The Missing Port Files: What Became of the Chinese Studies?

592GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

The Missing Port Files: What Became of the Chinese Studies?

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OPINION BY : Hem Kumar October 2026

But before the Government of Guyana commits the country to another round of consultants, feasibility exercises and foreign financing discussions, it must answer a basic question: what became of the work already undertaken by Chinese companies on the very same deep-water-port proposition?

China State Construction Engineering Corporation was engaged to conduct a preliminary study into a deep-water harbor at the mouth of the Berbice River. Dalian Port Corporation also examined the Berbice port proposition. Those were not casual conversations. They involved technical engagement on an infrastructure project that Government now describes as nationally strategic.

Today, however, the public is being told to look instead to Bechtel, a US engineering giant; to Hess-funded preliminary engineering work; to possible US Export-Import Bank financing for another stage of design; and to unspecified interest from Qatar. The project has moved through Chinese, US corporate, US engineering, US export-credit and Gulf-financing channels—yet the Guyanese people have not been given a full account of what happened in between.

That silence is unacceptable.

A simple question

If Chinese firms had already undertaken studies, where are the results?

Did the studies conclude that the Berbice port was technically viable? Did they identify a preferred location? Did they assess dredging needs, berth depth, cargo volumes, road access, environmental risks, rail potential, industrial zones and the economics of moving Brazilian goods through Guyana?

Or did those studies find that the project could not meet the commercial test?

The Government cannot now spend further public money on feasibility work, while refusing to disclose whether earlier studies reached conclusions that are relevant to the present exercise. If the Chinese studies were incomplete, Government should say so. If they were inadequate, Government should identify the deficiencies. If they were completed, their findings should be published.

There can be no credible national planning process in which every new foreign partner starts from zero while previous studies disappear into official drawers.

Who ended the Chinese pathway?

The more serious question is why the Chinese pathway was abandoned.

Was there a decision by Cabinet? Was it a ministerial decision? Was a memorandum of understanding allowed to lapse? Did the companies withdraw? Did the parties fail to agree on finance, ownership, construction rights, land, concessions or rates of return?

Or was Guyana encouraged—directly or indirectly—to move away from Chinese involvement and toward a US-centered project structure?

The public deserves a clear answer because the project has changed character. The initial Chinese interest was associated with a deep-water harbor and wider industrial or export-processing possibilities. The current model is increasingly tied to US engineering, possible US export-credit financing, regional trade with Brazil, gas-linked industry and strategic infrastructure planning.

That may be the right direction. But it cannot be treated as self-evidently right simply because the new partners are American.

Financing is not free

US Export-Import Bank interest may be useful, but Guyana must understand what it means before celebrating it as an achievement. Export-credit finance is designed to support exports from the lending country. It can shape procurement, equipment sourcing, contractor selection and the wider commercial ecosystem around a project.

That raises questions Government must answer openly:

♦ What conditions would attach to US EXIM financing?

♦  Would Guyana have to procure US goods, services, contractors or technology?

♦ Would the State provide sovereign guarantees, land concessions, tax exemptions or minimum-revenue assurances?

♦ Would any financing require that Chinese firms, equipment or capital be excluded?

♦ What would be the total repayment cost to Guyana over the life of the loan?

♦ Would Guyanese companies receive genuine equity, contracts and decision-making authority—or merely small subcontracting opportunities?

Guyana must not exchange one dependency for another under the language of “strategic partnership.”

Bechtel needs scrutiny too

Bechtel’s technical competence is not the issue. The issue is public transparency.

How was Bechtel selected? Was there a competitive process? What are its exact terms of reference? How much is Guyana paying for the current feasibility work? What studies and data from the Chinese firms, the Inter-American Development Bank and Hess-funded pre-FEED work are being used?

Most importantly, is Bechtel’s work independently testing the project’s commercial viability, or is it being conducted to justify a political decision already made?

A deep-water port is not bankable because it has a powerful foreign engineering firm attached to it. It becomes bankable when there is independently verified cargo demand, reliable infrastructure links, enforceable user commitments, realistic tariffs, viable construction costs and transparent risk allocation.

The test is bankability

The Berbice port is being presented as a doorway to Brazil. That ambition may be sound. But a port cannot survive on speeches, maps and geopolitical enthusiasm.

It needs cargo. It needs a road capable of moving that cargo reliably from the Brazilian frontier to the coast. It needs customs, border services, storage, logistics systems, security and a functioning commercial corridor. It needs shipping lines and exporters prepared to sign contracts. It needs a clear answer to whether cargo moving through Guyana will truly be faster, cheaper and more dependable than competing routes.

If the port is expected to support fertilizer plants, data centers, refining or gas-related industry, those projects too must be real—not just aspirational additions designed to make an uncertain port look viable.

Before Guyana borrows or grants concessions for a US$1 billion to US$2 billion project, the public must see the demand study, traffic forecasts, expected revenue, environmental assessment, financing terms and worst-case liabilities.

Publish the record

The Government should immediately release:

♦ The agreement, memorandum or terms under which China State Construction Engineering Corporation was engaged.

♦ Any report, draft report, data, technical drawings or correspondence arising from that engagement.

♦ The record of Dalian Port Corporation’s involvement and any proposals it submitted.

♦ The decision that ended, suspended or displaced the Chinese route.

♦ The procurement and contractual documents governing Bechtel’s current assignment.

♦ The Hess-funded pre-FEED findings, subject only to legitimate commercial confidentiality.

♦ The terms of any US EXIM letter of interest and all conditions attached to prospective financing.

♦ The location-analysis criteria for Crab Island and the former CGX shorebase site.

♦ The full feasibility study once completed, before any binding construction, financing or concession agreement is signed.

A sovereign project needs sovereign answers

Guyana has every right to work with the United States, China, Qatar, Brazil, multilateral institutions and private investors. Diversifying partners is not the problem. The danger arises when strategic national infrastructure is moved from one foreign orbit to another without transparency, competition or parliamentary scrutiny.

The port must not become a geopolitical trophy, a consultancy conveyor belt or another project in which Guyanese taxpayers carry the risks while foreign firms secure the contracts and the strategic leverage.

Did the United States request, encourage, condition financing upon, or otherwise influence the exclusion of Chinese participation in the port project? If not, publish the documentary record that settles the matter.

The Government cannot credibly present the Berbice deep-water-port initiative as a wholly new undertaking without accounting for the work already commissioned or explored by Chinese companies. China State Construction Engineering Corporation was engaged to conduct a preliminary study at the mouth of the Berbice River, while Dalian Port Corporation also examined the Berbice deep-water-port proposition.

The subsequent emergence of Bechtel, Hess-backed pre-FEED work and prospective US EXIM financing raises a legitimate question: why did the Chinese pathway disappear, and was Guyana’s strategic infrastructure policy redirected by geopolitical pressure rather than an open, transparent and competitive national process?

The Government’s first duty is not to protect the sensitivities of Washington, Beijing, Doha, Bechtel, Chevron or any other external actor. Its duty is to the people of Guyana.

That duty begins with the missing Chinese studies.