The Penalty That Never Comes

592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

The Penalty That Never Comes

INVESTIGATION · WALES GAS-TO-ENERGY

Lindsayca’s insolvency warning is the third act of a script Guyana keeps refusing to end— while Guyanese are made to pay the price–faced with incessant blackouts that never seem to end.

OPINION BY : Editor – September 2026

By September’s end, Lindsayca Guyana Inc; the contractor entrusted with the single largest infrastructure undertaking in this country’s history — is projected to run out of money. Kaieteur News reports the company has asked the Government of Guyana for approximately US$170 million more, a 22 percent markup on its original US$759 million contract, and has proposed converting a fixed-price construction agreement into a cost-plus arrangement: an open tab, paid for by the Guyanese public, for a company that has now missed its delivery date at least twice.

None of this is new. What is worth naming is the pattern underneath it.

A CLAUSE WITH TEETH, VOLUNTARILY PULLED

In May 2026, when government and Lindsayca settled a Dispute Avoidance–Adjudication Board ruling over defective soil conditions at the Wales site, the resolution did more than add US$97 million to the contract price. Buried in the Prime Minister’s own announcement was this: both parties agreed to forgo the respective rights to historical liquidated damages, capped at 10 percent of the contract price. In plain terms, government surrendered its own contractual leverage — the financial penalty built into the agreement specifically to punish delay — in exchange for closing out one dispute.

That is not a government that forgot it had a stick. It is a government that put the stick down

THEN THE NEXT DELAY ARRIVED, AND THE STICK STAYED DOWN

By August 25, with a fresh deadline slipping, Prime Minister Mark Phillips told the country government was still deciding whether to penalize the contractor at all, choosing instead to give the company “an opportunity to deliver” toward a December 2026 target for partial power. Kaieteur News has separately reported the cumulative cost of the project’s two-year delay at close to US$884 million above the base cost of the plants themselves — paid for in higher fuel-import costs and continued reliance on rented power-ship electricity, not recovered from the company responsible.

No consequence has yet attached to two years of missed deadlines and a nine-figure funding shortfall — even as the same contractor is shortlisted for more work.

AND NOW, A THIRD ACT

Kaieteur’s reporting adds the financial endgame to the delay story: a contractor reportedly out of money, requesting nearly a quarter of its original contract value on top of what it has already been paid, while simultaneously being considered — according to Kaieteur’s sources — for two-thirds of Phase Two of the same project. That arrangement is reported to be partly designed to fold Phase One’s shortfall into a new, larger contract rather than resolve it as what it is.

At the same time the company pleads insolvency to Georgetown, its balance sheet has evidently supported six-figure sponsorships of Venezuelan golf tournaments, energy conferences in Caracas and Houston, and cultural philanthropy in Texas — spending priorities that sit uneasily beside a request for emergency public financing.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY QUESTION

This is not simply a story about cost overruns, which are common to large infrastructure projects everywhere. It is a story about a government that has, twice now, had a contractual instrument to hold a non-performing contractor to account, and twice declined to use it — first by trading it away in a settlement, then by choosing patience over consequence when the next deadline came due. Guyanese ratepayers are being asked to fund the difference both times: once through a higher contract price, and now potentially through a fundamentally restructured payment arrangement that removes the fixed-price protection altogether.

The public record does not yet show a formal default or termination clause distinct from the liquidated-damages provision already waived — if one exists, it too appears un-invoked. Either way, the operative fact is the same: no consequence has yet attached to two years of missed deadlines and a nine-figure funding shortfall, even as the same contractor is shortlisted for more work.

TIMELINE: THE ESCALATING ASK

Date	Development
Nov. 2022	CH4.Lindsayca awarded EPC contract for Wales GTE US$759M.
Jul. 2025	CH4 exits the consortium; Lindsayca commits to complete the project alone.
Jan. 2025-DAB ruling Apr 2026	Kaieteur reports Lindsayca seeking US$250M more; government disputes/denies an US$80M secret payment.
May 2026	Government confirms US$97M settlement (12.8% increase) for soil-stabilisation defects — and both parties waive rights to historical liquidated damages, capped at 10% of contract price
Aug.2026	PM Phillips says government still deciding on penalties for renewed delay; Lindsayca reportedly shortlisted for two-thirds of Phase Two (≈US$353.4M) while Phase One remains unresolved.
Sep. 2026	Lindsayca reportedly nearing insolvency by month’s end; requests ≈US$170M more (22% above original sum) and proposes converting the fixed-price contract to cost-plus.

QUESTIONS THE GUARDIAN IS PUTTING TO THE GTE TASKFORCE, THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

Does the EPC contract with Lindsayca contain a default or termination clause distinct from the liquidated-damages provision waived in May, and has it ever been considered?
What specific undertakings has Lindsayca given regarding its ability to complete the project without an equity or debt infusion, and has government sought independent verification of the company’s financial position?
If the fixed-price EPC structure is converted to cost-plus, what mechanism will cap the state’s exposure to further cost growth?
On what basis is Lindsayca being considered for Phase Two while Phase One remains unresolved and the company reports insolvency risk?

— The Board