GHOSTS OF THE PHANTOM SQUAD

THE 592 GUARDIAN | INVESTIGATIVE EDITORIAL

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE EDITORIAL

GHOSTS OF THE PHANTOM SQUAD

AK-47s, Venezuelan Gangsters, and a Government That Has Seen This Before

The 592 Guardian | Accountability Journalism for the Guyanese Citizen Georgetown, Guyana · June 2026

Thirty-three AK-47 assault rifles. Two separate seizures. In less than a month. One government that has, so far, said almost nothing of substance — and one city businessman with a record that reads less like a dossier and more like a warning that was never heeded. The 592 Guardian submits that what Guyana is witnessing is not an isolated law enforcement story. It is the re-emergence of a structural pathology that this country has paid for before in blood, impunity, and institutional decay. And the current administration’s silence is not merely politically inconvenient. It is, given what history has already documented, an indictment in itself.

On June 5, 2026, a routine-sounding police search in Farm, East Bank Demerara became anything but. Officers acting on intelligence intercepted a vehicle at Schoonard, West Bank Demerara, and found 23 AK-47 rifles and 503 rounds of matching ammunition. A Venezuelan national, Jonathan Gans, was arrested at the scene. Days later, a wanted bulletin was issued for city businessman Randy Jagdeo and one Orlando Gabriel. Jagdeo — now 40 years old — surrendered to the Criminal Investigation Department on Sunday, accompanied by his attorney. He remained in custody as of press time.

This was the second such seizure in less than a month. In late May, ten AK-47-style rifles were intercepted in Berbice. Three Guyanese nationals are currently before the courts in connection with that matter. The serial numbers on most of the June cache had been obliterated. Deputy Police Commissioner Wendell Blanhum confirmed the weapons were manufactured in the United States.

Thirty-three military-grade rifles in sixty days. The GPF has no comment of substance. The Minister of Home Affairs says she is ‘still assessing.’ Guyanese have heard this cadence before.

When Demerara Waves asked Minister of Home Affairs Oneidge Walrond about the apparent motive behind two major arms seizures in rapid succession, she responded: “Still assessing. The investigation is active.” Her advisor, former minister Robeson Benn, offered only: “Guyanese always have to be concerned when guns are being pushed around.” That was it. From a government managing a country with one of the most valuable oil discoveries in the Western Hemisphere, two cabinet-level figures could not produce a single sentence about what 33 assault rifles are doing circulating through Guyanese wharves.

I.WHO IS RANDY JAGDEO — AND WHY DOES HIS RECORD MATTER

The AFC press release framing this story as a PPP protection scandal deserves scrutiny before it deserves amplification. Randy Jagdeo is not a PPP loyalist. His recent history suggests precisely the opposite political alignment — which makes the story considerably more complex and considerably more alarming than opposition talking points allow.

In May 2025, Jagdeo was charged with inciting treason following a Facebook post in which he declared that Essequibo belongs to Venezuela — a statement made, notably, while displaying signage at his ‘Thousand Dollar Store’ on the East Bank of Demerara that featured Guyana’s map with the Essequibo region excised. The charge carried the possibility of life imprisonment. In January 2026, the Diamond Magistrate’s Court threw the case out entirely, with Magistrate Dylon Bess upholding a no-case submission, finding the charge legally flawed and unsupported by sufficient evidence.

Tren De Aragua

Step back and read that sequence again. A Guyanese businessman publicly expressed sympathy for Venezuela’s territorial claims over Essequibo. His treason charge collapsed in court. Months later, he surfaces in connection with 23 AK-47s being transported by Venezuelan nationals. One of those nationals — Jonathan Gans — was arrested at the scene. Security officials, speaking on background to Demerara Waves, said they believe the weapons were destined for mining sector gangs or border networks, and that Tren de Aragua — the Venezuelan criminal organization with transnational reach — may be extending its footprint westward into Guyana.

A man who publicly sided with Venezuela on Essequibo. A treason charge that dissolved. Then Venezuelan nationals and 23 AK-47s. The 592 Guardian does not assert guilt. We assert that these facts demand answers no one in authority is providing.

The 592 Guardian does not assert that Randy Jagdeo is guilty of anything beyond what has been proven. What we do assert is this: the convergence of a pro-Venezuela public posture, a collapsed treason prosecution, and a subsequent arms trafficking investigation involving Venezuelan co-accused is not a coincidence that a responsible government can afford to treat with ‘still assessing.’ It is a national security threat that demands transparent, publicly communicated investigation — and it is receiving neither.

II.THE GHOST IN THE ROOM: ROGER KHAN AND THE PHANTOM SQUAD

The AFC’s invocation of Roger Khan is not mere electioneering. It is a reference to a chapter of Guyanese governance that was proven, prosecuted in a United States federal court, and never domestically reckoned with. For any reader unfamiliar with that chapter, The 592 Guardian submits the following record — not as historical color, but as living institutional precedent.

Between 2002 and 2006, Guyana was in the grip of a crime wave triggered by the escape of five prisoners from Camp Street Prison on February 23, 2002. Criminal gangs, most notoriously that of Rondell ‘Fineman’ Rawlins, conducted robberies, murders, and massacres. The Guyana Police Force was outmatched. Into that vacuum stepped Shaheed ‘Roger’ Khan — an Indo-Guyanese cocaine trafficker with construction and forestry businesses as cover, Colombian supply lines, and connections that reached into the highest offices of the People’s Progressive Party government led by President Bharrat Jagdeo.

What Khan ran was not a private security firm. It was an extrajudicial killing unit — the Phantom Squad — staffed largely by former police officers, armed with military-grade weapons, and operating with what prosecutors and WikiLeaks cables later established was de facto state protection. The squad’s primary targets were Afro-Guyanese criminal figures. The ethnic geometry of that targeting was not incidental. It was the entire point.

Khan later advertised in local newspapers — in his own name — that he had been fighting crime on behalf of the Bharrat Jagdeo-led government. The government denied it. The US federal court record told a different story.

The evidentiary record is not circumstantial. In December 2002, Khan and associates were intercepted by a Guyana Defense Force patrol driving an armored vehicle. Inside: military arms, and a Cellular Protocol Analyzer — a Smith Myers CSM 7806, sophisticated telephone interception equipment that is sold only with government authorization. The GDF detained them. They were released hours later on direct orders from Presidential Secretariat Head Roger Luncheon, who directed the return of all equipment.

In US federal court proceedings, Smith Myers co-director testimony confirmed the cellular intercept equipment used by Khan’s network had been sold to the Government of Guyana. Court exhibits showed the purchase was received on behalf of the government by then Health Minister Dr. Leslie Ramsammy. An independent contractor subsequently traveled to Guyana to train Khan and his associates in the equipment’s use. Dr. Ramsammy denied any knowledge of Khan or the surveillance device. The exhibits bearing his signature were entered into the court record regardless.

Among those killed as a direct result of communications intercepted using that equipment: Ronald Waddell, a popular Afro-Guyanese political talk show host, shot outside his East Bank Demerara home on January 30, 2006. And Donald Allison, youth organizer and boxing coach. A former Phantom Squad member turned DEA and FBI informant, Selwyn Vaughn, testified under oath to the operational details of Waddell’s execution — the surveillance, the call to Khan, the four former police officers who arrived in a burgundy Toyota AT 192 armed with automatic weapons.

A WikiLeaks cable from the US Embassy in Georgetown, later made public, is unambiguous: it states that Home Affairs Minister Ronald Gajraj orchestrated Guyana’s death squads in 2002-03, certainly in close collaboration with Khan,’ and that Luncheon ‘intervened and ordered the authorities to release Khan and return his equipment.’ The cable also notes that PPP government leaders ‘were comfortable with Khan because they thought he was on their side,’ and expressed anxiety about the prospect of a criminal kingpin aligned with the political opposition.

The PPP was not merely tolerant of a drug lord. According to a US Embassy cable, a US federal court record, and Khan’s own public statements, it was his client. The question in 2026 is whether the institutional appetite for that arrangement was ever truly extinguished.

What happened to the principals? Gajraj resigned under international pressure and was appointed High Commissioner to India — a soft landing that became a template. A presidential commission of inquiry, chaired by then Acting Chief Justice Ian Chang, found ‘no credible evidence’ of Gajraj’s involvement in extrajudicial killings. The inquiry’s conclusions were contested by virtually every independent observer and contradicted by the US Embassy’s own assessment. Gajraj served in India until the government changed in 2015.

Roger Khan himself fled to Suriname in June 2006 as police closed in. Then-Justice Minister Chan Santokhi — now Suriname’s President — declared him a threat to national security. Khan was eventually extradited to the United States. He was convicted of narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and witness tampering. He was sentenced to fifteen years. He returned to Guyana in September 2019 after serving approximately ten years. He was questioned about the murders of Ronald Waddell and Donald Allison. He was released on station bail days later. The charges were dropped. No evidence, it was said.

Roger Khan, as of the date of this editorial, is a free man in Guyana. The 592 Guardian formally asks: has he been questioned in connection with, or eliminated from, the current investigation into 33 AK-47 rifles moving through Guyanese wharves?

III. THE VENEZUELAN VECTOR: TREN DE ARAGUA AND GUYANA’S EXPOSED FLANK

The Roger Khan framing, while historically essential, must not be allowed to obscure the distinct and equally alarming security dimension of this crisis: the Venezuelan criminal penetration of Guyanese territory. These may be related phenomena — or they may be parallel tracks that intersect at the point of arms supply. Either possibility is grave.

Tren de Aragua is not a street gang. It is a transnational criminal organiZation that originated in the Tocoron Prison in Aragua state, Venezuela, and has since expanded across at least a dozen countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Its documented activities include arms trafficking, narcotics distribution, human trafficking, contract killing, and — increasingly — the provision of coercive services to state and non-state actors in territories where Venezuelan influence is being projected. Security analysts have documented its relationship with elements of the Maduro government as instrumentally symbiotic: the organization operates freely where it serves state interests and is contained where it does not.

Against that backdrop, the presence of Venezuelan nationals as primary movers in both the May Berbice seizure and the June Schoonard seizure is not a footnote. It is the story. Background sources cited by Demerara Waves believe the weapons were destined for mining sector networks or border gangs — and express the view that Tren de Aragua is actively expanding westward into Guyana. This aligns with the documented pattern of incidents along the Cuyuni River, where a GDF patrol boat was fired upon by unidentified gunmen as recently as May 29, 2026, injuring a soldier — the second such incident that month.

A GDF patrol boat fired upon on the Cuyuni. Venezuelan nationals moving AK-47s through Georgetown wharves. A businessman with public pro-Venezuela sympathies in police custody. This is not a crime story. It is a sovereignty story.

The ICJ proceedings on the Essequibo matter have not resolved the underlying pressure Venezuela applies through non-military means. Caracas has long understood that coercive presence in disputed territory — through mining networks, criminal infrastructure, and allied local facilitators — is a tool of territorial politics that costs far less than conventional military action and produces deniability that ICJ proceedings cannot easily pierce. The question The 592 Guardian raises is this: are the weapons now circulating in Guyana part of a criminal supply chain, a political intimidation infrastructure, or both? Because the answer to that question determines whether this is a GPF matter or a matter of national defense.

The GPF, to state the obvious, is not equipped to answer that question on its own. Its capacity limitations are institutional and resource-driven — not a criticism of individual officers but a structural reality. What is required is a joint intelligence assessment involving the GDF, the GPF’s organized crime unit, the DEA (which has maintained a Georgetown office since 2017), and CARICOM’s regional security architecture, to the extent that architecture can be activated. None of that has been publicly announced. The government has said it is ‘still assessing.’

IV.THE SILENCE DOCTRINE: WHAT INSTITUTIONAL NON-RESPONSE REVEALS

The AFC is wrong to frame this primarily as a PPP-protection story about Randy Jagdeo, because Jagdeo’s own public record does not support the claim that he is a PPP asset being shielded. But the AFC is entirely right to identify the government’s silence as a scandal in its own right — and the Roger Khan precedent is precisely why that silence cannot be given the benefit of the doubt.

The operating manual of PPP crisis management, as established across two decades of governance, follows a predictable sequence: initial silence, followed by minimal acknowledgment, followed by institutional process (inquiry, investigation, review) that produces findings convenient to the government, followed by the quiet resolution of the matter through reassignment, soft exile, or legal collapse. Ronald Gajraj went to India. Roger Khan’s murder charges evaporated. The Camp Street massacre inquiries produced no convictions of political significance. The pattern is not conspiracy theory. It is documented institutional history.

The silence of the Ali-Jagdeo government on 33 AK-47s is not uncertainty. It is a posture. And that posture has a name: it is called impunity management.

The specific questions that silence must be made to answer are these.

First: how did rifles — US-manufactured, with obliterated serial numbers — pass through Guyanese port infrastructure in not one but two transactions within sixty days? Wharves are regulated. Customs is a state function. Someone either missed this or facilitated it. The government owes the public a customs and port-of-entry audit, publicly disclosed.

Second: what is the status of Randy Jagdeo’s prior case — the treason matter — in relation to this investigation? The collapse of that prosecution deserves re-examination in light of his current circumstances. The 592 Guardian does not suggest the earlier charge was validly framed — the magistrate’s ruling suggests otherwise. But the pattern of a man with documented pro-Venezuela public positions being in proximity to a Venezuelan-linked arms network is a pattern that prosecutorial authorities have an obligation to examine in its totality, not in isolated case files.

Third: what is the current status of Roger Khan in Guyana, and has he been interviewed as part of any intelligence assessment related to the current arms proliferation? The 592 Guardian acknowledges this question may seem like a reach to some readers. We submit that given Khan’s documented history of arms procurement, his established criminal networks, and the fact that he has been a free man in this country for seven years with no accountability for any of the acts he admitted to, the question is not a reach. It is due diligence.

V.WHAT ACCOUNTABILITY DEMANDS

The 592 Guardian does not traffic in conspiracy. We traffic in documented pattern, institutional precedent, and the editorial obligation to ask what powerful entities prefer not to answer. On the basis of what has been established — in US federal courts, in WikiLeaks cables, in the public record of the Phantom Squad era, and in the current facts of two arms seizures and a government that cannot find its voice — we make the following editorial demands.

The Ministry of Home Affairs must provide a public briefing — not a press statement — on the results of its ‘assessment,’ including a timeline of both seizures, the known movement of the weapons through Guyanese territory, and the status of all persons in custody. ‘Active investigation’ cannot be a shield against public accountability on matters of this gravity.

The Guyana Revenue Authority and the Customs Anti-Narcotic Unit must commission and publish an audit of port-of-entry controls that speaks directly to how military-grade weapons are entering Guyana undetected. If that audit reveals systemic failure, the responsible officials must be identified. If it reveals facilitation, those individuals must be prosecuted.

The National Assembly must hold an emergency session on national security. The Speaker — whose own record of institutional responsiveness The 592 Guardian has previously documented — must convene that session within fourteen days. Parliamentary oversight of the security apparatus is not optional in a constitutional democracy.

And the government must answer, publicly and on the record, whether any domestic intelligence assessment has been made of Tren de Aragua’s presence in Guyana — and if so, what its findings are and what response has been authorized.

THE ROT IN THE PLOT

Guyana has been here before. A crime wave it could not contain. A state that found it more convenient to outsource violence than to build institutions. A drug lord with an armored vehicle, military weapons, and government-restricted surveillance equipment — released the same day he was detained, by order of the Presidential Secretariat.

That chapter did not end cleanly. It ended with unmarked graves, with a talk show host shot in his driveway, with a boxing coach killed on intelligence gathered by equipment the Health Minister signed for, and with a drug lord who served ten years in an American prison and returned to Guyana to face — nothing.

We do not know, as of this writing, whether Randy Jagdeo is a criminal, a facilitator, a dupe, or a man in the wrong place at the wrong time. The courts will determine that. What we do know is that 33 military-grade rifles have entered this country in sixty days, that Venezuelan nationals are the primary movers, that a man with documented pro-Venezuela public sympathies is in custody, that the border is being probed with live fire, and that the government’s response to all of it is silence dressed up as process.

The light is in. The rot is visible. What remains to be seen is whether any institution in this country has the will to act on what it illuminates — or whether Guyana will wait, as it has before, for an American federal court to tell us what happened in our own wharves.

The 592 Guardian is an independent accountability journalism outlet covering Guyanese governance, public finance, and regional geopolitics.

Editorial correspondence: editor@the592guardian.com