THE 592 GUARDIAN — INDEPENDENT EDITORIAL Holding Power Accountable Since the Oil Boom 

MONDAY JUNE 01, 2026, EDITORIAL GUYANA — ENERGY & GOVERNANCE 

SPECIAL EDITORIAL 

BY: Hem Kumar

Held to Ransom:   

A Nation That Cannot Stop Shooting Itself 

A damning letter from a Turkish barge operator is not just a power crisis. It is the final bill arriving for decades of reckless contracting, grand promises, and a government that has never once been held accountable for the wreckage it leaves behind. 

THE EDITORIAL BOARD

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THE 592 GUARDIAN

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01 JUNE 2026 

A letter arrived last Sunday at the Ministry of Public Works. It was polite in tone, measured in language, and devastating in consequence. Signed jointly by Beyza Özdemir, Americas Director of Commercial Operations for Karadeniz Powership Yasin Bey, and Antonio Neto, Managing Director of Urbacon Concessions Investments, it informed the Government of Guyana that it could not be granted the thirty days it had begged for. Instead, it was being given until June 1 — this Monday — to accept a new pricing structure. Or the lights go out in New Amsterdam. 

The government, which stewards one of the most oil-rich nations on earth, was effectively on its knees before a barge operator, pleading for extra time. That image should shock every Guyanese. It does not arrive from nowhere. It is the logical endpoint of a pattern of governance so consistent in its failure,so brazen in its disregard for accountability, that it has become the defining feature of how this country manages its public resources. 

“Alignment and unification of the commercial terms and pricing structure across all country operations remain essential requirements for the continuation of the arrangement.”

— LETTER FROM KARPOWERSHIP/URBACON TO MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 25 MAY 2026 — TRANSLATION: ACCEPT OUR PRICE HIKE OR GO DARK. 

I THE LETTER AND WHAT IT REALLY SAYS 

The document, Ref. No. GY-071, is a masterclass in corporate coercion dressed as diplomacy. The two companies acknowledge that the original Powership Time Charter Plus Agreement expired on May 21, 2026. They note, with generous self-congratulation, that they have “continued services beyond the original contract expiry” out of “good faith.” They then decline the government’s written request — made in desperation on May 22 — for a thirty-day extension, granting instead a single week ending June 1. 

But the most telling line is buried mid-letter: the insistence on “alignment and unification of the commercial terms and pricing structure across all country operations.” In plain language, Guyana is being told it must now accept the same inflated, standardized rates Karpowership charges across its entire global fleet — rates which, as this newspaper has documented, have been vigorously contested in Pakistan, Lebanon, and South Africa as exploitative and opaque. 

This is not a negotiation. This is a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum issued to a nation that has no alternative. And the reason Guyana has no alternative is entirely a story of its own government’s making.

II THE FINANCIAL ANATOMY OF THE DEAL

When GPL inked its first contract with Urbacon Concessions Investments W.L.L. — the Qatari-registered shell company that serves as the local face of Turkey’s Karpowership International — on April 13, 2024, it did so under a corporate arrangement designed to obscure accountability. UCC Holdings is incorporated in Qatar. Its strategic partner is a Turkish company. Its managing director signed this week’s ultimatum letter. The chain of liability is long, the chain of proTt is short, and it runs directly to Istanbul. 

US$884M

ESTIMATED TOTAL ADDITIONAL                          COST FROM GTE DELAYS,INCLUDING RENTALS, FUEL &       LEGAL SETTLEMENTS

US$619M

HEAVY FUEL OIL IMPORT BILL FOR THE TWO-YEAR POWERSHIP RENTAL PERIOD ALONE

US $97M  SETTLEMENT PAID TO LINDSAYCA/CH4 AFTER THE GOVERNMENT LOST ITS OWN  LEGAL SETTLEMENTS  ARBITRATION  US$116M  KARPOWERSHIP’S WINNING BID  FOR THE 60MW DEMERARA  VESSEL — THE HIGHEST AMONG  ALL BIDDERS

The terms of the 36MW Berbice vessel deal set the stage: GPL agreed to pay 6.62 US cents per kilowatt hour as a monthly charter fee, plus a separate 0.98 US cents per kWh for operation and maintenance. That is before fuel. GPL is responsible for supplying the Heavy Fuel Oil itself. Former minister David Patterson was unambiguous: when all costs are aggregated, the true price of this power exceeded 55 US cents per megawatt, and the two-year bill would top US$200 million for the 36MW ship alone. 

When the government returned to the same company for the second, 60MW

vessel, competing bidders had offered to supply similar capacity for as little as US$37.7 million. Karpowership bid US$116.4 million — more than three times the lowest offer — and won. Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo conformed the award and offered the public a negotiated reduction from $0.1117 to $0.095 per kWh as consolation. The arithmetic of that generosity remains unexplained. 

DOCUMENTED 

The Two-Year Damage Sheet: A document presented to the National Assembly on April 22, 2025, revealed the combined daily rental cost of both ships at GY$48,847,450 — a staggering GY$35.6 billion over two years, or approximately US$165.8 million in charter fees alone. GPL’s fuel bill, separately, stands at GY$47 billion per annum, with 93% of that being imported Heavy Fuel Oil. Prime Minister Mark Phillips revealed in 2026 a 74.8% average increase in fuel import costs since the start of the year — costs the Guyanese taxpayer absorbs entirely. 

III THE ROOT CAUSE: GAS-TO-ENERGY AND THE BRIDGE THAT NEVER ENDED 

None of this would have been necessary had the Gas-to-Energy (GTE) project delivered on its central promise: cheaper, cleaner baseload power from Guyana’s own offshore gas reserves by the end of 2024. That promise was made repeatedly, loudly, and with the full authority of the state. It was not kept. 

When first conceived, the GTE project carried a price tag of US$478 million. By 2026, that figure had bloated past US$2 billion — with some analysts warning the final total, inclusive of grid upgrades, legal settlements, and delay costs, could approach US$3 billion. The ExxonMobil-built offshore pipeline was completed on schedule in 2024. It now lies idle, filled with nitrogen to prevent corrosion, waiting on a power plant that has not arrived. 

2018 — PROMISE MADE

GTE project announced at an estimated cost of US$478 million. Cheaper electricity “for all Guyanese” pledged as the cornerstone of the oil wealth dividend. 

EARLY 2024 — FIRST MISS 

Completion pushed from end-2024 to Q4 2025. GTE Task Force head Winston Brassington cites work delays, late equipment deliveries, and foundation issues at the Wales site. 

APRIL 2024 — THE BARGE ARRIVES 

GPL signs emergency contract with Urbacon/Karpowership for 36MW power ship at New Amsterdam. The “temporary” bridge solution begins. US$1M mobilization fee paid upfront. 

LATE 2024 — SECOND BARGE, HIGHER PRICE 

Government awards second Karpowership contract for 60MW — at US$116M, the highest bid submitted, beating competitors by as much as US$78 million. 

2025 — LEGAL DEFEAT 

Government loses arbitration against contractor CH4-Lindsayca and is forced to pay a US$97M settlement. Legal fees add approximately US$2M more. CH4 subsequently dissolves from the consortium; Lindsayca continues alone. 

MAY 2026 — THE ULTIMATUM 

Contract expires May 21. Government begs for 30-day extension May 22. Karpowership refuses. The nation is given until June 1 to accept new pricing terms — in secret, with no public disclosure, until a leaked document exposed the crisis.

IV THE COMPANY’S GLOBAL TRAIL OF CONTROVERSY 

The Guyana government, in its rush to the power ship solution, either did not perform due diligence on Karpowership’s global record — or it did and proceeded regardless. Either conclusion is troubling. 

In Pakistan, a Karadeniz subsidiary was accused of paying politically connected middlemen over US$5 million to clinch a five -year contract worth US$565 million. Pakistan’s Supreme Court rescinded the deal in 2012, triggering a seven-year legal battle and a continuing corruption investigation. In Lebanon, the company stands accused of paying commissions to a company linked to politically connected businessmen; the country’s financial public prosecutor impounded both operating ships as surety for a potential US$25 million fine. In Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Sudan, the company has been accused by US Senate investigators of deliberately causing blackouts to gain financial leverage during contract renegotiations — a playbook that Guyana’s current predicament should render hauntingly familiar. 

Investigators from South Africa’s amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism described the Karpowership business model with clinical precision: the company had “shifted decisively from being a provider of short-term power supply for urgent temporary shortfalls, to effectively making itself the costly solution to permanent ’emergencies.'” The company’s own founder once acknowledged, in a communication reviewed by US diplomatic sources, that the power ship “is intended as a short- to mid-term solution to help a country’s leadership mitigate potential social or political unrest.” The pitch is not about energy security. It is about political survival — and the price of that survival compounds annually. 

“The company shifted decisively from being a provider of short term power to making itself the costly solution to permanent ’emergencies.'” 

— AMABHUNGANE CENTRE FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, ON KARPOWERSHIP’S GLOBAL BUSINESS MODEL 

THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME. THIS IS THE PATTERN.

The tragedy of the power ship crisis is not that it is surprising. It is that it is entirely predictable — the latest chapter in a decades-long pattern of megaproject mismanagement that has drained the Guyanese treasury across successive administrations, with the same architects, the same excuses, and the same absence of consequence. 

The Skeldon Sugar Factory, built by Chinese contractor CNTIC at a cost of approximately US$187–200 million — a sum that at the time exceeded the entire national budget — was commissioned in 2009 and never functioned as designed. It did not modernize GuySuCo; it accelerated its collapse. The contagion of its failure spread to every other sugar factory in the country. Guyana is still repaying the loans. The factory’s roof has since caved in. The debt, per the Caribbean Development Bank loan terms, runs until 2033. 

The Amaila Falls Hydro Project — another “transformative” energy solution — consumed over US$100 million before being abandoned. It left behind no power, no infrastructure, and a template for how grand announcements and opaque contracting can consume public funds without producing public benefit. 

The Cheddi Jagan International Airport expansion, the Sheriff Street Mandela Avenue road project, the Surendra Specialty Hospital: each a variation on the same story. Foreign contractors, cost overruns, deadline extensions, legal disputes, and a public that is informed only after the damage has been done. 

DOCUMENTED

The Pattern, Documented: “Afer losing some US$200 million in the Skeldon Sugar Factory, over US$100 million in the Amaila Falls Hydro Project, around US$100 million in the Surendra Specialty Hospital and a litany of impetuous sojourns, it seems that Guyana is witnessing an antithesis of The Midas Touch” — Kaieteur News analysis, October 2025. When GTE is added to this ledger, the cumulative cost of the PPP/C government’s failed megaprojects exceeds half a billion US dollars, excluding the ongoing power ship rental and fuel bills. 

VI THE ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT 

There is a structural reason these failures repeat. It is not incompetence alone, though there is incompetence. It is the near-total absence of public accountability in the contracting process. The details of the power ship agreements were not proactively disclosed. The scale of the GTE cost overruns was not proactively disclosed. The government’s legal defeat against Lindsayca and the resulting US$97 million settlement was not proactively disclosed. The approaching contract expiry — and the company’s pricing demands — was not proactively disclosed. Guyana, an oil-rich nation with billions in natural resource revenues, learned that its electricity supply was days from collapse through a leaked letter. 

Minister Deodat Indar, to whom the ultimatum was addressed, did not respond to media requests for comment on Saturday. The government, which controls the messaging infrastructure of a state flush with petroleum revenues, chose silence. The citizens who pay the fuel bills, who absorb the charter fees, who will absorb whatever new pricing Karpowership demands — they were the last to know, and may still not know the full terms of what is being agreed in their name. 

■ THE COMPOUNDING CRISIS 

Guyana sits on a gas pipeline built and paid for, lying idle under nitrogen, while it imports Heavy Fuel Oil at GY$47 billion a year, rents foreign-owned ships at US$165 million over two years, pays out US$97 million in lost arbitration, employs a US$50,000-a-month consultancy with reported ties to officials, and now faces an undisclosed price increase from a company with a documented global history of leveraging dependency for financial gain. 

Every dollar of this was preventable. None of it has been accounted for. No official has resigned. No contractor has been blacklisted. No independent public inquiry has been ordered. 

VII WHAT MUST HAPPEN NOW 

The immediate crisis must be managed — Guyana cannot negotiate from cold and dark. But managing the immediate crisis cannot become the permanent excuse for burying the larger accountability reckoning. This newspaper calls for the following, without equivocation: 

Full public disclosure of the new pricing terms being negotiated with Karpowership, before they are signed. The Guyanese public is the paying party. It has the right to know the cost before commitment, not after. 

An independent parliamentary inquiry into how a nation with the fastest growing oil economy in the Western Hemisphere arrived at a point where a foreign barge company could threaten its power supply with one week’s notice. This inquiry must have subpoena authority, public hearings, and a mandate to examine the GTE procurement, the Karpowership award process, and the Urbacon/UCC corporate structure. 

Accountability for the GTE delays. Winston Brassington has overseen a project that ballooned from US$478 million to over US$2 billion, missed its delivery date by more than two years, required an emergency foreign rental that will cost nearly US$900 million in total, and lost a US$97 million arbitration. These are not abstractions. They are Guyanese dollars that will not build schools, hospitals, or roads. 

A moratorium on emergency no-bid contracts of the type that delivered Karpowership its Guyanese monopoly. The procurement record shows that better, cheaper alternatives existed at every stage. They were not chosen.

A nation that cannot account for the past is condemned to repeat it. Guyana has repeated it in sugar, in hydro, in roads, in airports, in hospitals, and now — most expensively — in energy. The letter dated May 25, Ref. No. GY-071, is not merely a power company pressing for better rates. It is the invoice for years of decisions made without transparency, without competition, and without consequence. Until those conditions change, the next invoice is already being written. 

The lights may stay on after June 1. The reckoning, however, is overdue. 

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THE 592 GUARDIAN | EDITORIAL BOARD | 31 MAY 2026 

ALL FIGURES SOURCED FROM NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS, GPL PRESS RELEASES, KAIETEUR NEWS, STABROEK NEWS, AND AMABHUNGANE CENTRE FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM.