Staff— Writer

The joint suggestion by President Ali and Undersecretary Helsberg that Guyana could soon serve as a testing ground for Silicon Valley innovation is not just premature—it is profoundly misleading.

President Ali and Undersecretary Helsberg

The joint suggestion by President Ali and Undersecretary Helsberg that Guyana could soon serve as a testing ground for Silicon Valley innovation is not just premature—it is profoundly misleading. It risks dressing aspiration as achievement while ignoring the deep structural deficiencies that define the country’s current reality.

At the heart of any modern technological ecosystem lies energy security—but energy does not exist in isolation. It is inextricably tied to another critical and often overlooked resource: water.

Advanced computing, artificial intelligence systems, and especially data centres are not only power-intensive; they are also extraordinarily water-dependent. These facilities require vast quantities of water for cooling systems to prevent overheating and maintain operational stability.

Globally, large-scale data centres can consume millions of gallons of water annually, placing significant strain on local water resources.
Guyana is nowhere near prepared to meet such demands. Even at the level of basic service delivery, the country continues to struggle with providing consistent access to potable water for its own population. Significant portions of the population still face irregular supply, inadequate treatment, and limited distribution infrastructure.

This is not a marginal inconvenience—it is a fundamental development failure in relation to a basic human right.

To speak, therefore, of hosting water-intensive, high-tech infrastructure in a context where citizens themselves are not guaranteed reliable access to clean water is to expose a stark misalignment of priorities. It raises serious questions about allocation: would scarce resources be diverted to sustain foreign-owned technological operations while communities continue to endure deficiencies in essential services?

Moreover, scaling water infrastructure to support such industries is neither quick nor simple. It requires extensive investment in treatment facilities, storage systems, distribution networks, and long-term resource management strategies. These are systems Guyana is still in the process of trying to build for domestic use. Adding industrial-scale technological demand to an already strained system would not accelerate progress—it would compound existing vulnerabilities.

The reality is unavoidable: without first securing both energy and water at a national level, the vision of Guyana as a hub for advanced technological experimentation collapses under the weight of its own contradictions. A country cannot credibly power and cool the future if it cannot yet reliably supply the basics to its people.

Equally critical is the question of human capital. Technology ecosystems are not imported; they are cultivated.

They depend on a steady pipeline of highly trained engineers, software developers, data scientists, and researchers. Guyana’s education system, while improving in access, has not yet reached the depth or specialization required to sustain a knowledge economy at scale. Technical and vocational training remains underdeveloped, and brain drain continues to siphon off the very talent needed to build a domestic innovation base. In such an environment, foreign firms would not be integrating into a local ecosystem—they would be operating in isolation from it.

The digital infrastructure tells a similar story. A credible tech hub demands high-speed, low-latency, and highly reliable internet connectivity, supported by redundancy and strong cybersecurity frameworks. Guyana’s digital landscape is still uneven, with gaps in broadband penetration, inconsistent service quality, and limited resilience against disruptions. These are not minor inconveniences; they are fundamental barriers to participation in the global digital economy.

Then there is the legislative and regulatory environment—arguably one of the most critical yet overlooked components of this discussion. Global technology companies operate within strict legal frameworks governing data protection, privacy, intellectual property, cross-border data flows, and artificial intelligence ethics. Guyana’s legislative architecture in these areas remains fragmented and, in some cases, outdated. The absence of comprehensive data protection laws and clear digital governance policies creates uncertainty for investors and exposes citizens to risk.

Beyond infrastructure and policy lies a deeper institutional issue: execution capacity.

Announcements of partnerships and high-level engagements are not substitutes for implementation. Guyana has seen no shortage of ambitious initiatives across sectors, yet delivery often lags behind declaration. Large-scale transformation requires not only vision but also disciplined project management, transparency, and accountability—areas where public confidence remains uneven.

There is also a geopolitical dimension that cannot be ignored. When small, resource-rich states are positioned as “testing grounds” for powerful foreign industries, questions must be asked about agency, benefit distribution, and long-term sovereignty. Who owns the data generated within Guyana? Who sets the rules? Who captures the economic value? Without clear safeguards, the country risks becoming a site of extraction—not of oil this time, but of data and technological advantage.

None of this is an argument against ambition. Guyana should pursue digital transformation, invest in artificial intelligence literacy, and engage global technology leaders. But transformation is not achieved through optics. It is built through sequencing—energy first, education second, infrastructure third, governance throughout.
What the public is being offered instead is a narrative of leapfrogging without the necessary launchpad. It is a vision that assumes Guyana can bypass stages of development that every successful tech ecosystem has had to painstakingly build.

The danger is not simply that these ambitions may fail. It is that they distract from the urgent, foundational work that must be done now. Reliable electricity. Modernized education. Comprehensive digital legislation. Institutional strengthening. These are not glamorous initiatives, but they are indispensable.
Until these fundamentals are addressed, the idea of Guyana as a Silicon Valley outpost remains what it is: a compelling storyline, carefully staged—but ultimately disconnected from the lived and measurable realities of the nation.

Guyana does not need to be a testing ground. It needs to be a country that works.

America’s Interest in Guyana’s Bauxite Must Be Met With Guyana’s Terms

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BY: Hem Kumar         

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣

The United States’ growing interest in Guyana’s bauxite industry is not an act of charity, nor is it simply about “investment” or “development.”

It is a calculated move in a global contest for control of critical minerals — and Guyana must respond with equal calculation, not passive acceptance.

Under Secretary Jacob Helberg’s remarks in Georgetown make one thing clear: Washington sees Guyana not just as a supplier of bauxite, but as a strategic asset in a wider effort to counter China’s dominance in global resource supply chains. The talk of advanced surveying, infrastructure expansion, and logistics integration is not neutral. It is the language of positioning — securing influence over where resources are found, how they are extracted, and who ultimately benefits.

Guyana, however, is not without leverage. In fact, it may be one of the most strategically positioned countries in the hemisphere today.

Geographically, Guyana is the natural Atlantic gateway for northern Brazil — a region with enormous industrial and agricultural output that remains logistically constrained. Any serious plan to reroute trade through Guyana immediately elevates the country from a peripheral player to a regional logistics hub of immense value.


At the same time, Guyana is rapidly emerging as an energy powerhouse. Cheap and abundant energy is the single most important ingredient for industrialization. This means Guyana is not confined to exporting raw materials — it has the capacity to process them.
And that is where the conversation must fundamentally shift.

If the United States wants access to Guyana’s bauxite, then it must be prepared to invest not just in extraction, but in production. Alumina refineries. Aluminum smelters. Downstream manufacturing. Jobs, technology transfer, and industrial capacity must be part of the equation.

Guyana cannot afford to remain a pit stop in a global supply chain where value is added elsewhere and profits are exported.
Anything less is a continuation of a model that has historically underdeveloped resource-rich nations.

Equally critical is the issue of data sovereignty. The proposal for advanced surveying of Guyana’s mining lands raises serious red flags. Geological data is not just technical information — it is strategic intelligence. It determines future wealth, bargaining power, and national security.

Guyana must make it unequivocally clear: all survey data generated within its borders is the sovereign property of the State. No exceptions. No ambiguity. No quiet concessions buried in agreements.

To allow foreign entities to control or exclusively access such data would be to surrender the blueprint of the country’s natural wealth.

There is also a deeper concern that cannot be ignored. If this initiative is part of a broader U.S. strategy to displace China, then Guyana risks being drawn into a geopolitical tug-of-war where its resources become the prize and its sovereignty the collateral.

This is precisely why the Ali administration must fully recognize the strength of its current position. Guyana is not desperate for attention; it is being actively courted. That distinction matters.

Negotiations conducted from a position of perceived need will yield vastly different outcomes than those conducted from a position of strategic strength.
The government must therefore set the terms clearly and unapologetically:
Guyana’s resources will not be extracted without value-added industries.
Guyana’s geography will not be leveraged without reciprocal national benefit. Guyana’s data will not be owned or controlled by foreign interests.

This moment is not just about bauxite. It is about defining the country’s development trajectory for decades to come.
The United States may be eyeing Guyana’s resources, but Guyana must ensure it is not being sized up for exploitation dressed as partnership.

If Washington wants in, it must come prepared to build — not just to take.

Policy Addendum: Terms Guyana Must Set for Any U.S. Engagement in the Mining Sector

To ensure that foreign interest translates into national development — not dependency — Guyana must establish clear, enforceable conditions for participation in its bauxite and wider mining industry.

First, mandatory value-added production must be non-negotiable. Any foreign investor, including U.S. companies, should be required to commit to establishing in-country processing facilities such as alumina refineries and, where feasible, aluminum smelters. Exporting raw bauxite while importing finished products is an outdated model that Guyana can no longer afford.

Second, binding local content and workforce development laws must be expanded beyond oil and gas into mining. This includes quotas for Guyanese employment at all levels, technical training programs, and the transfer of managerial and engineering expertise. If Guyana is to industrialize, its people must be at the center of that transformation.

Third, joint venture structures with meaningful state or local equity participation should be prioritized. Guyana must not remain a passive recipient of royalties; it should be an active stakeholder in the ownership and profitability of its resource sector.

Fourth, full data sovereignty over all geological and survey information must be codified in law. Any data collected through advanced surveying technologies must be stored within Guyana, controlled by the State, and accessible for national planning purposes. No exclusive ownership or external control of this data should be permitted under any agreement.

Fifth, infrastructure-for-development agreements must be structured carefully. Roads, ports, and logistics corridors built to facilitate mining must also serve national and regional economic integration — including agriculture, manufacturing, and trade with northern Brazil — rather than functioning solely as extraction channels.

Sixth, clear fiscal terms and anti-avoidance safeguards must be enforced. This includes transparent royalty structures, ring-fencing provisions, and strict monitoring to prevent profit shifting and tax erosion by multinational corporations.

Finally, a strategic resource governance framework must guide all agreements. Guyana should identify priority minerals, define long-term industrial goals, and align foreign investment with a national development plan — not the other way around.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

Carter Center Report Exposes Dangerous Delays in Electoral Reform as Political Advantage Trumps Democracy

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BY: Staff— Writer

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣.    

The Carter Center’s final report on Guyana’s 2025 elections does more than offer technical recommendations—it delivers a quiet but unmistakable warning: the country’s democratic framework is being strained not by chaos, but by calculated inaction.
At the heart of the report lies a troubling reality. The absence of meaningful reform in campaign financing, the continued blurring of lines between state resources and party interests, and the lack of equitable media access are not new problems. They are longstanding deficiencies that successive administrations have acknowledged but failed to correct.

The difference now is that the stakes are significantly higher. With unprecedented oil revenues flowing into the state, the opportunities for political advantage through public spending have expanded dramatically—and so too has the risk to democratic fairness.

The Carter Center’s concern that the ruling party appeared to benefit from biased state media coverage should not be treated as a passing observation. It speaks to a deeper structural imbalance where incumbency is leveraged not just through governance, but through control of national narratives. When state media ceases to function as a public good and instead becomes an extension of political messaging, the electoral playing field is no longer level—it is engineered.

Equally troubling is the continued opacity surrounding campaign financing. In any functioning democracy, transparency in political funding is essential to prevent undue influence and ensure accountability. In Guyana, however, this remains an unresolved issue, despite years of discussion and repeated calls for reform. The Carter Center’s warning is particularly pointed: in an era of oil wealth, the absence of clear rules governing political donations and expenditures creates fertile ground for abuse, whether through direct funding channels or the indirect use of state resources.

What is most concerning is not that these problems exist, but that they persist without urgency. The call for constitutional and electoral reform is not new. It has been echoed by local stakeholders, civil society, and international observers for years. Yet progress remains slow, fragmented, and often politically convenient. This pattern of delay raises an uncomfortable question—whether the lack of reform is due to incapacity, or whether it serves a deliberate political purpose.

The politically divided structure of the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) further compounds these challenges. Instead of functioning as an independent and impartial body, it continues to reflect the entrenched political polarization of the country. Without reform to its composition or operational framework, public confidence in the electoral system will remain fragile, regardless of how efficiently elections are administered on polling day.

The Carter Center’s recommendation for an independent audit of the voters’ list is another critical issue that demands immediate attention. Persistent doubts about the integrity of the list—whether justified or not—undermine trust in the electoral process. Addressing these concerns proactively is not optional; it is essential for legitimacy.

Perhaps the most telling statistic in the report is the 5 percent decline in voter turnout, despite an expanded voters’ list. This is not merely a numerical shift—it is a signal. It suggests growing disengagement, skepticism, or fatigue among the electorate. In a country where political participation has historically been high, any decline should be treated as a warning sign of eroding confidence.

What emerges from the Carter Center’s report is a paradox. On election day, procedures were largely orderly, transparent, and well-managed. Yet the broader electoral environment—shaped by financing gaps, media imbalance, and institutional weaknesses—remains deeply flawed. This is the illusion of procedural success masking systemic vulnerability.
Guyana now stands at a critical juncture. The question is no longer whether reforms are needed—the evidence is overwhelming. The question is whether there is genuine political will to implement them. Continued delay risks normalizing a system where electoral advantage is quietly embedded in the structures of governance itself.

If reforms continue to be deferred, the consequences will not be immediate instability, but something more insidious: the gradual erosion of public trust, the weakening of democratic norms, and the entrenchment of political inequality.
The Carter Center has done its part by documenting the risks and outlining the path forward. The responsibility now lies squarely with Guyana’s political leadership.

Whether they act—or continue to delay—will determine not just the credibility of future elections, but the integrity of the country’s democracy itself.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

The Hague Under Pressure: Venezuela’s Brazen Attempt to Pre-empt Justice

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BY: Hem Kumar 

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣

It is not just defiance. It is something more troubling.

Before the International Court of Justice has even concluded its hearings, Venezuela has already declared that it will not accept the Court’s ruling if it upholds the 1899 Arbitral Award. This is not a post-judgment rejection. This is a pre-emptive strike — an attempt to cast doubt on a decision that has not yet been made.

𝘾𝙖𝙡𝙡 𝙞𝙩 𝙬𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙞𝙩 𝙞𝙨: 𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙨𝙪𝙧𝙚.

When a state participates in legal proceedings while simultaneously announcing that any unfavourable outcome will be discarded, it crosses the line from legal advocacy into coercion. It sends an unmistakable message — not just to Guyana, but to the Court itself — that the authority of international law is conditional, subject to political convenience.

 𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙦𝙪𝙚𝙨𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙪𝙣𝙖𝙫𝙤𝙞𝙙𝙖𝙗𝙡𝙚: 𝙞𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙚𝙛𝙛𝙤𝙧𝙩 𝙩𝙤 𝙞𝙣𝙛𝙡𝙪𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝘾𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩 𝙗𝙚𝙛𝙤𝙧𝙚 𝙞𝙩 𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙖𝙠𝙨?

Courts are not swayed by rhetoric, but states know that perception matters. By declaring the process illegitimate in advance, Venezuela is attempting to plant a seed — to frame any ruling in Guyana’s favour as inherently flawed, contested, and destabilizing. It is a calculated move to weaken the impact of the judgment before it is even delivered.

 𝙏𝙝𝙞𝙨 𝙞𝙨 𝙣𝙤𝙩 𝙝𝙤𝙬 𝙜𝙤𝙤𝙙 𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙩𝙝 𝙥𝙖𝙧𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙥𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙬𝙤𝙧𝙠𝙨.

You cannot engage a court, present arguments, cite history, submit evidence — and in the same breath declare the outcome meaningless. That is not a legal strategy; it is a political maneuver dressed in the language of law.

Even more concerning is the timing. This declaration came before the Court had even closed hearings. That is not impatience — it is premeditation. It suggests that Venezuela is not awaiting justice; it is preparing to reject it.

And in doing so, it risks undermining more than just this case.

If every state were to adopt this posture — accept only the rulings it likes, dismiss those it does not — the entire framework of international dispute resolution would collapse into irrelevance. Treaties would become optional. Courts would become symbolic. Power, not law, would decide outcomes.

𝙏𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙞𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙙𝙖𝙣𝙜𝙚𝙧𝙤𝙪𝙨 𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙘𝙚𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙗𝙚𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙛𝙡𝙞𝙧𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙬𝙞𝙩𝙝 𝙝𝙚𝙧𝙚.

Venezuela’s call for “regional mediation” only deepens the contradiction. The ICJ process exists precisely because decades of negotiation under the Geneva Agreement failed to produce a resolution. To now suggest a return to those same deadlocked pathways is not a solution — it is delay, repackaged.

𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝙙𝙚𝙡𝙖𝙮, 𝙞𝙣 𝙩𝙚𝙧𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙖𝙡 𝙙𝙞𝙨𝙥𝙪𝙩𝙚𝙨, 𝙞𝙨 𝙣𝙚𝙫𝙚𝙧 𝙣𝙚𝙪𝙩𝙧𝙖𝙡.

What remains is a stark reality: Venezuela wants the credibility of legal engagement without the discipline of legal outcomes. It wants to be heard, but not bound.

𝙏𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙞𝙨 𝙣𝙤𝙩 𝙥𝙖𝙧𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙥𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣. 𝙏𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙞𝙨 𝙢𝙖𝙣𝙞𝙥𝙪𝙡𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣.

And the world — especially small states that depend on international law for protection — should be paying very close attention.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

Ali Cannot Lecture Investors While Guyana’s Own Record Raises Red Flags

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BY: Hem Kumar 

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣

President Irfaan Ali wants investors to come prepared, to do their homework, and to stop treating Guyana like a drive-through market. Fair enough. But the problem is that this is the same administration that has spent years cultivating exactly the kind of investment culture it now wants to scold—one marked by preferential access, political convenience, and a troubling tolerance for foreign actors who seem to get the soft landing locals never receive.

The President is not setting standards so much as trying to retrofit them after the fact.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐦𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐆𝐮𝐲𝐚𝐧𝐚 𝐛𝐮𝐢𝐥𝐭

Guyana cannot spend years projecting itself as open for business at any cost, then act offended when investors come expecting access, speed, and influence. That image was reinforced by the government’s defensive posture on the oil contract, where the 2% royalty arrangement remains protected behind the familiar shield of contract sanctity, even as ordinary Guyanese are told to accept the deal as settled history. A state that refuses to revisit glaring imbalances in its most consequential contract cannot suddenly pose as a hard-headed gatekeeper when it is convenient.

The message abroad is not hard to decode: some deals are untouchable, some interests are protected, and some players are simply more welcome than others.

𝐖𝐚𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐭𝐨𝐧 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐧𝐠

That is why Congressman Gabe Evans’s recent letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio matters. Evans warned of “creeping Chinese influence” in Guyana and raised alarms about reports of Chinese firms securing contracts, financing, and political footholds in ways that could threaten U.S. interests in energy, diplomacy, and critical minerals. In plain terms, Guyana is not only being watched; it is being scrutinized for the very habits its leadership has normalized.

So when Ali stands before an American audience and lectures on investor expectations, the paradox is obvious. He is effectively telling U.S. investors to temper their assumptions while Washington is already asking whether Guyana has become too accommodating to Chinese influence.

 𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐟𝐚𝐯𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐬𝐦

The U.S. ambassador’s point about predictability cuts straight through the noise. Predictability means rules that are clear, consistent, and applied without regard to who has the best political connections. It does not mean one set of doors for locals, another for foreign firms, and a VIP corridor for the well-connected.

That distinction matters because the complaints from Guyanese businesses are not imaginary. Local truckers have protested what they describe as a system that favors Chinese-linked firms and squeezes out domestic operators, with some alleging that contracts and access flow through family ties, political connections, and selective facilitation. 

When local players are forced to shout just to be treated fairly, the government has already admitted the weakness of its own system.

𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭 𝐬𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐭𝐲, 𝐬𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐠𝐞

The administration’s favorite phrase—sanctity of contract—has become a political refuge. It is invoked to shut down calls for renegotiating oil terms, yet it is rarely accompanied by equal vigor in defending local enterprise from unfair competition or foreign dominance.

That is the real sting in this debate: the government is fiercely principled when protecting corporate arrangements, but noticeably flexible when the national interest requires courage.That is not consistency. It is choreography.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐜𝐚𝐫𝐩𝐞𝐭 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐛𝐥𝐞𝐦

The accusation now hanging over the administration is not simply that it welcomes investment. It is that it has rolled out the red carpet for certain foreign actors, especially Chinese businesses, and then turned around to demand restraint from everyone else.You cannot preach prudence to investors while refusing to exercise it on behalf of your own citizens.

This is not a neutral posture. It is a choice—one that signals to global capital that Guyana is willing to prioritize investor comfort over national leverage. When disputes arise, the government has too often appeared aligned with oil majors rather than the Guyanese people, particularly on issues of environmental liability, cost recovery audits, and regulatory enforcement. The result is a credibility gap wide enough to swallow the President’s Houston remarks whole.

Investors notice these signals, and so do citizens

A country cannot market itself as business-friendly, then punish the public for believing it.

𝐂𝐥𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠

If President Ali wants to be taken seriously, he must first explain why Guyana keeps attracting the same complaints: one-sided contracts, preferential treatment, weak procurement credibility, and a pattern of accommodation that now has even U.S. lawmakers sounding alarms. The issue is not that investors need to come prepared. The issue is that Guyana’s government should have prepared its own house long ago.

Until it does, the President’s lecture will remain what it sounded like in Houston: not a statement of principle, but an attempt to put discipline on an image his own administration helped create.

If President Ali truly wants investors to come prepared, then the government must first do its own preparation—by strengthening institutions, enforcing accountability, and demonstrating that Guyana is not just open for business, but serious about protecting its people, its resources, and its future.

Because in the end, the investment climate is not defined by speeches in Houston.

It is defined by the choices made at home.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮,𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

Names, Numbers, and Power:   Why the System Turned on  Dr. Jadoopat.

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BY: Staff Writer 

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣

There is an uncomfortable truth at the heart of Guyana’s extractive sector—one that powerful interests would prefer buried, redacted, or quietly erased. That truth is this: transparency was not only achieved, it was documented, published, and made accessible to the public under the stewardship of Dr.Rudy Jadoopat.

As National Coordinator of the Guyana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GYEITI) from 2017 to 2022, Dr.Jadoopat did what few in public office have dared to do—he operationalized transparency. Not as a slogan, but as a system. Not as rhetoric, but as verifiable data.

Under his leadership, Guyana did not merely subscribe to the EITI International Standard; it implemented it. The GYEITI National Secretariat was not just established—it was structured, managed, and driven to deliver measurable compliance with international requirements for accountability across oil and gas, mining, forestry, and fisheries.

But it is in the Annexes of the GYEITI Reports where the real story lies.

Those Annexes did not deal in abstractions. They named names. They detailed dates. They identified acreages, locations, and license numbers. They exposed, in plain data, the architecture of Guyana’s extractive economy—particularly the sprawling and notoriously opaque gold mining sector.

And therein lay the problem.

Because when transparency is real, it becomes inconvenient.

The disclosures did not discriminate. They revealed:

connections—individuals, associates, and entities tied to influence and power. Figures such as Su Zhi Rong, Ivor English,  Joe Harmon, Simona Broomes Ramzan Ali, Jagmohan and others emerged not through speculation, but through documented records. The Alphonso family reportedly holds claims to over one million acres of gold mining concessions. It is also alleged that they are part of the Multi-Stakeholder Group and serve as financiers of political parties and their leadership. Additionally, they are said to have the ability to influence state officials, including appointments and the removal of GGMC officers with whom they are not aligned.

The data spoke for itself, and it did so publicly.

For the political and economic elite, this was intolerable.

Transparency, when it begins to illuminate networks of privilege and proximity, is no longer celebrated—it becomes a threat.

What followed raises serious questions.

Jadoopat’s removal from his position did not occur in a vacuum. It coincided with growing unease about the breadth and accessibility of the information released. More troubling are the reported alterations to previously published datasets—columns removed, including critical fields such as “Date Granted” for concessions. These are not cosmetic edits; they strike at the integrity of the record.

Such actions, if verified, suggest not routine data management, but deliberate sanitization.

And here lies a critical miscalculation.

The data was never confined to a single server or website. It was downloaded, archived, and distributed. Local stakeholders, international organizations, and oversight bodies already possess the raw datasets. The attempt to retroactively obscure or modify public disclosures is not only futile—it invites deeper scrutiny.

Because in the age of digital transparency, erasure is not easily achieved. It is, however, easily detected.

What Guyana now faces is not simply a question of governance, but of credibility. The international community, including EITI oversight mechanisms and allied institutions, is watching closely—not just what is said, but what is changed, removed, or concealed.

Transparency cannot be selectively applied. It cannot be embraced when convenient and dismantled when uncomfortable.

If Guyana is to maintain any claim to accountability in its extractive industries, then the integrity of its disclosures must be defended—not diluted.

The work done between 2017 and 2022 set a benchmark. The question now is whether that benchmark will be upheld—or quietly undone.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮,𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

Appeal Court Undermines Critical Oil Spill Safeguard with Parent Guarantee Ruling

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BY: Dr. Vincent Adams

While looking ahead to a likely appeal to the Caribbean Court of Justice, Guyanese and Caribbean citizens must be worried sick about the Appeal Court’s devastating overturn of Justice Sandil Kissoon’s May 3, 2023 sage landmark Decision requiring Stabroek Block operator, ExxonMobil (Exxon) Guyana Limited (EMGL) to provide a Parent Company Guarantee (PCG) from its parent company Exxon and affiliates CNOOC and HESS to cover 𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬 related to an oil spill.

As the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Head who created the PCG policy as the only necessary means to protect Guyana’s interest, with all due respect to the Court, I hands down disagree with its overturning of Kissoon’s profoundly thorough understanding of the context and well thought out Decision heralding the nostalgic feeling of national independence until now when ironically, the nation is about to celebrate its 60th anniversary of independence. Founding fathers Forbes Burnham and Cheddi Jagan must be turning in their graves witnessing the surrendering of Guyana’s sovereignty to new colonial masters such as corporate giant Exxon.       

Unbelievably, although Exxon unconscionably corrals 86% of Guyana’s God given oil patrimony, the Court still chose to exonerate this filthy rich oil giant from all liabilities. EMGL, and 𝐧𝐨𝐭 Exxon, is the sole contractor party to the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) and all permits; and so, owns all of the liabilities despite 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐡𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐚𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬 to cover an oil spill. Consequently, in the event of a spill, EMGL declares bankruptcy and Exxon goes scot-free, leaving Guyana holding the bag of financial bankruptcy and environmental catastrophe – unquestionably the trickery behind Exxon creating EMGL to insulate itself from liability; hence, the necessity for originating the PCG to save Guyana. Exxon would never get away with such a scheme in its home country of the USA; but, as Judge Kissoon wisely puts it “EMGL is engaged in a course of action 𝐢𝐦𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐛𝐥𝐞 only by the omissions of a 𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐭, 𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐚𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐄𝐏𝐀…putting this nation and its people in 𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐯𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐝𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐜𝐚𝐥𝐚𝐦𝐢𝐭𝐨𝐮𝐬 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐚𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐫.”

Unfortunately, it appears that the Court accepted the nonsensical ghost defence arguments that the word “unlimited” is not in the permits; and that the guarantee should be capped with an estimate. The following EPA permit clauses in litigation are presented below for readers to judge for yourselves:   

Clause 14:1 “The Permit Holder (EMGL) is liable for 𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬 associated with” an oil spill. 𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐞 the specificity of 𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬 (definition of “unlimited”) which means 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐜𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐞𝐝 for example at the phantom $2 Billion estimate (accepted by the Court).

Clause 14:10 “EMGL must provide from the Parent Company or CoVenturers (CNOOC and HESS) one or more legally binding agreements in which they undertake to provide adequate financial resources to pay their respective environmental obligations if EMGL “𝐟𝐚𝐢𝐥 𝐭𝐨 𝐝𝐨 𝐬𝐨 ”. 𝐍𝐨𝐭𝐞 the specificity of “if EMGL 𝐟𝐚𝐢𝐥 𝐭𝐨 𝐝𝐨 𝐬𝐨”– dictating that parent Exxon must provide financial assurances/guarantee for 𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬 which EMGL cannot pay (𝐟𝐚𝐢𝐥 𝐭𝐨 𝐝𝐨 𝐬𝐨) Again, the definition of “unlimited”.  

In summary, clause 14.1 mandates that EMGL as the permit holder is responsible for 𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬. However, if EMGL has inadequate resources to cover all costs “ 𝐟𝐚𝐢𝐥 𝐭𝐨 𝐝𝐨 𝐬𝐨 ”, then 14.10 orders that deep pocket parent Exxon and CoVenturers are liable for 𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬 over what EMGL can cover. It is therefore unfathomable how such “unambiguous language” (Judge Kissoon’s words) could mean anything but an “unlimited guarantee”, since 𝐚𝐥𝐥 means no limit. Yes, the term “unlimited” is not mentioned in the permit, but that is ghost argument if the words mentioned mean the same as “unlimited”. Confusingly, the Court also found that “while Exxon remains liable for pollution related damages, that liability does not automatically require unlimited financial assurance”, completely ignoring the key operative words “𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬” at Clause 14.10 which could only mean “liability for 𝐚𝐥𝐥 pollution related damages”. It begs the question, why were key words “𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬” so visibly omitted from this most consequential finding?

Further, instead of “unlimited guarantee”, the ruling required an estimate of the damage as Financial Assurance, hinting that the Court may have been terribly misled that such an estimate is possible or ever done. Whosoever could do such an estimate has to be a fortune teller and should immediately purchase a lottery ticket. Nonetheless, just to humor such an ludicrous thought, the only possible estimating method would be of an analogous type using a similar situation such as the Macondo oil spill which occurred in our backyard, gushing 5 million barrels oil for 87 days costing British Petroleum $US145 B– none of which was, or could have been estimated! thereby leading to the million dollar question that was not addressed by the Court as to who will pay the cost of a Macondo type spill over and above Exxon’s farcical US $2B Assurance? It must be noted that this $2B ploy was Exxon’s first attempt in 2019 with insurance papers in hand to counter the EPA’s demand for the PCG, but it was instantly rejected.     

Another frivolous defence argument was that there was no specific PCG, when in fact, there can be no more of a substantively bona fide PCG than the legal language in the EPA Permits shown earlier. The only required side Agreement was to be amongst Exxon, CNOOC and HESS referenced in clause 14.10 earlier as the “binding agreement” to show how the three entities will share “pay their respective environmental obligations” which had to be approved by the EPA before start of operation. If the Govt testified that such an Agreement never existed, then they admitted to violating the permits by approving startups without that Agreement. The Court should have hoisted them by their own petard.

Sadly, the whole crux of the matter flies in the face of Guyana’s sovereignty at this time of the nation’s momentous 60th independence anniversary celebration, when Exxon is being enabled by authorities to evade its moral and financial obligation to bear all costs of spill damages occurring from operations earning it $Trillions, while cold bloodedly exposing to financial and environmental ruins, the poverty-stricken country that generously furnishes its wealth. Worse yet, besides dumping billions of barrels of hot, toxic, radioactive and oil laced produced water into our clean ocean, destroying its ecology and millions of fish eggs and fish life, and flaring of billions of cubic feet of toxic produced gas into our pristine air, causing health, acid rain, and climate change problems, Exxon is green-lighted to recklessly produce above the legal safe limits enshrined in the Environmental Impact Assessment, thus enhancing the chances of a spill without any liability coverage by virtue of this ruling. 

With Guyana at its tender age of policy and law making for this critical oil sector, consequential decisions such as this ruling must be informed by the numerous bad lessons learned from other countries. A case in point is the litigation in the British Courts involving Nigerians suing Shell Oil Co. for costs covering oil spills in Nigeria; but, because of the absence of a PCG, Shell’s defence was that the spills occurred under their subsidiary company as their operator, making Shell not liable. Surprise! Surprise!

Also, Repsol which operates in Guyana, was responsible for a small 12,000 barrels oil spill in Peru; and absent tight liability laws, the Government was forced to seize the passports of Repsol’s Executives and sued the company for US $Billions for cleanup and other liabilities, in addition to urgently establishing new laws to protect Peru from recurrences of this kind.

Lastly, it must not go unnoticed that Exxon had willingly agreed to, signed, and honored the PCG language first enshrined in the yellowtail exploration well permit in 2019 and repeated in all of the subsequent permits thereafter; but, only became an issue when the PPPC took office and sided with Exxon to negate it, resulting in the lawsuit by the two patriotic citizens that has brought us to this point.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮,𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

Government’s Rice Gamble Backfires

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BY: Hem Kumar 

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣

This is what happens when policy is crafted on the fly and dressed up as strategy.

The Government rolled out a $3 billion rice subsidy with a glaring loophole—an acreage-based payout structure that practically invites manipulation. Now that farmers are responding exactly as any rational actor would, the Agriculture Minister is reaching for the police instead of the mirror.

That is not leadership. That is deflection.

You cannot design a system that rewards smaller declared acreage with higher per-acre payments and then act shocked when large-scale farmers begin restructuring on paper. That outcome was not accidental—it was inevitable. Any serious policymaker would have seen it coming.

But instead of building safeguards into the framework from the start, the Government rushed the announcement, threw out attractive figures, and left the back door wide open.
Now the same administration is warning farmers not to “smart the system.”

The uncomfortable truth is this: the system was not smart to begin with.
Farmers are not operating in a vacuum. They are dealing with collapsing paddy prices, skyrocketing input costs, and shrinking margins. When survival is on the line, people will adapt. What the Minister is calling manipulation, many would call basic economic response.
And yet, rather than fixing the structural weakness, the Government is escalating to threats of prosecution.

This is governance by afterthought.
If the Guyana Rice Development Board already had detailed acreage records—as the Minister now claims—why were those records not used to design a subsidy mechanism that could not be easily gamed? Why introduce a tiered system without enforcement triggers, verification protocols, or clear legal definitions from day one?

Because this was never about precision. It was about presentation.

Announce big numbers. Appear responsive. Deal with the consequences later.
Now the consequences have arrived—and instead of recalibrating policy, the Government is criminalizing predictable behavior.

That is not accountability. That is panic management.

The rice sector does not need threats. It needs competence. It needs policies that are thought through, stress-tested, and grounded in the realities farmers face daily—not improvised measures that collapse under the weight of their own contradictions.

Band-aid governance will always produce bleeding outcomes.

And no amount of warning from a podium can patch what was fundamentally broken at the design stage.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮,𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

Two gas projects, many more questions, concerns

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This is a fine example of fiscal prudence, quality leadership, visionary governance.  Two Gas-to-Energy (GTE) projects, and Guyana’s biggest national budget ever is jostling for first place with the two GTEs relative to which requires more billions.  From what is known publicly, the Wales GTE holds steady at US$2.102 billion.  Included is the US$102 million Lindsayca-CH4 won in its soil stability dispute with Guyana.  It is also asking for, more like demanding, an additional US$250 million to get the two remaining jobs it contracted for done.  Namely, completing the gas conversion facility and the power generation plant.  When that US$250 million is added, the Wales GTE is set to cost US$2.352 billion (more than GY$500 billion).  Aside: Pres. Ali has made sanctity of contract the backbone of his refusal to renegotiate the Exxon oil contract.  Let’s see how he responds to Lindsayca-CH4’s push to squeeze another quarter billion US$ out of Guyana.  If he approves, it would hoist the original contract figure of US$759 million for the two unfinished facilities to over US$1 billion.

Though the completion and operationalizing of the Wales GTE is nowhere near to the finish line, a second GTE, this time for Berbice, has made its way into the national consciousness and conversation.  Reports are that it would cost at least twice the price of the Wales GTE.  The Wales GTE is causing Guyana no ends of trouble (reengineering and working around, delays, cost overruns, suitability, and so forth), but Guyana’s movers and shakers are being drawn into another GTE at twice the cost.  It could be asserted with reasonable assurance that the GTE projects will come very close to US$7 billion, if not more (US$2.342 billion for Wales, and US$4.64 billion for the Berbice GTE.  Though he didn’t offer any specific figures, Exxon’s Mr. Alistair Routledge made that clear, set that expectation.  Two GTE projects and a record national budget could be overtaken relative to dollars needed.  The 2026 budget was GY$1.558 trillion.  With Wales and Berbice considered, that’s US$7 billion which will be needed.  I urge my fellow citizens to keep the math simple. Pick a low USD: GY exchange rate.  The result veers uncomfortably close to GY$1.558 trillion that was Guyana’s biggest budget ever.

Can Guyana afford to spend so much on two projects?  As dire as the need is for a cheaper, better supply of energy, does this make sense?  When the problem-plagued Wales GTE isconsidered, Guyanese who can still think for themselves are invited to weigh the value of rushing into another GTE so quickly.  Almost like a reckless gambler, who abandons restraint, and goes on a spree.  

Consequences, be damned.  It is said that a fool and his money are soon parted.  I wonder if this will be the story of Guyana, its leaders, and the decisions they make about putting to the best use the oil money that belongs to the people.  Guyana cannot get going. Guyana cannot get a break.  Guyana is on the backfoot with the Wales GTE, but plunging into a bigger one, as if stone deaf, and blindfolded.  As though there is an addiction in the PPP Govt to joining with others and finding new ways to spend more of the billions (from any source) that are owned, or will be owed, by Guyanese.

A better approach is to get the first one right, and delivering.  Only then, move to a bigger one, despite electricity deficiencies ravaging this country so much.  Delay more added to Cost Oil.  More borrowed.  More withdrawn from the Oil Fund.  If this isn’t madness, then what is?  If not madness, then everyone else is crazy.  Instead of developments and projects to build Guyana sensibly and honestly, the priority is to milk it first.  Then bleed it. Party time, folks.


𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮,𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—