Venezuela: Elections Promised, Elections Deferred

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

 Venezuela: Elections Promised, Elections Deferred


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar October 2026

Venezuelan opposition calls for marches to demand the return of María Corina Machado and free elections.The María Corina Machado party has called for peaceful protests this Thursday, October 22, 2026, in Caracas and the rest of the country. They are demanding the return of the opposition leader, a schedule for the presidential elections, and the full release of political prisoners.The event coincides with the third anniversary of the 2023 primary elections, in which Machado triumphed. Under the slogan “The date of the election is the date of liberation,” the organizers seek to push for civic pressure to hold electoral events. Machado’s team claims that they have been prevented from returning to Venezuela. Her party supports holding the elections on July 24, 2027, a proposal that has not yet become an official electoral date.

Elections were among the principal pillars invoked to justify the intervention that removed Nicolás Maduro. Yet months later, the democratic objective appears to have been overtaken by a more convenient arrangement: an interim administration led by Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s former vice president, that has accommodated key United States priorities while elections remain indefinitely postponed.

Venezuela still has no declared date for a presidential vote. The promised democratic transition has instead been recast as a phased process in which “stabilization” and economic recovery come first, while the Venezuelan people are expected to wait for the restoration of the very political rights that were invoked to justify Maduro’s removal

.Rodríguez appears to have eased the pressure for a rapid electoral transition not by dismantling the political machinery of Chavismo, but by making herself useful to Washington. As Caracas responds to US demands and opens space for American interests—particularly in the oil sector—the urgency once attached to free elections appears to have diminished.

That raises an unavoidable question: if the removal of Maduro was presented as a route to restore the Venezuelan people’s democratic will, why has the central test of that promise—a free, credible and timely election—been pushed to the back burner?

Maria Corina Machado’s case makes the contradiction even sharper. Having won the opposition primary in 2023, she was barred from contesting the 2024 presidential election by a 15-year political ban. When Edmundo González replaced her as the opposition candidate, the opposition’s own released tally sheets indicated that González had defeated Maduro. Yet the will expressed by Venezuelan voters was ignored.

Machado subsequently self -exiled , lived in hiding inside Venezuela amid threats, repression and the risk of arrest before leaving the country clandestinely in late 2025. 

Her exile is not a voluntary withdrawal from Venezuelan politics. It is the continued exclusion of a major opposition leader from her own country. Repeated attempts to return have reportedly failed, leaving Machado unable to organise openly, campaign at home or stand beside the people who continue to regard her as a central figure in the struggle for democratic restoration.

Machado has been based mainly in Panama after brief periods in the United States and Europe. From exile, she has continued to coordinate opposition activity, lobby foreign governments, call for political prisoners’ release and press for free elections rather than accepting a transition defined solely by Washington and the Rodríguez administration.

Her exile is therefore not political retirement. It is an effort to keep a Venezuelan democratic movement organized internationally while her supporters, party leaders and prospective voters remain inside a country where the governing apparatus continues to constrain opposition activity

.Machado’s inability to return weakens the credibility of any claim that Venezuela is already on a democratic path. An election cannot reasonably be described as fully free if a major opposition leader remains effectively excluded from the country, unable to campaign freely, organize publicly or even return home

Her central demand is not merely personal re-entry; it is the restoration of a genuine constitutional order—freedom for political parties, release of political prisoners, a safe return for exiles and a credible timetable for elections. The unresolved question is whether the United States will treat those conditions as non-negotiable, or continue to prioritize stability and oil-sector cooperation with Rodríguez’s government.

And the people have not abandoned her. Venezuelans inside and outside the country have again rallied behind Machado’s return and her right to contest any proposed election. Their demand is straightforward: if Venezuela is to hold elections, the opposition leader who won its primary and commands broad public support must be allowed to return, campaign and compete freely.

Yet neither Caracas nor Washington seems to be treating that demand with the urgency it deserves. Caracas has little incentive to welcome back the opposition figure most capable of mobilising the public against the old governing order. Washington, meanwhile, appears more willing to work with Rodríguez on stability, security and oil than to insist that elections be conducted promptly under genuinely democratic conditions.

Machado’s decision to present Donald Trump with her Nobel Peace Prize medal was plainly an attempt to secure a stronger political relationship with the US president and his administration. But the gesture appears to have brought little in return. Rather than forcefully championing her return and an urgent electoral timetable, Washington has kept Machado at a distance while engaging Rodríguez as its principal interlocutor in Caracas.

The danger is that “stability” becomes a permanent excuse for postponing popular sovereignty. Maduro may be gone, but the structures, actors and habits of his system remain influential. A transition cannot credibly be called democratic while a major opposition leader remains in exile, political prisoners remain an issue, and elections are treated not as an immediate obligation but as a distant possibility.

Venezuela’s people have already voted, protested, endured repression and demanded change. They should not now be asked to wait indefinitely while Caracas and Washington negotiate the future of their country over their heads.

Azruddin Mohamed reflects (must resonate differently)

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

 Azruddin Mohamed reflects (must resonate differently)


OPINION BY: GHK LALL October 2026

‘I could have been a dead man.’  “I coudda  been a contender.  I could’ve been somebody instead of a bum.’  The first speaker is Mr. Azruddin Mohamed, Guyana’s Opp Leader on his release from jail.  The second and third sentences are from blockbuster cinema, On the Waterfront, with Marlon Brando as the anguished character.  What relationship could the two have with each other?

Mr. Mohamed riding the crest of the WIN arc has been handed every opportunity to be somebody.  Already he is Guyana’s Leader of the Opposition, which ranks him in the Top 10 of Guyana’s citizenry.  It’s my estimation, and reasoned on this basis: if this country’s Pres Ali is the First Citizen and Guyana’s Prime Minister Phillips is the 1st Vice President (or 2nd Citizen), then Guyana’s Leader of the Opposition, Mohamed, cannot rank as its 21st or 22nd citizen.  Therefore, he has an obligation.  To his family.  To his supporters.  To the wider Guyana constituency.  To comport himself in a manner becoming and corresponding to his new title and all the responsibilities associated with it.

With Mr. Mohamed reminiscing rather ruefully that ‘I could have been a dead man’ and with real bullet holes as supporting evidence, he has to be more circumspect.  Intelligence gathering shouldn’t be at the top of his list of duties.  If he puts himself in harm’s way, and becomes a dead man, then what value has he bestowed on Guyana, what legacy does he leave for posterity?  The sooner that he learns that the role of Opp Leader is not a one-man show, or a family affair, or a highlight reel instalment, the better he serves his party and this country.  It is no accident that the job of Opp Leader is given such prominent mention in the Constitution of Guyana.  On realizing that, the first rays of wisdom should penetrate as to the magnitude of the role.  Cheddi Jagan held it.  Desmond Hoyte held it.  Robert Corbin did.  So did Bharrat Jagdeo. 

The role of Guyana’s Leader of the Opposition is neither errand boy nor newspaper boy.  It is of a man among men.  

In the present roiling, piercing environment, Mr. Mohamed would be an also ran, a runner-up, if he has failed to grasp how the PPP Govt and its agents wait in ambush to dislodge or destroy those who make all of them look emaciated and emasculated.  Start at the top and come down from there.  At every level, the faces of PPP powers and the PPP snipers are twisted in rage, and willing to manufacture and participate in any manner of outrage.  To level those they hold as enemies.  To destroy those, they hold as pests and parasites, fitting company in the crowd of undesirables.

Why should Azruddin Mohamed who more than anyone in this country not know how villainous, even murderous, the PPP can be?  It was done before, and a two-word blanket was found: national security.  ‘I could have been dead.’  Damn right, Mr. Mohamed.  He had better learn a few things quickly; or he will not have enough time to learn anything.  The PPP is not into play.  Not when the local power formula is under stress.  The seven-seat majority doesn’t make it comfortable.  It makes the PPP commanding and controlling.  Run this through the mind: a boxer has a seven-inch reach advantage, and yet he is fearful of going into the ring.  There was parliament.  Closed.  It took some wrestling by white friends to take a crowbar and dig it open.

Mr. Mohamed’s prison stay, his restricted circumstances, his sixth sense, should all make him into a better Opp Leader.  The PPP is watching.  The PPP isn’t letting up.  The PPP holds all the cards.  Azruddin Mohamed either grows into the role of Opp Leader, or he goes down.  He has a merciful and benevolent PPP Govt waiting to help him along the way.  I could have been dead.  It’s time that something sinks in his head.

 Power Is a Public Trust, Not Private Property

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

  Power Is a Public Trust, Not Private Property


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar October 2026

“It is the responsibility of all citizens to acquire the civic and political education that allows us to participate with our opinion and our responsible vote, as well as to evaluate, accept or reject those who aspire to power. Political power is the ability of a person, group, or institution to direct, influence, or condition the behavior, decisions, and will of the members of a society, primarily through the structures of the State.”                                                                                   Power is a commission, that is to say:  “An entrusted task, a delegated mission, or a position of responsibility held on behalf of others. It is the act and effect of placing something or someone under the care of another person, or the specific thing or task that is entrusted.” 
Jose Marti, the Apostle of Freedom, tells us: “Government is a popular mandate: it is given by the people: it must be exercised to their satisfaction: their will must be consulted, their aspirations followed, their voice in need heard, and the power received must never be turned against the trusting hands that gave it to us, and which are its sole owners.”

 Recent events in Guyana and elsewhere should compel us to think more seriously about power: what it is, where it comes from, whom it belongs to, and how those who wield it ought to use it.

Power appears in many forms. It may be political, economic, religious, institutional, media-related, professional, or social. At its core, power is the capacity to command, influence, direct decisions, shape public opinion, or control resources that affect other people’s lives.

Political power is especially consequential because it carries the authority of the State: the ability to make laws, spend public money, award contracts, distribute national resources, deploy public institutions, and make decisions that can either expand or restrict the life chances of citizens.

In a country such as Guyana—now endowed with unprecedented oil wealth and confronted by far-reaching choices about development, inequality, land, environment, public services, and national unity—the question of power cannot be treated casually. The stakes are too high.

Yet much of our political conversation remains reactive. We respond to the latest controversy, accusation, press conference, procurement dispute, social-media confrontation, or electoral maneuver.We debate who said what, who offended whom, and which party scored the latest political point. Far less attention is given to the enduring civic principles by which citizens should assess every government, every opposition party, every public official, every political candidate, and every person or institution seeking influence over the country’s future.

Three principles deserve renewed public attention: democratic power must be a mandate, it must be obedient to that mandate, and it must be exercised as service.

Power Is a Mandate

In a democracy, political power does not belong to the officeholder, political party, Cabinet minister, President, Member of Parliament, councilor, or any influential group around them. It belongs to the people.

Those who enter office do so because citizens have entrusted them, through elections and constitutional procedures, with a limited authority to act on the public’s behalf. They are not owners of the State. They are temporary custodians of authority that originates with the people.

That distinction is fundamental.

A government elected with a substantial mandate does not receive a blank cheque. An electoral victory grants authority to govern, but it does not erase the people’s right to question, criticize, demand information, challenge decisions, organize peacefully, or insist that public resources be managed honestly and transparently.

The national treasury is not party property. Oil revenues are not the inheritance of a small political class. State lands, forests, rivers, mineral resources, contracts, public offices, and national institutions do not belong to whichever group currently holds office. They belong, in trust, to the people of Guyana—including those who voted for the government, those who did not, and generations yet unborn.

This is particularly important in an oil-producing society. Resource wealth can strengthen democracy when it is managed openly, prudently, equitably, and with long-term national interests in mind. But it can also concentrate power, reward political loyalty, weaken oversight, and create a culture in which citizens are expected to be grateful rather than entitled to accountability.

Guyana must reject that culture. Citizens are not petitioners before political benefactors. They are the sovereign source of democratic authority.

 Power Must Obey the People

The second test of democratic power is obedience—not blind obedience by citizens to officeholders, but obedience by officeholders to the constitutional order, the law, their electoral commitments, and the people from whom their authority is derived.

A government should be judged not merely by its promises, but by whether it governs in a manner consistent with the mandate it sought.

♦ Did it honor the commitments on which it asked for public support?       

♦Did it use transparent and lawful processes?                                          ♦Did it consult meaningfully on matters of major national consequence? 

♦Did it respect the independence of oversight bodies?             

♦Did it provide timely and credible information?                                         

♦Did it tolerate criticism, including uncomfortable criticism?       

♦Did it treat dissent as a democratic right rather than an act of hostility?

These questions should not be asked only of governments. They must also be asked of opposition parties, aspirants for office, civil-society leaders, trade unions, religious organizations, business interests, and media institutions.

Those who demand transparency while in opposition must be prepared to practice it when in government. Those who condemn executive overreach today must not seek identical powers tomorrow. Those who invoke democracy only when it advances their partisan interest do not strengthen democracy; they weaken public trust in it.

The discipline of democracy requires consistency.

No elected official should regard a five-year term as a period during which citizens must simply wait, remain silent, and accept every decision made in their name. Elections matter enormously, but democracy does not exist only on polling day. It lives in the period between elections: in public access to information, parliamentary scrutiny, independent journalism, civic participation, lawful protest, free expression, impartial institutions, and public accountability.

An official who cannot accept scrutiny has misunderstood the office. A government that fears questions may be tempted to avoid answers. And a society that abandons its responsibility to question power will eventually find itself governed without meaningful consent.

Power Must Be Service

The third and perhaps clearest measure of power is service.

Public office exists to serve the common good, not to enrich officeholders, reward friends, intimidate critics, construct patronage networks, or protect privileged interests. A public servant who uses office for personal advantage betrays the trust placed in him or her. A political leader who sees citizens primarily as votes, ethnic blocs, supporters, or opponents has already diminished the meaning of democratic representation.

The question Guyanese must ask of all who seek office is simple: do they live off politics, or do they live to serve through politics?

That question cannot be answered by campaign slogans, carefully produced advertisements, party colors, grand speeches, or social-media messaging. It must be answered by conduct: a record of sacrifice, integrity, competence, openness, respect for others, and commitment to the public interest even when doing so carries political cost.

Service is visible in practical choices. It is visible in whether roads, schools, hospitals, drainage systems, housing programs, employment opportunities, and public services reach citizens fairly. It is visible in whether public contracts are administered transparently. It is visible in whether communities are heard before decisions are imposed upon them. It is visible in whether the poor, vulnerable, remote, and politically unconnected receive equal concern.

Service also means safeguarding the future. Guyana’s leaders must not spend national wealth as though it has no end, nor make decisions that leave future generations with debt, environmental damage, distorted institutions, and missed opportunities. The country’s wealth must be converted into durable public value: educated citizens, reliable health care, resilient infrastructure, diversified industries, protected ecosystems, capable institutions, and a society in which every Guyanese can live with dignity.

A Duty for Citizens and Media

Democracy cannot survive on the virtue of leaders alone. It requires citizens who understand that their role does not end after casting a ballot.

Every Guyanese has a responsibility to acquire civic and political knowledge; to distinguish fact from propaganda; to read national budgets, policies, audit reports, laws, and public statements; to support independent journalism; to ask difficult questions; and to judge political actors by the same standards, regardless of party affiliation or ethnicity

.This is where Guyana’s media, civil society, professional bodies, religious institutions, educators, and community organizations have a special responsibility. Too much of public discourse is reactive. It follows the daily political quarrel, repeats official claims and partisan rebuttals, then moves on before the underlying issue has been examined.

We need more than reaction. We need civic education.

We need regular public discussion about the Constitution, the role of Parliament, the responsibilities of ministers, the limits of executive authority, procurement rules, the management of oil revenues, local-government powers, conflict-of-interest standards, access to information, the rights of citizens, and the duties of public institutions.

A society that does not understand how power is supposed to work will struggle to recognize when it is being abused.

The Standard We Must Apply

The standard should be clear and non-negotiable: legitimate democratic power is entrusted by the people, obedient to the people’s lawful mandate, and exercised in service of the people.

It does not belong to a party. It does not belong to a family, an ethnic group, a business network, a government minister, or a favored circle of advisers. It cannot be used as a weapon against citizens who think differently, vote differently, or demand answers

.Guyana is at a defining point in its history. Oil wealth has increased the country’s possibilities, but it has also increased the danger that political power may become more concentrated, more insulated, and less accountable. The response cannot be cynicism or withdrawal. It must be a more informed, vigilant, and principled citizenship.

The real test of those who seek power is not how loudly they speak about democracy when they are outside office. It is whether, once entrusted with authority, they remember that the power was never theirs to keep. It was borrowed from the people—and it must always be used in their service.

 

 

Barima Commission Must Explain Its Two-Hour Broadcast Delay

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Barima Commission Must Explain Its Two-Hour Broadcast Delay


OPINION BY : Hem Kumar October 2026

The Commission of Inquiry established to examine the MV Barima tragedy cannot credibly describe its hearings as fully public while barring real-time public access and retaining undefined authority to restrict what the public may see and hear.

The reported arrangement permitting recorded broadcasts on a two-hour delay is an improvement over an outright blackout. But it is not the same as open, immediate and unfiltered public scrutiny—particularly in an inquiry arising from a disaster that claimed lives, devastated families and raised serious questions about public safety, official oversight and accountability.

The Commission must now do more than say that recordings may be broadcast. It must explain, in clear and public terms, “what exactly may be restricted, who will make that decision, under what authority, and whether the public will ever be told what it was prevented from seeing or hearing“.

A Public Inquiry Cannot Be Public in Name Only

The public has a legitimate interest in seeing testimony as it unfolds—not merely after an unspecified review period, and not only to the extent permitted by the very body whose work is under scrutiny.

A two-hour delay creates a basic question: What is occurring during those two hours?

Is the delay simply intended to manage unforeseen legal issues, such as an objection concerning confidential information or material that could prejudice a criminal investigation? Or is it a mechanism through which content can be screened, removed, muted, delayed indefinitely or withheld from the public?

If no filtering is intended, the Commission should say so plainly.

If filtering is possible, the Commission must disclose the rules. The public should not be left to guess whether difficult testimony, embarrassing disclosures, criticisms of State agencies, or evidence adverse to influential officials could be interrupted or kept from immediate view.

The Questions the Commission Must Answer

The Commission should publicly answer the following questions before further hearings proceed under this arrangement:

1.“What is the legal basis for prohibiting real-time livestreaming of hearings that have been designated public?”

2.“Why was a two-hour delay selected?” What operational, legal or security concern requires a delay of that length rather than a shorter safeguard?

3.”Who has authority to order a restriction?” Is it the Chairman alone, the full Commission, Commission Counsel, the Secretary, or another person?

4.”What categories of information may be restricted?” Will restrictions apply only to legally protected material—such as personal data, security-sensitive evidence, privileged communications or evidence likely to prejudice criminal proceedings?

5.”Can material be withheld because it is politically embarrassing, critical of government agencies, damaging to reputations, or uncomfortable for senior officials?” The answer must be an unequivocal no.

6.”Will the Commission issue a public notice whenever a broadcast is paused, muted, edited, delayed beyond two hours or withheld?”

7.”Will the public be told why a restriction was imposed, who ordered it, and what legal authority was relied upon?”

8.”Will affected media houses be allowed to challenge a restriction immediately?” If so, what is the review process?

9.”Will every restricted portion be preserved in the official record?” There must be no gap in the evidentiary record because a segment was withheld from broadcast.

10.”Will censored or delayed material be released once the reason for restriction no longer exists?” If not, why not?

11.“Will full transcripts, exhibits, rulings and daily hearing recordings be published online promptly and free of charge?”

12.”How will families in Region One and other affected communities receive timely access to the proceedings if they lack the means to travel to Georgetown or maintain reliable internet access?”

13.“Has the Commission consulted bereaved families, survivors, media organizations and civil-society groups on the access arrangements?” If not, why not?

14.”Will the Commission publish a written broadcasting protocol setting out its rules before it begins exercising discretionary control over public access?”

These are not hostile questions. They are the minimum questions required where a public body exercises control over information arising from a national tragedy.

No Blank Cheque for Secrecy

There can be legitimate reasons to temporarily withhold a narrow portion of evidence. Personal information may require protection. Some evidence may touch on ongoing criminal inquiries. In rare cases, there may be a genuine security or legal basis to pause transmission.

But such exceptions must remain exactly that: exceptions.

They cannot become a broad and undefined license to manage the public narrative of the inquiry. A Commission of Inquiry is not a private arbitration. It is a public mechanism intended to establish facts, test responsibility and restore confidence where public trust has been shaken.

The more serious the tragedy, the stronger the obligation of transparency.

A blanket ban on real-time coverage, accompanied by a vague power to impose further restrictions, invites public suspicion—even if the Commission’s intentions are proper. Confidence cannot rest on assurances alone. It requires rules, reasons, records and accountability.

What Transparency Requires

The Commission should immediately adopt and publish a clear access protocol built on the following principles:

Livestreaming should be the default, with only narrowly tailored and legally justified interruptions.

Any restriction must be announced on the record at the time it is imposed.

Reasons must be stated publicly, unless even the explanation would compromise a lawful protected interest.

The scope and duration of each restriction must be limited, to what is strictly necessary.

No portion of testimony should be silently removed or altered.

A complete official record must be preserved,of all testimony, objections, rulings, exhibits and restrictions.

A register of withheld or delayed material should be published, identifying the date, duration, reason and authority for each intervention.

Delayed or restricted material should be released promptly, when the basis for withholding it ends.

Families and residents of affected riverine communities must be provided meaningful access, including public viewing locations, timely recordings, transcripts and reliable official updates.

The Central Issue

The issue is not whether a Commission may ever protect sensitive evidence. It may have that responsibility in limited circumstances.

The issue is whether the Commission will exercise that responsibility transparently—or whether it will expect the public to accept unexplained restrictions in a matter involving death, grief, public transport safety and possible institutional failures.

The families of those lost in the MV Barima tragedy deserve more than delayed access. They deserve an inquiry that is visibly independent, demonstrably fair and unquestionably open.

The public deserves to know: What is being delayed, who decides, what can be withheld, and why?

Until those questions are answered in writing, the two-hour broadcast arrangement remains not a transparency measure, but a qualified and potentially controllable form of public access.

 

 Georgetown’s Unexplained Snub of Israel Must End

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 Georgetown’s Unexplained Snub of Israel Must End


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar OCTOBER 2026

Israel’s reported nomination of an ambassador to Guyana has apparently remained unanswered for more than a year—a delay that carries significant diplomatic meaning. Under Article 4 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a receiving state must grant agrément before an ambassador, whether resident or non-resident, can be appointed, but it is under no obligation to explain a refusal. While such requests are ordinarily resolved within weeks or a few months, prolonged silence is widely understood as a “soft denial”: a confidential, face-saving means of signaling that the proposed nominee is unacceptable. In this context, Guyana’s extended non-response appears less like an administrative lapse than a deliberate political and geopolitical message.

Guyana’s failure to receive Israel’s non-resident ambassador, Matty Cohen, has become too conspicuous to be dismissed as a routine diplomatic delay. While Mr Cohen has already presented credentials in Jamaica, Barbados, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago, Georgetown has yet to explain why it has not set a date for him to be formally accredited to Guyana.

The Government of Guyana must stop treating the accreditation of Israel’s non-resident ambassador as a matter too inconvenient to explain.

Israel’s Ambassador Matty Cohen has reportedly presented his credentials to Jamaica, Barbados, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. Yet in Guyana—his country’s diplomatic relations have  not  been formalized with Georgetown nor the CARICOM Secretariat hosted in Guyana, and the Government boasts of its leadership role in regional affairs—there has been no public explanation for why he has not been invited to present credentials to President Irfaan Ali. This silence is unacceptable.

The acceptance of credentials does not amount to an endorsement of every action of the Government of Israel. It does not prevent Guyana from condemning civilian deaths, breaches of international humanitarian law, or acts that violate the U.N. Charter. Guyana can maintain its stated position on Palestine, insist on a negotiated two-state solution, and speak without fear against injustices wherever they occur.

But Guyana cannot simultaneously claim to be a serious international actor, a defender of dialogue and a champion of multilateralism while refusing—or appearing to refuse—to complete a basic diplomatic process with a country with which it has formal ties.

The Government owes the nation direct answers. Has Ambassador Cohen formally requested an appointment to present credentials? Has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delayed or rejected that request? Has President Ali’s Office been advised not to receive him? Is the delay administrative, political, ideological, or tied to Guyana’s voting posture at the United Nations?

Minister of Foreign Affairs Hugh Todd and President Irfaan Ali must disclose why.

A Cost to Guyana’s Development

The unexplained diplomatic freeze is not merely an issue of etiquette. It may deny Guyana access to knowledge, technology, investment contacts and practical partnerships that could support the country’s urgent development needs.

Guyana has placed agriculture at the center of its diversification agenda. It wants to cut CARICOM’s food-import bill, expand food production, strengthen food security, modernize farming and establish itself as a regional food producer. Those ambitions require more than speeches, acreage announcements and occasional machinery distributions. They require technology, technical expertise, research, training, logistics and value-added production.

Israel has experience that Guyana should not ignore.

Despite operating in a dry and water-constrained environment, Israel has built globally recognized capacity in:

♦ Precision agriculture that uses sensors, satellite information, soil data and automated equipment to improve yields while reducing waste.

♦ Drip irrigation and fertigation systems that deliver water and nutrients directly to plant roots, conserving water and improving farm efficiency.

♦ Water recycling and reuse, including systems for treating wastewater for agriculture and industry.

♦ Desalination, water-storage management, leakage reduction and smart monitoring of water distribution systems.

♦ Greenhouse farming, shade-house technology, hydroponics and controlled-environment agriculture that allow more reliable crop production.

♦ Seed development, crop protection, pest-control systems and research suited to difficult climatic conditions.

♦ Dairy and livestock management, including breeding, feed systems, herd health monitoring and higher output per animal.

♦ Post-harvest management, cold storage, packaging, grading, processing and supply-chain systems that reduce spoilage.

♦  Agricultural research, extension services and farmer training designed to move innovations from laboratories into actual farms.

♦ Food-processing technology, quality assurance, export certification and traceability systems that can help producers reach higher-value markets.

Guyana does not need to copy Israel’s model. Guyana has abundant water, fertile lands and a different climate. But that is precisely why a sensible partnership could be valuable. Guyana’s comparative advantages—land, rainfall, rivers, agricultural potential and access to Caribbean markets—can be strengthened by technology that makes production more efficient, climate-resilient, market-ready and profitable.

A country with Guyana’s natural assets should be asking how to produce more food with better planning, less waste, reliable irrigation, stronger storage, higher quality, and viable export chains. It should not be allowing diplomatic uncertainty to cut off potentially useful avenues of cooperation.

Agriculture Requires More Than Land

The repeated mistake in Guyana’s development planning is the assumption that acreage alone equals agricultural transformation. It does not.

Farmers need all-weather farm-to-market roads, drainage and irrigation systems, affordable financing, dependable energy, reliable inputs, technical support, storage, processing facilities, quality control and buyers. They need protection from flood, drought, pests, price instability and post-harvest losses.

Israeli technical cooperation could assist Guyana in practical areas such as:

♦ Climate-smart drainage and irrigation for rice, vegetables, fruits and other crops.

♦ Efficient irrigation in intermediate savannahs and hinterland farming areas where access to water can be seasonal or costly.

♦ Small-scale irrigation packages and solar-powered pumping systems for family farmers and community farms.

♦ Protected agriculture for high-value crops, including peppers, tomatoes, leafy vegetables, herbs and berries.

♦ Improved livestock systems, milk production, feed planning and veterinary monitoring.

♦ Cold-chain and pack-house systems to preserve produce before shipment to local, regional and international markets.

♦ -processing support for juices, sauces, spices, dried fruits, cassava products, dairy products, packaged vegetables and other value-added goods.

♦  Digital tools that give farmers weather information, crop guidance, market prices and early warnings of pest or disease outbreaks.

♦ Training partnerships involving Guyanese farmers, technicians, agricultural students, the Guyana School of Agriculture, the University of Guyana and relevant public agencies.

Guyana must not reduce its international partnerships to oil, roads, loans and ceremonial visits. The country needs results-oriented cooperation that strengthens domestic productive capacity. Agriculture, agro-processing, water security and rural employment are not side issues. They are central to whether Guyana can build an economy that survives and prospers beyond petroleum.

 Diplomatic Recognition Is Not Surrender

Some may argue that Israel’s military conduct in Gaza makes normal diplomatic engagement impossible. That argument misunderstands diplomacy.

Guyana should remain free to condemn what it considers violations of international law. It should continue to support the protection of civilians, humanitarian access, accountability for atrocities and a just peace for Palestinians and Israelis alike. It should do so consistently, including where powerful states are involved.

But refusing to receive an ambassador is not a substitute for a coherent foreign policy. Nor does it advance Guyana’s interests.

Diplomatic engagement creates a formal channel for Guyana to make its concerns known. It allows the Government to pursue agricultural, technological, educational and investment cooperation while maintaining its independence on matters of war, peace and international law.

No responsible government should make Guyanese farmers, consumers, young people, businesses and public institutions pay the price for unexplained political hesitation.

The Questions Government Must Answer

President Ali and Minister Todd should immediately address the following:

1.Has Ambassador Matty Cohen formally sought permission to present credentials in Georgetown

2.If so, when was the request made, and what response did Guyana provide?

3.Has Guyana delayed, declined or placed conditions on his accreditation?

4.If there is a delay, what specific policy, legal, administrative or diplomatic reason justifies it?

5.Does Guyana intend to receive Israel’s ambassador before the end of 2026

6.Has the failure to accredit him affected Israel’s engagement with Guyana or the wider CARICOM Community?

7.What steps has Guyana taken to explore cooperation with Israel on agriculture, water management, agro-processing, climate adaptation, technology and training?

These are reasonable questions. They require clear answers, not private briefings, evasive statements or partisan spin.

Guyana cannot declare itself the food basket of the Caribbean while neglecting every available avenue for agricultural modernization. It cannot demand a greater voice in global affairs while leaving basic diplomatic matters unresolved. And it cannot champion national development while permitting opaque political calculations to block partnerships that may benefit the Guyanese people.

The Government must receive Ambassador Cohen or explain, in full, why it will not. That is the minimum standard of transparency and seriousness Guyanese citizens should expect.

Oil, Influence and the Essequibo Line

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 Oil, Influence and the Essequibo Line: Guyana Must Not Become Collateral in Washington’s Venezuelan Bargain


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar October 2026

The removal of United States sanctions against Jorge Rodríguez is not an isolated administrative decision. It is another clear instalment in Washington’s rapidly expanding accommodation with Caracas—one driven by oil, political access, regional influence and President Donald Trump’s determination to remake hemispheric diplomacy as a series of transactions.

For Guyana, the issue is not whether Venezuela should remain permanently isolated, impoverished or politically frozen. The Venezuelan people deserve recovery, stability and democratic choice. But Guyana cannot afford to be naïve about what is being built around it: a new US-Venezuela understanding in which oil is the currency, political rehabilitation is the reward, and the unresolved claim to Essequibo risks being treated as an inconvenient complication to be managed rather than an unlawful aggression to be stopped.

The Rodríguez rehabilitation

Jorge Rodríguez is not a marginal official. He is president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, one of the most powerful figures in the governing structure, and brother of interim President Delcy Rodríguez. The Trump administration’s October 14 delisting formally removes him from OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals list, after Delcy Rodríguez herself was removed earlier this year.

This matters because it signals something larger than the lifting of restrictions against one individual. Washington is steadily normalizing its relationship with the political apparatus running Venezuela—not merely tolerating it from a distance, but engaging it as the vehicle through which investment, legislation, energy agreements and political transition are to be organized.

That is precisely why the move must be read alongside the larger oil diplomacy now unfolding. Delcy Rodríguez has said that an agreement with the United States covers 17 oil fields and forms part of 61 agreements, with plans involving 250 drilling rigs and nearly US$76 billion in anticipated oil investment over five years.

Washington is no longer merely applying pressure to Caracas. It is acquiring leverage, access and a commercial stake in a reconstituted Venezuelan energy sector.

Trump’s hemispheric doctrine

The emerging doctrine appears simple: secure energy, curb instability, expand US commercial presence, contain external rivals and deal with whatever political authority can deliver the transaction.

That approach has a certain brutal clarity. Venezuela possesses immense oil resources, a strategic Caribbean and Atlantic location, a fractured economy, a depleted energy system and a governing elite in need of capital, recognition and relief. The United States possesses sanctions power, markets, financial reach, oil technology and the ability to decide who is brought in from the cold.

In such a relationship, both sides see opportunity.

Caracas receives capital, oil-sector rehabilitation, improved access to global commerce and an opportunity to trade political concessions for survival. Washington receives greater influence over Venezuelan crude, privileged access for US-linked firms, a chance to steer the country away from rival powers, and a more direct say in a state that has for years been treated as a regional security problem.

But there is a danger in treating this as a simple story of American influence disciplining Venezuela. Great powers often prefer a manageable dispute to a principled confrontation, especially where the confrontation threatens profitable arrangements. The more Washington becomes commercially invested in Venezuela’s recovery, the more it may be tempted to prioritize “stability” over accountability.

And for Guyana, the word “stability” can become dangerous when it is used to obscure the difference between peace and appeasement.

Oil is the bargaining table

The essential question is not whether America will continue supporting Guyana. The United States has deep and growing interests here: oil investment, maritime security, democratic stability and a strategic partnership with one of the hemisphere’s fastest-growing petroleum producers.

But partnership is not the same as permanence, and strategic interest is not the same as an unconditional guarantee.

Trump’s Venezuela policy suggests that Washington is prepared to convert sanctions relief, commercial access and diplomatic recognition into negotiating instruments. There is nothing surprising about that; it is the very nature of transactional diplomacy. The concern for Georgetown is that, at some stage, Venezuela may seek to place the Essequibo controversy into that transaction.

Caracas may not demand that Guyana surrender territory outright. It does not have to. The subtler danger is pressure for language about “dialogue”, “mutual accommodation”, “confidence-building”, “resource-sharing”, “joint development”, or some regional mechanism designed to give Venezuela a political foothold where international law gives it none.

That is how settled borders can be reopened: not necessarily through tanks and warships, but through diplomatic ambiguity, commercial inducement and the false claim that both sides must compromise for peace.

Guyana must reject that premise completely.

There is no legitimate “middle ground” between Guyana’s sovereignty and Venezuela’s unilateral claim. There is no equitable bargain to be made over territory that was settled by the 1899 Arbitral Award and is properly before the International Court of Justice.

Venezuela has not withdrawn

Washington’s accommodation of Caracas must be measured against an inconvenient fact: Venezuela has not abandoned its claim to Guyana’s Essequibo region.

Guyana has told the International Court of Justice that Venezuela repeatedly defied the Court’s provisional measures. In December 2023, the Court ordered Venezuela not to take action that would modify the situation in the territory under Guyana’s administration. In May 2025, it issued a further order barring Venezuela from conducting or preparing elections in the disputed territory after Caracas moved to establish and elect authorities for its so-called “Guyana Essequiba” state.

That record should matter in every conversation Washington has with Caracas.

A government cannot be treated as a responsible partner in regional stability while it simultaneously asserts jurisdiction over another state’s territory, redraws maps, manufactures administrative claims and seeks to impose political authority over land it does not control.

The issue is not a historic grievance to be politely acknowledged and then parked in the corner while oil agreements are signed. It is a live sovereignty dispute before the world’s principal judicial body. Venezuela’s compliance with the Court’s measures must be a material test of its international rehabilitation.

If Washington is willing to lift sanctions, open oil fields, facilitate investment and recognise the political legitimacy of the Rodríguez administration, then Washington must also be willing to demand something concrete: that Venezuela cease all acts intended to alter, administer, claim or threaten Guyana’s Essequibo territory.

Anything less sends the wrong signal. It tells Caracas that aggression can coexist comfortably with commercial reintegration.

The danger of “quiet diplomacy”

Guyana should be deeply wary of diplomatic language that calls for tensions to be “lowered” without identifying the source of the tension.

There is nothing wrong with peaceful relations. Guyana should want stable borders, open commerce, regional integration and a Venezuela at peace with itself and its neighbors. But peace cannot mean silence while one country maintains an unlawful claim over another’s territory.

A quiet border achieved by asking Guyana not to speak too loudly about Essequibo would not be security. It would be strategic sedation.

The danger is greatest if Washington decides that its Venezuelan oil agenda requires a reduction in political temperature. In that case, Guyana may be encouraged—not formally ordered, perhaps, but quietly advised—to avoid “provocative” actions; to pursue “pragmatic dialogue”; to temper its insistence on the Court process; or to consider arrangements that create the appearance of compromise.

Georgetown must be clear in advance: Guyana is not the obstacle to regional peace. The obstacle is Venezuela’s refusal to accept a legally settled boundary and its continuing effort to convert a failed territorial claim into a bargaining position.

There can be dialogue between neighbors. There can be diplomacy between governments. There can be cooperation on migration, crime, environmental protection and trade. But there can be no negotiation over Guyana’s territorial integrity.

Guyana’s strategic response

Guyana must neither panic nor sleepwalk. The proper response is disciplined, sustained and unmistakably firm.

♦ Demand explicit US language. Georgetown should seek clear public and private reaffirmation from Washington that the 1899 Award is binding, Guyana’s territorial integrity is inviolable, and the ICJ process—not political horse-trading—is the appropriate avenue for resolving the controversy.

♦ Tie rehabilitation to compliance. Venezuela’s access to sanctions relief, investment and diplomatic normalization should be linked to verifiable respect for the ICJ’s provisional measures and an end to acts purporting to administer Essequibo.

♦ Reject resource-sharing formulas. Guyana must not entertain “joint development” schemes, shared petroleum frameworks or border-management mechanisms that confer legitimacy on Venezuela’s claim or weaken Guyana’s exclusive sovereign authority.

♦ Build a wider security coalition. CARICOM, Brazil, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union and other democratic partners should be pressed to state clearly that no bilateral US-Venezuela arrangement can affect Guyana’s sovereignty or maritime rights.

♦ Strengthen Guyana’s own readiness.  Diplomacy is strongest when it is supported by a capable state. Guyana must continue investing in border administration, defense capability, surveillance, civil defense, infrastructure in the hinterland and the institutional presence of the state throughout Essequibo.

♦ Keep the public informed. In moments of geopolitical adjustment, secrecy creates vulnerability. The Guyanese public has a right to know whether assurances have been sought, what commitments allies have made, and whether the Government has established firm red lines with every major partner.

No barrel is worth a border

The United States may calculate that Venezuela can become a useful energy partner, a manageable political transition and a strategic prize in Trump’s expanding hemispheric footprint. Venezuela may calculate that oil wealth can purchase rehabilitation without requiring surrender of its maximalist posture on Essequibo.

Guyana must ensure that both calculations fail where its sovereignty is concerned.

Washington is entitled to pursue energy security. Caracas is entitled to seek economic reconstruction. But neither government is entitled to treat Guyana’s territory as the residual item on a wider deal sheet.

The 1899 Award cannot be adjusted to accommodate American oil strategy. The ICJ process cannot be subordinated to Venezuelan commercial recovery. And Essequibo cannot be transformed into the price Guyana pays for someone else’s version of regional stability.

That is the message Georgetown must deliver—calmly, relentlessly and without ambiguity: no sanctions concession, no drilling license, no investment package and no barrel of Venezuelan crude can become the currency for compromise over Guyana’s sovereignty.

 

No Special Tax Pass for America

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  No Special Tax Pass for America


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar October 2026

The United States should not be permitted to demand from Guyana the very concessions that its own corporate, environmental and labor systems would not casually grant at home. If American companies want access to Guyana’s oil wealth, infrastructure pipeline and emerging markets, they should compete fairly—not seek a taxpayer-funded advantage over Guyanese businesses.

The United States has a 21 percent federal corporate income-tax rate, while most states also impose corporate-income taxes; 44 states levy one, with an average top rate of about 6.57 percent among those states.  Guyana’s general corporate-tax system is already substantial on paper: commercial companies generally face 40 percent tax on chargeable profits or a 2 percent minimum-corporation tax on turnover, while other non-commercial companies generally face a 25 percent rate. 

But headline tax rates alone do not tell the real story. In the United States, a foreign or domestic investor operates within a far denser enforcement environment: federal and state taxation, regulatory agencies, workplace rules, litigation exposure, environmental permitting, disclosure obligations, organized labor in some sectors, and far higher wage expectations.

In Guyana, by contrast, the state is still building the institutional machinery needed to regulate a rapidly expanding petroleum economy and major infrastructure buildout. That makes tax holidays and bespoke concessions especially dangerous: they can strip away one of the few clear, measurable ways through which the Guyanese public captures value from foreign investment.

The Uneven Bargain

  Issue   United States Guyana Special US concession
Corporate tax 21% federal, state 1-10% 40% -commercial  25%- other companies  A tax holiday can reduce or eliminate the public return even where Guyana loses.
Consumption tax Sales and City taxes VAT 14%- zero rated and exempt Foreign firms should not receive bespoke relief 
Payroll Dues Federal payroll-tax, State unemployment contributions NIS 8.4%- Employer 5.6% -Employee Guyana should not subsidize foreign labor costs while local workers and firms carry ordinary statutory burdens
Labor rules  Federal requirements, anti-discrimination rules , workplace-safety obligations, States setting higher protections. The Equal Pay Act   Worker protections exist,  enforcement capacity, wage levels , bargaining power are  weaker . US firms should not exploit Guyana’s weaker bargaining environment while simultaneously demanding public subsidies.
Environmental compliance Extensive federal, state and local permitting, monitoring, enforcement and liability exposure  Regulatory systems are developing  Lower regulatory cost in Guyana tax breaks would compound it

The point is not that Guyana should copy the United States line by line. The point is simpler: American corporations already know how to operate under stringent regulation, pay layered taxes and meet higher labor costs at home. They should not arrive in Guyana demanding a softer tax regime, reduced obligations and privileged access while presenting themselves as engines of development.

The Tax Holiday Trap

A tax holiday is often marketed as an investment incentive. In reality, it can become a transfer of public wealth from citizens to investors.

Every dollar Guyana gives away through an unnecessary exemption is a dollar not available for flood control, health care, roads, schools, electricity, policing, climate resilience, public housing, technical education or capital for Guyanese entrepreneurs. This is particularly serious in a country whose oil revenues are finite, whose developmental needs are immense, and whose people have waited generations for meaningful economic transformation.

A government should therefore ask a hard question before granting any special fiscal concession: would the company invest anyway?

If the answer is yes—as it may be for firms pursuing Guyana’s energy sector, public infrastructure contracts, strategic geography, regional market access or oil-funded consumer demand—then the concession is not an incentive. It is a giveaway

Guyana’s existing tax structure also shows why the debate must be grounded in facts, not slogans. The country already applies exemptions and zero-rated treatment in certain categories, while VAT is generally charged at 14 percent on taxable supplies.  The appropriate issue is not whether incentives can ever be used; it is whether each one is transparent, time-limited, legally authorized, publicly justified and demonstrably better for Guyana than collecting the ordinary tax.

Ambassadorial Lobbying and Sovereignty

When a foreign ambassador lobbies aggressively for tax holidays, special concessions or preferred treatment for companies from his or her country, that is not a neutral act of diplomacy. It is commercial advocacy on behalf of external corporate interests

.Guyana must decide whether its tax policy will be made in the public interest or shaped through diplomatic pressure. The American ambassador may properly promote US investment. But Guyana’s government has an equal—indeed superior—duty to protect revenue, preserve competitive neutrality and ensure that Guyanese businesses are not relegated to the margins of their own economy.

The danger is not simply lost tax revenue. It is the construction of a two-tier economy:

♦ Foreign firms receive fiscal relief, expedited approvals, diplomatic backing and access to lucrative projects.

♦ Guyanese firms face bank-interest costs, limited capital, cumbersome procedures, scarce procurement opportunities and the full weight of tax compliance.

♦ Guyanese workers remain trapped in lower-paying or insecure work while high-value contracts, profits and decision-making flow abroad.

♦ The state becomes increasingly dependent on foreign companies for sectors it should be deliberately helping local enterprises enter.

That is how a country with immense natural wealth remains economically dependent.

Killing the Golden Goose

Guyana is the golden goose—not for foreign governments, not for multinational corporations, and not for politically connected intermediaries, but for present and future generations of Guyanese.

The petroleum sector, public infrastructure program, strategic location and rapidly expanding domestic economy create exceptional bargaining power. The tragedy would be for Guyana to surrender that leverage precisely when it should be using it to secure better terms: taxes, local ownership, jobs, technology transfer, skills development, environmental bonds, transparent procurement and reinvestment in communities.

A foreign company that wants a tax concession should have to prove, publicly and independently, that it will deliver more to Guyana than Guyana would receive under the ordinary law. That proof should include binding commitments on employment, Guyanese procurement, training, profit retention, local equity participation, environmental responsibility and the repayment of incentives if promises are broken.

A Guyanese Standard

Guyana should adopt a simple national rule: no special deal for a foreign company unless the Guyanese public can see the full price, the full benefit and the enforceable obligations.

That means:

♦ Publish every tax holiday, waiver, concession and investment agreement.

♦ Require a public fiscal-impact assessment before approval.

♦ Set firm expiry dates and prohibit automatic renewals.

♦ Attach measurable local-content and workforce targets to every incentive.

♦ Require claw back provisions where companies fail to meet employment, investment or procurement promises.

♦ Bar discretionary concessions that give foreign firms an advantage over qualified Guyanese businesses.

♦ Subject major concessions and Exim Bank-linked arrangements to parliamentary scrutiny.

♦ Protect Guyana’s freedom to trade and invest with all partners, including the United States and China, according to Guyana’s national interest—not Washington’s geopolitical preferences.

Guyana should welcome American investment, as it should welcome investment from every credible partner. But investment is not benevolence, and diplomacy is not a license to raid the future.

A country that gives away its taxes, contracts, strategic assets and policy space in exchange for promises of investment may discover too late that it has not attracted development—it has subsidized its own economic subordination.

 

PPP-PNC Axis: Dr. Jagdeo, ever the calculator, ever the arranger

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  PPP-PNC Axis: Dr. Jagdeo, ever the calculator, ever the arranger


OPINION BY: GHK LALL October 2026

The questions are many.  The conjectures number more.  Together or apart, they cover much territory, burrow deeply.  This PPP-PNC development, what’s in it for Dr. Bharrat Jagdeo?  What the source, the driving force, behind his epiphany?  Is it really for the betterment of the Guyanese people?  Or, is more about power?  I sidestep the power of the purse.

I start with the familiar.  Vice President Jagdeo does nothing for nothing.  He is within striking distance of my years, but ambitions still burn brightly.  Thwarted before, they burn brighter now; more fiercely.  He has control of the millions.  In foreign currency, virtually unlimited.  So, assets are available to make ambitions possible.  For its part, the PNC has given subtle signs that it is ready and willing.  Guyanese will discover who is who and what leads where.  Of this one aspect be assured: I think the days of WIN are numbered.  Regrettable, but undeniably real.  For a PPP-PNC Axis threatens that kind of extinction.  The people may still get to decide.  They have that say in their hands.

Dr. Jagdeo, with his most persuasive smile affixed, said it is for the people.  Those who were forced to travel light and head for the bright lights.  Paycheck and standards and living like, well, people.  And, he said, for those who are here, and should get a better share.  Under the Jagdeo Provisions, I am due two shares.  One for having left; another for coming back.  My only business is the people’s business.  Jagdeo knows this very well, but didn’t want to hear any of it.  PPP haters seek to topple the party and its powers.  Now he’s all love: PPP-PNC.  It’s time for revision, adjustment, change, enhancement.  By God! This is glorious.  He just left Attorney General Anil Nandlall with nothing to do.  A reformed Jagdeo puts an end to the need for Constitutional Reform.  Officially terminates that PPP patented farce.

There’s a wrinkle.  Recall that line about ‘the best laid plans of mice and men.’  It applies just as well in Guyana, and in both the PPP and PNC.  The wrinkle is that Dr. Jagdeo’s ambition is also Dr. Ali’s ambition.  The former has the vintage blends of experience (assuredly to Guyana’s detriment) under his belt; the latter has all the recklessness (national damages) of callow youth inseparable from his name, his record.  The PPP-PNC alliance banishes all of those negatives; makes many out-of-reach areas reachable.  Who takes precedence?  How will this play out?  The PNC has the best seat, but by then it’s too late.  Good for PNC prospects; terrible and intolerable for the Guyanese people.  I am including the masses of poor Guyanese.  They still count, don’t they?

So, what’s more in it for Bharrat Jagdeo, this wiliest of wily political operators?  Cheddi Jagan taught him.  Janet Jagan groomed him.  Ramotar and Rohee reinforced him.  The Commies at Patrice Lumumba drilled him.  Control.  Total control.  Absolute power and absolute authority.  Thus, the fires burn at fever pitch.  But there he was.  Cool as a cobra, and Robert Corbin’s body not even cold yet.  Pres Ali let the cat out of the bag.  The business that Robert Corbin started needs finishing.  What kind of business?  Father, forgive those who know not what they say, do.  The plague of flies they let loose.

I believe that what’s in this PPP-PNC bonding is the achievement of a lifelong dream.  A lifetime appointment.  Jagdeo just laid the first stone in that building at the Robert Corbin memorial.  I have a recommendation.  Instead of ole and stale PPP-PNC, the advice is to rename this fusion party The Robert Corbin Brotherhood.  If offensive to the women in both parties (my apologies), then the Robert Corbin Association works just as well, may even be grander.  The mystery, alongside its magnificence, is who would ever have believed that anyone in the PPP had such a high regard for any PNC luminary!  Especially Mr. Robert Herman Orlando Corbin.

I stay one last time with the same question: this PPP-PNC fraternity-sorority: what’s in it for Jagdeo?  Everything, it seems.  Including paradise regained.  Plus, the PNC well set inside it.  This is why Guyana is so beloved!  Finally, there is understanding.

PAPER GOLD  The Institutions That Must Stop the Laundering Economy

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA 

PART III: PAPER GOLD  The Institutions That Must Stop the Laundering Economy


OPINION BY:  Hem Kumar October 2026

A criminal gold economy does not survive because smugglers are clever. It survives because institutions fail to connect the evidence already in their possession.

One agency holds mining licenses. Another receives export declarations. Another monitors border crossings. Another investigates financial transactions. Another patrols rivers and airstrips. Another prosecutes cases. Another manages tax records.

If those institutions work separately, criminal networks work in the spaces between them. That is the institutional problem facing Guyana.

The country has agencies with relevant mandates: the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission, the Guyana Gold Board, the Guyana Revenue Authority and Customs, the Financial Intelligence Unit, the Guyana Police Force, the Special Organized Crime Unit, the Guyana Defense Force, immigration authorities and the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The question is not whether Guyana has institutions.The question is whether those institutions operate as a system.

The Laundering Chain

Gold laundering is often imagined as a transaction at the end of the process: a questionable shipment, a false invoice or a suspicious export.

In reality, laundering begins much earlier.

It begins when an unlicensed miner sells gold into a licensed channel. It begins when a dealer buys gold without verifying the source. It begins when a mine’s declared production is not checked against reality. It begins when cash changes hands without a meaningful record. It begins when an aircraft or boat can move gold from a remote location without being logged, monitored or questioned.

By the time the gold reaches the export stage, it may already have passed through several layers of apparent legitimacy.

The dealer has a licence. The exporter has documentation.The shipment has been assayed. The metal may even have passed through a bank.

But none of those steps answers the central question: Was the gold lawfully produced and lawfully acquired?

A laundering economy works by converting criminal origin into administrative normality.

The GGMC Test

The Guyana Geology and Mines Commission should sit at the center of any serious traceability system.

It is not enough for the commission to issue licenses, collect declarations and conduct periodic inspections. It must have the capacity to test whether the information it receives makes sense.

♦ If a mining claim declares a sudden increase in gold production, the regulator should be able to compare that declaration with the size of the concession, mining equipment on site, fuel use, workforce, geological potential, prior yield and known operational history.

♦ If a buyer suddenly acquires unusually large volumes of gold, authorities should be able to identify the suppliers and determine whether their combined declared production supports the volume purchased.

♦ If an exporter sends a major consignment overseas, regulators should be able to trace that shipment back through every buyer and mine in the chain.

This is not an impossible standard. It is the minimum standard required in a region where illicit gold crosses borders, armed groups tax mining activity and foreign buyers increasingly demand proof rather than promises.

The Gold Board Test

The Guyana Gold Board cannot be merely a buyer, facilitator or record keeper. It must be a gatekeeper.

Any government-linked gold-purchasing structure should be capable of identifying unusual patterns: repeated transactions just below reporting thresholds, unexplained cash purchases, excessive volumes from low-output districts, recurring use of intermediaries, sudden shifts in seller profiles and disparities between mine production and gold sold.

Where suspicious activity is identified, the information should not sit in a file.

It should trigger a rapid referral to the Financial Intelligence Unit, the Guyana Police Force, Customs and the mining regulator. The response must be coordinated before the gold is exported, melted or transferred to an offshore buyer. Once questionable gold reaches an international refinery, Guyana has already lost control of the evidence.

The FIU Test

The Financial Intelligence Unit has a role that is too often misunderstood. Gold is not only a mining commodity. It is also a financial instrument.

It can be used to move value across borders without wiring money. It can be bought with cash, exchanged through intermediaries, used to pay traffickers, converted into foreign currency or settled through stablecoins and other digital assets.

That makes gold transactions an anti-money-laundering issue as much as a mining issue.

The FIU should be asking whether gold purchases are matched by legitimate income, lawful corporate activity, verifiable ownership and explainable payment patterns. It should be examining whether a dealer receives unexplained third-party transfers, makes large cash deposits, conducts cross-border payments inconsistent with reported business activity, or uses crypto-linked settlement arrangements without a clear commercial explanation.

The key is not to criminalize every cash purchase or every digital transaction. The key is to identify the patterns that make lawful commercial activity indistinguishable from the movement of criminal value.

The Border Test

The Cuyuní, the Rupununi and the wider interior cannot be treated as distant spaces beyond normal state reach. They are where the state’s claim to sovereignty is tested daily.

A border strategy focused only on formal checkpoints will fail if gold can move by river, trail, aircraft, road and informal landing site. The response must combine intelligence, patrols, aerial monitoring, local reporting systems, licensing checks and targeted inspections of the trading points where illicit material is converted into cash.

The GDF, police, Customs, immigration and mining authorities do not need to duplicate one another. They need a shared operational picture.

That means common intelligence assessments, shared watchlists, coordinated deployment and a clear procedure for handing a case from an armed patrol to a financial investigator, from a financial investigator to a prosecutor, and from a prosecutor to a court.

A seizure without an investigation is theatre. An investigation without financial tracing is incomplete. A prosecution without asset recovery allows the criminal enterprise to regenerate.

The Prosecution Test

Guyana’s public debate too often ends at the announcement of an operation. A raid is announced. A boat is intercepted. A shipment is seized. A statement is issued.

Then silence.

The public should be able to follow major gold-smuggling cases from seizure to charge, from charge to trial, and from trial to outcome. Where cases collapse, the public deserves to know whether the problem was weak evidence, poor chain-of-custody practices, inadequate legislation, lack of forensic capacity, witness intimidation or simple institutional neglect.

The same standard must apply to politically connected persons, licensed businesses, public officials and foreign-linked networks.

A country cannot credibly claim to be fighting organized crime if enforcement is reserved for the small courier while the financiers, facilitators, buyers and beneficial owners remain untouched.

The gold economy is not sustained by the person carrying a package through the bush. It is sustained by the people who finance the purchase, organize the transport, arrange the paperwork, receive the payment and protect the network.

What Must Happen Now

Guyana does not need another vague promise of “stronger enforcement.”It needs a public, measurable gold-integrity plan.

That plan should include:

– A mine-to-export digital traceability system linking licenses, production records, dealer purchases, assay results, transport documentation, export permits and payments.

– Mandatory beneficial-ownership disclosure for gold dealers, exporters and major mining entities.

– Routine reconciliation of production data against purchases and exports.

– Risk-based audits of mines, dealers and exporters whose declared activity is inconsistent with known capacity.

– Joint operations targeting unlicensed airstrips, river landings and remote commercial routes.

– Financial monitoring of high-risk gold transactions, including cash-intensive purchases and digital-asset settlement.

– Published annual data on seizures, license suspensions, investigations, charges, prosecutions, convictions and recovered assets.

– Formal intelligence-sharing arrangements with Brazil, Suriname, the United States and other relevant partners.

– An independent review of whether existing agencies have the staffing, technology, legal powers and political backing needed to enforce the system.

None of this will eliminate smuggling overnight. But it would make Guyana a more difficult place in which to launder gold, hide ownership, move criminal money or transform Venezuelan-origin metal into apparently lawful Guyanese exports.

The Choice

The choice before Georgetown is not between economic development and strict enforcement. A credible gold sector requires both.

Guyana can build an industry that attracts responsible investors, reputable refiners and legitimate international buyers. Or it can permit an opaque trade in which criminal networks exploit every weak link, while lawful miners, local communities and taxpayers bear the cost.

The refinery wall in the United States is a warning.

Venezuela’s gold has reached the point where even powerful commercial and political actors cannot easily persuade refiners to accept it without proof of clean origin.

Guyana should treat that outcome as a lesson, not a spectacle.Because once a country’s gold is considered suspect, no press release, embassy speech or official assurance can melt away the doubt.

Prem Narine: a fascinating, chilling portrait

 

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  Prem Narine: a fascinating, chilling portrait


OPINION BY: GHK LALL October 2026

The name Prem Narine registered slowly; then like a tsunami.  A detective with a difference.  Results.  A profile that expanded before the eyes, grew on the consciousness. This was of a man earmarked for special graces, one going places.

I lost track of Mr. Narine for a while.  Whenever a reminder came of his continued existence, he had a new rank; higher on the Police ladder.  The initial belief was that here was a rising star.  Guyana needs as many as it can get, but with this qualifier: their sparkle must be genuine, their light pure.  Being a reader, there’s knowledge of different types of stars.  Some are different in a dubious way; they still float higher.

There’s no recollection of Mr. Narine’s rank when I returned to Guyana.  But this fact can’t be challenged: he has risen like a rocket.  His people, the Commission, must have seen a man of considerable potential (and usefulness).  One day. elevated to Inspector, which brought a nod of approval.  Next day, there’s Senior Supt Prem Narine.  He didn’t just breeze through promotions; he blew through them like a tornado.  There’s something circular about those, I understand.  But that’s only the beginning.  Try chief of detectives alongside Guyana’s Number One Spymaster.  What a combination!  Which one is the night job, that’s my challenge?  For some reason, the well-named James Jesus Angleton, a legendary CIA chief spook, flashed across the screen of my mind.  It’s wide.  Was he a defender of the American Way!  Now, this raises a question.  What about the Guyana Way?  Then another question.

The people behind Snr Supt Narine’s grand ascension, must have great expectations of him.  What are those?  There’s the remarkable, and it staggers.  By his own mouth, six execution-style murders taken in stride, only to let them slide into oblivion.  Whatever else Mr. Narine did or didn’t do in his body of work, there’s the evidence of those murders that pointed to one man.  Yet nothing resulted.  Either he forgot, or he filed away for later use.  Like today.  There’s regard for someone so resourceful, and more.  Skepticism.  Consternation.  The chill of concern.  What else is still unrevealed, hence unknown?  What else will Snr. Supt Narine, now a shoo-in for Dep Comm (even Top Cop), not do in the interests of some consideration?  I wouldn’t say political.  Not when an officer of Narine’s caliber is involved.  But bureaucracies can be flexible, and law enforcement ones are prone to being manipulated more than most.  They are most flexible.  Consider those, fellow Guyanese (and Americans).

Here’s the fascinating and repelling part of all this, with Snr Supt Narine, as Oscar winning performer.  Six execution-style murders with evidence pointing to one citizen didn’t raise alarms, unleash fears, of a rampaging serial killer.  Recently, however, anxieties arise about ‘national security threat.’  Mr. Narine is wasted as a policeman.  He is a natural poet.  Now this officer and gentleman is the head of the national spy machinery.  Holy Mackerel!  Hallucinating time.  The symmetry is compelling.  From evidence of six execution-style murders made to disappear to ‘national security threat’ made to appear.  What gives every indication of being untouchable before (like witness protection, or confidential asset) is now exposed in broad daylight before an international audience.  What am I doing in this damned and doomed town?  I proceed.

Mr. Narine as chief sleuth is worrying.  There can still be coexisting with that title, despite all the magic it can produce, when necessary.  Mr. Narine as Guyana’s Special Branch headman is a different story.  The recommendation is that his superiors rethink and reassign the Special Branch chieftainship.  Universally, Special Branches are notorious.  Regardless of their official names.  Their heads are untouchable.  America had and has them.  Stalin had them.  The PNC had them.  The PPP have them.  Guyana had one that was on the payroll of people that are of interest to other countries.  They have incomparable reach and clout here.

This is the seat that Snr Supt Narine occupies.  Loads of trust vested.  Potential, I think.  Superiors must be pleased by his past and present output.  Guyanese, meanwhile deal in great uncertainty.          When National Spymasters are too good at that game, the people are in trouble.  The Constitution gets scrambled.  Democracy’s ideals suffer.  How will Guyana’s Chief Spymaster, Mr. Prem Narine, be tomorrow?  Recall Faulkner: the past is prelude….