Justice for All, Not Speed for the Select Few

Justice for All, Not Speed for the Select Few

A Chronicle letter writer – Cedric Lord states that” a judiciary must be mindful of public confidence ” We agree with his statement and choose to expound on this statement.

Lord’s letter identifies a real and serious issue: delays in Guyana’s courts can erode confidence in justice. But it weakens its own argument by appearing to demand urgency principally in one politically prominent extradition matter, rather than confronting the broader, systemic backlog that affects ordinary citizens every day.

The Chief Magistrate’s statement that the court “will control its own pace” may understandably sound blunt, particularly against public concern about the duration of the proceedings. Still, a magistrate must retain control of proceedings, including the pace at which evidence is admitted, objections are addressed, cross-examination is conducted, and legal rights are protected.

A court cannot be expected to accelerate merely because a case is high-profile, politically charged, or of interest to powerful actors.

Judicial independence is not immunity from criticism. Courts can and should be held accountable for unnecessary adjournments, poor case management, unexplained delays, and inefficient procedures. But public commentary must avoid crossing into an effort to pressure a judicial officer toward a particular timetable or outcome in a live proceeding.

The proper standard should apply consistently: prompt, fair, transparent justice for every litigant—not expedited justice for the cases that dominate the headlines.

Mr. Lord’s appeal would have been far stronger had he addressed the full condition of the judiciary. Many citizens have waited years simply for civil claims, land disputes, family matters, criminal trials, probate cases, or appeals to be heard. Some have seen witnesses disappear, documents become unavailable, finances collapse, and personal lives remain in limbo while matters languish without meaningful movement. Those litigants deserve the same urgency now being demanded in the Mohamed extradition proceedings.

There is also an important distinction between delay caused by court administration and time consumed by due process. Repeated adjournments without justification, unavailable court dates, missing files, insufficient judicial resources, and weak case-flow management deserve scrutiny and reform. But cross-examination, applications, appeals, evidentiary objections, and legal arguments are not automatically “delay tactics”; they may be legitimate safeguards in a process that could result in a person being surrendered to another state.

The principle ought to be:

Justice delayed is justice denied—but justice rushed can be justice crushed.

A credible call for reform would therefore urge the judiciary, government, Bar Association, prosecutors, defense counsel, and court administration to improve efficiency across the entire system. That would include more judges and magistrates where needed, reliable court calendars, firm but fair case-management rules, better digitisation and records systems, published data on backlogs, reasons for extended adjournments, and equal attention to the ordinary litigant whose case has remained unheard for years.

In short, the judiciary must indeed be mindful of public confidence. But public confidence is not secured by demanding speed in one selected case. It is secured when every citizen—regardless of wealth, political profile, connections, or media attention—can reasonably expect a hearing that is fair, independent, and concluded within a reasonable time.