A Court Victory Is Not a Blank Cheque
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A Court Victory Is Not a Blank Cheque
OPINION BY: Hem Kumar November 2026
The Full Court removed restrictions on the Government’s access to the VAMED hospital sites. It did not settle the contractual dispute—or explain why GRA seized four company vehicles.
The Government of Guyana won an important court ruling in September. It should neither be denied that victory nor permitted to turn it into something larger than it was.
The Full Court set aside five preservation orders affecting the VAMED hospital sites, containers, equipment and related property. The decision removed judicial restrictions that had constrained the Ministry of Health’s actions at the projects. But it left the underlying contractual dispute for arbitration. It was not a final adjudication of who owes whom, who ultimately bears responsibility for the breakdown, or what compensation may be payable.
That distinction now matters urgently.
VAMED says the Guyana Revenue Authority seized three trucks and a car on November 7. Its attorney, Nigel Hughes, says the officer conducting the seizure failed, when challenged, to identify the applicable law, produce supporting documentation or establish that prior notices or demands had been issued. Those allegations have not been judicially determined. They nevertheless require a direct, documented response from the authority that exercised the power.
The Government cannot answer a question about customs enforcement merely by celebrating a judgment about interim court protection.
Nor should the public accept a contractual dispute as a general justification for taking a contractor’s property.
What the Full Court actually decided
The September ruling was more substantial than a procedural technicality.
According to published accounts of the decision, the Full Court held that section 16 of the State Liability and Proceedings Act prohibited injunctions against the State in proceedings of this kind. The prohibition could not be avoided simply by calling restrictions on the State’s conduct “preservation orders.” The judges also found that the orders lacked an adequately established statutory foundation under the Arbitration Act 2024 and conflicted with the trial judge’s findings that there was no urgency and that damages would be an adequate remedy.
In short, the Full Court examined the substance of the orders, not merely their label.
That was a real defeat for VAMED’s attempt to keep interim judicial protection over the sites and assets. The Government was no longer constrained by those particular orders, and the Attorney General’s Chambers presented the ruling as clearing the way for the Ministry to take possession of the sites, containers, equipment and associated materials and proceed with the projects.
An honest assessment must acknowledge that consequence. It would be wrong to suggest that all subsequent access to the sites necessarily violated the August orders.
But removing a restraint is not the same as adjudicating every right underlying the dispute.
The decision, as publicly reported, concerned the availability and legal foundation of interim relief. The referral of the contractual dispute to arbitration remained intact. It did not become a final determination of ownership of every disputed asset, the validity of every financial claim or the lawfulness of every subsequent enforcement action.
That is the boundary the Government must not blur.
The ruling shifted the practical balance—not the final merits
The immediate consequence of the Full Court ruling was to shift the practical balance towards the State.
VAMED lost the protection of orders requiring preservation of the sites, containers, equipment, documents and intellectual property. In seeking permission to appeal and a stay, the company alleged that the Ministry had begun opening, removing and interfering with property, including 52 containers and construction equipment. Those assertions were made in VAMED’s application; they were not findings accepting its account.
The company also argued that the ruling left it without interim protection pending constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Its lawyer maintained that the original preservation measures were distinct from prohibited injunctions and were available under the Arbitration Act. That is VAMED’s challenge to the Full Court’s reasoning, not an established reversal of it. The reporting reviewed records an application for leave and a stay, not their grant.
The practical implications are nevertheless significant. Where physical restrictions are removed and damages are treated as an adequate remedy, the immediate emphasis shifts away from keeping everything untouched and towards determining responsibility and compensation later.
That makes a reliable record of what happens to disputed property especially important. Inventories, photographs, custody records and clear accounts of what has been used, moved or retained are not bureaucratic luxuries. They are the evidence on which later claims may turn.
The Government’s ability to move forward with the hospitals should be accompanied by that discipline—not treated as an escape from it.
GRA must establish its own enforcement case
The seizure of four vehicles introduces a separate question.
VAMED has expressly acknowledged the Full Court’s September ruling. Its position is that setting aside the preservation orders does not relieve GRA of the need to establish a lawful basis for its own action and comply with applicable procedures. It has demanded disclosure of the grounds and documentation supporting the seizures.
That demand deserves an answer.
If the vehicles were subject to unpaid duties, breached concession conditions, temporary-importation requirements or some other customs obligation, GRA should identify the alleged breach and the authority invoked. If notices were issued, it should identify them. If prior notification was not required, it should explain the applicable procedure.
The absence of a prior notice would not, by itself, settle the legality of a seizure. Neither would the failure to produce a document at the scene necessarily establish that no lawful authority existed. Those questions depend on the relevant law and facts.
But that is precisely why GRA must explain its case rather than leave the public to infer one.
The Full Court’s decision does not, in the published account, determine a customs breach concerning these four vehicles. If GRA relies on that judgment in any way, it should identify exactly how. If it relies on a separate statutory power, it should state that power and the facts said to justify its use.
A court victory in one proceeding cannot substitute for an explanation in another.
Arbitration is not immunity—but neither is it a license for pressure
The Government has confirmed initiating ICC arbitration under the hospital contracts. VAMED’s recent statements likewise describe the contractual dispute as being before arbitrators. The public material reviewed does not establish the precise current procedural stage or disclose a final award.
Arbitration does not give a contractor immunity from otherwise lawful regulatory enforcement. VAMED cannot defeat a genuine customs case merely by pointing to its dispute with the Ministry of Health.
The opposite proposition is equally important: the Government’s contractual allegations do not themselves establish a customs case.
The State occupies two positions here. It is a party seeking to defend its conduct and financial interests in a commercial dispute. It also commands public institutions with coercive powers unavailable to the contractor. That imbalance makes demonstrable separation between contractual strategy and regulatory enforcement essential.
The concern is not simply that GRA acted while arbitration was pending. It is whether the authority acted on an independently supportable enforcement case—or whether public power is being drawn into the effort to strengthen the Government’s position against its contractual opponent.
That question cannot responsibly be answered by asserting a motive for which the evidence has not yet been produced. But neither should it be dismissed merely because the Government says it is protecting taxpayers.
The financial dispute cannot be settled by political assertion
VAMED’s claims have been put at approximately €45.53 million, including €19.15 million described as certified payments. The Government disputes the presentation of the sums as uncontested debts and raises performance, valuation and set-off issues. Those competing positions remain for determination; neither side’s account should be reported as an established balance owing.
The same discipline must apply to any suggestion that the Government is now “recovering its losses.”
What losses? Established by whom? Calculated under which contractual provisions? And what connection, if any, do those alleged losses have to GRA’s action against these vehicles?
Protecting public funds is a legitimate objective. It is not a universal legal explanation.
The Government is entitled to pursue its contractual remedies and defend itself in arbitration. But the political assertion that a contractor has failed cannot become a running account against which different state agencies take property without clearly explaining their respective legal grounds.
If these seizures are unrelated to the contractual dispute, GRA should make that independence demonstrable. If there is a connection, the public deserves to know its precise nature.
Our earlier questions have not disappeared
This publication’s August analysis asked about the corporate restructuring, the identity of the contractual counterparty, any necessary novation, the status of performance bonds and the authorization of changes to financing arrangements. Those questions were reported as unanswered at the time. They require renewed documentary examination, not an assumption that the September ruling disposed of them.
The starting point remains what actually changed in the corporate and contractual arrangements. From that follow questions of consent, guarantees, financing and responsibility.
The Full Court ruling addressed interim protection. It should not be made to stand in for answers about the administration of the contracts.
Taxpayers need both kinds of accountability: a lawful route to completing the hospitals and a transparent explanation of how the projects reached this impasse.
The Government must show the limits of its power
Teles has suggested that the vehicle seizures were connected to VAMED’s public criticism of the Government. That is an allegation of retaliatory motive, not an independently established fact.
But the demand for evidence cuts both ways. VAMED must substantiate its accusations. GRA must substantiate its enforcement action.
The September ruling strengthens the Government’s practical position. Precisely for that reason, it should be accompanied by restraint, documentation and clarity about the limits of what the court decided. The Government won the removal of particular interim restrictions. It did not obtain a public exemption from explaining subsequent exercises of state power.
Until GRA provides a clear, documented account, the vehicle seizures remain an unresolved allegation of overreach. The proper response is not another declaration of victory over VAMED. It is disclosure.
Guyana needs the hospitals completed. It also needs to know that its Government can fight a contractual case without allowing the machinery of the State to become an unexplained instrument of pressure against the opposing party.

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