๐“๐‡๐„ ๐’๐‡๐€๐ƒ๐Ž๐– ๐’๐„๐‚๐‘๐„๐“๐€๐‘๐ˆ๐€๐“: ๐‡๐Ž๐– ๐†๐”๐˜๐€๐๐€โ€™๐’ ๐Œ๐ˆ๐๐ˆ๐’๐“๐‘๐˜ ๐Ž๐… ๐๐€๐“๐”๐‘๐€๐‹ ๐‘๐„๐’๐Ž๐”๐‘๐‚๐„๐’ ๐Œ๐€๐˜ ๐๐„ ๐„๐๐†๐ˆ๐๐„๐„๐‘๐ˆ๐๐† ๐€ ๐‚๐Ž๐Œ๐๐‹๐ˆ๐€๐๐‚๐„ ๐ˆ๐‹๐‹๐”๐’๐ˆ๐Ž๐ ๐€๐‡๐„๐€๐ƒ ๐Ž๐… ๐“๐‡๐„ ๐‰๐”๐๐„ ๐Ÿ๐ŸŽ๐Ÿ๐Ÿ” ๐„๐ˆ๐“๐ˆ ๐•๐€๐‹๐ˆ๐ƒ๐€๐“๐ˆ๐Ž๐

BY: Hem Kumar 

๐™๐™๐™š 592 ๐™‚๐™ช๐™–๐™ง๐™™๐™ž๐™–๐™ฃ

๐—ช๐—›๐—”๐—ง ๐—›๐—”๐—ฆ ๐—›๐—”๐—ฃ๐—ฃ๐—˜๐—ก๐—˜๐—— โ€” ๐—”๐—ก๐—— ๐—ช๐—›๐—ฌ ๐—œ๐—ง ๐— ๐—”๐—ง๐—ง๐—˜๐—ฅ๐—ฆ

๐™Ž๐™ช๐™—๐™Ÿ๐™š๐™˜๐™ฉ: ๐˜ฟ๐™ง. ๐™‹๐™ง๐™š๐™ข ๐™ˆ๐™ž๐™จ๐™ž๐™ง | ๐™๐™ค๐™ก๐™š: ๐˜ผ๐™™๐™ซ๐™ž๐™จ๐™ค๐™ง, ๐™‚๐™ค๐™ซ๐™š๐™ง๐™ฃ๐™ข๐™š๐™ฃ๐™ฉ ๐˜ผ๐™œ๐™š๐™ฃ๐™˜๐™ฎ ๐™€๐™ฃ๐™œ๐™–๐™œ๐™š๐™ข๐™š๐™ฃ๐™ฉ | ๐™ˆ๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™ž๐™จ๐™ฉ๐™ง๐™ฎ ๐™ค๐™› ๐™‰๐™–๐™ฉ๐™ช๐™ง๐™–๐™ก ๐™๐™š๐™จ๐™ค๐™ช๐™ง๐™˜๐™š๐™จ, ๐™‚๐™ช๐™ฎ๐™–๐™ฃ๐™–

๐™†๐™š๐™ฎ ๐˜ฟ๐™š๐™–๐™™๐™ก๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™š: ๐™…๐™ช๐™ฃ๐™š 2026 ๐™€๐™„๐™๐™„ ๐™‘๐™–๐™ก๐™ž๐™™๐™–๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐˜ฟ๐™š๐™˜๐™ž๐™จ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ

๐—”๐—ป ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ป๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐—ถ๐—น๐—ถ๐˜๐˜† ๐—ฒ๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐—ฐ๐—ถ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐—น ๐˜€๐—ผ๐—ฐ๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐˜๐˜†, ๐—น๐—ฒ๐—ด๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜€, ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ถ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ป๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ฎ๐˜‚๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐˜€

๐—ฆ๐—จ๐— ๐— ๐—”๐—ฅ๐—ฌ: ๐—ช๐—›๐—”๐—ง ๐—›๐—”๐—ฆ ๐—›๐—”๐—ฃ๐—ฃ๐—˜๐—ก๐—˜๐—— โ€” ๐—”๐—ก๐—— ๐—ช๐—›๐—ฌ ๐—œ๐—ง ๐— ๐—”๐—ง๐—ง๐—˜๐—ฅ๐—ฆ

The appointment of Dr. Prem Misir to the role of  โ€œ๐—”๐—ฑ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ผ๐—ฟ, ๐—š๐—ผ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ป๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—”๐—ด๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐˜† ๐—˜๐—ป๐—ด๐—ฎ๐—ด๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜โ€ at the Ministry of Natural Resources is not, as it has been presented, an administrative upgrade. It is a strategic repackaging โ€” one that serves two simultaneous purposes: it gives the international EITI Board the optical illusion of reform (a new title, a fresh mandate) while preserving operational control exactly where it has always resided โ€” inside the Ministry.

In investigative terms, what we are looking at is a ๐—ฆ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ฑ๐—ผ๐˜„ ๐—ฆ๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐˜:  a parallel administrative track installed above the official GYEITI Secretariat, designed to filter, manage, and where necessary, neutralize inconvenient data before it reaches independent auditors.

The timing is not coincidental. Guyana was referred to the EITI Validation Committee on March 19th. A second โ€œLowโ€ or โ€œNo Progressโ€ rating in June 2026 risks triggering full suspension from the EITI. This appointment is the governmentโ€™s firewall โ€” designed to ensure the 2024 and 2025 data sets do not expose the same structural gaps that caused the 2023 suspension.

๐—ช๐—ต๐—ฒ๐—ป ๐˜†๐—ผ๐˜‚ ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ป๐—ผ๐˜ ๐—ฐ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ด๐—ฒ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ณ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐˜๐˜€, ๐˜†๐—ผ๐˜‚ ๐—ฐ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ด๐—ฒ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜€๐—ผ๐—ป ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฎ๐—ด๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ๐—บ. ๐—ข๐—ฟ ๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ถ๐—บ๐˜‚๐—บ, ๐˜†๐—ผ๐˜‚ ๐—ฐ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ด๐—ฒ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ๐—ถ๐—ฟ ๐˜๐—ถ๐˜๐—น๐—ฒ.

๐—ฆ๐—˜๐—–๐—ง๐—œ๐—ข๐—ก ๐—œ: ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐— ๐—˜๐—–๐—›๐—”๐—ก๐—œ๐—–๐—ฆ โ€” ๐—ง๐—›๐—ฅ๐—˜๐—˜ ๐—ช๐—”๐—ฌ๐—ฆ ๐—ง๐—›๐—œ๐—ฆ โ€œ๐—ฅ๐—˜๐—•๐—ฅ๐—”๐—ก๐——โ€ ๐—•๐—ฌ๐—ฃ๐—”๐—ฆ๐—ฆ๐—˜๐—ฆ ๐—ง๐—ฅ๐—”๐—ก๐—ฆ๐—ฃ๐—”๐—ฅ๐—˜๐—ก๐—–๐—ฌ

1.๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—”๐—ด๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐˜† ๐—™๐—ถ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐˜„๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น

Traditionally, the GYEITI Secretariat goes directly to the Guyana Gold Board, the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (GGMC), and the Guyana Revenue Authority (GRA) for raw data. Under the guise of โ€œcoordination,โ€ state agencies may now have been instructed โ€” formally or informally โ€” to route all GYEITI-related data through the Advisor first.

This creates a pre-screening layer. Discrepancies, unreconciled figures, and gaps in reporting can be โ€œsmoothed outโ€ before they ever reach the Independent Administrator. By the time the auditors see the numbers, the numbers have already been managed.

2. ๐—ฉ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—ถ๐—ฑ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐—ฆ๐—ฐ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฝ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด

With the June 2026 Validation looming, the EITI Board will conduct stakeholder interviews. A core function of the Advisor role is almost certainly the coaching of newer, more compliant civil society members โ€” those who replaced the sidelined independent voices โ€” on the โ€œcorrectโ€ narrative to present to international investigators.

This is not governance. This is choreography.

3. ๐—–๐—ผ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐˜๐˜‚๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—œ๐—บ๐—บ๐˜‚๐—ป๐—ถ๐˜๐˜†

By holding the title of โ€œAdvisorโ€ rather than โ€œNational Coordinator,โ€ Dr. Misir is no longer technically an officer of the GYEITI Secretariat. This insulation is deliberate. If the 2026 EITI Report contains errors, omissions, or unreconciled data, the Ministry can blame โ€œadministrative fragmentationโ€ or Secretariat staff โ€” while the Advisor, as a protected contractual entity, remains untouchable.

๐—”๐—ฐ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ป๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐—ถ๐—น๐—ถ๐˜๐˜† ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜€ ๐—ป๐—ผ๐˜ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐—ฒ๐—ป ๐˜€๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ด๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฑ. ๐—œ๐˜ ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜€ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ๐—ฒ๐—ป ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฐ๐—ต๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐˜๐˜‚๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น๐˜† ๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฑ.

๐—ฆ๐—˜๐—–๐—ง๐—œ๐—ข๐—ก ๐—œ๐—œ: ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐—Ÿ๐—˜๐—š๐—”๐—Ÿ ๐—˜๐—ซ๐—ฃ๐—ข๐—ฆ๐—จ๐—ฅ๐—˜ โ€” ๐—ช๐—›๐—”๐—ง ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐—ฆ๐—ง๐—”๐—ž๐—˜๐—›๐—ข๐—Ÿ๐——๐—˜๐—ฅ๐—ฆ ๐—ฆ๐—›๐—ข๐—จ๐—Ÿ๐—— ๐—ง๐—”๐—ฅ๐—š๐—˜๐—ง

The following represent potential breaches of the 2023 EITI Standard and Guyanaโ€™s domestic administrative law framework:๐—˜๐—œ๐—ง๐—œ ๐—ฅ๐—ฒ๐—พ๐˜‚๐—ถ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐Ÿญ.๐Ÿฐ โ€” ๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐— ๐—ฆ๐—šโ€™๐˜€ ๐—ฅ๐—ถ๐—ด๐—ต๐˜ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—ข๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฒ ๐—œ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—น๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป

The EITI Standard mandates that the Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) must oversee the implementation of the EITI process. The central legal question is this: Was the โ€œAdvisor, Government Agency Engagementโ€ position created unilaterally by the Ministry, without the MSG reviewing or approving its Terms of Reference?

If the answer is yes โ€” and all available indicators suggest it is โ€” this constitutes a direct breach of the multi-stakeholder oversight mandate. It is not a procedural technicality. It is a structural violation.

๐—˜๐—œ๐—ง๐—œ ๐—ฅ๐—ฒ๐—พ๐˜‚๐—ถ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐Ÿญ.๐Ÿญ โ€” ๐—”๐—ฐ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ป๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐—น๐—ฒ ๐—š๐—ผ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ป๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—Ÿ๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜€๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ฝ

The EITI Standard requires the government to appoint a senior individual who is legally accountable for the accuracy of data submitted to the International Board. If the Minister holds nominal leadership and Misir operates as the operational Advisor, a critical gap opens: who is legally responsible when the data is wrong?

This ambiguity is not accidental. It is the point.

๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—จ๐—น๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ ๐—ฉ๐—ถ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐˜€ ๐—ค๐˜‚๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป

Legal inquiries should focus specifically on whether the Minister exceeded his statutory authority by creating a role that functionally overlaps with โ€” and potentially subordinates โ€” the statutory duties of the GYEITI National Secretariat. If the Secretariat is a body established by law or regulation, and the Advisor role effectively supersedes its data-collection mandate, the Minister may have acted ultra vires โ€” beyond his lawful powers.

๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—”๐—ฐ๐—ฐ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜€ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—œ๐—ป๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐—”๐—ฐ๐˜ (๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿญ๐Ÿญ) ๐˜ƒ๐˜€. ๐—–๐—ผ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐˜๐˜‚๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ฆ๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐˜†

Since the Commissioner of Information has remained non-responsive, the Advisorโ€™s contract almost certainly operates as a private services agreement โ€” shielded from standard civil service disclosure requirements.

The key distinction that must be established: Is Dr. Misir, a Public Officer subject to Guyanaโ€™s Integrity Commission Act, or a Contractual Consultant operating outside those accountability structures? The answer determines whether his contract, scope of work, and remuneration are subject to public disclosure โ€” or deliberately hidden behind a procurement veil.

๐—ฆ๐—˜๐—–๐—ง๐—œ๐—ข๐—ก ๐—œ๐—œ๐—œ: ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐—”๐—จ๐——๐—œ๐—ง ๐—ง๐—ฅ๐—”๐—œ๐—Ÿ โ€” ๐—ช๐—›๐—”๐—ง ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐—™๐—ข๐—ฅ๐—˜๐—ก๐—ฆ๐—œ๐—– ๐—”๐—จ๐——๐—œ๐—ง๐—ข๐—ฅ ๐— ๐—จ๐—ฆ๐—ง ๐—ง๐—ฅ๐—”๐—–๐—˜

The auditorโ€™s task is to reconstruct the.๐——๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฎ ๐—–๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ถ๐—ป ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐—–๐˜‚๐˜€๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฑ๐˜†  

Four specific lines of inquiry should be pursued simultaneously:

1. ๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ง๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—บ๐˜€ ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐—ฅ๐—ฒ๐—ณ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ ๐—š๐—ฎ๐—ฝ

Obtain the formal Scope of Work for the Advisor position. Examine it for language that grants authority to โ€œreview,โ€ โ€œvet,โ€ โ€œapprove,โ€ or โ€œcoordinateโ€ data from GGMC, GRA, or the Guyana Gold Board. Any such language confirms the existence of a pre-screening layer that compromises the integrity of the audit trail.

2. ๐—•๐˜‚๐—ฑ๐—ด๐—ฒ๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜† ๐—ข๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ด๐—ถ๐—ป

Determine whether the Advisorโ€™s remuneration is drawn from the GYEITI Secretariatโ€™s allocated budget or from the Ministry of Natural Resourcesโ€™ โ€œContracted Servicesโ€ line. If the latter: he is a political agent funded through a discretionary ministerial budget, not a technical officer of the transparency body.

3.๐—œ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ป๐—ฎ๐—น ๐— ๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ฎ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—ฆ๐˜๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ฒ ๐—”๐—ด๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐˜€

Has any Internal Memorandum been issued to GGMC, GGB, or GRA instructing those agencies to copy or route GYEITI-related data transfers through the Advisor? Such a document, if it exists, is the single most damaging piece of evidence โ€” it proves the firewall is operational, not theoretical.

4. ๐—ข๐—ฏ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ ๐—œ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ณ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ ๐˜„๐—ถ๐˜๐—ต ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—œ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—”๐—ฑ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ถ๐˜€๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฟ

IDoes the Advisor attend meetings between the Independent Administrator (the international auditors) and state agencies? His presence in those sessions โ€” even as a passive โ€œobserverโ€ โ€” constitutes government overreach into what is legally required to be an independent reconciliation process. It is sufficient grounds to challenge the validity of any GYEITI Report produced under these conditions.

๐—ฆ๐—˜๐—–๐—ง๐—œ๐—ข๐—ก ๐—œ๐—ฉ: ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐—›๐—”๐—ฅ๐—— ๐—ค๐—จ๐—˜๐—ฆ๐—ง๐—œ๐—ข๐—ก๐—ฆ โ€” ๐—™๐—ข๐—ฅ ๐—–๐—œ๐—ฉ๐—œ๐—Ÿ ๐—ฆ๐—ข๐—–๐—œ๐—˜๐—ง๐—ฌ ๐—ฆ๐—ข๐—จ๐—ฅ๐—–๐—˜๐—ฆ ๐—ข๐—ก ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐—š๐—ฅ๐—ข๐—จ๐—ก๐——

When you approach the independent MSG members who have been sidelined, ask them directly:

Q1:๐—ช๐—ต๐—ผ ๐—ถ๐˜€ ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐˜๐˜‚๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น๐˜† ๐—ฐ๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ถ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐— ๐—ฆ๐—š ๐˜€๐˜‚๐—ฏ-๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—บ๐—ถ๐˜๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฒ ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ฒ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด๐˜€?

Is it Secretariat staff, as it should be โ€” or is the Advisor leading those sessions? If the latter, the MSGโ€™s operational independence has been effectively captured.

Q2: ๐—›๐—ฎ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ ๐˜†๐—ผ๐˜‚ ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ฒ๐—ป ๐—ต๐—ถ๐˜€ ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐˜โ€™๐˜€ ๐—ฆ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐—ช๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ธ?

If the Ministry refused to table the Terms of Reference at an MSG meeting, they have likely already violated EITI Requirement 1.4. The refusal itself is evidence.

Q3: ๐—œ๐˜€ ๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฝ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—ถ๐—ป ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป๐˜€ ๐˜„๐—ถ๐˜๐—ต ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—œ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—”๐—ฑ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ถ๐˜€๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฟ?

His attendance in auditor meetings is not a neutral administrative courtesy. It is observable interference with the independence of the reconciliation process โ€” and it should be formally documented and reported to the EITI International Secretariat.

Q4:๐——๐—ผ ๐—š๐—ฌ๐—˜๐—œ๐—ง๐—œ ๐˜€๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ณ๐—ณ ๐—ป๐—ผ๐˜„ ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ฝ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐˜ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—ต๐—ถ๐—บ ๐—ถ๐—ป ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐˜† ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ถ๐˜๐˜†?

Even an informal โ€œdotted lineโ€ reporting structure โ€” where Secretariat staff feel obligated to keep the Advisor informed before acting โ€” functionally subordinates the technical body to a political appointee. Ask Secretariat staff directly, and off the record.

Q5:๐—ช๐—ฎ๐˜€ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐˜€ ๐—ฎ ๐—–๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐˜-๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ฝ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ฝ๐—ผ๐˜€๐˜?

If so, why was it not publicized through the Department of Public Information in the standard transparent manner? A Cabinet-approved position that bypasses public announcement raises immediate questions about what the government did not want publicly scrutinized.

๐—ฆ๐—˜๐—–๐—ง๐—œ๐—ข๐—ก ๐—ฉ: ๐—ง๐—›๐—˜ ๐—•๐—ข๐—ง๐—ง๐—ข๐—  ๐—Ÿ๐—œ๐—ก๐—˜ โ€” ๐—ช๐—›๐—”๐—ง ๐—ง๐—›๐—œ๐—ฆ ๐—”๐—Ÿ๐—Ÿ ๐— ๐—˜๐—”๐—ก๐—ฆ

The Ministry of Natural Resources is attempting to satisfy the June 2026 Validation Committee by presenting the appearance of strengthened government engagement. The international optics are: new title, new energy, renewed commitment.

The operational reality is the opposite. A political gatekeeper has been installed to manage the narrative flowing into the EITI process โ€” to ensure that unreconciled figures, unexplained discrepancies, and data gaps do not survive into the final report in the form that would trigger a second suspension.

The legal hook that could unravel this entire arrangement is EITI Requirement 1.4. If it can be demonstrated that this role was created without MSG knowledge, without MSG review of its Terms of Reference, and without MSG consent โ€” then the government has not strengthened its EITI compliance. It has violated it. And the June 2026 Validation outcome should reflect that violation accordingly.

The question is no longer whether something is wrong with how GYEITI is being managed. The question is whether the evidence trail is strong enough to prove it to an international body before the window closes.

๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐˜„๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ผ๐˜„ ๐—ฐ๐—น๐—ผ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐˜€ ๐—ถ๐—ป ๐—๐˜‚๐—ป๐—ฒ.

๐™๐™๐™š 592 ๐™‚๐™ช๐™–๐™ง๐™™๐™ž๐™–๐™ฃ-๐™๐™ง๐™ช๐™ฉ๐™ , ๐˜ผ๐™˜๐™˜๐™ค๐™ช๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™–๐™—๐™ž๐™ก๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ฎ,๐™„๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™š๐™œ๐™ง๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ฎ ๐™„๐™ฃ๐™‚๐™ช๐™ฎ๐™–๐™ฃ๐™– ๐˜ผ๐™ฃ๐™™ ๐˜พ๐™–๐™ง๐™ž๐™—๐™—๐™š๐™–๐™ฃ ๐™‹๐™š๐™ง๐™จ๐™ฅ๐™š๐™˜๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ซ๐™š๐™จ.โ€” โœฆโ€”

Government responds to Fire at Apaiqua Landing Region Seven

Apaiqua Landing, Mazaruni River โ€“ The Government of Guyana, under the direction of His Excellency President Dr. Mohamed Irfaan Ali, has mobilized an immediate response following a devastating fire at Apaiqua Landing, Region Seven, on the evening of May 8, 2026.
Minister of Natural Resources, Hon. Vickram Bharrat, and Minister of Home Affairs, Hon. Oneidge Walrond, are currently on the ground engaging affected residents and assessing the extent of the damage.

Preliminary reports indicate that nine buildings were destroyed, leaving more than twenty persons displaced. The Government extends its deepest sympathies to the families and business owners impacted by this unfortunate incident.
Efforts are underway to provide urgent assistance and support to those affected. Relevant agencies are actively coordinating relief measures while investigations continue to determine the cause of the fire.

The Government remains committed to ensuring that all necessary resources are deployed to assist the affected community during this difficult time.

Barbados Calls for Stronger Caribbean Cooperation on Migration and Workforce Development

Barbados is urging Caribbean nations to strengthen regional cooperation on migration and labor movement as leaders continue to examine long-term economic sustainability across the region.

Speaking during discussions at the United Nations International Migration Review Forum, Barbados Minister of Home Affairs Gregory Nicholls emphasized that migration is no longer simply a social issue, but a critical economic and developmental matter for small island states.

According to Nicholls, Caribbean countries must begin treating migration as part of a broader regional strategy tied to workforce development, economic growth, and resilience. He noted that many countries throughout the Caribbean continue to face labor shortages in sectors such as healthcare, construction, hospitality, and agriculture, while at the same time dealing with population shifts and emigration.

Barbados believes stronger collaboration within CARICOM could help create more balanced movement of skilled workers throughout the region. Officials argue that freer movement between Caribbean nations would not only benefit economies but also strengthen regional integration and cooperation at a time when global economic pressures continue to affect small developing states.

The issue has become increasingly important as several Caribbean countries attempt to modernize their economies while responding to changing migration trends, climate-related challenges, and growing international competition for skilled labor.

Regional leaders have also acknowledged that migration policies must be handled carefully to ensure social stability and economic fairness while still creating opportunities for Caribbean citizens to work and contribute across borders.

The discussions are expected to continue as CARICOM governments push for deeper regional collaboration and more unified policies on labor mobility and development.

Press Freedom: fears, limitations, more fears

Press freedom in Guyana is once again in the headlines, the consciousness of Guyanese. Itโ€™s time to raise the cudgelsseveral decibels. Now that the World Press
Freedom Index highlights Guyanaโ€™s continued slide into disrepute, the call is for another look, more inquiries. I reverse, then come forward.

During his first turn at the wheel, it was Pres Ali who immersed himself in political sanctimonies, while railing against criticism. Naysayers, media protestors,
constitutionally-inspired conscientious objectors and others he deemed undesirable soothsayers all came in for heavy condemnation. In Aliโ€™s telling, he was all for
criticism, but only on the condition that it falls within the perimeters of what he termed โ€˜constructive criticism.โ€™ I asked then, ask again: by what divine right of
presidents did Excellency Ali seize for himself the moral authority to impinge on what acceptable criticism is, is not, andshould be? To spotlight the president some more,
expose his frailty (his fallacy) longer, by what fig leaf of his imagination, by what token of intellectual gravitas, did he conjure whatโ€™sโ€˜constructive criticism?โ€™ And,
what made he, Irfaan Ali (PhD), the sole authority thereto?

Thereafter, the die was cast, hatchets brandished, messages communicated. It was open season on citizens exercising freedom of thought, freedom of belief (political not
religious), freedom of expression, and freedom to express such in every channel in this society, whether private enterprise, or publiclybacked. When State media doors
were slammed harder, sealed tighter, in the face of those who fell into one of Aliโ€™s colorful denunciations, hunting season flourished. Victims bagged,hogtied from
head-to-toe. Though unexpected, it didnโ€™t surprise that a Stabroek News would be visited by the PPP Govtโ€™s Grim Reaper.

First, there were vice presidential railing and ranting about coverage and commentary, though today he seeks cover under the cloud of climate change. Then came the kiss
of death, a Jagdeo special that manifested his totalitarian tendencies, and communistic love for total control: no chopping off of ads. But eliminating, through clever non-
dispersal of tens of millions in ad payments. Was that a scheme that reeks of the Machiavellian, the politically sinister, or what? Meanwhile, there were those

individuals who spoke out being singled out for the PPP Govtโ€™s Saturday Nite Special: a two-by-four to the skull. One captain calling for the constructive; another
far cleverer biding his time, while working feverishly, to deliver his coup de grace: no submission and cooperation, no consideration and no compassion. Said more
colloquially: no money. no love. I am still trying to figure out the legal equation, the constitutional formula, that Minister of Law, Order, and PPP Justice, Mr. Anil
Nandlall, employs as the basis for this overreach, the assassinsโ€™excesses. Or why what is demanded for the PPP is denied to others. How could it be that what the PPP
claims as piety for itself is damned as heresy in others. Another for Ali and Nandlall: Stabroek stopped. Now stop social media. Guyanese truckers crying against
impoverishing Chinese invasions.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Ali-Jagdeo-Nandlall government insists that it cherishes press freedom, is a welcoming, comforting, lighthouse to press wanderers,
media shipwrecked, and freedomโ€™s outcasts. It must be recalled that the Third Reich always insisted that the gods were on its side. Some gods those must have been! I
sympathize withExcellency Ali, doctor of overstatement, and heavily overburdened worker. But to give Lords of the Guyana Realm, Jagdeo and Nandlall, a pass, is
asking too much. If theyโ€™re ignorant, I help: the deeper the oppression, the stronger the conviction. Conclusion: methinks that those who object to light and truth must be
messengers of darkness, hypocrisies foremost heroes. Thus, press freedom, (freedom itself), falters, fades, in PPP Guyana. if they donโ€™t know, those who labored to narrow
the boundaries of argument and dissent have invariably self-destructed. Press freedoms, other freedoms, are matters of principle; neither leadership luxuries nor
benevolence.

Cocaine, Cash and Firepower: Major Bust Signals Deepening Narco Threat

Another major cocaine bust at Springlands has once again exposed the persistent and deeply troubling role Guyana continues to play in the global narcotics trade.
On Friday, the Customs Anti-Narcotic Unit (CANU) intercepted more than 45 kilogrammes of cocaineโ€”packaged in 40 brick-like parcelsโ€”with an estimated European street value of โ‚ฌ1.575 million (US$1.856 million). Two individuals have since been arrested. The operation also uncovered an Uzi firearm fitted with ammunition, a stark reminder of the dangerous convergence between drug trafficking and organized violence.

Authorities confirmed that the shipment was destined for Europe, reinforcing a now-familiar pattern: Guyana as a transshipment point in a lucrative and far-reaching international drug network. While CANU has emphasized that the drugs carry a comparatively modest local street value of approximately GY$50 million, the near US$2 million valuation abroad underscores the high stakes driving these operations.

CANU has credited intelligence-led operations and regional cooperation for the successful seizure. While such efforts are commendable, they also raise urgent questions about the scale and sophistication of trafficking networks operating within Guyanaโ€™s borders. Each high-profile bust signals not only enforcement success, but also the troubling volume of narcotics that may be slipping through undetected.
Equally concerning is the presence of a high-powered firearm alongside the narcotics cache. This is not incidental. It reflects the militarization of criminal enterprises and the growing threat posed to community safety, particularly in border regions like Corentyne.

Guyana is to meaningfully disrupt its role in transnational drug trafficking, enforcement alone will not suffice. Sustained intelligence coordination, tighter border controls, and deeper institutional accountability must become the norm rather than the exception.

Otherwise, these periodic seizuresโ€”however significantโ€”risk becoming little more than snapshots of a much larger, largely unseen crisis.

Two gas projects, many more questions, concerns

This is a fine example of fiscal prudence, quality leadership, visionary governance.  Two Gas-to-Energy (GTE) projects, and Guyanaโ€™s biggest national budget ever is jostling for first place with the two GTEs relative to which requires more billions.  From what is known publicly, the Wales GTE holds steady at US$2.102 billion.  Included is the US$102 million Lindsayca-CH4 won in its soil stability dispute with Guyana.  It is also asking for, more like demanding, an additional US$250 million to get the two remaining jobs it contracted for done.  Namely, completing the gas conversion facility and the power generation plant.  When that US$250 million is added, the Wales GTE is set to cost US$2.352 billion (more than GY$500 billion).  Aside: Pres. Ali has made sanctity of contract the backbone of his refusal to renegotiate the Exxon oil contract.  Letโ€™s see how he responds to Lindsayca-CH4โ€™s push to squeeze another quarter billion US$ out of Guyana.  If he approves, it would hoist the original contract figure of US$759 million for the two unfinished facilities to over US$1 billion.

Though the completion and operationalizing of the Wales GTE is nowhere near to the finish line, a second GTE, this time for Berbice, has made its way into the national consciousness and conversation.  Reports are that it would cost at least twice the price of the Wales GTE.  The Wales GTE is causing Guyana no ends of trouble (reengineering and working around, delays, cost overruns, suitability, and so forth), but Guyanaโ€™s movers and shakers are being drawn into another GTE at twice the cost.  It could be asserted with reasonable assurance that the GTE projects will come very close to US$7 billion, if not more (US$2.342 billion for Wales, and US$4.64 billion for the Berbice GTE.  Though he didnโ€™t offer any specific figures, Exxonโ€™s Mr. Alistair Routledge made that clear, set that expectation.  Two GTE projects and a record national budget could be overtaken relative to dollars needed.  The 2026 budget was GY$1.558 trillion.  With Wales and Berbice considered, thatโ€™s US$7 billion which will be needed.  I urge my fellow citizens to keep the math simple. Pick a low USD: GY exchange rate.  The result veers uncomfortably close to GY$1.558 trillion that was Guyanaโ€™s biggest budget ever.

Can Guyana afford to spend so much on two projects?  As dire as the need is for a cheaper, better supply of energy, does this make sense?  When the problem-plagued Wales GTE isconsidered, Guyanese who can still think for themselves are invited to weigh the value of rushing into another GTE so quickly.  Almost like a reckless gambler, who abandons restraint, and goes on a spree.  

Consequences, be damned.  It is said that a fool and his money are soon parted.  I wonder if this will be the story of Guyana, its leaders, and the decisions they make about putting to the best use the oil money that belongs to the people.  Guyana cannot get going. Guyana cannot get a break.  Guyana is on the backfoot with the Wales GTE, but plunging into a bigger one, as if stone deaf, and blindfolded.  As though there is an addiction in the PPP Govt to joining with others and finding new ways to spend more of the billions (from any source) that are owned, or will be owed, by Guyanese.

A better approach is to get the first one right, and delivering.  Only then, move to a bigger one, despite electricity deficiencies ravaging this country so much.  Delay more added to Cost Oil.  More borrowed.  More withdrawn from the Oil Fund.  If this isnโ€™t madness, then what is?  If not madness, then everyone else is crazy.  Instead of developments and projects to build Guyana sensibly and honestly, the priority is to milk it first.  Then bleed it. Party time, folks.


๐™๐™๐™š 592 ๐™‚๐™ช๐™–๐™ง๐™™๐™ž๐™–๐™ฃ-๐™๐™ง๐™ช๐™ฉ๐™ , ๐˜ผ๐™˜๐™˜๐™ค๐™ช๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™–๐™—๐™ž๐™ก๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ฎ,๐™„๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™š๐™œ๐™ง๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ฎ ๐™„๐™ฃ๐™‚๐™ช๐™ฎ๐™–๐™ฃ๐™– ๐˜ผ๐™ฃ๐™™ ๐˜พ๐™–๐™ง๐™ž๐™—๐™—๐™š๐™–๐™ฃ ๐™‹๐™š๐™ง๐™จ๐™ฅ๐™š๐™˜๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ซ๐™š๐™จ.โ€” โœฆโ€”

GPLโ€™s battery deal has blown the lid off the governmentโ€™s energy mirage. 

A US$27.3 million battery storage contract is not a triumph of foresight; it is an indictment of a failed energy doctrine that spent years mocking the very solutions it is now rushing to embrace.

For too long, Guyanese were told to trust the grand promise of gas-to-energy, a project sold as the magic wand that would cut electricity bills in half and deliver cheap power on demand.

 Instead, the country is now watching GPL scramble to patch a fragile grid with battery storage, solar systems, control upgrades, and emergency fixes โ€” the very measures that should have formed the backbone of a serious energy strategy from the start.

That is the scandal at the heart of this story. The problem is not that Guyana is finally investing in modern grid support. The problem is that these investments are arriving only after years of political swagger, inflated promises, and a relentless refusal to admit that a single mega-project could not carry the weight of the countryโ€™s energy future.

The new battery systems at New Sophia and Goedverwagting may improve stability, reduce outages, and help integrate renewables. Fine. But what does it say about the original plan when the grid now needs a costly battery layer just to function properly? What does it say when the state must spend millions more to make the system resilient, while the public is still waiting to see the promised payoff from the gas-to-energy gamble?

This is where Pandoraโ€™s box opens. Once the lid is lifted, out spill the uncomfortable questions: Why was solar dismissed as too expensive when the government is now spending heavily on technologies built around solar integration and energy storage? Why was the nation railroaded into a US$2 billion bet on a single path when a diversified clean-energy strategy could have created local jobs, technical capacity, and industrial growth? Why are Guyanese being asked to accept ever more spending as normal, while accountability remains optional?

The arithmetic is unforgiving. Every new contract, every grid upgrade, every emergency fix adds weight to the argument that the original energy vision was not merely ambitious but dangerously narrow. If a project was supposed to solve the crisis, why is the crisis still demanding more public money, more imports, more foreign expertise, and more damage control?

Guyana could have used its oil-era resources to build a domestic energy industry, not just purchase pieces of one. It could have invested in solar manufacturing, battery assembly, training centers, and export-ready clean-energy capacity. It could have turned a national necessity into an economic engine. Instead, it appears to be buying expensive apologies for bad planning.

The public should not be comforted by the language of โ€œmodernizationโ€ when modernization is being used to disguise correction. A battery storage system is useful. A reliable grid is essential. But neither should be used as cover for a broader failure of judgment, transparency, and economic imagination.

If the government wants the country to believe in its energy plan, then it must do more than announce new contracts and repeat old slogans. It must publish the numbers, explain the delays, account for the rising costs, and admit what many Guyanese already suspect: that the great cheap-power promise has not aged well.

The lid is off now. What remains in Pandoraโ€™s box is not just technical failure, but political reckoning.

๐™๐™๐™š 592 ๐™‚๐™ช๐™–๐™ง๐™™๐™ž๐™–๐™ฃ-๐™๐™ง๐™ช๐™ฉ๐™ , ๐˜ผ๐™˜๐™˜๐™ค๐™ช๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™–๐™—๐™ž๐™ก๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ฎ,๐™„๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™š๐™œ๐™ง๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ฎ ๐™„๐™ฃ๐™‚๐™ช๐™ฎ๐™–๐™ฃ๐™– ๐˜ผ๐™ฃ๐™™ ๐˜พ๐™–๐™ง๐™ž๐™—๐™—๐™š๐™–๐™ฃ ๐™‹๐™š๐™ง๐™จ๐™ฅ๐™š๐™˜๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ซ๐™š๐™จ.โ€” โœฆโ€”

A suspect was shot and injured

A suspect was shot and injured on Friday evening after allegedly robbing a money changer of GY$200,000 along America Street, according to the Guyana Police Force.
Preliminary reports indicate that the money changer, who is a licensed firearm holder, discharged his weapon during the incident, injuring one of the suspects. The wounded individual has since been apprehended and transported to a medical facility, where he is receiving treatment under police guard.
Law enforcement officials have confirmed that efforts are ongoing to locate and apprehend a second suspect believed to be involved in the robbery.
As of late Friday night, crime scene investigators remained on site within a secured perimeter, processing evidence and gathering information to support the investigation. The money changer was also escorted to the location to assist detectives.
The Guyana Police Force has assured that investigations are ongoing and further updates will be provided as more information becomes available.

Lights, Camera…No Action: Guyana’s Film Ambition Without a Framework

๐˜‰๐˜ : ๐˜๐˜ฆ๐˜ฎ ๐˜’๐˜ถ๐˜ฎ๐˜ข๐˜ณย 

๐™๐™๐™š 592 ๐™‚๐™ช๐™–๐™ง๐™™๐™ž๐™–๐™ฃ

ย ๐™‹๐™ง๐™š๐™จ๐™ž๐™™๐™š๐™ฃ๐™ฉ ๐™„๐™ง๐™›๐™–๐™–๐™ฃ ๐˜ผ๐™ก๐™žโ€™๐™จ ๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™ซ๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™–๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐™ฉ๐™ค ๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™š๐™ง๐™ฃ๐™–๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ๐™–๐™ก ๐™›๐™ž๐™ก๐™ข๐™ข๐™–๐™ ๐™š๐™ง๐™จ ๐™ข๐™–๐™ฎ ๐™๐™–๐™ซ๐™š ๐™—๐™š๐™š๐™ฃ ๐™™๐™š๐™ก๐™ž๐™ซ๐™š๐™ง๐™š๐™™ ๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐™– ๐™œ๐™ก๐™ค๐™—๐™–๐™ก ๐™จ๐™ฉ๐™–๐™œ๐™š, ๐™—๐™ช๐™ฉ ๐™ž๐™ฉ ๐™ง๐™š๐™จ๐™ฉ๐™จ ๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐™– ๐™™๐™ค๐™ข๐™š๐™จ๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™˜ ๐™›๐™ค๐™ช๐™ฃ๐™™๐™–๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™–๐™ฉ ๐™ž๐™จ, ๐™–๐™ฉ ๐™—๐™š๐™จ๐™ฉ, ๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™˜๐™ค๐™ข๐™ฅ๐™ก๐™š๐™ฉ๐™šโ€”๐™–๐™ฃ๐™™ ๐™–๐™ฉ ๐™ฌ๐™ค๐™ง๐™จ๐™ฉ, ๐™ช๐™ฃ๐™˜๐™ค๐™ข๐™ฅ๐™š๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ซ๐™š.

Because in the global race for film and creative industry investment, Guyana is not entering a vacuum. It is stepping into a fiercely competitive marketplace where countries have spent yearsโ€”sometimes decadesโ€”building legal frameworks, financial incentives, and institutional systems designed specifically to attract and retain production capital.

Consider Trinidad and Tobago. Through its Trinidad and Tobago Film Company (FilmTT), the country offers structured cash rebate programmes of up to 35% for qualifying local and foreign productions. This is not a vague promiseโ€”it is codified, accessible, and supported by clear guidelines. Productions benefit from established permitting processes, location scouting support, and a functioning ecosystem of trained crew and service providers.

Jamaica goes further. Its Jamaica Promotions Corporation (JAMPRO) administers a well-defined incentive regime offering up to 25% in tax rebates, combined with streamlined customs facilitation, duty concessions, and an established film commission that actively manages international productions. Jamaicaโ€™s Film Commission is not aspirationalโ€”it is operational. It closes deals, facilitates logistics, and ensures that investors encounter efficiency, not uncertainty.

Even Barbados, with a smaller landmass and resource base, has moved decisively to position itself as a creative economy player, offering production incentives, modern intellectual property protections, and clear regulatory pathways for investors.

Beyond the Caribbean, jurisdictions like Georgia in the United States offer transferable tax credits of up to 30%, while countries like Canada and South Africa have built billion-dollar film sectors on the back of aggressive, well-structured incentive frameworks and robust legal protections.

ย ๐™‰๐™ค๐™ฌ ๐™˜๐™ค๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™ง๐™–๐™จ๐™ฉ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™ž๐™จ ๐™ฌ๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ ๐™‚๐™ช๐™ฎ๐™–๐™ฃ๐™–.

๐™๐™๐™š๐™ง๐™š ๐™ž๐™จ ๐™ฃ๐™ค ๐™๐™ž๐™ก๐™ข ๐˜ผ๐™˜๐™ฉ.

๐™๐™๐™š๐™ง๐™š ๐™ž๐™จ ๐™ฃ๐™ค ๐™๐™ž๐™ก๐™ข ๐˜พ๐™ค๐™ข๐™ข๐™ž๐™จ๐™จ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐™ฌ๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ ๐™จ๐™ฉ๐™–๐™ฉ๐™ช๐™ฉ๐™ค๐™ง๐™ฎ ๐™–๐™ช๐™ฉ๐™๐™ค๐™ง๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ฎ.

๐™๐™๐™š๐™ง๐™š ๐™ž๐™จ ๐™ฃ๐™ค ๐™ฅ๐™ง๐™ค๐™™๐™ช๐™˜๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐™ง๐™š๐™—๐™–๐™ฉ๐™š ๐™ค๐™ง ๐™ฉ๐™–๐™ญ ๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™˜๐™š๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ซ๐™š ๐™ง๐™š๐™œ๐™ž๐™ข๐™š.

๐™๐™๐™š๐™ง๐™š ๐™ž๐™จ ๐™ฃ๐™ค ๐™ข๐™ค๐™™๐™š๐™ง๐™ฃ, ๐™š๐™ฃ๐™›๐™ค๐™ง๐™˜๐™š๐™–๐™—๐™ก๐™š ๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™š๐™ก๐™ก๐™š๐™˜๐™ฉ๐™ช๐™–๐™ก ๐™ฅ๐™ง๐™ค๐™ฅ๐™š๐™ง๐™ฉ๐™ฎ ๐™›๐™ง๐™–๐™ข๐™š๐™ฌ๐™ค๐™ง๐™  ๐™–๐™ก๐™ž๐™œ๐™ฃ๐™š๐™™ ๐™ฌ๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™š ๐™™๐™š๐™ข๐™–๐™ฃ๐™™๐™จ ๐™ค๐™› ๐™œ๐™ก๐™ค๐™—๐™–๐™ก ๐™ข๐™š๐™™๐™ž๐™– ๐™ฅ๐™ง๐™ค๐™™๐™ช๐™˜๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ.

Guyanaโ€™s Copyright Act, rooted in outdated provisions, does not reflect the realities of digital distribution, streaming rights, or complex international co-productions. Enforcement mechanisms remain weak, leaving creators and investors exposed. Trademark protections exist in theory but lack the consistent enforcement necessary to build investor confidence.

And perhaps most critically, there is no integrated policy architecture that connects vision to execution.

Instead, what Guyana currently offers is natural beauty without regulatory clarity. Potential without protection. Invitation without infrastructure.

This is not a small gapโ€”it is a structural disadvantage.

When a production company evaluates a location, it is not simply asking, โ€œIs this place visually compelling?โ€ It is asking:

ย ๐˜พ๐™–๐™ฃ ๐™ฌ๐™š ๐™ง๐™š๐™˜๐™ค๐™ซ๐™š๐™ง ๐™ค๐™ช๐™ง ๐™˜๐™ค๐™จ๐™ฉ๐™จ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™ง๐™ค๐™ช๐™œ๐™ ๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™˜๐™š๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ซ๐™š๐™จ?

๐˜ผ๐™ง๐™š ๐™ค๐™ช๐™ง ๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™š๐™ก๐™ก๐™š๐™˜๐™ฉ๐™ช๐™–๐™ก ๐™ฅ๐™ง๐™ค๐™ฅ๐™š๐™ง๐™ฉ๐™ฎ ๐™ง๐™ž๐™œ๐™๐™ฉ๐™จ ๐™ฅ๐™ง๐™ค๐™ฉ๐™š๐™˜๐™ฉ๐™š๐™™?

๐™’๐™ž๐™ก๐™ก ๐™ฅ๐™š๐™ง๐™ข๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™จ ๐™—๐™š ๐™ž๐™จ๐™จ๐™ช๐™š๐™™ ๐™š๐™›๐™›๐™ž๐™˜๐™ž๐™š๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™ก๐™ฎ?

๐™„๐™จ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™š๐™ง๐™š ๐™– ๐™ฉ๐™ง๐™–๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™š๐™™ ๐™ก๐™ค๐™˜๐™–๐™ก ๐™ฌ๐™ค๐™ง๐™ ๐™›๐™ค๐™ง๐™˜๐™š?

๐˜พ๐™–๐™ฃ ๐™ฌ๐™š ๐™ง๐™š๐™ก๐™ฎ ๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™š ๐™ก๐™š๐™œ๐™–๐™ก ๐™จ๐™ฎ๐™จ๐™ฉ๐™š๐™ข ๐™ฉ๐™ค ๐™š๐™ฃ๐™›๐™ค๐™ง๐™˜๐™š ๐™˜๐™ค๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™ง๐™–๐™˜๐™ฉ๐™จ?

On each of these questions, Guyana struggles to provide a competitive answer.

The $3.7 billion allocated to the orange economy, while significant on paper, does little to resolve these fundamental deficiencies if it is not directed toward building legislative and institutional capacity. Without reform, that investment risks becoming symbolicโ€”an announcement rather than a transformation.

The creation of a National Multistakeholder Taskforce may suggest movement, but taskforces do not compete with tax credits. Consultations do not replace compliance frameworks. And ambition, no matter how frequently repeated, does not reduce investor risk.

President Ali is correct in one respect: Guyana should not be on a single track. Diversification is necessary. The orange economy, if properly developed, could unlock new revenue streams, empower local creatives, and position the country within a rapidly expanding global industry.

But diversification without preparation is not strategyโ€”it is exposure.

If Guyana is serious about becoming a โ€œmega hubโ€ for culture and entertainment, then the work ahead is not promotionalโ€”it is legislative. It is institutional. It is technical.

ย ๐™„๐™ฉ ๐™ง๐™š๐™ฆ๐™ช๐™ž๐™ง๐™š๐™จ ๐™ก๐™–๐™ฌ๐™จ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™–๐™ฉ ๐™ฅ๐™ง๐™ค๐™ฉ๐™š๐™˜๐™ฉ, ๐™–๐™œ๐™š๐™ฃ๐™˜๐™ž๐™š๐™จ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™–๐™ฉ ๐™›๐™ช๐™ฃ๐™˜๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ, ๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™˜๐™š๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ซ๐™š๐™จ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™–๐™ฉ ๐™˜๐™ค๐™ข๐™ฅ๐™š๐™ฉ๐™š, ๐™–๐™ฃ๐™™ ๐™จ๐™ฎ๐™จ๐™ฉ๐™š๐™ข๐™จ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™–๐™ฉ ๐™™๐™š๐™ก๐™ž๐™ซ๐™š๐™ง.

๐™๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ก ๐™ฉ๐™๐™š๐™ฃ, ๐™‚๐™ช๐™ฎ๐™–๐™ฃ๐™– ๐™ž๐™จ ๐™ฃ๐™ค๐™ฉ ๐™ค๐™›๐™›๐™š๐™ง๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™œ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™š ๐™ฌ๐™ค๐™ง๐™ก๐™™ ๐™– ๐™ฅ๐™ง๐™ค๐™™๐™ช๐™˜๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐™™๐™š๐™จ๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™–๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ.

๐™„๐™ฉ ๐™ž๐™จ ๐™ค๐™›๐™›๐™š๐™ง๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™œ ๐™– ๐™ฅ๐™ง๐™ค๐™ข๐™ž๐™จ๐™š ๐™จ๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ก๐™ก ๐™ฌ๐™–๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™œ ๐™ฉ๐™ค ๐™—๐™š ๐™—๐™ช๐™ž๐™ก๐™ฉ.

The OAS Report Is Not Noiseโ€”It Is an Indictment

BY: Hem Kumar 

๐™๐™๐™š 592 ๐™‚๐™ช๐™–๐™ง๐™™๐™ž๐™–๐™ฃ

The latest findings from the Organisation of American Statesโ€™ Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression are not casual observations to be brushed aside by the usual machinery of denial. They amount to a clear and sobering indictment of the state of press freedom in Guyanaโ€”one that exposes a pattern of hostility, obstruction, and calculated opacity emanating from the highest levels of public authority.

At the centre of this troubling assessment is the identification of an โ€œadverse environmentโ€ for journalism, driven in part by hostile rhetoric from public officials, including President Irfaan Ali and the Department of Public Information. This is not merely about tone. It is about power. When those who wield state authority choose language and conduct that delegitimise the press, they do more than criticiseโ€”they signal to the wider society that scrutiny is unwelcome and dissent is suspect.

The exclusion of media houses from the Presidentโ€™s first post-inauguration press conference is emblematic of this deeper malaise. Six outlets reportedly left in the dark while others received direct invitations is not an administrative oversightโ€”it is selective access. It raises a fundamental question: who decides which journalists are allowed to ask questions of the State? In any functioning democracy, the answer cannot be โ€œthose who are most favourable.โ€

The governmentโ€™s reflexive dismissal of criticism as โ€œmaliciousโ€ and โ€œmisleadingโ€ only compounds the issue. This is a familiar tacticโ€”discredit the messenger to avoid confronting the message. 

But the OAS report cuts through that noise, reminding public officials that their words carry weight, and that with that weight comes an obligation: not to inflame, not to intimidate, and certainly not to interfere.

Equally troubling is the reportโ€™s highlighting of financial leverage as a potential tool of influence. The issue of outstanding state debts to media entities, alongside the broader principle outlined by the IACHR, underscores a dangerous realityโ€”public funds can be weaponised to reward compliance and punish criticism. That is not governance. That is coercion dressed in bureaucracy.

Then there is the persistent fog surrounding access to information. Protests outside the Office of the Information Commissioner, the failure to produce mandatory reports for over a decade, and the routine denial or delay of information requests all point to a system designed not to inform, but to obstruct. Transparency is not optional in a democracy; it is foundational. When it is withheld, accountability withers.

The refusal to disclose campaign financing, the silence on the GDF helicopter crash report, and the incomplete oil audit further deepen public distrust. These are not trivial matters. They go to the heart of governance, national security, and the management of the countryโ€™s most critical resources. A government confident in its stewardship does not hide from scrutinyโ€”it welcomes it.

Even more concerning are the broader implications for political participation and democratic expression. The reported obstruction surrounding opposition activities and leadership processes, whether denied or not, feeds into a growing perception that the political space itself is being managed rather than contested freely. The OAS is unequivocal on this point: freedom of expression is not a luxury during political processesโ€”it is the very mechanism through which democracy breathes.

And now, the global metrics are beginning to reflect what many on the ground have long observed. Guyanaโ€™s slip on the Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index is not an isolated statisticโ€”it is a symptom. A symptom of a deteriorating environment where access is restricted, criticism is vilified, and information is controlled.

What makes this moment particularly consequential is not just the content of the report, but the credibility of its source. The OAS Special Rapporteur is not a partisan actor, nor a local critic easily dismissed. It is part of an established inter-American human rights framework, grounded in legal principles and democratic norms that Guyana itself has committed to uphold.

The predictable response will comeโ€”deflection, denial, and the familiar chorus of โ€œmisrepresentation.โ€ But that will not erase the substance of what has been documented. Nor will it restore confidence in institutions that appear increasingly resistant to scrutiny.

The question now is whether the government will treat this report as an attack to be repelled or a warning to be heeded. Because the stakes are not merely reputational. They are democratic.

A government that controls access to information, selectively engages the press, and dismisses criticism as hostility does not strengthen the Stateโ€”it weakens it. And a society where journalists operate under pressure, exclusion, or uncertainty is not one that can claim to be fully free.

This report should not be buried beneath rhetoric. It should be confrontedโ€”with transparency, with reform, and with a renewed commitment to the principle that no democracy can function in the absence of a free, independent, and unencumbered press.

Anything less would only confirm what this report has already made clear.

๐™๐™๐™š 592 ๐™‚๐™ช๐™–๐™ง๐™™๐™ž๐™–๐™ฃ-๐™๐™ง๐™ช๐™ฉ๐™ , ๐˜ผ๐™˜๐™˜๐™ค๐™ช๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™–๐™—๐™ž๐™ก๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ฎ,๐™„๐™ฃ๐™ฉ๐™š๐™œ๐™ง๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ฎ ๐™„๐™ฃ๐™‚๐™ช๐™ฎ๐™–๐™ฃ๐™– ๐˜ผ๐™ฃ๐™™ ๐˜พ๐™–๐™ง๐™ž๐™—๐™—๐™š๐™–๐™ฃ ๐™‹๐™š๐™ง๐™จ๐™ฅ๐™š๐™˜๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ซ๐™š๐™จ.โ€” โœฆโ€”