Mac Maharaj – Guyana needs a few

  592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY  IN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

Mac Maharaj – Guyana needs a few


OPINION BY : GHK LALL —August 2026

Mac Maharaj.  Knew the name.  South Africa, Mandela.  Apartheid, the struggle.  Then, 592Guardian shared a piece on Saturday, and I realize that I didn’t know the man at all.  There’s a biography of him in the house, somewhere among the thousands of other books.  Must find and read.  If only to gather what made him tick, what made him stick through the barrage of brutality he absorbed.

Sathyandranath “Mac” Maharaj. A South African Revolutionary.

Thanks to 592Guardian, I got a sketch of Mr. Maharaj.  The fighter for freedom.  Against the depraved and bestial.  Long odds for people with a short stick, a few bricks, to stand in defiance against a well-equipped killer army coming after them.  With blood in its eye.  Hate in its heart.  And inhumanity in its corpse of a soul.  But Mac Maharaj was one of those men and women with an indomitable will, and a spirit that just couldn’t be defeated.  By racists of the worst sort.  By demagogues who would kill a man, and burn a village, then kneel in church, worship their gods, and go home to their families.

They hung him from the seventh floor of a high-rise building.  From a window he dangled, held by one ankle.  He didn’t cave.  For almost sixty days, he was tortured, then beaten unconscious, left with a paralyzed arm.  And still, this man of steel, Mac Maharaj, would not yield.  Not a whisper, not a syllable, would he give to his animalistic inquisitors.  Nothing.  Nothing.  After a dozen years in one of those South African dungeons and fortresses that was specially reserved for the hardheaded and hard of hearing, he was released from Robben Island.  To Swaziland, he escaped.  From there he carried on the fight that lasted just under two long, grim, unending decades more.

Mac Maharaj was a man among a band of glorious men and martyrs, a pack of patriots that never knew the word surrender.  Mandela and Tutu towered above them all.  South Africa is different because of them, and their sacrifices.  The world is a better place, for their unceasing fighting spirit.  They made a pact with the despairing, denied, and degraded Black and colored people of South Africa.  And they never walked back, never even looked back for a fleeting second.  The thought of crossing the floor and shaking hands with the devils (Malcolm X), never surfaced.  Despite the prods and electric shocks, the stone killers and the wormy white politicians.  They persevered through all the punishments that were thrown against them.

I cross oceans.  Redirect gaze from Capetown  to GeorgetownWhat Guyana has makes me want to spit first, then puke.  Men and women made of mincemeat.  Froth.  And a financial calculator for a brain.  They throw in the towel, as soon as pressures brace.  They climb backsteps.  Roll across floors.  Lick boots.  Excellence in leadership.  When hunger multiplies.  While poverty stretches, intensifies.  Their own people betrayed and sabotaged.  It’s for the country.  I say it’s for the money.  I say it’s for the rewards of sucking up and brownnosing. 

And still thinking that there is no smearing.  Across face.  Across now rancid existence.  The simple people committed to, the simple people that trusted, now sold out for a clap on the back and a book of dirty deeds to do to prove oneself.

Where are their guts that don’t deflate, the stones in them that don’t shatter?  Cheddi Jagan and Walter Rodney could have plastered a foolish grin on their faces and toadied up to the powers of their time.  The thought never crossed, and neither did they.  What kind of men do Guyana have today?  But those that plot the quickest and easiest way out.  Why wait and miss the boat, find the gate closed?  Seize the moment and spring out like a jack-in-the-box to the life of a puppet, or some disparaged flunkey.  A mannequin on display in a lingerie showcase. 

The fight has gone out of those who signed up, who stood before the people, and swore to them: your pain is my pain, your struggle is mine.  Until they collapsed in cowardly submission.  Until the carrots dangled proved too much to resist.  Guyanese want life at the top.  Ease, no squeeze.  Crawling through mud and heat and sleaze is for people of stronger dispositions. 

More principled and patriotic makeup.  Like a Mac Maharaj, and a Mandela.  Guyana’s honest and honorable fell first.  The strong and the brave succumbed long before, and in more numbers now.

 THE PRICE OF NOT LOOKING

   592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

 THE PRICE OF NOT LOOKING


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar —August 2026

How a company convicted of bribery in Ecuador became the lowest bidder on Guyana’s largest hydropower project — and why no one at NPTAB appears to have asked why

 

On Thursday August 27 , an Ecuadorean tribunal sentenced former President Lenin Moreno to five years in prison and barred him permanently from public office. His crime: presiding, as vice president and later president, over a bribery network built around the construction of the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant — a network that, according to Ecuador’s Attorney General, moved roughly US$76.1 million from Sinohydro Corporation Limited into the pockets of Moreno’s family and business associates between 2009 and 2018. China’s former ambassador to Quito, Cai Runguo, was jailed alongside him. Nineteen other defendants were convicted.

Sixteen  weeks earlier, on May 8, 2026, that same company — Sinohydro Corporation Limited — submitted the lowest bid on file for Guyana’s Amaila Falls Hydropower Project: US$416,866,949.21, for a 165-megawatt facility that this government has called the cornerstone of its renewable energy strategy. Five companies bid. Sinohydro’s proposal is the cheapest. As of this writing, it remains under evaluation by the National Procurement and Tender Administration Board, with no award announced. 

This newsroom  does not allege that anyone in Guyana’s procurement apparatus has been bribed. We make a narrower and, in some ways, more damning claim: that it should not have taken a foreign courtroom to make Sinohydro’s history relevant to this government’s evaluation of its bid — because that history was never a secret.

It was published. It was public record before the RFP was even reissued. And nothing in the public account of this procurement suggests anyone asked about it.

A RECORD IN PLAIN SIGHT

Sinohydro’s presence in Guyana is not new. In 2020, Zijin Mining Group contracted the company to perform stripping works at the Aurora Gold Mine after acquiring the site from Guyana Goldfields. That arrangement itself drew scrutiny — the Ministry of Labour publicly stated that Zijin’s transfer of roughly 141 AGM employees to Sinohydro’s payroll did not comply with Guyana’s labour laws.

So the company was already known to regulators here, under circumstances already flagged as irregular.

Its international record runs considerably longer and darker. Investigators for the African Development Bank’s Office of Integrity and Anti-Corruption found that Sinohydro misrepresented its prior project experience while bidding for a Uganda road contract in 2013, using references to projects that had not been substantially completed. The World Bank’s Sanctions Board separately reprimanded the company over violations tied to the construction of a hydroelectric plant in Mali. Botswana terminated a Sinohydro airport-expansion contract outright for non-fulfilment of its terms. A Nigerian energy company has pursued an international arbitration claim against Sinohydro. None of this required Ecuador’s verdict to surface — Kaieteur News itself reported in November 2021, on the record, that Sinohydro was among three Chinese firms bidding for the Amaila Falls project that carried prior World Bank blacklisting.

The question is not whether Guyana’s government read Ecuador’s verdict. The question is why it apparently never read its own newspapers.

THE REGULATIONS ALREADY EXIST

Guyana is not without the legal architecture to act on precisely this kind of history. The Procurement Act 2003 and the regulations governing the Public Procurement Commission establish a debarment regime: Regulation 3(1) empowers the Commission to debar or suspend a supplier or contractor found to have engaged in prohibited conduct; Regulations 13 and 14 prohibit any procuring entity from soliciting or considering bids from a debarred or suspended contractor or its affiliates; Regulation 16 requires the Commission to publicise debarments and maintain a public register.

What the Act does not do — so far as this newsroom has been able to establish — is compel Guyana’s evaluators to cross-reference the debarment registers of the multilateral institutions whose own investigators have already done this work. A firm barred by the World Bank or the African Development Bank is not automatically barred in Georgetown. That gap is not a technicality. It is the precise seam through which a company with Sinohydro’s documented history can walk, unremarked, into a $417 million tender for a national infrastructure asset.

This is not a hypothetical failure mode. It is, on the available record, the one we are in. President Ali has recently and publicly proposed a digital procurement system that would track “beneficial ownership, tax and social-security compliance, contractor classification, past performance, debarments and suspensions” for every bidder — a system he has described as necessary precisely because none of that information currently follows a contractor through the process. The Amaila Falls tender is the argument for that system, made in real time, using this government’s own pending decision as the exhibit.

NOT AN ISOLATED SEAM

Sinohydro is not the only name in this government’s contractor pool that should trouble anyone charged with due diligence. This publication’s  ongoing examination of Sigma Engineers Ltd. Inc. — a Bangladesh-linked contractor holding water-infrastructure and recruitment contracts with Guyana Water Inc. — has documented an open anti-corruption charge against the company in Bangladesh, and an address listed on a Guyana government document that resolves, on inspection, to a private residence in Toronto.

Different company, different sector, same structural failure: a government relying on a bidder’s own paperwork rather than independently verifying who it is dealing with.

Two cases do not yet prove a pattern is policy. They are, at minimum, sufficient to demand one. A procurement system that cannot distinguish a company convicted of bribery abroad, or blacklisted by the world’s principal development lenders, from any other bidder is not a neutral process awaiting the lowest price. It is an open door.

WHAT THIS PUBLICATION  IS ASKING

The 592 Guardian is not in a position to determine, from public documents alone, whether Sinohydro’s bid was flagged internally and set aside for other reasons, or whether it was evaluated as though its record did not exist. That distinction matters, and only the National Procurement and Tender Administration Board and the Office of the Prime Minister can resolve it. We are asking them to.

Specifically:

Did NPTAB’s evaluation committee for the Amaila Falls Hydropower Project review Sinohydro Corporation Limited’s debarment or sanctions history with the World Bank, the African Development Bank, or any other multilateral lender prior to or during bid evaluation?     

Does Guyana’s procurement framework require such a check as a matter of standard practice, for this tender or any other above the high financial threshold?                                                                            And if no such check occurred here, will the government now conduct one before any award is made — rather than after?

Guyana did not create Sinohydro’s record. Ecuador’s courts did not create Guyana’s obligation to examine it. But a government that has spent the better part of this year promising a procurement system capable of catching exactly this kind of history has, in the Amaila Falls tender, a bid sitting in front of it right now that tests whether that promise is real.

The lowest price on the table is not the only number that matters. The public should not have to wait for a verdict in Quito to learn what its own tender board already had reason to ask in Georgetown.

The Board

Whose Face, Whose Money

 592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

Whose Face, Whose Money


EDITORIAL—Staff WriterAugust 2026

The Essequibo Expo and the Public’s Right Not to Fund Its Own Persuasion

The Essequibo Expo opened Friday  night at Anna Regina under a banner that tells you everything about how this administration understands the difference between governing and campaigning: it tells you nothing about it, because in the mind of the Guyana Office for Investment, there is no difference. “GUYANA UNLOCKED. VISION 2030 AND BEYOND. GUYANA’S INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES,” the backdrop declares, in letters large enough to be read from the Charity market square.

Beneath it, life-sized, unmissable, and entirely unnecessary to the stated purpose of the exhibit: the faces of President Irfaan Ali and GO-Invest Chief Executive Officer Peter Ramsaroop

Around them, on trestle tables built by a public agency and staffed by public officers, sit the actual products of Guyanese enterprise — Rooster’s pure Pomeroon coconut water, Pomeroon Rose Products’ farm-value additions, Flamboyant Grill’s achars and pepper sauces, Industries Moore’s cornmeal and cassava flour. These are the people the expo is nominally for. They did not ask for their labour to be framed by two political portraits. They did not need to be.

The government supplied the framing regardless, at public expense, because the point of the exercise was never solely to promote coconut water. It was to ensure that whatever goodwill these products generate accrues, by visual association, to two men who did not grow, process, bottle, or sell a single item on that table.

A STATUTORY AGENCY, NOT A CAMPAIGN OFFICE

GO-Invest is not a PPP/C institution. It is a statutory body of the Guyanese state, funded by the Consolidated Fund, mandated to facilitate investment and export readiness for every Guyanese regardless of how they vote.

Its budget is not the President’s money, and it is not Mr. Ramsaroop’s money.

It is the public’s money, extracted through VAT, PAYE, and the excise this newsroom’s  readers pay every time they buy fuel, cigarettes, or a case of the very beverages showcased at that booth.

It is worth being precise about what that money already buys Mr. Ramsaroop personally. Disclosed only reluctantly during the Committee of Supply, and only after a minister first protested that time had run out, the figures are now on the parliamentary record: a basic salary of $1.9 million per month, a gratuity of two times that figure annually — $5.223 million — a vacation allowance of $1.901 million, and $117,000 in travelling and other allowances. This is not the compensation of a struggling public servant scraping by. It is the compensation of a man handsomely remunerated by the very taxpayers whose currency he now spends, again, on a backdrop bearing his own face.

Peter Ramsaroop self promotion courtesy of public funds

The public is not merely paying for the message. It is paying to be told, in its own currency, whom to credit for the sun rising.

Mr. Ramsaroop has left no ambiguity about how he understands his role. “Catch the President’s vision,” he told Guyanese in 2021, urging citizens “regardless of their political persuasion” to buy into it. GO-Invest’s mandate, he said, is “to deliver on the President’s promise to the people of Guyana.”

Note the substitution: not the state’s promise, not the country’s development plan ratified through any institutional process — the President’s promise. A statutory investment agency’s chief executive, drawing a public salary north of $28 million a year in total remuneration, has defined his own institutional purpose as personal fealty to the man who appointed him.                                  The Essequibo Expo banner is simply that sentiment rendered in vinyl.

THE PARADOX THIS EDITORIAL BOARD WAS ASKED TO EXPOSE

Readers have reach out  to us making a point too rarely stated plainly: many Guyanese who pay the taxes and duties that fund GO-Invest’s operations do not support this government, do not endorse this President’s branding, and would not choose to have their tax contribution spent building his public image.

They are not exempted from the bill. Every VAT receipt, every duty on imported goods, every excise line on a payslip flows into the same Consolidated Fund that pays for the tent, the banner, the printing, and the salaries of the officers who erected it — irrespective of whether the person paying voted PPP/C, APNU+AFC, WIN, or did not vote at all.

This is the paradox this editorial exists to name:

citizens are compelled, through the ordinary mechanics of taxation, to underwrite political messaging some of them actively reject.

There is no PPP/C fundraising drive here soliciting willing donors. There is no opt-out. The funding mechanism is indistinguishable from the mechanism that pays for hospitals, roads, and salaries — which is precisely what makes the diversion of that mechanism toward incumbent image-building so difficult to see, and so important to say aloud.

THIS IS NOT A UNIQUELY GUYANESE PROBLEM — WHICH IS WHY IT HAS A KNOWN REMEDY

Jurisdictions that take public integrity seriously have already drawn this line. The United Kingdom’s Cabinet Office Directory on Government Communications and equivalent Westminster-tradition codes in Canada, Australia, and across the Commonwealth Caribbean generally prohibit the use of a minister’s name, image, or personal branding on government-funded public communications, precisely because state resources cannot lawfully be converted into an incumbency advantage.

The distinction those codes draw is simple and exportable: government communication informs citizens of a service; political communication personalizes credit for a leader. GO-Invest’s Essequibo Expo booth is unambiguously the latter, dressed in the institutional clothing of the former.

Min. of Finance Ashni Singh amongst the crowd

Guyana has no comparable code that this editorial board has been able to identifyno GECOM guidance, no Public Service Commission directive, no Cabinet circular restricting the personal branding of state-funded promotional material. That absence is not evidence of propriety. It is evidence of a gap the Constitutional Reform Commission, the Public Service Commission, and this Parliament have simply never been made to close.

Silence in the statute book has never once meant the practice is harmless — it has meant only that no one has yet been made to answer for it.

WHAT ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIRES

This publication  does not ask GO-Invest to stop promoting Guyanese agro-processors. It does not ask that the Rooster’s, the Pomeroon Rose Products, the Flamboyant Grills of Essequibo be denied a platform their products have earned.

It asks a narrower and entirely reasonable thing: that a statutory agency’s public-facing material bear the institution’s name and mandate, not the personal likeness of its politically appointed chief executive and the President who appointed him. If Mr. Ramsaroop wishes to campaign on his record, the PPP/C’s party apparatus is fully equipped to fund that campaign.

It should not be funded, even partially, by the Consolidated Fund, and it should never be indistinguishable from the state’s own communications

Until that distinction is restored, every taxpayer in Essequibo who walked past that booth last night — supporter and skeptic alike — paid for the privilege of being told, in the government’s own choice of imagery, exactly whom to thank.

Most of them did not ask to be thanked on those terms. Fewer still were asked whether they agreed.

— The Board

MAC MAHARAJ  and the Discipline of Revolution

  592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

 


 Mac Maharaj and the Discipline of Revolution

OP-ED BY : Hem Kumar August 2026

There was a time when political commitment was not measured by a Facebook post, a motorcade, a press release, or the ability to speak loudly at a public meeting. It was measured by what a person was prepared to endure—and whether, after prison, torture, isolation and exile, that person still remained committed to the cause.

Sathyandranath “Mac” Maharaj. A South African Revolutionary .

Sathyandranath “Mac” Maharaj’s life belongs to that tradition. Arrested in July 1964 during apartheid South Africa’s repression of the African National Congress and its allied underground, Maharaj was convicted in the so-called Little Rivonia Trial and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. He spent most of that sentence on Robben Island alongside Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and other figures who would come to embody South Africa’s liberation struggle.

The record of his interrogation is not precisely documented in the sources this newsroom  could verify, but multiple independent accounts agree he was subjected to sustained torture during that period and gave his interrogators nothing that broke the underground network he had helped build.

The prison sentence was not merely imprisonment. It followed brutal state repression and torture. Yet Maharaj emerged neither politically broken nor personally detached from the struggle. That fact is central to understanding him. Many persons can speak about sacrifice after the danger has passed; Maharaj lived through the danger when apartheid still controlled the courts, the police, the prisons, the borders and the machinery of everyday life.

On Robben Island, Maharaj became part of another extraordinary act of political resistance: preserving Mandela’s prison manuscript. Mandela wrote what would later form the basis of  Long Walk to Freedom in secret. When prison officials discovered the original manuscript hidden in the garden, a transcribed copy had already been prepared. Maharaj had copied the text in tiny handwriting and concealed it within a study file among his academic materials. When he was released in December 1976, the hidden manuscript left prison with him.

That distinction — between what can be footnoted and what cannot — matters more with Maharaj than with most subjects, because his life’s work depended on exactly that kind of discipline: what to reveal, what to withhold, and when.

That episode tells us something larger than an ingenious prison escape for a set of papers. It reveals the discipline of serious political work. The men on Robben Island understood that a struggle is fought not only with speeches and demonstrations, but with memory, organization, education, trust and patience. They understood that the written record of a movement mattered. They understood that history itself could become a battlefield.

After his release, Maharaj left South Africa in 1977 and was assigned by the ANC to work in exile. But exile did not become retirement.

It was from exile that he became the authenticating link in one of the most audacious acts of sabotage of the entire anti-apartheid campaign.

A young South African contractor named Rodney Wilkinson, who had gained access to South Africa’s Koeberg nuclear power station near Cape Town, smuggled out the plant’s building plans and delivered them to the ANC. Maharaj vetted the material and the man. He then made an unusual call: rather than send a trained guerrilla into Koeberg, he judged that Wilkinson himself — already inside, already trusted by the plant’s engineers — gave the operation its best chance of reaching the reactor’s most vulnerable points. The mission was named, after him, Operation Mac.

On the night of 18–19 December 1982, Wilkinson planted four limpet mines at Koeberg — two on the reactor heads, two in cabling beneath the control rooms — timed to detonate after the plant’s reactors were shut and, according to the ANC’s own account, after independent nuclear experts had been consulted to rule out any radiation risk to civilians. The devices, aged and imperfectly engineered, went off in a staggered sequence over roughly twelve hours rather than simultaneously. No one was injured. Wilkinson had already arranged his own farewell party from the plant for the same week — sitting through the send-off, by his own account, while wondering whether the mines beneath the building would hold their timing.

This publication  has not been able to verify specific damage or delay figures sometimes attached to the Koeberg attack, and does not print unverified numbers. What is documented, corroborated on the record by both Maharaj and Wilkinson decades later, is the operation itself: a nuclear facility under construction for the apartheid state, penetrated and struck by a insider recruited and directed from exile.

Maharaj’s most sustained act of discipline came in 1988, when the ANC decided to send serving leadership back into South Africa itself — not as visitors or infiltrators passing through, but to live and command from inside the country they had been exiled from. Maharaj, by then a member of the ANC’s National Executive Committee, was chosen alongside Umkhonto we Sizwe commander Siphiwe Nyanda to go first.

The preparation took months. In Amsterdam, an operative built Maharaj a new identity from nothing — disguise specialists trained him to alter his walk, padded clothing to change his build, and the city’s opera-house wigmaker built him a wig from a foam cast of his own skull. The cover story given to his own ANC colleagues in Lusaka, who were not told the truth, was that Maharaj had gone to Moscow for a kidney operation.

“Not even his colleagues in Lusaka could be let in on what he was about to do.”

In August 1988, travelling in disguise, Maharaj and Nyanda were smuggled into Swaziland and walked across the border into South Africa on foot. A car was waiting, driven by an ANC sympathizer who had not been told what the operation was. It dropped them outside the Carlton Hotel in central Johannesburg. Maharaj later described the state he and Nyanda were in as they crossed: on a high state of alertness, ready, as he put it, to see ghosts on every street corner.

What followed was Operation Vula — Vulindlela, ‘to open the way’ — an underground project to connect the ANC’s exiled leadership directly to its structures inside South Africa, using acoustic modems and one-time-pad encryption relayed through a London flat to reach Lusaka in real time, smuggled equipment carried in by sympathetic air crew, and a growing number of returning operatives, each fitted with a disguise of their own.

The historian Stephen Ellis would later call it the most effective and impressive project the ANC ever mounted. It ran until the ANC’s unbanning in 1990, when Maharaj was detained by security police just three days before he was due to appear publicly as a relaunched South African Communist Party leader — arrested, that final time, in the open, under his own name.

He does not need the embellishment. The documented record already describes a man convicted at twenty-nine, imprisoned for twelve years, and sent back into the country that had jailed him wearing another man’s face and walk, to build, from inside, the network that helped end the system that built Robben Island in the first place.

This is where the lesson becomes uncomfortable for many contemporary politicians and activists.

Maharaj did not build a political reputation through convenience. He did not become relevant only when power was within reach. He did not enter struggle as a career path, then treat public service as a route to contracts, status, personal enrichment or permanent entitlement. His political life was marked by a sustained line: underground work, imprisonment, education in prison, exile, clandestine return, organization, democratic transition and, later, public office.

When apartheid fell and South Africa held its first democratic election in 1994, Maharaj became Minister of Transport in Nelson Mandela’s first cabinet. From prisoner to minister was not simply a personal triumph. It reflected an idea that is now too often forgotten: those who demand the right to govern must first show the capacity to serve, organize and sacrifice for something beyond themselves.

Maharaj eventually left frontline electoral politics and government office, though he later returned to public service as spokesperson to President Jacob Zuma. But whether one agrees with every political association or decision made in his later years is not the central point. The record from 1964 through the democratic transition is a record of sustained commitment under conditions that most of today’s political actors would find unimaginable.

The missing quality in Guyana

Guyana’s political culture urgently needs this kind of consistency—not the reproduction of another country’s struggle, and certainly not romantic slogans about revolution, but a return to the ethics that gave liberation politics its meaning.

Too much of what passes for activism today is episodic. A crisis appears; voices rise. A controversy trends; commentators mobilize. An election approaches; principles suddenly become fashionable. Then the moment passes, attention moves elsewhere, and the public is left with the same unaccountable systems, the same secrecy, the same political patronage and the same institutional decay.

There is a difference between protest and political work.

Protest can be necessary. Outrage can be justified. Public criticism can expose wrongdoing. But sustained political work requires more: study, institutional memory, documentation, community organization, courage under pressure, financial independence, internal democracy and a willingness to remain engaged after the headlines disappear.

That is the distinction that Maharaj’s story brings into sharp relief.

In Guyana, we have no shortage of persons prepared to condemn corruption when it is politically useful, denounce discrimination when it affects their constituency, or speak of justice when they are outside the corridors of power. What remains scarce is a culture of principled consistency: people willing to challenge wrongdoing no matter who commits it; to build organizations that outlive personalities; to maintain public records; to defend citizens who bring inconvenient information; and to resist the temptation to trade conviction for access.

The country’s oil era makes this deficiency even more dangerous.

A society receiving enormous resource revenues cannot afford a political class that thinks only in five-year electoral cycles, nor activists who mobilize only around personal ambition or partisan instruction. Guyana needs citizens and leaders who can sustain scrutiny of contracts, public procurement, environmental protection, land allocation, infrastructure spending, local-government authority and the integrity of public institutions over decades—not merely until the next appointment, contract, candidacy or coalition arrangement.

Courage without consistency is performance

The mythology of politics often celebrates the dramatic moment: the arrest, the protest, the confrontation, the speech. But Maharaj’s example suggests that the deeper test is what comes after.

What do you do after you are released?

Do you return to the work? Do you educate yourself? Do you preserve the movement’s record? Do you build networks quietly? Do you accept personal risk without converting sacrifice into a lifelong claim for privilege? Do you remain accountable when your side acquires power?

Those are harder questions than asking whether someone can denounce an opponent at a rally.

Maharaj’s life does not require us to erase complexity, overlook disputed episodes, or turn any political figure into a saint. Serious history does not work that way. But it does require honesty about a generation that understood commitment as an extended discipline, rather than a temporary performance.

That is what Guyana must recover.

Not blind loyalty. Not political violence. Not personality cults. Not imported revolutionary theatre.

What is needed is a democratic revolutionism of principle: sustained public education, organized citizens, fearless journalism, honest advocacy, transparent institutions and leaders who understand that the public good cannot be pursued only when it is safe, popular or profitable.

Mac Maharaj’s journey—from arrest and Robben Island, to exile and underground organization, to the first democratic government—reminds us that meaningful political change is rarely made by those who appear only when there is applause.

It is made by those who remain when there is a cost.

 

THE ASSET —When Washington Says the Quiet Part Aloud

  592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

THE ASSETWhen Washington Says the Quiet Part Aloud


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar— August 2026

There is a particular kind of admission that no investigative reporter can manufacture: the one a government makes about itself, on the record, because it no longer sees anything to hide.

That is what happened when Mauricio Claver-Carone — until recently the Trump administration’s informal envoy to Venezuela, operating with what sources describe as outsized influence behind the scenes — was asked by Reuters to explain why Alejandro Betancourt, a Venezuelan businessman under active criminal investigation in two European jurisdictions, was being used as a channel between Washington and Caracas.

He did not deny it. He confirmed it. Betancourt, he said, understood the oil business in both countries and could build the bridge the administration needed. A diplomatic source went further in comments to EL PAÍS: “He’s a U.S. asset and they use him. Betancourt has understood how to sell himself and the Americans are buyers.”

Set that sentence beside what has now been documented, and the picture stops being a matter of inference.

THE INTERVENTION

Betancourt is not a marginal figure awaiting the outcome of routine due diligence. He is the founder of Derwick Associates, the company that received at least eleven no-bid Venezuelan thermoelectric contracts worth roughly $5 billion under Hugo Chávez — contracts that, according to Transparencia Venezuela, were overpriced by some $2.9 billion, and several of which never delivered the power they were paid to generate. He is, by name, the reason the term “bolichico” exists in Venezuelan political vocabulary: the young, connected operator enriched by the Bolivarian state without the burden of prior experience.

He is also, as of this writing, the subject of a reopened Spanish National High Court case alleging that he and his partners bribed three PDVSA officials with $42 million to help defraud $4.85 billion through currency-exchange manipulation — a case built on an earlier Swiss money-laundering investigation, which was itself built on a U.S. inquiry whose defendants have already been convicted.

Zurich prosecutors confirmed to Global Investigations Review in May that their underlying probe into Betancourt remains active. Switzerland froze his assets, alongside those of Nicolás Maduro and other politically exposed persons, in January of this year.

None of that has been resolved. None of it has been dropped.

What has changed is narrower, and far more revealing: according to reporting by the Washington Post, senior U.S. officials — Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Landau, former Attorney General Pam Bondi, and former Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche among them — made direct contact with Swiss authorities to press for exactly one outcome.

Not Betancourt’s innocence. Not the closure of the investigation. His freedom of movement. Bondi and Blanche, per that reporting, explicitly asked Switzerland to resolve the matter without criminal charges or prison time. In May, Zurich’s prosecutor’s office withdrew the extradition order that had confined Betancourt to bail in the United Kingdom.

The State Department, around the same time, issued him a multiple-entry U.S. visa.

Read the sequence plainly. Named American officials, operating through named channels, asked a European justice system to let a man facing a $4.85 billion fraud allegation walk free of the mechanism that would have compelled him to answer for it — not because the case lacked merit, but because his liberty served a policy objective.

Zurich did not clear him. It removed the tool that would have brought him before a court.

THE OBJECTIVE

That objective is not obscure. It is, if anything, the one part of this story Washington has been willing to state outright: a functioning intermediary between the United States and the post-Maduro government of Delcy Rodríguez, at the precise moment both governments are negotiating the restructuring of Venezuela’s oil sector, its mining concessions, and its sovereign debt.

Betancourt has obliged. Flight records reviewed by EL PAÍS place him back in Caracas on June 27, days after two earthquakes killed more than 6,000 people, traveling with his wife and a small entourage on a private aircraft from Palm Beach. He returned in July — though the paper trail for that second trip is, by any editor’s standard, strange enough to warrant its own scrutiny.

One flight plan places Betancourt and a party of Spanish investors aboard a Venezuela-bound charter on July 22. A second version of the same flight — same aircraft, same crew, same route, filed while the plane was airborne — replaces every name on that list with two others: Laura Hietamies, a Finnish financier, and her husband Jacob Hirshman, co-founder of the crypto- and defense-linked digital bank Erebor, who has himself made repeated trips to Caracas this year to link Venezuela to the U.S. financial system.

Neither Hietamies nor Hirshman responded to EL PAÍS’s questions. Neither did Betancourt. A source familiar with the case called the substitution a deliberate attempt to obscure his presence in the country.

By July 30, Betancourt was flying out again — this time alongside the co-founders of Heeney Capital, a mining-focused investment firm that in May signed advance purchase agreements for Venezuelan gold and mineral projects as part of a White House-backed push to revive the sector.

The pattern that emerges is not one of a private citizen quietly managing his own legal exposure. It is a state-adjacent operator moving between Washington’s diplomatic apparatus and Caracas’s oil, mining, and debt portfolios, on flights whose paperwork does not consistently agree with itself, at the same time his own government’s investigators — in a country whose president has publicly promised to clean up precisely this kind of arrangement — decline to press the matter, and whose American sponsors have taken active steps to see that no other jurisdiction does either.

WHAT THIS ESTABLISHES — AND WHAT IT DOES NOT

It would overreach to say Washington’s conduct here proves personal financial gain for the officials involved; nothing in the record supports that, and accountability journalism loses its force the moment it claims more than its sourcing carries. What the record does support, on named officials and on-the-record institutional confirmation rather than anonymous insinuation, is narrower and no less serious: that the United States government, through its most senior law-enforcement and diplomatic officials, treated a foreign criminal investigation as an obstacle to strategic access — and moved to clear it, not by contesting the evidence, but by asking the investigating state to look past it.

That is not a footnote to hemispheric policy. It is the policy, stated by the men who made it.

— The Board

From Stabroek to the Orinoco: Two Petrostates, One Uncomfortable Question

592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

From Stabroek to the Orinoco: Two Petrostates, One Uncomfortable Question


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar–August 2026

Washington is negotiating direct access to Venezuela’s oil fields through a government it installed. Guyana should be watching the legal architecture, not just the geopolitics.

Reuters and Al Jazeera reported this week that the Trump administration is negotiating long-term access to a group of Venezuelan oilfields, structured as leases with an auction or tender to allocate blocks among American producers. Axios and the Wall Street Journal have since reported a more direct version: the United States government itself taking an equity stake in more than a dozen fields holding roughly 90 billion barrels — nearly a third of Venezuela’s proven reserves — with the deal spearheaded personally by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodríguez.

Whichever legal form it eventually takes, the direction is unambiguous. Seven months after the United States removed Nicolás Maduro from power, Washington is moving to convert its military and political leverage in Venezuela into a durable claim on the largest proven oil reserves on Earth. For a publication that has spent this year dissecting the legal architecture of Guyana’s own oil relationship with a foreign power, the Venezuelan deal is not a curiosity next door. It is a second data point in the same experiment — and one being conducted with far less legal cover than the first.

A Different Species of Arrangement

It is worth being precise about what distinguishes this deal from Guyana’s, because the comparison is instructive only if it is accurate. Guyana’s Stabroek Block operates under a 2016 Production Sharing Agreement — a private commercial contract between the state and a consortium of international companies (ExxonMobil, Hess, CNOOC), negotiated and signed by an elected government, however lopsided its terms. Whatever this newsroom has argued about the PSA’s fiscal structure, its absence of ring-fencing, or its selectively invoked “sanctity of contract,” the underlying instrument is a corporate agreement between a sovereign state and private firms.

What is being negotiated in Venezuela is a different species of arrangement entirely. Axios and the Wall Street Journal both describe active discussion of the US government itself holding direct equity in Venezuelan oilfields — not American companies operating under a state contract, but Washington as a working-interest holder in a foreign country’s national patrimony.

The Wall Street Journal notes this is historically almost unheard of: the only comparable precedent it could locate was Franklin Roosevelt’s wartime effort to create a US state oil company and buy into Saudi concessions in the 1940s — an effort that ultimately failed.                 Direct sovereign-to-sovereign resource capture of this kind has essentially no functioning modern precedent.

Layered onto that novelty is a legal problem Reuters flagged and that Venezuelan legal critics have seized on: Venezuela’s constitution reserves the hydrocarbon sector’s core activities to the state, and current law does not provide for the kind of acreage leases under discussion. Ricardo Hausmann — a Harvard economist and former Venezuelan government minister, not a fringe commentator — has already called both the interim government and the underlying hydrocarbons law illegitimate, writing that “an illegitimate interim government with an illegitimate hydrocarbons law has no legitimacy to strike this unconstitutional deal,” and predicting it “will be a fiasco for all involved, starting with Secretary of State Rubio.”

“They are treated as expropriated peoples in Guyana. Now examine what may happen next door — where the negotiating government was appointed, not elected.”

 

Who Is Actually Signing

The single fact that should concern Guyanese observers most is not the oil at all. It is the identity of the Venezuelan signatory. Delcy Rodríguez, the interim president now negotiating away nearly a third of Venezuela’s proven reserves, is Maduro’s own former vice president — installed by Washington after Maduro’s capture, not elected by Venezuelans. María Corina Machado, the opposition leader who actually won the 2024 election by a documented landslide and who was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize for her fight for that democratic transition, has been publicly sidelined from the process.

The Center for American Progress has characterized the arrangement bluntly: Washington “traded a democratic transition for oil access,” swapping “one indicted autocrat for another — this time, one acceptable to U.S. business interests.”

Machado herself has called for a fundamentally different model — full privatization of PDVSA, a new oil law, and Washington’s continued oversight of oil revenue only until a genuinely elected government can take over — explicitly conditioning long-term investment security on the rule of law and independent institutions that a durable, elected government would provide, not an interim one appointed by a foreign power.

That the deal now moving toward signature bypasses her entirely, in favor of the very apparatus she spent over a decade opposing, is the clearest evidence yet that this is a resource-access project first and a democratic transition project a distant second, if at all.

Two Petrostates, Side by Side

Guyana — Stabroek Block

Venezuela — 17-Field Deal

Private Production Sharing Agreement with a corporate consortium

Reported direct US government equity stake, or lease/tender to producers

Signed by an elected government (2016)

Negotiated by an unelected interim president installed by the US

Legal instrument fits, however imperfectly, within existing Guyanese petroleum law

Constitution reserves hydrocarbons to the state; current law has no acreage-lease mechanism

Domestic critics (Ram, this newspaper) contest fiscal terms and enforcement, not the state’s authority to sign

Prominent critics (Hausmann) contest the government’s legal authority to sign at all

US role: commercial partner via Exxon/Hess, plus recent security guarantees to Guyana against Venezuelan claims

US role: direct negotiating party and prospective equity holder

Questions Without Plausible Answers Yet

Several structural questions remain genuinely open, and any responsible analysis has to sit with that rather than resolve it prematurely:

  • Legitimacy and durability. If an unelected interim government signs 20-to-30-year commitments over a constitutionally reserved sector, does that bind a future elected Venezuelan government at all — or does it simply guarantee another cycle of contract disputes once Machado, or any elected successor, takes office? Guyana’s own PSA fight over “sanctity of contract” suggests durability questions do not resolve themselves even when the signing government was legitimately elected.
  • What happens to Essequibo. Rubio has already answered part of this one directly. Standing beside President Ali in Georgetown, he warned that any Venezuelan “adventurism” against Guyana or ExxonMobil’s operations would carry serious consequences — explicitly linking Washington’s Venezuela policy to Guyana’s territorial security. That commitment reads differently now that Washington has direct commercial exposure inside Venezuela’s own oil sector: the US has as much interest in a quiet, unresolved border dispute that keeps both governments dependent on American goodwill as it does in an active one favoring either side.
  • The Chinese displacement question. Some of the 17 fields under negotiation, in Lake Maracaibo, are currently operated under contracts signed with a Chinese firm during the Maduro era. Whether this deal formally displaces those contracts — and whether that becomes a template Washington applies to Chinese-linked interests elsewhere in the region, including the Berbice port financing this newsroom  has tracked shifting from Chinese pre-feasibility interest toward Bechtel and Hess — is not yet answered.
  • Field allocation transparency. Axios has separately reported friction inside the US government over the “pace” of Venezuelan oil deals, with industry figures pressing Washington to “pick winners and losers” among competing American firms. An opaque field-allocation process of this kind, run by a foreign government inside another country’s oil patrimony, is precisely the kind of arrangement that would draw sustained scrutiny from transparency advocates if it happened in Guyana.

Why This Matters in Georgetown

It would be a mistake to read the Venezuelan deal as simply “worse than Guyana’s” and leave it there. The more useful reading is structural: both cases show a resource-rich, institutionally strained state entering long-term hydrocarbon commitments with a dominant external power, under conditions where the domestic legal and democratic architecture is contested rather than settled. Guyana’s version of that story ran through a corporate PSA and an elected government whose 2020 about-face on renegotiation this publication has already documented in detail. Venezuela’s version is running through direct state-to-state resource capture, negotiated by a government that never faced Venezuelan voters, over the explicit objection of the woman who did — and won.

If the deal is signed in anything like its current reported form, it will hand Washington its clearest opportunity yet to demonstrate whether “energy security in the Western Hemisphere” means genuine partnership with resource-rich states, or simply a more efficient method of extraction dressed in newer legal clothing.

Guyana, sitting on the other side of a still-unresolved and now newly consequential border dispute, has every reason to watch closely.

The Board

Sources: Al Jazeera, Reuters (via Al Jazeera), Axios, Wall Street Journal (via Fortune/Axios reporting), Fortune, Center for American Progress, ABC News, CNBC/KHOU (Machado, CERAWeek), Associated Press (Rubio–Guyana remarks). This piece will be updated as terms of the deal, if signed, become public.

 

The Certificate Cannot Certify What the State Won’t Publish

592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊ INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM◊ GUYANA

The Certificate Cannot Certify What the State Won’t Publish


EDITORIAL · OPEN DATA & INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 

 A government training agency wants to claim a “world-class workforce” for Guyana. It cannot, because the state has built no mechanism for anyone outside it to check the claim — and the one office created to force that disclosure has been left to fail by design.

By the Editor – August, 2026

The Board of Industrial Training’s Chief Executive Officer, Richard Maughn, returned from a U.S. State Department leadership program this month with an assessment that Guyana is “on track in building a world-class labour market,” missing only greater collaboration between agencies to complete the picture. The claim was carried, uncontested, in the Guyana Chronicle. It should not have been.

Not because the training programs Maughn describes are fictional, and not because collaboration between agencies is a bad idea. The claim should not have gone uncontested because there is no way for a member of the Guyanese public, an academic, a civil society organisation, or an independent journalist to verify it. Guyana has no statutory requirement that any public agency — the Board of Industrial Training included — publish the workforce data, disaggregated by sector, nationality, and employer, that a claim like “world-class workforce” would need to survive contact with evidence. What exists instead is an architecture of non-disclosure, anchored by a single office that has spent more than a decade demonstrating what happens when transparency is optional.

A DECADE OF DORMANCY, PRICED AT $40 MILLION

That office is the Commissioner of Information, established under the Access to Information Act of 2011 to give the Guyanese public a statutory right to demand records from public bodies. Kaieteur News reported on February 10, 2026 — during the first day of consideration of the 2026 Budget Estimates — that the office has produced no annual reports, engaged in little to no meaningful contact with media, and given little to no response to citizens or civil society seeking public information, for more than a decade.

The government’s response to that record, per the same report, was to allocate $40 million to the office in this year’s budget, $33.5 million of it earmarked for the Commissioner’s own salary and benefits. The allocation was challenged on the floor of the National Assembly by an opposition parliamentarian during budget scrutiny; a government minister present committed to writing the Commissioner to press for compliance.

An office with no annual reports for over a decade was budgeted $40 million to continue operating exactly as it has.

Kaieteur News’s reporting adds a detail that sharpens the accountability failure: the ruling party’s own 2025 election manifesto promised full enforcement of the Access to Information Act if returned to office, and the Vice President said publicly that improvement should follow a win. The party won. Kaieteur News reports no notable change followed.

This is not an absence of promises. It is an absence of consequence for breaking them.

That finding is corroborated independently. A press freedom assessment published in April 2026 by the Inter American Press Association’s affiliated monitoring project found that the Access to Information Act, passed in 2011, is not functioning in practice; that numerous information requests from civil society and media have gone unanswered; and that the government added resources to the Commissioner’s office in the 2026 budget without attaching any guarantee of accountability.

Two independently reported sources — a domestic outlet covering a budget debate, and a regional press freedom monitor assessing the state of Guyanese journalism — arrive at the same conclusion by different routes.

THE PICKET, THE PRE-ACTION NOTICE, AND THE JUDICIAL REVIEW

The clearest demonstration of what that dormancy costs in practice belongs to Christopher Ram — chartered accountant, attorney, and one of Guyana’s most persistent civic advocates on matters of public disclosure. Ram is a public figure who has made his advocacy on this issue a matter of open record, and his effort to force the Commissioner’s office to function is worth tracing in full, because it shows an escalation, not a single complaint.

Citizens picketing Commisioner of Information Office

In late March and early April 2025, Ram organized a picket outside the Commissioner’s office at 340 East Street, Georgetown, joined by lawyers, opposition Members of Parliament, independent media, and transparency organizations, according to Kaieteur News’s contemporaneous coverage. Ram said the group’s information requests had been rebuffed on what he characterized as absurd grounds — including, he said, the Commissioner’s insistence on being addressed by his full honorific title before engaging with a request at all. Ram announced the picket would run for four weeks, escalating to the Office of the President — which holds portfolio responsibility for the Commissioner’s office — if the government did not respond.

The government did not respond in the way Ram sought. On April 23 and 24, 2025, Demerara Waves and Stabroek News reported that Ram had escalated to formal legal action: pre-action notices served on the Minister of Natural Resources and on the Commissioner himself, over the continued withholding of records related to the 2016 ExxonMobil Production Sharing Agreement — an agreement governing the disposition of Guyana’s single largest natural asset. By May 16 and 17, 2025, Stabroek News reported that Ram had filed what was described as Guyana’s first judicial review action under the Access to Information Act, alleging that the Commissioner’s conduct amounted to a systematic refusal to enforce the nation’s transparency law and constituted, in Ram’s words as reported, a constitutional crisis in government accountability.

That litigation remains a live thread in Ram’s public advocacy more than a year later. In a column published by Kaieteur News in May 2026, Ram named the Commissioner of Information’s continued, functionally unoccupied status alongside a dormant Constitutional Reform Commission and an opposition-chaired Public Accounts Committee that has not been permitted to meet — leaving years of Auditor General findings on public expenditure in the range of four to five billion United States dollars unexamined by the body constitutionally tasked with examining them.

Ram’s own assessment, as reported, was that Guyana’s democratic and accountability institutions are decaying under the weight of oil-era public spending, precisely because no institution with the power to compel disclosure is being permitted to use it.

FROM ARCHITECTURE TO WORKFORCE DATA

This publication has argued before — in response to a Stabroek News commentary on inter-agency information silos — that Guyana’s information failures are not a matter of institutional culture that better collaboration can fix. They are a matter of architecture. There is no statutory mandate compelling public agencies to produce and publish machine-readable data on a regular schedule. There is no independent regulator empowered to compel disclosure or sanction its refusal.

The Commissioner of Information was meant to be exactly that regulator. The record above is what happens when the office is funded to exist and not funded, staffed, or held accountable to function.

The Board of Industrial Training’s claim to a “world-class workforce” has to be read inside that architecture, not outside it. No labour force survey, sectoral employment breakdown, or work-permit disclosure accompanying Maughn’s remarks is available to the public through any standing government data channel. What is publicly available instead comes from two sources: international bodies, whose reports on Guyana’s labour and governance conditions are cited precisely because they are the only figures anyone outside government can obtain — and direct, physical observation of who is actually working on the ground.

This publication’s own reporting on Sigma Engineers Ltd. Inc., the Bangladesh-linked contractor holding a portfolio of Guyana Water Inc. contracts now confirmed at close to twelve billion Guyana dollars, is illustrative of the second category. Photographic evidence obtained in the course of that investigation — including an image published by Guyana Water Inc.’s own official account, captioned as showing “several Guyanese staff” — shows a workforce that is visually, overwhelmingly South Asian, standing alongside Guyana Water Inc.’s own Chief Executive Officer at a completed plant site.

Whether that composition reflects lawful work permits, documented labour-market testing, or compliance with the local-hiring obligations that apply to engineering and technical contracts under Guyana’s legal framework has not been disclosed by any government agency and cannot currently be verified against any published dataset.

That is not a gap in this publication’s reporting. It is the gap the state has left standing.

A workforce claim that cannot be checked against published data is not a finding. It is an assertion, made by the same government that funds an information office to sit idle and answers civic advocacy with a promise to write a stern letter. Guyana does not need another certificate, another training pipeline announcement, or another appeal for inter-agency collaboration to reach a world-class workforce.

It needs a legal obligation to publish the data that would let the public judge whether one exists — procurement records, work-permit issuances by sector and nationality, labour-market testing outcomes, and the Commissioner of Information’s own annual reports, filed on schedule, for the first time in over a decade.

Until that obligation exists in law, with a penalty attached to its breach, claims like Maughn’s will keep arriving exactly as this one did: unaccompanied by evidence, unchallenged by the outlet that carried it, and unverifiable by anyone the claim was supposedly made to.

— The Board

SOURCES

Guyana Chronicle, “BIT CEO says, emphasises need for greater collaboration,” August 2026.

Kaieteur News, “‘$40M for silence’ – Govt. allocates millions for unresponsive office of commissioner of information,” February 10, 2026.

Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa (SIP-IAPA) affiliated press freedom report on Guyana, April 20, 2026.

Kaieteur News, “Protest against Commissioner of Information continues today,” April 4, 2025.

Demerara Waves, “Christopher Ram threatens legal action over no information on oil agreement,” April 23, 2025.

Stabroek News, “Ram serves pre-action notices to Bharrat, Ramson over failure to provide oil info,” April 24, 2025.

Stabroek News, “Ram files judicial review case against Commissioner of Information,” May 17, 2025.

Kaieteur News, “Resource curse has taken root in Guyana – Ram warns,” May 4, 2026.

The 592 Guardian, prior reporting: “Beyond Polite Suggestions: Guyana Needs Open Data by Law, Not by Goodwill”; ongoing Sigma Engineers Ltd. Inc. investigation.

 

The State That Cannot Say No: Part II

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTERGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

 The State That Cannot Say No: Part II


Mediation by Ambush

OPINION BY: Staff Writer August 2026

A follow-up to “The State That Cannot Say No” · 

Six days into the Tassawini standoff, the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission finally moved — not to enforce the law, but to schedule a meeting. On August 26, GGMC Commissioner Newell Dennison proposed mediation talks in Georgetown between the Chinese Landing Village Council and miner Wayne Vieira, to be held the following day. Toshao Nikita Miller said no.

She was right to.

AN INVITATION ISSUED IN BAD FAITH

The proposal arrived with a glaring omission: at no point did GGMC require that Vieira’s equipment be withdrawn from Tassawini as a precondition for talks. Nine excavators, two bulldozers, and dredge engines remained staged at the contested backdam, blocked only by round-the-clock human presence — villagers who have now held that line for six days.

Around the clock Blockade

Miller’s response to Dennison was procedurally unimpeachable: mediation, she said, cannot produce a fair outcome where a power imbalance exists between the parties, or where undue pressure is placed on one side. She could not leave her village to negotiate a settlement while the thing being negotiated over sat idling at her people’s doorstep, its operators waiting for her back to turn.

That is not obstruction. That is a Toshao who understands, from decades of dealing with this specific miner, exactly what “mediation” has meant before

THE BARGES ANSWER THE QUESTION

Whatever ambiguity remained about GGMC’s good faith — or Vieira’s — dissolved last Monday night. As villagers held the blockade at Tassawini, operators loaded the heavy equipment onto barges and shipped it to Kariako, attempting to reach Tassawini by an alternate route while the Commissioner’s invitation to talk was still on the table. Miller called it plainly: not a show of good faith. The attempt was stopped again, but the sequence speaks for itself. A mediation offer was extended with one hand while the other hand tried to flank the blockade it was ostensibly meant to resolve.

This is not a case of miscommunication between GGMC and its permit-holder. It is a case of GGMC proposing talks while the party it regulates conducted, in parallel, exactly the kind of unilateral action mediation is supposed to prevent. If the Commissioner did not know about the Kariako maneuver, GGMC has no operational visibility into the conduct of a permit-holder it claims to be reasonably managing. If he did know, the invitation to mediate was theater.

“The moment my back turn, those machines are going to walk in the backdam.” — Toshao Nikita Miller

A PATTERN, NOT AN INCIDENT

This community has been here before. Village leadership recalls mining activity resuming in the past while a Toshao was away attending a National Toshaos Conference — the exact year lost to the accumulated weight of a dispute now running for decades, but the shape of it unmistakable to anyone who has followed Chinese Landing’s history with this permit-holder.

Miller’s insistence on a precondition — machinery off the land before talks begin — is not a negotiating tactic. It is a lesson paid for once already, now being applied so it does not have to be paid for again.

That history sits alongside a public record this newsroom has already documented: Minister Bharrat’s mischaracterization of the 2017 CCJ ruling as a merits victory for Vieira, when the Court explicitly declined to rule on the legitimacy of his permits or the Council’s standing; the March-to-July gap between mining’s resumption and the village even being informed the ban had lifted; a GGMC mines officer stationed on-site during an earlier equipment confrontation who neither stopped nor was able to stop the incursion.

Each incident, alone, might be read as bureaucratic failure. Together, they describe an institution that treats consultation with Indigenous communities as a formality to be scheduled around, not a precondition to be honoured.

 

WHAT GOOD FAITH WOULD LOOK LIKE

The Village Council has not refused to talk. It has refused to talk under duress — and it has said, in writing, what would change that. In formal correspondence to the Ministry of Natural Resources and to GGMC, the Council requested a cease work order on all preparatory mining activity and the suspension of any permission granted for equipment and operations in the area. Neither has been granted. That request, not the mediation invitation, is the test of whether government intends to act as an honest broker or merely as an usher for private mining interests.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights already told Guyana what good-faith engagement with Chinese Landing requires: formal entry-permission requests to the Toshao and Council, joint consultation on protective measures before they are imposed, and a permanent community-based monitoring mechanism — commitments the state has not implemented in the three years since the Commission ordered them. GGMC’s Thursday proposal met none of that standard. It asked a sitting Toshao, in the sixth day of a live blockade, to leave her people and negotiate the terms of her own community’s exposure while the equipment in question tried to slip in the back way.

Toshao Miller has said the Council remains open to mediation on the basis of mutual respect and fairness. The obligation to meet that standard sits with GGMC and with Vieira — not with the community holding the line at Tassawini.

The 592 Guardian will continue to track this story as it develops.

— THE BOARD

On the APA, Carbon Financing, Chinese Landing, and FPIC

592 GUARDIAN♦ ACCOUNTABILITY♦ INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

On the APA, Carbon Financing, Chinese Landing, and FPIC


OPINION BY: Hem Kumar August 2026

Do you remember the narrative that the Amerindian Peoples Association (APA) was somehow trying to block climate finance — carbon credits money — from reaching Amerindian communities?

That was never how 592 Guardian  understood the issue. If you understand what Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) actually means, the position becomes much clearer.

When we read APA’s submission to the ART Secretariat at the time, we understood where they were coming from. It was not a position against Indigenous communities receiving funding or benefiting from development. Why would an Indigenous rights organisation want to prevent Indigenous communities from benefiting from resources intended for their development? That interpretation, to 592 Guardian, was absurd — but it certainly supported a political narrative, one the government itself actively cultivated.

Vice President Jagdeo publicly attacked the APA over its complaint; the Guyana Chronicle ran a piece titled “They do not speak for us,” quoting a government-aligned figure accusing APA of the very consent violation it had alleged; and a pro-government outlet later framed APA’s failed appeal as “a failed political attempt to stymie the development of Amerindian Villages,” pointedly noting Guyana earned US$150 million in 2023 ART-TREES payments — as if the size of the payment were itself an answer to the process question APA was asking.

The issue, to our understanding, was how the decision was made, who made it, and whether Indigenous peoples had actually consented to it. And this is where FPIC becomes important.

FPIC is not a mechanism to say “yes” or “no” after everything has already been decided. It is a safeguard for Indigenous self-determination.

Learn More: https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1HkHyJoCG2/?mibextid=wwXIfr

THE SEQUENCE MATTERS

Free, Prior and Informed Consent means consent must come before the decision.

You cannot make the fundamental decisions about a project, program, policy or activity, begin implementing it, and then approach communities afterwards and call that FPIC. That is consultation after the fact. And consultation is not the same thing as consent.

Similarly, you cannot decide that mining concessions should be issued within or affecting Indigenous lands, conduct lotteries, issue concessions and allow activities to commence, and then approach Indigenous communities — as an agency or a miner — afterwards asking whether they consent to mining or entry to mine. By then, a critical decision has already been made. The consent was supposed to come before the decision to permit the activity, not after it.

This is why we have always found the criticism that organizations such as APA are simply “talking about consultation, consultation, consultation” to be somewhat simplistic. APA was attempting to apply FPIC as it is understood as an international standard, rather than treating it as another box to tick after a decision has already been taken.

WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED WITH THE CARBON CREDITS

This is not an abstract dispute. The documented timeline of Guyana’s ART TREES carbon credit program is, in fact, a textbook case of what FPIC is meant to prevent.

According to the Forest Peoples Program’s case study on the certification — first published on apaguyana.com and drawing directly on APA’s own account — the Government of Guyana submitted its proposal for carbon credit certification to the ART Secretariat in December 2020, before any prior consultation with Indigenous Peoples took place.

The proposal covered carbon credits generated from all forests nationally, including forests on Indigenous Peoples’ titled lands. Government did hold information-sharing sessions on the broader Low Carbon Development Strategy, of which the ART proposal was one component — but per APA and FPP’s account, these sessions did not amount to consultation in the sense required under international human rights law, and no Indigenous Peoples were asked for, or gave, their free, prior and informed consent to the proposal itself.

The National Toshaos Council did endorse the wider LCDS policy framework. But the NTC is not a body empowered to give FPIC on behalf of individual Indigenous communities for a scheme monetising carbon on their specific titled lands — a distinction government has repeatedly treated as immaterial, and one that goes to the heart of what “consent” is supposed to mean under FPIC. Consent is community-specific and land-specific.

A national council endorsing a national strategy is not the same thing as the villages whose titled forests are being sold into a carbon market agreeing to that sale.

Aster Global Environmental Services then conducted the validation and verification for ART’s certification — but its review, per FPP, was structurally limited to assessing government’s own self-reported compliance with the TREES standard, not an independent assessment of whether Indigenous communities had actually consented. ART certified the credits in December 2022. A portion was sold to Hess Corporation.

Only after all of that — the proposal, the endorsement, the validation, the certification, the sale — did APA’s formal complaint arrive, filed with ART’s grievance mechanism in March 2023. And even then, the complaint was dismissed twice: first in May 2023, then again on appeal in October 2023, both times without the Secretariat ever substantively engaging the FPIC question APA had raised. Government’s own framing of that outcome was that APA had failed on procedural grounds — questions about who APA represented, whether APA itself had consent to file.

Whatever the merits of that procedural dismissal, one fact remains: to this day, no independent body has actually adjudicated whether Guyana’s process met the FPIC standard. The complaint was dismissed on threshold grounds, not defeated on the merits.

 

That is the sequence problem in its purest form. The credits were designed, proposed, endorsed by a body without the authority to consent, validated against government’s own self-reporting, certified, and sold — and only at the very end of that chain was an Indigenous rights organization’s objection even heard, and then dismissed without reaching the substance.

592 Guardian understanding of APA’s position, then and now, was never that Indigenous communities should not receive the benefits of carbon financing. It was that the conditions for consent were never met before the money moved. That is a fundamentally different argument. It is the difference between saying: “Do not give Indigenous communities this funding,” and saying: “Before decisions are made about Indigenous lands and resources, Indigenous communities must have the opportunity to determine whether and how they consent to those decisions.” Those are not the same thing.

CHINESE LANDING

This brings us to mining, and to the standoff currently unfolding at Chinese Landing.

The question there cannot simply be whether the community was eventually consulted before a miner entered their lands with heavy equipment. We have to ask when they were consulted about the decision to mine from the inception, what information they had, what decision had already been made, and whether they actually had the ability to influence or withhold consent before that decision was taken.

The record at Chinese Landing shows exactly this pattern. A 1999 agreement gave the miner permission to work in exchange for tribute, employment and services — but by 2009 the Village Council had refused to renew that agreement and told the miner to cease work and remove his equipment. What followed was over a decade of legal proceedings that never actually resolved whether the village’s consent was required at all: a 2017 CCJ ruling that was narrowly procedural — it struck down a cease-work order on jurisdictional grounds and expressly left undecided whether the Village Council had standing to enforce consent requirements — followed by a 2021 High Court ruling, still on appeal, holding that minerals vest in the state and that the miner did not need village permission to access his permits in the first place.

That 2021 ruling is the sharper and more uncomfortable version of the argument this publication is  making here. It is not merely that consent was sought too late in that case. A court has held, as the law currently stands, that consent was never legally required at all — that the Mining Act’s vesting of minerals in the state overrides the Amerindian Act’s consent provisions. Notably, that reading contradicts an earlier ruling by the very same judge in a different case, where prospecting permits granted before the Amerindian Act’s commencement were held to require consent on renewal — a contradiction that has never been explained and remains unresolved on appeal.

If concessions have already been issued — which is often the case — the process has already moved considerably beyond the point at which consent should have been sought. And if our courts are, in live cases, reading our own laws as not requiring that consent in the first place, then the problem is not simply implementation. It is the law itself.

THE UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATION

Our existing laws may not fully reflect the FPIC standard. And perhaps that is precisely the uncomfortable conversation we need to have.

If our legal framework allows decisions affecting Indigenous lands to be made first and consent to be sought later — or, as the Chinese Landing litigation suggests, allows those decisions to be made without requiring consent at all — then perhaps the problem is not with the principle of FPIC. Perhaps the problem is that our laws need to catch up with the rights they are supposed to protect.

This is why this publication do not see FPIC as an obstacle to development, nor do we blame the APA for the positions it has held on either carbon financing or mining. What we do find a reasonable and open question is how to practically apply FPIC without jeopardizing Indigenous peoples’ rights in the process — and we believe the NTC and District Councils are trying to address exactly this through the development of FPIC guidelines and protocols.

Good intentions do not remove the requirement for consent. A project can be designed to bring jobs. A program can be designed to bring development. A policy can be designed with the best intentions. But good intentions do not automatically create consent.

FPIC exists precisely because even well-intentioned decisions can undermine Indigenous self-determination when Indigenous peoples are excluded from making those decisions.

SOURCES

Forest Peoples Programme, “ART’s Controversial Certification of Carbon Credits to the Government of Guyana” (29 Feb 2024, first published apaguyana.com); Kaieteur News reporting on APA’s March 2023 ART complaint and government response; Guyana Chronicle, “They do not speak for us” (15 Apr 2023); Vieira v. Guyana Geology and Mines Commission, [2017] CCJ 20 (A.J.); reporting on the 2021 High Court ruling and pending Court of Appeal proceedings; IACHR Precautionary Measures No. 196-23.

— The Board

Born Leaders? The Data Manning Cited Says Otherwise

592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

Born Leaders? The Data Manning Cited Says Otherwise


OPNION BY: Hem Kumar August 2026

A regional examining body’s own chief operating officer built a claim of male biological entitlement on statistics that disprove it.

At the August 18 launch of the 2026 CXC results in Anguilla, Dr. Nicole Manning, the Caribbean Examinations Council’s Chief Operations Officer, told the region something she framed as self-evident: that men are born leaders. She said it while standing in front of the numbers that refute it.

Dr. Nicole Manning COO – CXC

Manning was addressing a real and worthwhile subject — the growing gender gap in regional exam participation. Females made up 62 per cent of CAPE entries this year against 38 per cent for males; at CSEC level the split was 59-41. That gap deserves the “deeper assessment” she called for. What it does not support is the conclusion she drew from it.

AN ARGUMENT THAT DEFEATS ITSELF

Follow Manning’s own logic for a moment. Girls are outperforming boys in participation and, by extension, in the pipeline toward tertiary education and professional life, across two major regional examination levels. Manning’s response to that female outperformance was to declare that leadership is a male birthright which society has a duty to protect.

That is not an assessment of the data. It is a conclusion that arrived before the data did, and then bent the data to fit it.

If anything, the numbers Manning cited make the opposite case: whatever “natural” leadership capacity is supposed to look like, it is not tracking with the sex she says was born to hold it.

This is also, notably, an argument made by a woman who has herself risen to the chief operating officer’s chair of the region’s principal examining authority — a position that, on her own stated theory, she should not by nature occupy.

THE COALITION’S RESPONSE

The Caribbean Family Planning Affiliation, IGNITE, Youth Advocacy Movement Grenada, and Caribbean Religious Voices for Justice issued a joint statement the following day, and it is worth taking seriously rather than dismissing as reflexive offense. Their central distinction is the correct one: children are born with potential, not with rank. What later gets described as innate male leadership is, on their account, privilege exercised long enough and consistently enough that it comes to look like nature.

“Men are not born leaders any more than women are born followers.”

The coalition’s sharpest question is not rhetorical. Who built the structures that hand boys authority and teach girls accommodation? Who benefits from calling that arrangement natural rather than constructed?

A claim that something is innate is, among other things, a claim that it cannot be changed and should not be interrogated. That is precisely why the claim needs interrogating.

The groups also reached for a Caribbean-specific counter-history, and it holds up: across the region, women have run households, churches, schools, ministries, and movements, frequently absorbing the labor that men’s absence left behind, with little institutional credit for having done so. A regional examining body’s own COO erasing that record in a single sentence, at an official results launch, is not a minor rhetorical slip.          It is a senior education official using her platform to naturalize the very hierarchy the participation data is busy dismantling.

WHY THIS IS NOT A PRIVATE OPINION

Manning did not offer this as a personal reflection over dinner. She said it at the formal launch of CXC’s 2026 results, in her capacity as the Council’s Chief Operations Officer, addressing the exam performance of the region’s children. CXC sets and certifies the qualifications that determine university admission and employment prospects across the Caribbean. Its senior officers are not incidental voices in the region’s education conversation; they are among its most consequential ones.

That is what makes the coalition’s demand for “serious and constructive engagement” the right one, and the minimum one. An institution entrusted with certifying the academic futures of Caribbean boys and girls alike cannot have a chief operating officer telling the region, on the record, that one sex was born to lead and the other was not — especially not while her own slide showed the opposite trend.

The gender gap in exam participation is real and deserves the region’s full attention: why boys are falling away from CAPE and CSEC entry, what support structures are missing, what a coordinated response looks like. None of that requires, or is helped by, a theory of male biological destiny.

It requires the same thing every other education policy problem requires: evidence, structural analysis, and officials willing to follow the data rather than narrate over it.

— The Board