592 GUARDIAN♦ OPINION♦ GTOWN GUYANA♦ JUNE 2026

Spine Is Not a Slogan: Setting the Record Straight on Opposition Leadership

Dr.Rick Itwaru’s declaration that Guyana has finally found “an opposition with a spine” may resonate with those eager for confrontation, but it does not withstand serious scrutiny. The problem is not the desire for a stronger opposition—that is both valid and necessary. The problem is the reckless inflation of a political figure whose performance, to date, falls far short of the standard being claimed.

Spine is not noise. It is not posture. And it is certainly not selective defiance.

Spine, in the Guyanese political tradition, has a meaning forged under pressure—real pressure.

It was embodied by Dr. Cheddi Jagan, a man who did not merely speak against power but endured its full force. Jagan stood firm when it was dangerous to do so. He was not just opposed by a sitting government; he was undermined by coordinated international interference, including documented CIA involvement in destabilizing his administration. These are no longer speculative claims—they are part of the historical record.

Yet even under that weight, Jagan did not abandon the institutional ground. He did not retreat from the electorate that entrusted him with power. He held his party together, maintained organizational discipline, and continued to operate within the framework of democratic legitimacy. His convictions were not episodic—they were sustained. He wrote The West on Trial not as political theatre, but as a testament to ideological clarity and endurance. And ultimately, he returned to power not through spectacle, but through persistence and principle.

That is spine.

To now elevate Azruddin Mohamed into that lineage is not just premature—it is a distortion of political reality.

Eight months after being handed a democratic mandate, Mohamed has failed to ensure that his own party occupies its rightful seats in Region 10. This is not a minor oversight. It is a fundamental failure of leadership. Representation delayed is representation denied. Every day those seats remain unoccupied is a day the voters who supported him are effectively silenced.

Worse still, the vacuum has consequences. The previous Chair, Deron Adams, continues to occupy the space that voters explicitly chose to change. That is not resistance. That is surrender by default.

What exactly are we calling “spine” here?

If a leader cannot marshal his own organization to fulfill the most basic obligation—taking up seats already won—then the rhetoric of fighting the system rings hollow. Governance, even in opposition, demands structure, discipline, and follow-through. It requires more than public confrontation; it requires internal control and respect for the mandate given by the electorate.

Itwaru’s commentary conveniently sidesteps this reality. In doing so, it replaces analysis with advocacy. It constructs an image that does not align with the facts on the ground. And in elevating Mohamed beyond his demonstrated capacity, it does a disservice to the very standard of leadership it claims to defend.

Guyana does need a stronger opposition. It needs leaders who will challenge inequity, demand transparency in the management of oil wealth, and confront the excesses of entrenched power. But strength must be measured in outcomes, not intentions.

Cheddi Jagan’s legacy reminds us that real political courage is not situational. It is consistent. It does not falter at the first test of organization or responsibility. It does not leave supporters unrepresented while claiming to fight on their behalf.

Azruddin Mohamed may yet grow into a more effective political figure. That remains to be seen. But at this moment, the record is clear: he has not met the standard required to justify the praise being heaped upon him.

When he can secure his own political base, enforce internal cohesion, and ensure that the mandates given to him are fully executed—then, and only then, can a serious conversation begin about leadership worthy of national consequence.

Until that happens, talk of “spine” is not analysis. It is exaggeration.

And Guyana deserves better than that.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

 

592 GUARDIAN

I N D E P E N D E N T♦ A C C O U N T A B I L I T♦ Y J O U R N A L I S M ♦ G U Y A N A

V O L. 2 0 2 6 • E D I T O R I A L• J U N E 2 0 2 6

 5 9 2 G U A R D I A N. G Y

 D E M O C R A T I C– I N T E G R I T Y

S T A T E  R E S O U R C E S • L O C A L- G O V E R N M E N T

E L E C T I O N S • I N C U M B E N C Y A B U S E

Cabinet Outreaches, or Campaign Machinery in Disguise?

Across Guyana, a familiar political spectacle is unfolding — marketed as governance, engineered as campaigning. Citizens are being made to fund the electoral ambitions of a leadership they may never choose to vote for.

E D I T O R I A L B O A R D • 5 9 2 G U A R D I A N • J U N E 2 0 2 6

Call it what you will — “Cabinet outreach,” “community engagement,” “delivery of services.” Strip away the branding and what remains is blunt and familiar: the machinery of an incumbent government deploying public resources, state vehicles, ministerial authority, and taxpayer financed logistical infrastructure in the explicit service of its own electoral survival. With Local Government Elections on the horizon, these orchestrated spectacles are not a coincidence. They are a strategy — and Guyana’s citizens are footing the bill.

This is not a new accusation, nor is it an allegation without evidence. It is a pattern so well-documented by independent international observers that its repetition should constitute a national emergency for democratic governance. The question before the Guyanese public is no longer whether this is happening. The question is why it has been permitted to continue — and who benefits from the silence.

The Anatomy of an “Outreach”

Cabinet outreach programs, on their face, bear a legitimate description: ministers visiting communities, citizens raising concerns, government responding in real time. But the staging of these events — the ministerial motorcades, the government-branded tents, the state media camera crews, the distribution of benefits timed to crowd the pre-election calendar — reveals something altogether different from neutral public administration.

In May 2026, Vice President Dr. Bharrat Jagdeo led a widely publicized outreach at the Arthur Chung Conference Centre that drew hundreds of citizens with unresolved grievances — many of which had been pending for months, years, or in some cases, decades. The Kaieteur News observed that far from demonstrating governmental efficiency, these queues exposed the chronic failure of the very administrative systems the outreach purported to represent. A government that was governing electively would not need theatrical interventions to compensate for systemic dysfunction. What these events deliver instead is optics: the image of an accessible, responsive leadership — precisely the image that drives votes in a Local Government election.

“The flood of project launches, ribbon-cuttings, and welfare distributions during the campaign was not governance — it was blatant electioneering disguised as state business.”                                         S TA B R O E K N E W S  A N A LY S I S • S E P T E M B E R 2025      C I T I N G  E U  E L E C T O R A L- O B S E R V E R  M I S S I O N      F I N D I N G S

What International Observers Have Already Confirmed

This editorial does not rest on conjecture. It rests on the documented findings of independent international electoral missions — bodies whose mandates are accountability, not partisanship.

O N  T H E  R E C O R D: I N T E R N A T I O N A L  O B S E R V E R  F I N D I N G S    O N G U Y A N A

▸ European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report (November 2025): Found that “the level playing field was distorted by an undue advantage of incumbency, misuse of state resources, and under-regulated, weakly enforced campaign finance rules.” The EU EOM specifically noted that state resources were directly used in 29 percent of observed PPP/C campaign events — including five documented cases of state-owned vehicles transporting voters.

▸ EU EOM Preliminary Statement (September 2025):

Confirmed that President Ali’s administration “inaugurated a high number of public projects — hospitals, schools, roads, and bridges — and launched several social support programs combining these events with campaign activities.” State media and government social media accounts were simultaneously used to amplify party campaign messages, “further blurring the line.”

▸ EU EOM on campaign finance (September 2025): “There is no state funding in Guyana, and no provisions defining permissible sources and uses of funding, donations, or campaign expenditures. There are no regulations to ensure a level playing field for campaigning, nor adequate rules to minimize the use of state resources to the advantage of incumbency.”

▸ CARICOM Election Observer Mission Chief Josephine Tamai (September 2025): Recommended that regional model legislation be enacted to prohibit incumbent governments from using state resources for campaigning, with a legal “cut-o! point” once an election is called. Her mission was informed of state resource abuse during Guyana’s 2025 general elections and committed to addressing this in its final report.

▸ EU EOM (November 2025): Also documented “instances of direct pressure on civil servants and part-time government employees, including demotions and transfers linked to perceived support for opposition candidates” — and noted that voters in some communities reportedly refrained from openly supporting opposition parties due to fear of losing employment or social benefits.

These are not fringe allegations. These findings come from organizations operating under internationally recognized standards of election observation. They were independently verified, field-observed, and formally transmitted to Guyana’s election authorities with eighteen concrete recommendations. The government has had no shortage of opportunity to reform its conduct. The continuation of Cabinet outreaches in the pre-Local Government election period is not ignorance of these findings — it is indifference to them.

The Mechanics of Incumbency Abuse

Understanding the mechanism is essential. Incumbency abuse in the electoral context does not require a government to hand out cash in a polling station. It operates through a more sophisticated architecture — one that exploits the structural advantages of power itself.

---

G O V E R N A N C E V S. E L E C T I O N E E R I N G :                 T H E  C R I T I C A L  D I S T I N C T I O N

ACTIVITY		LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE		ELECTIONEERING IN DISGUISE
Project commissioning		GOV Scheduled, announced through	procurement processes, implemented by agencies	PARTY Ribbon-cuttings timed to electoral calendar; ministers personally present with media coverage
Community outreach		GOV Routine constituency offices and ministry helpdesks serving the public continuously		PARTY Mass theatrical events with VP/ministerial presence in swing communities ahead of polling
Cash transfers / benefits		GOV Administered through scheduled, established social protection programs		PARTY Announced or accelerated prior to elections; distributed at events featuring party officials
State vehicle usage		GOV official transport for government business within procurement rules		PARTY Documented transport of voters to campaign events — five	instances observed by EU EOM in 2025
State media coverage		GOV Balanced coverage of government and	opposition activities	PARTY EU EOM found pro-government bias; state social media used to amplify party campaign messages

The architecture is deliberate. It exploits a fundamental asymmetry: an opposition candidate cannot mobilize a ministerial motorcade, cannot issue a press release through the ministerial motorcade, cannot issue a press release through the Department of Public Information, cannot host an event at a state facility, cannot promise on-the-spot resolution of long pending government grievances — because the opposition does not hold the keys to the state. When a Cabinet minister conducts an outreach, they arrive not merely as a politician, but as an embodiment of state power itself. That embodiment is priceless as electoral currency, and it costs the PPP/C nothing beyond what the Treasury already provides.

“When citizens are made to fund the campaign of those who govern them — without their consent and without legal prohibition — democracy is not merely weakened. It is quietly strangled.”                          — 5 9 2  G UA R D I A N  E D I T O R I A L    B O A R D

Citizens Are Paying for Their Own Political        Manipulation

This is the heart of the matter, and it demands to be stated plainly. Every government vehicle that carries a minister to a pre-election community rally was purchased with public funds. Every state media crew that films a ribbon-cutting is paid from the public budget. Every DPI press release that frames a Cabinet outreach as benevolent governance is produced by public servants on public time. The logistical backbone by public servants on public time.

The logistical backbone of these “outreaches” — the tents, the sound systems, the security, the officials’ salaries — is financed by the taxpayers of Guyana, including those who have never voted PPP/C and never will.

There is no legal prohibition on this in Guyana. The EU EOM was unambiguous: there exist no regulations to ensure a level playing field, and no elective rules to minimize the misuse of state resources. That legal vacuum is not an accident. Governments do not legislate themselves out of advantages they are actively enjoying. The burden of demanding reform, therefore, falls not on the institution that benefits — but on the citizenry, civil society, and the international community that has now placed this failure formally on the record.

The Local Government Election Stakes

The timing of the current Cabinet outreach surge cannot be separated from the budgetary provision made for Local Government Elections in the 2026 National Budget. These elections contest all 1,220 council seats across Guyana’s 80 local authority areas — the granular level of governance closest to everyday life: NDCs, municipalities, the institutions that manage drainage, markets, road maintenance, and community infrastructure. They are also the level at which PPP/C control — and its absence — is most directly felt by ordinary Guyanese.

Georgetown, which has remained under APNU/PNCR control since independence in 1966, is a particular strategic target. since independence in 1966, is a particular strategic target. The pattern observed in the 2023 local elections — where the

PPP/C campaigned heavily in opposition strongholds — is repeating. Cabinet outreaches in communities historically resistant to the PPP/C serve as both a political foothold and a demonstration of state capacity that opposition-controlled councils cannot match. They are not service delivery. They are competitive displacement.

What Accountability Requires

International observer missions have delivered their findings. GECOM has received eighteen recommendations. The CARICOM observer chief has called for regional model legislation. None of it has produced reform. The question now is what mechanism can compel what neither conscience nor institutional recommendation has achieved.

What Must Happen Before Local Government Elections Are Held

1. LEGISLATIVE PROHIBITION Parliament must enact enforceable campaign finance legislation that expressly prohibits the use of state vehicles, state media, state employees, and public funds in any event that combines government service with electoral or party activity. The legal vacuum identified by the EU EOM is not a regulatory inconvenience — it is the engine of incumbency abuse. 2. INDEPENDENT AUDIT OF OUTREACH EXPENDITURE GECOM and the Auditor General’s Office must jointly audit the budgetary expenditure associated with Cabinet outreach programs conducted in the six months preceding the Local Government Elections date, with findings made public before polling day. 3. CARICOM PRE-ELECTION OBSERVATION Given the formally documented pattern of pre-election state resource abuse in the 2025 general elections, a CARICOM or OAS observer presence must be activated not merely on election day but during the campaigning period itself — with an explicit mandate to monitor Cabinet activities for electoral conduct violations. 4. CIVIL SERVANT PROTECTION LEGISLATION The EU EOM documented direct pressure on civil servants linked to perceived support for opposition candidates. Guyana requires statutory protection for public employees from political coercion, with enforceable penalties for ministerial interference in their employment. 5. STATE MEDIA SEPARATION The National Communications Network and the Department of Public Information must be placed under an independent editorial board with a legal mandate of political impartiality, removing their current function as instruments of ruling party amplification. 6. MORATORIUM ON RIBBON-CUTTING EVENTS In the ninety days preceding any electoral event, the commissioning of public infrastructure by sitting ministers must be prohibited as a campaign-adjacent activity. Project completions may be announced through press release only, without ministerial ceremony

The Closing Argument

 Vice President Jagdeo, speaking at the ACCC outreach in May 2026, said: “We’ve done the campaign, and now we have to deliver on what we promised our people.” The distinction he draws — between campaign and delivery — is precisely the one his government is systemically erasing. When campaign promises are fulfilled through state- branded ceremonies, with media coverage, in state facilities, on state time, the campaign never ends. It simply brings its uniform.

The Guyanese state belongs to every citizen — not to the party that temporarily occupies its executive. When the machinery of that state is redirected toward the perpetuation of a single party’s grip on power — without legal prohibition, without electoral oversight, and without public accountability — democracy is not merely weakened. It is quietly strangled by the very institution sworn to protect it.

Cabinet outreaches, as currently conducted, are not a public service. They are a public liability — to democratic integrity, to equal electoral competition, and to every Guyanese citizen who deserves a genuinely free and fair vote.

The 592 Guardian calls on GECOM, civil society, and Guyana’s regional and international partners to treat this not as a talking point, but as the constitutional crisis it has become.

◆ ◆ ◆

---

The 592 Guardian is an independent accountability publication. This editorial references findings from the European Union Election Observation Mission Final Report (November 2025), the CARICOM Election Observer Mission (September 2025), Kaieteur News, Stabroek News, and Demerara Waves reporting. No public official approached for comment prior to publication responded within the editorial deadline.

---

© 2 0 2 6  5 9 2 G U A R D I A N  •  I N D E P E N D E N T             A C C O U N TA B I L I T Y  J O U R N A L I S M  •                         G E O R G E T O W N , G U YA N A  •  5 9 2 G U A R D I A N . 

Not Development—Deal-Making

The Cybele Energy debacle is not an anomaly—it is a symptom.

The Cybele Energy affair is not an isolated embarrassment. It is evidence of a systemic failure in how Guyana allocates and manages its extractive resources.

What is unfolding across oil, gold, and now uranium is not development. It is deal-making dressed up as development, where acreage is treated not as a national responsibility but as a speculative asset to be acquired, parked, and flipped.

The warning signs were there from the start. Ghanaian company Cybele Energy secured Oil Block S7 with a US$17 million signing bonus, exceeding the required amount and drawing celebratory headlines. But months later, the company had not paid. The government was forced to issue an ultimatum: pay up or forfeit the license, with nearly US$4 million in default interest already accrued. A serious operator does not need to be chased down to prove it can meet its most basic financial commitment.

This is why the signing bonus matters. It is not merely a fee. It is the first test of bona fides. When a company can promise a large sum to win attention but cannot deliver it on time, the public is entitled to ask whether the bid was ever grounded in real operational capacity. Cybele’s profile—thin on technical history, heavy on marketing—confirmed the suspicion that something was off from the beginning.

The same speculative logic has shown up elsewhere in Guyana’s oil sector. In the recent auction round, Sispro, a Guyanese company, was publicly identified as a winner of blocks but later faced questions about its ability to move from award to execution.

The Sispro episode fits squarely within this framework. Faced with deadlines and obligations, the solution was not execution—it was substitution. Bring in external investors at the eleventh hour, restructure the deal, and attempt to salvage value through transfer rather than performance. It is a recycling of access, not the creation of output.

Reports indicate that local and foreign partnerships were brokered and written into the structure at the eleventh hour, suggesting that the block was won first and the real search for capital and capacity began afterward. This is exactly how flipping begins: acquire, stall, then assign to a deeper-pocketed partner.

But oil is only the most visible front.In the gold sector, presents an even older version of the same problem. 

The same speculative architecture has long been at play. Concessions are acquired not as production assets, but as tradable instruments. Holders sit on acreage, do the bare minimum to maintain claims, and quietly shop for buyers or partners.

Value is extracted not from the ground, but from the paper—licenses flipped, stakes diluted, and deals brokered behind closed doors. The result is a sector where opacity thrives, and genuine production is often secondary to transactional maneuvering.

Public reporting has described a system where mining licenses can be tied up by operators who fail to comply, fail to declare production properly, or exploit the gap between award and enforcement. Guyana’s recent suspension of more than 100 Brazilian miners underscores that the sector is still vulnerable to weak compliance, false representations, and speculative holding patterns.

Then there is uranium, where the problem is not just speculation but secrecy. A Canadian firm has publicly announced it is advancing a uranium project in Guyana, but the broader point is that uranium is a strategic mineral and any arrangement involving it should attract the highest level of transparency, scrutiny, and disclosure. When such deals are cloaked in silence, the public is left to wonder whether the State is managing the sector—or merely announcing it after the fact.

What ties these sectors together is not the commodity. It is the governing style. Awards are made before capacity is fully tested, announcements are issued before full confidence is established, and the public is asked to trust deals that appear to have been structured for speculation rather than delivery. That is not resource governance. It is resource arbitrage.

This is why the country must stop treating every large bid or flashy announcement as proof of seriousness. In extractive industries, the real question is never who shouted the loudest. It is who can actually finance, develop, report, and deliver under transparent rules. Guyana’s record suggests that question is still being asked too late.

The larger pattern is clear: speculators set up shell companies, bid on acreage with no plans and no experience, and do so with one intent—to flip. Sispro followed this script. Cybele followed it. The gold sector has seen the same for years. And now, with uranium, the pattern threatens to extend into an even more sensitive strategic domain.

What is unfolding on Guyana’s “Main Street” is a speculative marketplace, one where access to national resources is leveraged and traded in ways that enrich intermediaries while exposing the State to risk. It is a system that begins to resemble a frontier bazaar more than a governed sector.

If Guyana is to avoid becoming a playground for opportunists, the rules must change. Pre-award due diligence must be rigorous and verifiable. Financial commitments must be secured before licenses are granted. Technical competence must be non-negotiable. Transparency must be enforced, especially in high-risk sectors like uranium. And above all, the State must send a clear signal: its resources are not chips in a speculative game.

Because when speculation outpaces regulation, the country does not move forward—it gets played

The wool has been pulled over the public’s eyes long enough. It is time to hold the line, tighten the rules, and ensure that Guyana’s extractive wealth is developed, not traded.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

After 100 Days, the Opposition Returns—And Still Misses the Point

A government is only as accountable as its Opposition is effective. By that measure, Guyana’s Opposition has just delivered one of its weakest performances in recent memory.

After more than 100 days without a sitting of the National Assembly—100 days to prepare, to investigate, to build airtight lines of questioning—the Opposition has returned with a bloated but unfocused list that avoids the very pressure points where accountability is most urgently required.

This is not a failure of time. It is a failure of will, strategy, and political seriousness.

At the heart of the country’s governance crisis is the steady erosion of procurement safeguards and the explosion of no-bid contracting. Yet the Opposition has failed to mount sustained, targeted pressure on this issue. The no-bid street lighting contracts alone raise serious red flags—pricing, selection, execution—but where is the forensic questioning?

Where is the relentless pursuit of answers on the Gas-to-Energy (GtE) project, now burdened by cost escalations and shifting narratives? Where is the structured dismantling of the Karpowership agreement, with its long-term financial implications for taxpayers?

Billions have been advanced for infrastructure—roads, pump stations—yet many remain incomplete while contractors walk away with mobilization fees. This is not mismanagement; it is a pattern. And patterns demand exposure. Instead, the Opposition offers fragments.

The GOAL scholarship program—once touted as transformative—now sits under a cloud of unanswered questions: refunds, reallocations, and the quiet diversion of funds toward local institutions absent any transparent procurement framework. Silence on this issue is not oversight; it is complicity by omission.

Meanwhile, state resources are being deployed in ways that dangerously blur the line between governance and political campaigning. Cabinet outreaches have taken on the character of partisan mobilization exercises, funded by the public purse. The Vice President’s “open days” only deepen the concern: under what constitutional or statutory authority are these engagements being conducted, and within which defined portfolio?

The Digital ID rollout proceeds at pace, yet the legal safeguards meant to protect citizens remain hollow. The Data Protection Act exists, but enforcement is effectively absent. The Commissioner—reportedly based in Schenectady, New York—has no visible institutional footprint in Guyana. No office. No accessibility. No demonstrated oversight. Yet citizens are expected to hand over sensitive personal data into this vacuum.

Then there is Drainage and Irrigation—hundreds of billions expended over the years, and still, communities flood with predictable regularity. Where is the accountability for that spending? Where are the audits, the performance metrics, the consequences? If billions can be spent with so little to show, what exactly is being measured—delivery or depletion?

Even basic governance failures persist without sustained challenge. Region 10 remains without a substantive Administrative head. This is not a minor administrative oversight; it is a direct weakening of local governance structures. And yet, it barely registers in the Opposition’s line of attack.

What is presented instead is a patchwork of questions—procedural, scattered, and ultimately non-threatening. After 100 days, this is not scrutiny. It is theater without consequence.

Oversight is not about asking many questions. It is about asking the right questions, repeatedly, until answers are forced into the open. It requires precision, persistence, and a clear understanding of where power is being exercised without accountability.

The uncomfortable truth is this: when an Opposition fails to apply pressure where it matters most, it does not merely weaken itself—it strengthens the very system it claims to challenge.

Guyana is not suffering from a shortage of issues. It is suffering from a shortage of effective opposition.

And until that changes, accountability will remain optional

Questions the Opposition Should Be Asking

If the Opposition is serious about accountability, then the following questions—directed to specific sectors and their respective ministers—should already be on the Order Paper:

Natural Resources Sector (Minister of Natural Resources)

– How many large-scale and medium-scale mining concessions have been issued, transferred, or “flipped” over the past five years, and what total value has been derived from these transactions?

– What mechanisms exist to prevent the wholesale trading of concessions for massive private profit without corresponding benefit to the State?

– How much revenue has Guyana earned from concession transfers compared to the estimated private gains generated from resale or joint venture arrangements?

– What due diligence is conducted on concession holders to ensure they possess the technical and financial capacity to develop the resources?

– Why does Guyana continue to allow the effective speculation of its mineral assets with minimal taxation or oversight?

Public Works Sector (Minister of Public Works)

– How many contracts for roads, bridges, and pump stations have been awarded via restricted or no-bid processes in the past three years?

– What is the total value of mobilization fees paid to contractors for projects that remain incomplete or significantly delayed?

– What enforcement actions have been taken against defaulting contractors, and how much of those mobilization advances have been recovered?

Energy and Infrastructure (Prime Minister / Office of the President)

– What is the current total cost of the Guyana-to-Energy (GtE) project, and how has it changed from its original estimate?

– What penalties or renegotiation clauses exist within the Karpowership agreement to protect Guyana from long-term financial exposure?

– Who approved these agreements, and were they subjected to independent review?

Governance and Procurement (Attorney General / Ministry of Finance)

– How many contracts have been structured deliberately below procurement thresholds to avoid public tendering?

– What audits have been conducted into no-bid contracts, including the street lighting program, and will those reports be made public?

– What legislative reforms are being pursued to close procurement loopholes currently being exploited?

Human Services and Social Protection (Minister of Human Services)

– What measurable outcomes have been achieved from state-funded interventions targeting vulnerable populations, particularly in relation to adolescent pregnancy and child protection?

– How are funds allocated, tracked, and audited across these program?

Digital Governance and Data Protection (Office of the Prime Minister / ICT responsibility)

– Why is the Digital ID system being rolled out in the absence of a fully operational Data Protection framework?

– Where is the Data Protection Commissioner physically based, what resources are allocated to that office, and how can citizens access it?

– What safeguards are in place to prevent misuse or unauthorized access to citizens’ personal data?

Agriculture and State Investments (Minister of Agriculture)

– What is the total amount of state funding invested in projects such as Tacama Soya, Moblissa Dairy, and GUYSUCO over the past five years?

– What return on investment has been realized, and what independent audits have been conducted?

– What criteria are used to determine which private or semi-private ventures receive state financing?

Drainage and Irrigation (Minister of Agriculture / NDIA)

– How much has been spent on drainage and irrigation infrastructure over the past decade?

– Why do flooding events persist in key agricultural and residential areas despite this expenditure?

– What performance benchmarks exist, and who is held accountable when systems fail?

Public Administration (Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development)

– Why does Region 10 remain without a substantive Administrative head?

– What impact has this had on governance, project execution, and service delivery in the region?

Executive Authority and Public Resources (Office of the Vice President)

– Under what official constitutional or statutory portfolio are the Vice President’s “open day” engagements conducted?

– What public funds are allocated to these activities, and how are they justified as governmental rather than political exercises?

These are not obscure or technical matters. They are central to the management of public resources, the rule of law, and the integrity of governance. Their absence from sustained parliamentary scrutiny is not accidental—it is indicative of an Opposition that has yet to fully assume its constitutional responsibilities.

What the Public Already Knows—and Why These Questions Matter

“These questions are not speculative. They arise from patterns, decisions, and outcomes already visible to the public—issues that demand structured parliamentary interrogation, not silence.

In the mining sector, there is growing concern that concessions are being treated less as instruments of national development and more as tradable assets—acquired, warehoused, and flipped for enormous private gain. Reports of joint ventures and transfers involving millions—sometimes billions—raise a fundamental question: how is it that Guyana’s natural wealth is generating windfalls for a few while yielding comparatively little for the State?

In public works, the evidence is physical and undeniable. Incomplete roads, underperforming pump stations, and delayed infrastructure projects dot the landscape. Yet contractors have already received substantial mobilization payments. The gap between disbursement and delivery is no longer anecdotal—it is systemic.

The Gas-to-Energy project continues to shift in scope and cost, with limited transparency on its final financial exposure. Similarly, the Karpowership agreement remains insufficiently interrogated, despite its long-term implications for energy pricing and national expenditure.

The procurement system itself shows signs of deliberate strain. Contracts repeatedly appear just below thresholds that would trigger competitive bidding. The no-bid street lighting program has further amplified concerns that entire categories of public works are being executed outside the spirit—if not the letter—of procurement law.

“The GOAL scholarship program, once widely celebrated, now raises uncomfortable questions about refunds, reallocations, and the quiet redirection of funds toward local institutions, linked to cronies. The absence of transparent processes has eroded public confidence.

“Meanwhile, the line between state and political activity appears increasingly blurred. Cabinet outreaches and high-profile “open day” engagements resemble organized political mobilization, all are funded by public resources. This raises constitutional concerns that go beyond optics—they strike at the proper use of state power.

On digital governance, the rollout of a national Digital ID system is proceeding without a credible enforcement framework for data protection. A Commissioner without visible infrastructure, accessibility, or public engagement does little to reassure citizens that their personal data is secure.

Drainage and Irrigation remain one of the clearest examples of expenditure without outcome. Despite hundreds of billions invested over the years, flooding persists with predictable regularity, affecting farmers, households, and entire communities. The issue is no longer whether money is being spent—but whether it is being spent effectively.

State-supported ventures such as Tacama Soya, Moblissa Dairy, and the ongoing financial demands of GUYSUCO continue to absorb public funds with limited transparency on performance or return. These are not marginal expenditures; they are significant fiscal commitments made in the name of national development.

Even administrative governance gaps—such as the continued absence of a substantive Administrative head in Region 10—reflect a broader pattern of neglect that weakens institutional oversight at the regional level.

“Taken together, these are not isolated concerns. They form a coherent picture of governance under strain—where transparency is uneven, accountability is inconsistent, and public scrutiny is too often absent where it matters most.

This is precisely why the questions must be asked—and why failing to ask them is not a minor oversight, but a fundamental lapse in representation.