Washington’s Echo Chamber: The Caribbean Must Not Trade Sovereignty for Access

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY INJOURNALISM♦GUYANA

Washington’s Echo Chamber: The Caribbean Must Not Trade Sovereignty for Access

OPINION BY : Hem Kumar October 2026

There is a political playbook now taking shape across the Caribbean and Latin America. It is presented in the language of partnership, security, prosperity, technology and collective action. It is wrapped in the vocabulary of fighting transnational crime, defending democracy, strengthening borders, protecting supply chains and resisting external coercion.

But beneath the attractive language lies a question that citizens of Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and the wider Caribbean must ask without fear or apology:

At what point does cooperation with the United States stop being cooperation and become compliance?

That question became impossible to ignore at the United Nations General Assembly when United States President Donald Trump announced that the world should replace the term “Artificial Intelligence” with “Superintelligence,” or “SI.” The term “artificial,” he argued, made intelligence sound fake. He said the United States would use “Superintelligence” and hoped the rest of the world would follow.

Then Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar rose and publicly declared: “I want to agree with President Trump.” She endorsed the terminology and said, “We commit to that.”

The issue was never really AI versus SI. The issue was the reflex.

Pres.Trump and PM Bissesar

A prime minister of an independent Caribbean nation had been given a choice: treat an American president’s spontaneous preference as a position to be considered, debated and evaluated—or embrace it immediately before the world. The response sent a message far beyond technology. It suggested that Washington speaks, and Port of Spain echoes. That is not what sovereignty is supposed to look like.

Sovereignty Is Not Ceremony

A country does not become sovereign merely because it possesses a flag, an anthem, a passport, a coat of arms and a seat at the United Nations.

Sovereignty is the practical ability to make independent decisions. It means a government can listen to Washington, Beijing, London, Brussels, Caracas or any other capital, but still arrive at a position because it serves the national interest—not because a powerful country has announced its preference.

A sovereign country can cooperate. It can form alliances. It can seek military assistance, trade access, investment and intelligence support. It can agree with the United States when the facts and interests warrant agreement.

But it must also retain the ability to disagree. That is the test.

The problem is not that Trinidad and Tobago may share a position with the United States. The problem is a public display of uncritical alignment, particularly on an issue where there was no evident domestic policy process, scientific consultation, parliamentary discussion or CARICOM position.

A country that cannot pause before saying “we commit” to an American president’s terminology may eventually find it difficult to pause before committing to his foreign-policy priorities, his sanctions agenda, his security architecture or his geopolitical conflicts.

The Shield and the Strategy

This concern becomes more serious when placed alongside the US-led Shield of the Americas initiative, launched in 2026 and expanded at the UN General Assembly. Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago are among the governments that have joined this hemispheric framework.

Its language sounds unobjectionable: stronger security, joint action against organized crime, economic resilience and greater cooperation among countries of the Americas.

Who could oppose fighting drug trafficking, firearms smuggling, money laundering, human trafficking, cybercrime and transnational criminal networks? No responsible government should. But citizens must distinguish between genuine crime-fighting cooperation and an arrangement that progressively turns regional governments into instruments for carrying out Washington’s security and diplomatic agenda.

The communiqué adopted under the Shield rests on three pillars:

♦ Economic cooperation.

♦ Security cooperation.

♦ Multilateral coordination.

That third pillar deserves the closest attention.

“Multilateral coordination” sounds harmless. In practice, it can mean that governments which should be independently assessing international questions begin to coordinate positions in the United Nations, the Organization of American States and other international bodies around a US-defined agenda. The danger is not always a formal order from Washington. It is often subtler.

It is the creation of a political environment in which smaller states learn that access, security assurances, investment opportunities and favorable diplomatic attention are connected to proving that they are “reliable” partners. A reliable partner gradually becomes one that does not embarrass Washington, does not challenge Washington and does not depart too far from Washington’s preferred line.

That is how sovereignty can be weakened without a single flag being lowered.

The Security Lever

The Shield of the Americas communiqué envisages coordinated action against 24 groups identified as narco-terrorist or foreign-terrorist threats, including potential sanctions, asset freezes, immigration restrictions and legal action against persons who knowingly provide support It also contemplates using the Organization of American States’ mechanisms under the Rio Treaty, or TIAR, to examine collective action against such groups.

That may sound like a narrowly focused anti-crime initiative. But regional citizens should understand what such a structure can become.

Once governments accept a common security framework, the central question becomes: who defines the threat? Will threats be defined independently by Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, CARICOM and other regional states on the basis of evidence, law and domestic interests? Or will the definition flow primarily from US intelligence assessments, US designations and US geopolitical priorities?

Those are not academic concerns.

Security designations carry consequences. They can affect banking, trade, shipping, investment, travel, insurance, remittances, immigration, digital platforms and cross-border commercial relationships. They can expose domestic companies and individuals to serious legal and financial consequences. They can also draw countries into conflicts whose origins, objectives and ultimate costs have not been fully explained to their own citizens.

Before Guyana signs on to any sanctions-orientated or security-related framework, the public has a right to know:

♦ Which organizations are being targeted.

♦ What evidence supports the designations.

♦ What actions Guyana has agreed to take.

♦ Whether Guyanese law authorizes those actions.

♦ Whether Parliament has been informed.

♦ What obligations are being assumed by Guyana’s police, military, intelligence, financial and immigration agencies.

♦ What protections exist for Guyanese citizens, businesses and institutions.

♦ What happens if Guyana concludes that a US-backed measure is not in its national interest.

Security cooperation without transparency can easily become security dependence.

Guyana’s Special Vulnerability

Guyana’s situation is more complicated than Trinidad and Tobago’s because Guyana faces a real and continuing threat from Venezuela over the Essequibo region.

That reality cannot be minimized.

Guyana is entitled to seek security partnerships. It is entitled to welcome diplomatic support from the United States. It is entitled to strengthen maritime surveillance, intelligence sharing, border monitoring, cybersecurity, coast-guard capacity and defense readiness. It is entitled to seek support for the protection of its offshore petroleum assets and its territorial integrity.

No sensible Guyanese should demand that the country isolate itself while Venezuela maintains an unlawful claim to more than two-thirds of Guyana’s territory.

But it is precisely because Guyana is vulnerable that Guyana must be careful.

A country facing a security threat can become so anxious for protection that it begins to mistake dependency for partnership. It can become reluctant to take any position that may irritate the power it believes is protecting it. It can become more concerned with demonstrating loyalty than defending policy independence.

That is the danger Guyana must avoid.

The United States may be an important ally in the defense of Guyana’s sovereignty. But Guyana must never allow the defense of its sovereignty against Venezuela to become the justification for surrendering its diplomatic sovereignty to Washington.

That would be a cruel irony: defending Essequibo from external control while allowing Guyana’s foreign policy to become externally managed.

Ali’s Washington Problem

President Irfaan Ali has enthusiastically emphasized Guyana’s expanding relationship with the United States. His government has highlighted deeper US-Guyana security cooperation, praised Trump’s leadership and presented Guyana as a committed partner in Washington’s hemispheric security initiatives.

Again, engagement is not the offense.

Guyana needs friends. It needs allies. It needs partners capable of helping it deter Venezuelan aggression and strengthen national security. The public concern is whether the Government is defining the terms of that relationship or merely accepting terms fashioned elsewhere.

When Guyana signs a US-led communiqué that includes “multilateral coordination,” the Government must explain what that means.

♦ Does Guyana retain its absolute freedom to vote independently at the United Nations?

♦ Can Guyana support Washington on the Essequibo controversy but differ with Washington on Cuba, Palestine, sanctions, trade disputes, climate financing, migration, development policy or relations with China?

♦ Can Guyana take a CARICOM position when that position differs from the United States?

♦ Can Guyana say no to a military, security, sanctions or intelligence proposal that it considers contrary to its law or interests?

♦ Or has Georgetown accepted the idea that being a “good partner” requires keeping step with Washington on every major issue?

Those questions cannot be dismissed as anti-American. They are pro-Guyana questions.

Partnership Is Not Obedience

A mature relationship between states is not built on obedience. It is built on clarity, reciprocity and mutual respect.

Guyana can say to Washington:

♦ “We value your support for Guyana’s territorial integrity.”

♦ “We welcome intelligence and security cooperation against shared threats.”

♦ “We will work with you against narcotics trafficking, illegal arms, money laundering and organised crime.”

♦ “We will defend democracy, international law and the right of states to live free from external aggression.”

But Guyana must also be able to say:

♦ “We will make our own decisions.”

♦ “We will not adopt every US priority as Guyana’s priority.”

♦ “We will not join conflicts without a clear Guyanese interest.”

♦ “We will not treat regional consultation as a replacement for Guyana’s independent judgment.”

♦ “We will not use national security as an excuse to avoid parliamentary scrutiny.”

♦ “We will not allow security cooperation to compromise the country’s non-negotiable right to think, speak and vote for itself.”

That is what equal partnership sounds like.

CARICOM Must Not Be Reduced

The Caribbean’s strength has always rested on its ability to act collectively while maintaining an independent voice. CARICOM countries are small, but they are not insignificant. They have moral authority, diplomatic experience and a long record of defending international law, decolonization, peace, climate justice and the rights of small states.

Guyana has historically been part of that tradition.

♦ It is inconsistent for Guyana to demand respect for international law in the Essequibo controversy, then become silent when the same international-law principles are inconvenient for a powerful ally.

♦ It is inconsistent to argue that small states must not be bullied by larger powers, then allow Guyana’s positions to be moulded by the expectations of the hemisphere’s dominant power.

♦ It is inconsistent to call for a stronger multilateral system while joining arrangements that may reduce multilateral consultation to coordination behind Washington’s lead.

Guyana must work with the United States. But it must also work through CARICOM, the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the wider Global South. Its foreign policy cannot be reduced to a single axis.

Parliament and the Public

The Shield of the Americas communiqué may not itself be a binding treaty. It is described as a declaration of intention, not a ratified agreement that automatically creates enforceable legal duties.

But non-binding documents often become the foundation for binding actions.

They can lead to intelligence-sharing protocols, sanctions measures, policing agreements, military cooperation, financial restrictions, technology contracts, data-sharing arrangements, diplomatic commitments and OAS resolutions. The public may only discover the full implications after political commitments have already been made.

That is why Parliament must not be treated as an afterthought.

The Government of Guyana should place before the National Assembly:

♦ The complete communiqué and every annex, protocol and side agreement connected to Guyana’s participation.

♦ A list of the 24 groups referred to in the security component.

♦ A legal opinion on Guyana’s obligations and discretion under the arrangement.

♦ The financial, operational and staffing commitments required of Guyanese agencies.

♦ The terms governing intelligence sharing and personal-data protections.

♦ A statement of whether US personnel, equipment or operational assets will be stationed or deployed in Guyana.

♦ A clear explanation of how Guyana will preserve independent voting and diplomatic positions in international forums.

♦ The procedures through which Guyana may decline, amend or withdraw from proposed joint actions.

The public cannot defend national sovereignty if it is denied the information required to understand what has been agreed in its name.

The Real Playbook

The public should understand the playbook.

♦ First comes the language of shared values: democracy, security, freedom, prosperity and sovereignty.

♦ Then comes the language of common threats: criminal networks, drugs, arms trafficking, hostile states, cyberattacks and foreign influence.

♦ Then comes the invitation to coordinate: intelligence-sharing, sanctions, border initiatives, digital standards, investment screening and common diplomatic positions.

♦ Then comes the expectation of political alignment: support the designation, vote for the resolution, adopt the terminology, repeat the talking point, endorse the priority and demonstrate reliability.

♦ Finally, independent disagreement begins to look like disloyalty.

That is how smaller states can be absorbed into the geopolitical agenda of a larger power—not necessarily through invasion, formal colonialism or public coercion, but through institutional habits, elite relationships, security dependence and the gradual normalization of agreement.

The result is an echo chamber. Washington speaks. Regional governments repeat. Citizens are told it is partnership.

Guyana Must Speak for Guyana

The question is not whether Guyana should have relations with the United States. Of course it should. The question is whether Guyana will have a foreign policy of its own.

A country defending itself against Venezuela must be especially vigilant not to become overly dependent on any single foreign power. It needs strong friends, but it also needs options. It needs security support, but it needs constitutional accountability. It needs diplomatic partnerships, but it needs the confidence to disagree.

President Ali must therefore make clear that Guyana’s participation in the Shield of the Americas does not mean automatic alignment with Washington on foreign policy, sanctions, military action or UN voting.

♦ Guyana must cooperate where cooperation serves Guyana.

♦ Guyana must resist where resistance serves Guyana.

♦ Guyana must consult with its CARICOM neighbors before allowing foreign powers to shape the region’s collective agenda.

♦ And Guyana must remember that sovereignty is not measured by how loudly a government praises an ally. It is measured by whether, when the moment comes, that government can say:

Washington has spoken. Now Guyana will speak for Guyana.