Washington’s Partner, Guyana’s Acquaintance
|
Listen To This Article Here : 👇🏽🎧
|
Washington’s Partner, Guyana’s Acquaintance
OPINION BY: Hem Kumar
The implicit message is uncomfortable:a smaller partner may be asked to travel to the metropole for a handshake, while a larger, more consequential regional actor receives a senior US cabinet-level visit and a signed agreement on its own soil. That does not prove unequal treatment in every respect, but it is a legitimate diplomatic reading—especially when the smaller partner is the one directly exposed to the territ. orial claim.
President Irfaan Ali went to Washington to secure an “enhanced” defence partnership with Pete Hegseth. Weeks later, Hegseth went to Caracas, stood before Venezuela’s acting president, and announced a renewed military agreement with a country the United States had recently treated as its principal regional adversary.
The contrast should disturb every Guyanese citizen—not because cooperation with Washington is wrong, but because it reveals how Washington ranks its partners. Guyana may be an important acquaintance. Venezuela, even after political upheaval, is being treated as a strategic partner whose military relationship Washington considers worth pursuing on Venezuelan soil.
Hegseth did not merely meet Venezuelan officials. He signed an agreement restoring technical-military cooperation, including joint training, intelligence sharing, strategic cooperation, and the provision of defence equipment and capabilities. He called Venezuela a “compliant security partner” and described the arrangement as “historic.”
Ali, by contrast, travelled to the Pentagon on October 21 to sign a Joint Declaration for an Enhanced Defense Partnership. It promised deeper military cooperation, multi domain training, combined exercises, air-domain awareness, and joint action against narco terrorism and trafficking.That is not nothing. But it is not the same diplomatic treatment.
The message in the protocol
Diplomacy speaks through protocol as clearly as it speaks through communiqués.
When a US Secretary of War flies to Caracas, signs at the presidential palace, meets the acting president, and publicly welcomes Venezuela back into America’s security architecture, Washington is signalling that it sees Venezuela as central to its regional strategy.
When Guyana’s president must travel to Washington to obtain a defence declaration, while the full terms of that declaration remain undisclosed, Washington is signalling something else: Guyana is welcome within America’s orbit, but it is not yet being treated as a peer whose security requires a fully reciprocal, publicly accountable compact.
This is not a claim that the United States has abandoned Guyana. It has not. Rubio has publicly vowed a forceful response if Venezuela attacks Guyana, and the Pentagon has described the Ali–Hegseth agreement as a “landmark” enhanced defence partnership.
But friendship is not the same as priority. And a handshake in Washington is not the same as a security guarantee.
Guyana’s exposed position
Guyana’s exposure is not abstract. Venezuela continues to assert a claim over Essequibo, a territory of roughly 160,000 square kilometres, while the International Court of Justice has not issued a final judgment. The dispute is inseparable from Guyana’s oil wealth, offshore infrastructure, border security, and national sovereignty.
In that context, Guyana needs more than statements about “shared values” and “mutual benefit.” It needs clarity.
What precisely has Guyana agreed to? What has the United States agreed to provide? Does the arrangement include intelligence-sharing limits, access to bases or airspace, equipment transfers, troop deployments, contractor involvement, financial obligations, termination rights, or protections for classified information?
The public does not know. The Joint Declaration itself has not been published, and neither have any annexes, implementation schedules, side letters, or financing arrangements connected to it. That omission is not a technicality. It is the difference between a sovereign partnership and a relationship defined by the stronger party’s discretion.
Venezuela gets the visit; Guyana gets the invitation
The optics are brutal.
Venezuela receives Hegseth in Caracas. Guyana sends Ali to Washington. Venezuela receives a signed military agreement at home. Guyana receives a declaration whose legal force, duration, cost, and implementation terms remain hidden from the public.
That asymmetry tells Guyana something important about its place in Washington’s hierarchy.
Washington does not treat every partner identically. It treats states according to strategic value, leverage, risk, and utility. Venezuela matters because of its size, geography, military capacity, criminal networks, oil, and potential role in regional security. Guyana matters because of its oil, its location, its vulnerability to Venezuela, and its willingness to align with US interests.
But willingness is not the same as leverage.
Guyana cannot assume that because it has opened its doors to American cooperation, Washington will automatically place Guyana’s territorial security above America’s broader regional calculations. The United States will pursue its own interests. Guyana’s responsibility is to ensure that its interests are protected in writing, in law, and in practice.
Ali must confront the reality
President Ali has said Guyana is not being bullied or controlled. He has described the relationship with Washington as sovereign, mutual, and beneficial. Those are reassuring words, but they are not a substitute for disclosure.
If Guyana is truly a sovereign partner, then the agreement should be capable of surviving public examination.
Publish the Joint Declaration. Publish every annex, memorandum, implementation schedule, and side letter connected to it. State whether it is legally binding. State how long it lasts. State how it may be amended or terminated. State whether it gives the United States, US contractors, or US companies any access, preference, or rights connected to Guyanese defence facilities, strategic infrastructure, resource data, or critical minerals.
Then table the arrangement before the National Assembly.
National security may justify protecting tactics. It does not justify concealing the existence, scope, duration, and consequences of national commitments. A government that believes an agreement serves the country should welcome scrutiny, not fear it.
Partnership must be enforceable
Guyana should not retreat from cooperation with the United States. It should demand a better version of it.
A serious security partnership must include:
♦A publicly available principal agreement, with sensitive operational details protected through a lawful classified annex.
♦Clear limits on intelligence sharing, personnel access, communications systems, and foreign military activity on Guyanese soil.
♦Explicit US commitments regarding Guyana’s territorial integrity, airspace, maritime zones, offshore assets, and critical infrastructure.
♦ Parliamentary oversight, with confidential access for elected representatives where operational secrecy is genuinely necessary.
♦ Independent counterintelligence, personnel vetting, secure communications, and breach-reporting obligations.
Without these safeguards, Guyana may find itself sharing more than it receives. It may become a useful location for American surveillance, logistics, and regional operations, while remaining uncertain whether Washington’s commitments would hold in the moment Venezuela escalates.
The question Ali must answer
The question is not whether Guyana should cooperate with the United States. It should.
The question is whether Guyana is negotiating as a sovereign state—or accepting the role of a smaller, useful acquaintance whose security concerns can be acknowledged, managed, and postponed whenever Washington’s larger strategic interests require it.
Hegseth went to Caracas because Venezuela matters to Washington’s regional design. Ali went to Washington because Guyana needs Washington’s protection, technology, intelligence, and deterrence. That difference in posture is not incidental. It is the whole point.
Guyana must now decide whether it will remain a grateful recipient of American attention, or become a partner capable of setting terms, protecting secrets, defending territory, and insisting that friendship be matched by enforceable commitment.
If Ali believes Guyana is truly sovereign, he should prove it—not with a speech in Washington, but by showing the Guyanese people exactly what their government has signed.

Discover more from 592guardian.com
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.



Leave a Reply
Want to join the discussion?Feel free to contribute!