GECOM’s Non-Answer: How a “Conclusive Statement” Ducked the One Question It Was Asked

592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

 GECOM’s Non-Answer: How a “Conclusive Statement” Ducked the One Question It Was Asked


ANALYSISY BY : Editor– AUGUST,2026   

The Elections Commission Secretariat says it has no authority to rule on the Article 161(3)(b) impasse. But its own abstention is not neutral — it is a default ruling for indefinite tenure, and neither camp in the underlying constitutional debate has supplied a mechanism to fill the gap it leaves open.

The Guyana Elections Commission’s Secretariat yesterday issued what it plainly intended as a closing word on two festering disputes — the standoff over opposition-nominated Commissioners under Article 161(3)(b), and the parallel fight over opposition scrutineers. On the Commissioner question, GECOM said it has no legal authority to determine the validity of nominations made by the Leader of the Opposition, and that it cannot intervene in, adjudicate upon, or resolve any impasse involving persons he has nominated.

That is not a conclusion. It is a recusal — and recusal, in a standoff where one side already holds the seats, is not a neutral act. It is a ruling for the status quo, issued without GECOM having to own it as one.

THE THEORY GECOM DECLINED TO TOUCH

The constitutional debate GECOM stepped around has a name and a leading proponent: University of Guyana law lecturer Neville Bissember, whose position is that “the Leader of the Opposition” in Article 161(3)(b) denotes an office, not a person. Wherever the phrase appears in the Constitution, it refers to whoever presently holds that office — which means the advice power the clause vests is a live, current power, not one frozen in the hands of whoever exercised it last. On this reading, three Commissioners nominated by a predecessor Opposition Leader, for a parliamentary opposition configuration that no longer exists, cannot be taken to represent a bloc that never nominated them.

Bissember’s rebuttal to the “life tenure” argument is careful, and worth stating precisely. Article 161(6) imports the removal protections of Article 225 — a Commissioner “shall not be removed therefrom or suspended from the functions thereof” absent cause such as infirmity or misconduct. Defenders of the sitting Commissioners — Vincent Alexander, Charles Corbin, and Desmond Trotman, all APNU-nominated — cite this as an ironclad shield. Bissember’s answer is that the question is not removal at all. It is expiry. The appointments were made within, and for, a specific opposition configuration; when that configuration was reconfigured by the 2025 election and produced a new Leader of the Opposition, the basis on which the appointments rested came to an end on its own terms. Article 225 governs cause-based removal. It was never built to answer whether a mandate has simply run its course.

Bissember offers a test to sharpen the point: reverse the 2025 result. Had the WIN-led coalition instead formed the government, with Bharrat Jagdeo or President Ali holding the office of Leader of the Opposition, few would seriously argue that Commissioners nominated by a PPP predecessor should remain in their seats once the office had passed to another party entirely.

If permanence is the rule, it has to hold in both directions — not just the direction that happens to keep the current occupants in place.

THE QUESTION BISSEMBER’S OWN LOGIC DOES NOT ANSWER

Push that reversed scenario one step further than Bissember does, and it stops being a rhetorical device and starts exposing a real structural hole.

If the 2025 outcome had gone the other way — Mohamed elected President, Jagdeo or Ali installed as Leader of the Opposition — what, on Bissember’s own reasoning, happens to Alexander, Corbin, and Trotman?

Would Norton still be saying “no vacancy ” exists here ?

They could not remain opposition Commissioners. Their mandate, by Bissember’s own account, would have expired the moment the office passed to a Leader who never nominated them and owes their appointment nothing. But they could not become government Commissioners either. Article 161(3)(a) vests the three government-side seats in the President’s own deliberate judgment — a wholly separate appointment power, textually and procedurally distinct from the advice mechanism in 161(3)(b). Nothing in the Constitution allows a sitting opposition-nominated Commissioner to migrate seats when the political wind changes. There is no clause that converts an opposition nominee into a presidential appointee by operation of law.

So in the reversed scenario, on the very logic that says their mandate expired, Alexander, Corbin and Trotman would hold no seat on the Commission at all — not the one they were nominated to, which has expired, and not the other one, which they were never appointed to and have no constitutional path into.

That is the right answer as a matter of principle. It is also the answer nobody currently arguing this dispute — not Bissember, not GECOM’s own Chairperson, not the Secretariat’s statement issued this past week  — has actually operationalized. Expiry-in-principle is not the same as a mechanism that empties the seat.

Attorney  Ralph Ramkarran has come closest to naming the gap honestly: he argues Commissioners in this position ought, as a moral imperative and a matter of standard political practice, to resign when the nominating office changes hands. That is candidly not a constitutional compulsion. It is an appeal to conscience, offered precisely because no one has found a provision that does the job automatically.

Into that gap steps the argument actually being run today by the sitting Commissioners and their defenders: there is no vacancy, and without a vacancy, there is nothing for the President to appoint anyone to — regardless of whose theory of Article 161(3)(b) is correct. It does not matter, on this account, whether Alexander’s mandate expired in principle in September 2025. He has not resigned. No court has ordered his removal. No constitutional amendment has intervened. The seat, mechanically, is occupied, and occupied seats do not create vacancies by force of academic argument.

This is the trap Bissember’s framework — for all its textual discipline — has not yet escaped, and the trap the reversed-election hypothetical makes undeniable: a theory of expiry without an accompanying mechanism of vacation is not a resolution. It is a description of a problem, dressed as an answer to it.

GECOM’S ABSTENTION IS NOT NEUTRAL

This is precisely the terrain GECOM’s Secretariat chose to avoid entirely, framing its non-answer as a jurisdictional limit rather than a substantive position. The Commission says it cannot adjudicate the impasse. It does not say why an “impasse” exists in the first place, or acknowledge that its own inaction is what allows one side of that impasse — the incumbent, APNU-nominated Commissioners — to remain in place indefinitely, by default, without GECOM ever having to defend that outcome as correct.

This is not a hypothetical asymmetry. It is the operating reality right now. The Commission’s own Chairperson, Justice (ret’d) Claudette Singh, has previously taken a position closer to Bissember’s — that the Commission could not properly reconstitute itself on the opposition side until a new Leader of the Opposition was named and had submitted fresh nominees. The Secretariat’s statement yesterday does not engage that position, endorse it, or explain why it no longer governs. It simply declares the entire question outside GECOM’s remit.

A constitutional commission that will not say who is validly seated on it, while continuing to pay and convene those already seated, has not stayed neutral. It has chosen an outcome and called it an absence of one., 

THE SAME PATTERN, PLAYING OUT AGAIN ON SCRUTINEERS

The Secretariat’s statement did something similar, in miniature, on the scrutineer question. GECOM confirmed it is currently remunerating 69 scrutineers appointed by APNU+AFC, while WIN has separately submitted its own list of nominees for opposition scrutineer positions. The Secretariat was careful to say the existing arrangement should not be read as a determination that WIN is not entitled to representation — while simultaneously conceding that the Commission will, at some point, have to make a determination on the matter. It has not made one. In the meantime, the arrangement inherited from the prior opposition configuration continues to be funded and operated, exactly as with the Commissioners.

The Secretariat did rule on one narrower point: the Chief Election Officer has no independent authority to alter the existing scrutineer arrangement or implement WIN’s list unilaterally, because the CEO is, notwithstanding anything in any written law, subject to the direction and control of the Commission itself. That is a correct statement of the chain of authority. But it does not resolve anything — it simply relocates the unanswered question from the CEO’s desk to the Commission’s, where it has now sat, unresolved, through two separate public disputes on two separate questions, both governed by the same underlying constitutional logic about who a change in the Opposition Leader’s office actually displaces.

WHAT A CONCLUSIVE STATEMENT WOULD ACTUALLY REQUIRE

GECOM did not conclude the Article 161(3)(b) impasse yesterday. It described its own unwillingness to conclude it, and it did so in language crafted to sound procedural rather than consequential. But the consequence is real: every day the Secretariat treats this as a matter for the Opposition Leader and the President alone to sort out between themselves, Alexander, Corbin, and Trotman continue to sit as Commissioners on nominations from an opposition configuration that, on a serious and carefully argued constitutional reading, ceased to exist in September 2025.

Resolving this properly requires more than GECOM restating its own limits. It requires either the courts to settle whether Article 161(3)(b) contains an implied mechanism of expiry, Parliament to legislate one where the Constitution is silent, or the Commission itself — not merely its Secretariat — to take up the question it insists it cannot touch.

Until one of those things happens, GECOM’s Wednesday statement will stand not as a resolution, but as a record of the moment the Commission chose institutional convenience over the constitutional question actually before it.

— The Board

Ms. Afeefa Ally -what a wonderful Guyanese story

592 GUARDIAN♦ ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTERGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

Ms. Afeefa Ally –what a wonderful Guyanese story


OPINION BY; GHK LALL–August  2026

Hers is one of those great, big, feel good stories.  The achievement of Ms. Afeefa Ally brings a glow.  Of delight at her overachievement.  Splendidly done, Ms. Ally.  She now stands as a role model for others.  Through can do energy.  Becoming an inspiration for the challenged.  A standard of going forth and never looking back, never giving up.  Amid all the highfliers at this year’s CSEC rite of passage for Guyanese youths, Ms. Ally’s story is the one that will stay with me.  One that I will use as a reference, when I hear excuses.  When I see shrinking and complaining about all that is wrong with the world and unfair about life.

For me, Ms. Afeefa Ally’s seven subjects represent more than a hard-earned milestone.  It is a monument to determination and dedication.  At the risk of gross exaggeration, it is several times the number of subjects that she earned.  The stars aligned.  The system in the home came together, worked.  The support system in the school overperformed.  From teachers and friends.  From a 59-year-old grandmother to the daily journey to be back in a school again. 

A helping hand.  A comforting presence.  A familiar companion.  Too often, the worse that Guyana has to offer is on display.  Very quietly, this young lady toiled in the CSEC trenches and emerged smelling like a rare rose.  Seven Grade Ones, three grade twos.  Guyanese have every cause to be proud of her work ethic, her outstanding achievement against the odds.  Despite the hand that fate has dealt her. 

I am proud of Afeefa Ally.  Her achievement is Guyana’s achievement.  I feel like it is mine.

I would like to suggest that the Government of Guyana search for ways on how it could render a hand to her in this her now post CSEC years.  I wish there were more stories like hers.  Of the students from various indigenous communities, who rise above their environment of destitution and ever so often official depravity.  Of the children from broken or abusive homes, who tarried on relentlessly, and kept the midnight oil burning.  Of those hopefuls laboring in neighborhoods where the noise of the music peals to the equivalent of an atomic explosion, and where alcohol and other substances of unrestrained merriment are the order of the day and the long hours of the night. 

I can visualize the candle going down to its last flicker, and a head resting exhaustedly and uneasily on a small table so laden with books.  An age so suffused with hope.  Education for poor Guyanese is more than about the future.  It is about the richness of the oxygen that, at times, can be so difficult to encounter, then infinitely more of a struggle to inhale.

I love these kinds of stories.  The challenge for me is that they are so far apart.  A lonely trickle here, a lost episode in some forlorn corner of Guyana.  It is why they are cherished the more, and an Afeefa Ally stands as Guyana’s latest golden child.  Except that she is one that is different.  Numbers that are small in comparison.  An institution that is not usually among those hailed and heralded, that owns and controls the spotlight year after year.  From an area that is some distance from the busy, on the run, up in the clouds, metropolis.  

A separate word is due to her grandmotherIt is some sacrifice, those days.  In itself, one that I cannot remember coming across in my time here, or travels elsewhere.  At least, she could read, so she was in a position to help.  And help she did with a seemingly inexhaustible supply of patience, and something else. 

There has to be some love in there.  A deep, abiding, love.  We shall see this through together.  Ms. Afeefa Ally and her grandma did.  This is as grand as it gets.  There are still these types of Guyanese that inspire hope deep inside.

SIGMA’S IMPOSSIBLE TIMELINE:

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SIGMA’S IMPOSSIBLE TIMELINE:


How GWI’s Own Contracts Contradict Sigma Engineers’ Sworn Public Denial

OPINION BY: Staff Writer –August 2026

Guyana Water Incorporated and Sigma Engineers Ltd Inc cannot both be telling the truth. That is not editorializing — it is arithmetic. GWI’s own public statement, its own signed contracts, and its own Facebook page place Sigma Engineers on the receiving end of government water infrastructure contracts beginning October 13, 2022 — seven days after the company was incorporated. Sigma’s public rebuttal, delivered through counsel and threatening legal action against Opposition Leader Azruddin Mohamed, insists the company’s first Guyanese contract was not awarded until 2026.

Both statements cannot stand. The documentary record, obtained and cross-verified by The 592 Guardian, resolves the contradiction — and it does not resolve in Sigma’s favor.

THE CLAIM SIGMA MADE

Responding to Mohamed’s allegations, Sigma Engineers issued a statement rejecting what it called “serious misrepresentations of the facts” and confirming it had retained legal counsel to pursue action. On the specific question of timing, Sigma’s statement was unambiguous: the company denied Mohamed’s claim that it was established just five working days before receiving a government contract, and stated instead that its Guyana-registered entity — properly incorporated on October 6, 2022 — did not receive its first Guyanese contract until 2026, following competitive bidding through the National Procurement and Tender Administration Board (NPTAB).

Sigma further confirmed that Mohamed Aqtar Ali, brother of President Irfaan Ali, is engaged by its Guyana operation as a “senior technical consultant,” while denying he holds any affiliation with the company’s Bangladesh parent.

WHAT THE PAPER TRAIL ACTUALLY SHOWS

The 592 Guardian has obtained the Certificate of Incorporation for Sigma Engineers L.T.D. Inc — Company No. 13572, incorporated under Guyana’s Companies Act on October 6, 2022, with M. Tamjeed Rahmaan listed as sole incorporator, director and secretary. We have also obtained the underlying GWI contract, its governing addendum, and the NPTA Board Approval letters covering every major water-sector award Sigma has received since.

Contract No. GWI 2022/43430 — the procurement of plant design, supply and installation of water treatment facilities for Lot 3 (Caledonia, Cummings Lodge and Bachelor’s Adventure, Region 4) — is dated October 13, 2022. That is seven days after Sigma’s incorporation, not four years, and the contract explicitly states it was entered into via international competitive bidding under NPTAB, the very process Sigma’s statement credits for its supposed first award.

The contract was subsequently amended by Addendum 2, dated February 29, 2024, raising the total contract sum from GYD $3,697,274,857 to GYD $3,951,992,986 under Variation Order No. 1 — a document bearing the signature of M. Tamjeed Rahmaan himself, accepting the change order on behalf of the contractor.  

The same individual named as Sigma’s sole director personally signed contract paperwork in 2024 — two years before the company’s public claim that no such contract existed.

 

THE FULL CONTRACT RECORD

GWI’s public statement, issued in response to Mohamed’s allegations, credited Sigma with a run of contracts across the water sector: Lot 3, the Hope Surface Water Treatment Plant, the Shelter Belt rehabilitation, a well-drilling programme, and the CDB-financed Leguan and Wakenaam facilities. The National Procurement and Tender Administration Board’s own award letters confirm each of these in turn.

Contract Awarded Value (GYD) Source Document
Lot 3 — Caledonia, Cummings Lodge, Bachelor’s Adventure Oct 13, 2022 $3,951,992,986* GWI 2022/43430 + Addendum 2
Hope Surface Water Treatment Plant (Lot 1) Nov 29, 2024 $3,569,315,208 NPTA Ref 133/2024/45 Ret
CDB Lot 2 — Leguan & Wakenaam Oct 28, 2024 $1,486,448,800 CDB Contract Agreement
Wells — Friendship, Westminster, Shelter Belt, Melanie Damishana n/a (bid comparison $411,600,000 GWI statement, Aug 2026
Shelter Belt Rehabilitation & Expansion Dec 31, 2025 $2,439,894,525 NPTA Ref 154/2025/45

*Amended sum reflecting Variation Order No. 1 (Feb 2024); original contract sum was GYD $3,697,274,857.

Summed together, these five contracts total approximately GYD $11.86 billion — closely approaching the figure of more than $12 billion that Mohamed cited in his original allegations, a figure Sigma’s statement did not directly address.

GWI’S OWN OFFICIALS, ON THE RECORD

GWI Chief Executive Officer Shaik Baksh has publicly defended the award process itself, stating that Sigma secured its contracts through international tenders and was the lowest responsive bidder on several projects. Asked about Aqtar Ali’s involvement, Baksh was direct: “So far as GWI is concerned, he was never a figure.”

That statement addresses procurement influence. It does not address — and GWI’s own institutional Facebook page undercuts — the question of who has actually been photographed standing beside Sigma’s crews at completed GWI facilities. GWI’s official account posted images of Baksh posing with Sigma’s on-site staff at the newly constructed Cummings Lodge plant, captioned: “The New Cummings Lodge Water Treatment Plant was constructed by Sigma Engineering Ltd at a cost of GYD $1.3 billion, with a team comprising of several Guyanese staff.” The cost figure in that caption — $1.3 billion — closely matches the $1,304,444,724 final contract price for Cummings Lodge confirmed in the signed change-order documents obtained by this publication. The claim of “several Guyanese staff,” however, is not visually supported by the photograph GWI itself chose to publish alongside it.

GWI CEO with Sigma staff

SIGMA’S NARROWING DEFENSE

Sigma’s position, as relayed through its attorneys, has narrowed since its initial public statement. Rather than continuing to deny the existence of earlier contracts outright, Sigma’s lawyer has maintained — per reporting citing the correspondence — that the locally incorporated Sigma Engineers Ltd Inc has received only one contract since its 2022 registration: a contract for rehabilitation of GWI’s Shelter Belt facility, which Sigma places in 2026.

The NPTAB’s own award letter for that project is dated December 31, 2025 — not 2026 — narrowing, though not eliminating, the discrepancy in Sigma’s timeline. That letter names the awardee “Sigma Engineers Ltd Inc.” By contrast, NPTA’s November 2024 award letter for the Hope plant names the awardee simply “Sigma Engineers Ltd” — no “Inc.” Whether this inconsistency in NPTA’s own paperwork reflects two distinct corporate entities, or simply administrative imprecision, has not been established.

What can be established is that NPTA treats both awards as going to the same contractor: identical CEO addressee, identical board chairman, identical procurement process.

If Sigma intends to argue that a technical corporate distinction — Ltd versus Ltd Inc — separates the entity that signed the 2022 Lot 3 contract from the entity now facing public scrutiny, that argument has not yet been made explicitly, and it does not appear to account for M. Tamjeed Rahmaan’s personal signature on 2024 contract paperwork under the Sigma Engineers name.

WHAT REMAINS UNRESOLVED

Aqtar Ali has separately denied, through his attorney, being a director or shareholder in any company named by Mohamed, and has threatened defamation proceedings over public statements made about him. Sigma has confirmed Aqtar Ali’s role as a senior technical consultant to its Guyana operation without detailing when he was engaged or on what terms. None of the documents obtained by this publication place Aqtar Ali’s name on Sigma’s corporate filings, which list Rahmaan alone as incorporator, director and secretary.

What the documentary record does establish, without need for inference, is this: Sigma Engineers held a signed, NPTAB-tendered government water contract within seven days of its Guyana incorporation in October 2022 — not, as the company’s public statement claimed, four years later in 2026. GWI’s own contracts, GWI’s own change orders, GWI’s own NPTA award letters, and GWI’s own Facebook page all place that timeline beyond dispute.            Sigma Engineers’ public statement to the contrary is not merely mistaken.

Measured against the documents its own director signed, it is not true.

— The Board

The Sigma File: A Bangladesh Shell, a Billion-Dollar Water Contract, and the President’s Brother

592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

The Sigma File: A Bangladesh Shell, a Billion-Dollar Water Contract,and the President’s Brother


By: Staff Writer — The 592 Guardian– August 2026

Certificate of Incorporation Oct. 6 2022

On October 6, 2022, a company called Sigma Engineers L.T.D. Inc was born in Guyana. Its Certificate of Incorporation, filed with the Registrar of Companies, lists Company No. 13572. Its sole director, secretary, and incorporator was a single man: M. Tamjeed Rahmaan, of 225 F New Market Street, North Cummingsburg, Georgetown.

Seven days later, on October 13, 2022, that one-man company signed a contract with the Government of Guyana worth GYD $3,697,274,857 — nearly US$17.7 million — to design, supply, and install water treatment facilities across three communities in Region Four.

Sigma Engineers had no prior operating history in Guyana. It had existed, on paper, for a week.

Today, that contract has grown to nearly GYD $4 billion. Its Guyana registered address is the same building that houses Gaico Construction, one of the most favored contractors of the Irfaan Ali administration. Its Bangladesh-based parent company faces an unresolved corruption case in its home country, filed by that country’s Anti-Corruption Commission, naming the same men who founded the firm that now builds Guyana’s public water infrastructure. And the President’s own brother, Mohamed Aqtar Ali, sits inside the company as a paid consultant — a fact Sigma disclosed only after being publicly accused, and only in the barest possible terms.

This is the paper trail.

I. Seven Days

Notice of Change of Directors May 28 2024

The corporate filings are unambiguous. Sigma Engineers L.T.D. Inc — Company No. 13572 — was incorporated under Guyana’s Companies Act on October 6, 2022. The Notice of Directors and Notice of Secretary, both dated the same day, list one name for every statutory role: M. Tamjeed Rahmaan. Director. Secretary. Incorporator. All at once, all one man, at a residential address in North Cummingsburg.

 

There is nothing illegal about a single-director company. But single-director companies do not, as a rule, win nine-figure state infrastructure contracts within days of coming into existence — unless something about that company’s backing was already known to the people awarding the contract.

The contract in question — GWI 2022/43430, “Procurement of Plant Design, Supply and Installation of Water Treatment Facilities,” tendered as International Competitive Bid No. GWI-GoG-W067-2022 through the National Procurement and Tender Administration Board — was a genuine, publicly advertised tender. Bids closed August 9, 2022. Sigma was awarded Lot 3: water treatment plants for Caledonia, Cummings Lodge, and Bachelor’s Adventure, all in Region Four.

The agreement was signed October 13, 2022. Sigma Engineers L.T.D. Inc had been a legal entity in Guyana for exactly one week.

Addendum to original contract from Oct 13 2022

 

The listed “official address” for the contractor on that agreement is not in Georgetown at all. It is 239–240 Madrasa Road, Tazpur, Ashulia, Savar, Dhaka-1341, Bangladesh — the compound address of Sigma Group, the Bangladeshi engineering conglomerate founded in 1985 by three men: Syed Arshed Reza, Md. Mizanur Rahman, and Syed Md. Kamal. The Guyana entity, in other words, was never really a Guyanese company transacting with a foreign parent. It was, from day one, a local shell wearing the paperwork of incorporation, with the actual contracting party’s real address printed in black and white on the government’s own contract.

II.The Bill Keeps Growing, the Deadlines Keep Slipping

The original contract price was GYD $3,697,274,857. By February 2024, Addendum 2 raised it to GYD $3,951,992,986 — an increase of G$254,718,129 under “Variation Order No. 1.”

The increase was not evenly spread. Two of the three plants actually came in under their original estimates: Caledonia’s price fell by roughly $53.1 million, Cummings Lodge’s by roughly $58.4 million. The entire net increase, and then some, was loaded onto a single plant — Bachelor’s Adventure — which rose by $366.2 million.

The project’s own contractual terms called for completion within 24 months: effective November 10, 2022, with a project end date of November 9, 2024.

None of the three plants met that deadline.

Caledonia was commissioned in January 2025 — roughly two months late.

Cummings Lodge was commissioned October 19, 2025, with President Ali personally in attendance — nearly a year late.

Bachelor’s Adventure, the plant that absorbed almost the entire cost increase, has no confirmed commissioning date in the public record as of this writing — more than 20 months past its own original deadline.

The plant that cost the most extra money is also the plant that has taken the longest, with no public accounting yet for why.

III. A Recruitment Licence That Recruited No One

In February 2024 — the same month the GWI contract’s price was being revised upward — a separate story surfaced. A letter from Guyana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, dated February 5, 2024, authorized Sigma Engineers Ltd. Inc to recruit healthcare workers from Bangladesh, reportedly for as many as 500 positions.

The Ministry’s public explanation, when the letter leaked, was that the authorization was issued at Sigma’s own request, framed as a regulatory safeguard against trafficking and improper labor processing amid a genuine health-sector staffing crisis. The Private Sector Commission had been lobbying government for help with skills shortages across health, construction, engineering, and services.

The government later confirmed something else: not a single healthcare worker was ever actually recruited through this authorization. Guyana’s medical shortages continued to be addressed through existing bilateral arrangements, chiefly Cuban medical personnel.

So a license was issued, in the health sector, at a company’s own request — and it produced nothing. Meanwhile, that same company’s engineering contract, in an entirely different sector, continued to operate using labour that appears — on the evidence below — to have come from the same country the healthcare authorization was meant to cover.

IV. Who Is Actually Building Guyana’s Water Plants?

GWI Ceo Shaik Baksh with Sigma’s staff

In late 2024, Guyana Water Incorporated posted photographs to its own official Facebook page of GWI’s CEO, Shaik Baksh, posing with the construction crew at the New Cummings Lodge Water Treatment Plant.

The post’s caption is direct: “The New Cummings Lodge Water Treatment Plant was constructed by Sigma Engineering Ltd at a cost of GYD $1.3 billion, with a team comprising of several Guyanese staff.”

The $1.3 billion figure in that caption lines up closely with the $1,304,444,724 total contract price recorded for Cummings Lodge in the project’s own change-order documentation — confirming this photograph documents the same plant tracked in the contract paper trail above.

The photograph itself shows more than two dozen workers in matching Sigma-branded uniforms, standing behind Baksh as he shakes hands with another man in a dark suit. Every visible member of that crew — with the sole exception of Baksh and one other man in Western business attire — appears South Asian.

GWI’s own caption asserts the team comprised “several Guyanese staff.” Nobody visibly identifiable as Guyanese appears in the photograph GWI selected to illustrate that claim.

A second set of photographs, obtained separately, shows a similarly large Sigma crew — again uniformly South Asian in appearance — posed in front of completed water storage tanks at what appears to be the same or a comparable Region Four site. Two men in business suits are pictured with the group.

Sigma staff in front of a Water Treatment Plant

Taken together, these are not opposition talking points. One set of images comes from GWI’s own institutional Facebook page, captioned by GWI itself, with GWI’s own CEO physically present and smiling for the camera. If the workforce building a billion-dollar public water plant was substantially foreign, GWI’s own communications team photographed it, published it, and then wrote a caption claiming otherwise.

V. The Legal Question GWI’s Photo Raises

Guyana’s work permit regime, administered through the Ministry of Home Affairs, requires labour market testing: an employer seeking to bring in foreign workers must demonstrate that the positions cannot be filled by Guyanese nationals. Guyana’s Local Content Act further identifies 40 ring-fenced sub-sectors — including engineering, consulting, and professional/technical services — where local hiring and content requirements apply, and the government has stated publicly that it is stepping up enforcement against companies “rotating foreign workers to circumvent local hiring obligations or evading local content mandates.”

It should be noted precisely: Guyana’s Local Content Certificate regime, administered by the Local Content Secretariat under the Ministry of Natural Resources, is scoped specifically to the petroleum sector — it does not directly govern a water-utility contract like Sigma’s GWI agreement. The applicable framework here is the general work permit and labor market testing process, not the oil-and-gas-specific LCC.

That distinction does not weaken the underlying question — it sharpens it. Sigma’s only publicly documented authorization to import foreign labour was the February 2024 Ministry of Foreign Affairs letter — and that letter covered healthcare workers, not construction or engineering labour, and produced zero actual recruits.

If the workforce photographed at the Cummings Lodge plant was substantially Bangladeshi, as GWI’s own photograph suggests, the relevant question is straightforward: under what authorization, and with what labour market testing, did that workforce enter and work in Guyana? No public record answers that question. GWI’s own caption — asserting Guyanese participation that its own photograph does not show — does not answer it either.

VI . The Bangladesh File

Sigma Group’s roots run to 1985, when Syed Arshed Reza, Md. Mizanur Rahman, and Syed Md. Kamal founded Sigma Engineers as a partnership of three engineers in Dhaka. The firm grew into Bangladesh’s dominant water infrastructure contractor — deep tube wells, water treatment plants, later power generation and heavy civil works. It has a legitimate, audited financing history: World Bank-linked IPFF facility records show Sigma Engineers Ltd received commercial bank loans in 2016–17 for water treatment plants in the Comilla and Adamjee export processing zones, audited without qualification.

But the same company’s leadership also faces an unresolved corruption case in its home country.

On October 21, 2020, Bangladesh’s Anti-Corruption Commission filed a case against eleven people — eight engineers of the Bangladesh Water Development Board, and three Sigma Engineers Limited executives: Chairman Syed Arshed Reza, Managing Director Syed Md Kamal, and General Manager Abdus Salam. The allegation: the accused misappropriated Tk 34.42 crore — more than US$3 million at the time — through the procurement of water pumps for the Kashimpur Pump House Rehabilitation, under the Manu River Irrigation Project. BWDB engineers allegedly paid Sigma Tk 61.60 crore for pumps valued at Tk 34.42 crore less than that.

A single BWDB engineer had formed a one-member evaluation committee and recommended Sigma for the work without consulting outside experts. The underlying investigation had been running since 2019, a year before charges were filed — this was not a rushed or politically opportunistic filing.

Syed Arshed Reza and Syed Md Kamal are the same two men identified as founders of the Sigma Group entity now operating in Guyana.

No public record establishes the current status of that Bangladesh case whether it proceeded to trial, was dismissed, or remains pending

It should be treated, honestly, as an unresolved allegation against named individuals, not a proven or closed matter. But it is a documented fact that Sigma’s own leadership, in its home jurisdiction, is on record facing a criminal case alleging exactly the kind of single-evaluator, inflated-price contracting irregularity that Guyanese authorities do not appear to have asked about before handing that same leadership’s Guyana entity a nearly $4 billion water contract.

VII. 225 New Market Street

Sigma’s registered Guyana address — 225 New Market Street, North Cummingsburg, Georgetown — is not an obscure residential lot. It is the headquarters of Gaico Construction & General Services Inc., one of the most consistently favoured contractors of the current administration. Gaico’s own public listings confirm the address as its head office, the “GAICO Construction Building.”

Gaico’s recent contract history speaks for itself: a $3.3 billion award for its lot of the New Parika Modern Port Facility in 2025 — the largest of three lots let — and a subcontracted role in the $865 million Belle Vue project, brought in by the original contractor after the fact in an arrangement that drew pointed questions from opposition MPs in Parliament this past February.

No evidence has yet surfaced of a direct joint venture, shared contract, or ownership link between Sigma and Gaico. The confirmed fact is narrower and still worth stating plainly: a Bangladesh-linked company that won a billion-dollar state contract one week after incorporation is registered at the same physical address as Guyana’s most prominently favoured domestic contractor.

Whether that reflects a formal business relationship, an accommodation arrangement, or something GWI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs never thought to ask about, remains an open question — and one worth putting to both companies directly.

VIII. The President’s Brother, Undisclosed Until Accused

In August 2026, Opposition Leader Azruddin Mohamed publicly alleged that Sigma Engineers was connected to Mohamed Aqtar Ali — the brother of President Irfaan Ali — and challenged the company’s account of its own establishment and government contracts.

Sigma’s response, reported by HGP Nightly News, was to reject the allegations as “serious misrepresentations,” announce it had engaged legal counsel, and threaten “appropriate legal action.” In the same statement, Sigma confirmed — for the first time publicly — that Mohamed Aqtar Ali is engaged by Sigma Engineers Limited Incorporated in Guyana as a “senior technical consultant.” The company offered no further detail: no date of engagement, no description of his responsibilities, no terms of compensation. It stated only that he has “no affiliation” with Sigma’s Bangladesh entity.

The family relationship is not in dispute; it is a matter of public record. What is notable is the sequence: Sigma disclosed the President’s brother’s role inside the company only after being publicly accused of concealing it, and even then disclosed the barest fact of his employment without any of the specifics that would let the public assess what that role actually involves.

Sigma’s rebuttal also contains a claim that does not survive contact with the documents underlying this story. The company told HGP that, despite its October 2022 Guyana registration, its “first contract” in Guyana was not awarded until 2026 — roughly four years later — via national competitive bidding through NPTAB. The contract examined throughout this piece — GWI 2022/43430, Lot 3 — is dated October 13, 2022. It is not a 2026 contract. It is not Sigma’s first Guyana contract by four years’ delay; it is Sigma’s first Guyana contract, full stop, and it was signed one week after the company existed.

That is not a matter of interpretation. It is a conflict between what Sigma told the Guyanese public, under the shadow of a legal threat, and what the government’s own contract documents say.

What Remains Unanswered

This investigation does not claim to have proven a conspiracy. It documents a paper trail, and the trail raises questions that neither Sigma, GWI, nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has yet answered on the public record:

 Why was a single-director company with no operating history awarded a nearly $4 billion state contract within seven days of its incorporation?

What labour market testing, if any, was conducted before the workforce photographed at the Cummings Lodge plant — a workforce that appears substantially foreign — was brought into the country, given that the only publicly documented import authorization Sigma held was for healthcare workers, not engineering labour?

 Why does GWI’s own published caption claim “several Guyanese staff” on a project photograph that shows none?

Did GWI or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs know, at the time of contracting or authorization, that Sigma’s named Bangladesh leadership faced an unresolved Anti-Corruption Commission case in their home country?

 What is the nature of the relationship, if any, between Sigma’s Guyana registration and Gaico Construction, whose headquarters Sigma shares as its registered address?

What, specifically, does Mohamed Aqtar Ali do for Sigma Engineers, when did that engagement begin, and what is he paid?

Sigma has said it wants public discourse “based on accurate and verifiable information.” This piece is built from nothing else: a certificate of incorporation, a signed contract, a change order, a Ministry letter, a foreign anti-corruption filing, and photographs GWI published itself. The company, and the government agencies that contracted with it, now have the documents in front of them. The 592 Guardian has put the same questions to Sigma Engineers ♦GWI  the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will publish any response in full.

The 592 Guardian will continue to track this story. Readers with additional documentation — contracts, work permit records, or employment data relevant to Sigma Engineers’ Guyana operations — are invited to contact the editor directly.

The Chairman’s Denial: Paul Cheong’s Own LinkedIn Contradicts His Sworn Claim on L’Heureuse

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The Chairman’s Denial: Paul Cheong’s Own LinkedIn Contradicts His Sworn Claim on L’Heureuse

OPINION BY: Staff Writer –August 2026

GuySuCo CEO sues Opposition Leader for defamation over a road-contract conflict-of-interest claim — while his own professional profile lists him as Chairman of the very company he says he has no role in

Dr. Paul Cheong, Chief Executive Officer of the Guyana Sugar Corporation (GuySuCo), has filed suit in the High Court of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Demerara, against Opposition Leader Azruddin Mohamed, seeking upward of $10 million in damages and an injunction against further publication over a Facebook video posted on August 11, 2026. In his Statement of Claim, Cheong swears he is “not the owner of L’Heureuse Construction Services or L’Heureuse Construction Services Inc.” and that he holds “no ownership, management or decision-making role” in the company. This publications  own review of the public record complicates that sworn position.

THE ALLEGATION THAT TRIGGERED THE SUIT

Mohamed’s video linked Cheong to L’Heureuse in connection with a $6.8 billion bid submitted under a $121 billion, seventeen-lot national road tender — the Parika-to-Versailles four-lane highway among them — and questioned the propriety of a sitting state-corporation chief executive holding an interest in a company competing for government road works.

L’Heureuse itself issued a public statement on August 11 denying that Cheong holds any ownership, management, or decision-making role in the company, and noting it was incorporated on August 11, 2017. Cheong’s subsequent Statement of Claim, filed August 17, tracks that denial closely: he says he has never bid on or been awarded a government road contract.

WHAT THE COMPANY’S OWN DIRECTORS SAY ABOUT THEMSELVES

This publication reviewed the LinkedIn profiles maintained by Paul Cheong and by Marvin Cheong, who is publicly listed as an officer of L’Heureuse.

Both are self-authored, current professional profiles — not third-party claims, and not statements attributed to Mohamed or to this news outlet .

Paul (Christopher) Cheong’s LinkedIn headline reads: “Chariman at Lheureuse Construction and Services Inc.” [sic]. It is listed as his current position, above a separate line identifying him with the Private Sector Commission of Guyana.

Marvin Cheong’s LinkedIn headline reads: “Managing director at L’Heureuse Construction and Services Inc.” — also listed as a current position, under the “Experience” heading with the title “Managing director.”

Chairman and Managing Director are governance and management titles, by definition — the very categories Paul Cheong’s sworn claim disavows.

Chairman and Managing Director are, on their face, management and governance titles. That places Paul Cheong’s own self-description in direct tension with the specific language of his Statement of Claim — not with the broader, separately unresolved question of who owns L’Heureuse’s shares, but narrowly with his sworn assertion that he has “no ownership, management or decision-making role” in the company.

WHAT THIS EVIDENCE DOES AND DOES NOT ESTABLISH

This publication draws a firm line here. A LinkedIn title is not a shareholder register, and it is not proof of who actually controls or benefits from L’Heureuse Construction and Services Inc. The claim, circulating separately, that Marvin Cheong — listed as the company’s owner of record — is fronting for his father is a distinct allegation this newsroom  has not independently verified through company registry filings, and it is treated here as such: unverified. What is verified, because it is self-published and current, is that both Paul and Marvin Cheong publicly describe themselves as holding management roles at the same company at the same time that Paul Cheong has sworn in a Statement of Claim that he holds no such role.

The company’s public documented work includes the roundabout and dual carriageway on the Schoonord-to-Crane four-lane highway, running north from the roundabout to within roughly ten metres of the A Line concrete bridge. That segment’s defects-liability period expired August 29, 2024, and the company has maintained the pavement remains in good condition — a claim that bears directly on Mohamed’s assertion, made in the video that prompted the suit, that the road is already deteriorating.

WHY IT MATTERS

Guyana’s state corporations sit at the centre of the country’s oil-era procurement boom, and the credibility of their leadership rests on a clean separation between public office and private contracting interest. A defamation suit is Cheong’s legal right, and Mohamed will have to substantiate his claims before a court under the ordinary rules of evidence. But when a plaintiff’s own sworn pleading and his own public professional profile point in different directions on the narrow question of what role he holds in the company at issue, that contradiction belongs in the public record alongside the litigation — regardless of how the underlying ownership dispute is ultimately resolved.

This newsroom  will continue to track the proceedings, any response Cheong’s attorneys file addressing the LinkedIn discrepancy, and any registry documentation that speaks to the actual ownership structure of L’Heureuse Construction and Services Inc.

— The Board

Two Nominees, Two Other Jobs

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 Two Nominees, Two Other Jobs

OPINION BY : Staff Writer– August 2026

The President’s picks for the Judicial Service Commission and the Public Service Commission each already hold a second post close enough to the first to demand an answer before confirmation, not after.

T wo of the President’s nominees to Guyana’s constitutional commissions arrive already carrying another job — and in both cases, the second job sits close enough to the first to raise the kind of question that ought to be answered before either appointment is finalised, not after.

Retired Justice Carl Singh has been proposed for reappointment to the Judicial Service Commission, the body that expired on July 13 and that the President is now moving to reconstitute under Article 198(2). Singh is a natural pick on paper — a former Chancellor of the Judiciary, credentialed and well known to the institution.

“He is also, at this moment, the sitting Chairman of the Constitutional Reform Commission, appointed to that post by President Ali and sworn in alongside seventeen other commissioners in April 2024.”

The overlap is not cosmetic. The JSC’s own composition is built around the Chancellorship: by constitutional design, the Chancellor chairs the Commission, the Chief Justice sits on it, and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission sits on it as well.

A retired Chancellor joining that body is not an outsider being added to an unrelated panel — he is stepping into the specific institutional lineage the JSC was built to run through. That alone might be unremarkable, given Singh’s background. What makes it worth a second look is that Singh simultaneously chairs the body Guyana convened specifically to review and recommend changes to the machinery of constitutional appointments — including, potentially, the very judicial appointment provisions the JSC operates under. One man sitting at the head of both the commission that might reform the rules and the commission that operates under them is not evidence of wrongdoing.

It is, at minimum, a structural question about whether reform recommendations touching judicial appointments can be seen as arriving independently of the people who currently sit inside that system.

The Constitutional Reform Commission has itself struggled for legitimacy on unrelated grounds — the Guyana Human Rights Association called for Singh and the full membership to resign last September, citing the commission’s inertia and the shifted political landscape since its 2024 swearing-in. Singh has publicly acknowledged the commission’s sluggish pace, attributing it to administrative delay rather than institutional design.

Whatever the merits of that defence, it does not touch the separate question raised by his JSC nomination: whether the same person should simultaneously hold the chairmanship of the body reviewing the constitutional order and a seat inside the judicial body that order currently produces.

The second nomination raises a cleaner conflict. Maurice Gajadhar has been proposed for the Public Service Commission, the body responsible under Article 200 for appointments, discipline and removal across Guyana’s public service. Gajadhar is also, and has been since 2020, Chairman of the Board of Guyana Power and Light — a state-owned corporation, and not a small one.

That chairmanship already produced a public conflict-of-interest controversy on Gajadhar’s watch. In 2021, GPL purchased two vehicles from Rudisa Motor Company Guyana Inc., a company for which Gajadhar serves as Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer. Former-Public Infrastructure Minister David Patterson called it plainly: “That is a clear conflict of interest.” GPL’s response at the time did not deny the transaction — it defended the purchase as having gone through a National Competitive Bidding Process, which addresses the procurement mechanics without addressing the more basic problem: a state corporation buying vehicles from a company run by its own board chairman is a conflict irrespective of how the invoice was generated. Gajadhar was still chairing the GPL board as recently as February of this year, when he led a board inspection of the utility’s new National Control Centre.

To be precise about the shape of the concern: the Public Service Commission does not regulate GPL directly. Its Article 200 jurisdiction runs to the public service — the civil service proper — not to the governance of state-owned commercial entities, so this is not a case of Gajadhar being asked to police his own corporation from a new perch. The more grounded question is one of fitness. The PSC exists to safeguard the integrity of appointments and discipline across the public service; it is difficult to square that mandate with elevating a nominee whose own record as a public-corporation chairman includes a documented, publicly contested instance of exactly the kind of self-dealing the Commission is meant to guard against elsewhere in the state.

Neither of these facts, on its own, disqualifies either man. Guyana is a small country with a shallow bench of people credentialed enough to fill these seats, and some overlap between public roles is close to unavoidable. But “unavoidable in general” is not the same as “unexamined in this instance,” and nothing in the correspondence between Minister Teixeira and Opposition Leader Mohamed — nor in the Opposition’s brief, non-committal acknowledgments of the nominees — indicates that either overlap was raised, let alone resolved, before the names went forward.

The Opposition Leader’s responses to date have noted the nominees and their curricula vitae without expressly endorsing or objecting to either. That may still be the right posture while the record is incomplete. But it should not be the final posture.

Before Mohamed’s office signs off on Singh for the JSC or Gajadhar for the PSC, both men’s dual roles deserve a direct question, asked and answered on the record: what happens to the other seat if this one is confirmed. A commission built to guard against exactly this kind of overlap should not be the one asking Guyanese to take it on faith.

— The Board

The Vendor and the Verdict

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The Vendor and the Verdict


BOARD EDITORIAL– August, 2026

How the President Built New Markets, Then Blamed Citizens for Leaving Them

There is a particular kind of dishonesty that does not lie about facts. It lies about sequence. It takes something a government did, something a government failed to do, and something a citizen was forced to do in between — and rearranges the order until the citizen looks like the author of their own hardship.

This week, President Irfaan Ali performed that rearrangement in public, on camera, at a national press conference, and called it an explanation of the cost of living.

The claim, stated plainly, was this: Guyanese families are increasingly shopping in supermarkets and eating in restaurants rather than buying in traditional markets and cooking at home, and this shift in “consumer behaviour” is a meaningful contributor to what households are paying. The same sweet potato, cassava and plantain a family once bought in the market, he said, is now being bought under a supermarket roof — at a margin he attributes to overheads the supermarket, not the shopper, decided to carry.

Set beside that claim, and delivered by the same man in the same season, is a second set of facts that the government itself put into the public record. The administration is expanding the Model Village Initiative’s market infrastructure across multiple regions. In Skeldon, Region Six, the President personally announced an upgraded, modernised market as part of a wider community redevelopment plan. At the same cost-of-living press conference in which he diagnosed “changing consumer behaviour” as part of the problem, he also floated expanding direct farmer-to-consumer markets — a proposal that only makes sense as policy if the diagnosis is that people need better markets to shop in, not that they made a lifestyle error by leaving the old ones.

You do not fund the vendor and indict the customer in the same breath.

THE CONTRADICTION, STATED PRECISELY

A government cannot coherently hold three positions at once: that Guyana is modernising and prospering, that citizens are choosing supermarkets and restaurants because a modernising and prospering country makes those choices available, and that the same citizens are somehow responsible for the price consequences of choices the government spent years telling them to make with pride.

If the shift to supermarkets is evidence of rising national prosperity — which is precisely how this administration has narrated its own economic record for four years — then it cannot simultaneously be recast as a lapse in judgment when the bill comes due.            Prosperity narrated upward cannot be blamed downward.

Vendors at Stabroek Market

Nor can the market-infrastructure investment be reconciled with the consumer-behaviour framing without contradiction. If the government’s own analysis is that people have drifted from markets toward supermarkets and that drift is inflating what they pay, the coherent policy response is to make markets more attractive, more accessible, and more competitive — which is, to its credit, precisely what the Skeldon upgrade and the farmer-to-consumer market proposal represent.

But a government that is simultaneously building the very infrastructure meant to solve a problem cannot, in the same set of remarks, tell the public that the problem is theirs for having created it. Either the market system needs state investment because it was failing people, or people made a cultural error by leaving it.

It cannot be both, and the government’s own capital programme concedes which one is true.

WHAT A CITIZEN IN BOURDA MARKET ACTUALLY EXPERIENCES

The test of any economic claim is whether it survives contact with the person it is supposedly describing. A person shopping in Bourda Market paying for bora does not experience inflation differently because another person, three miles away, is buying the same bora under an air conditioner.

Vendors at Stabroek Market

A family cooking seven nights a week does not escape the price of plantain by virtue of never once entering a restaurant. A pensioner living on a fixed income does not defeat rising costs by refusing supermarkets he was never shopping in to begin with.                      The cost-of-living complaint was never limited to supermarket shoppers. It has come from vendors, from market shoppers, from pensioners, from people who have never set foot in an air-conditioned aisle — which is itself the evidence that the diagnosis offered does not fit the complaint being answered.

This is where the President’s own account becomes most useful to the case against it. He did not stop at consumer behaviour. He went further, and in going further, he handed the public the actual explanation: farmers, he said, are receiving one price. Consumers are paying a substantially higher one. Retailers, in his own words, are imposing what he characterised as excessive mark-ups between the two.

That is not a story about culture. That is a story about a supply chain in which someone, somewhere between the farm gate and the checkout counter, is extracting more than the system can bear — and the government’s own considered response, floated in the same breath, is to expand direct farmer-to-consumer markets specifically to shorten that chain.

PERSONAL FINANCE IS NOT PUBLIC POLICY

No serious person disputes that individual households make choices, some wiser than others. There are families who overspend. There are shoppers who pay for convenience. There always have been, and there always will be, in every economy on earth. But a national cost-of-living crisis, sustained across years, touching pensioners, market vendors, contract workers and salaried professionals alike, is not explained by aggregating personal budgeting decisions.

It is explained by policy: by what a government has and has not done about supply chains, mark-ups, transportation costs, production incentives and market access. Conflating the two is not an analytical error. It is a convenience — one that transforms citizens from people bearing the weight of economic pressure into people accused of having invited it.

A national cost-of-living problem is public policy. Rebranding it as a cultural habit is how a government excuses itself from answering for it.

THE RECORD THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT TALK AROUND

The administration wants credit — and has, in other contexts, earned some — for the subsidies, VAT removals and freight support it has extended over the past several budget cycles. That record exists and this publication has not disputed it. But that same record is precisely what makes the culture-blaming framing indefensible.

A government that boasts, correctly, that it has spent billions cushioning households from global price shocks cannot then turn around and describe the persistence of high prices as a matter of where people choose to shop.

 

Either the structural interventions have not been sufficient to solve the mark-up problem the President himself identified, in which case the honest answer is to say so and account for why, or the interventions have worked and the residual pressure genuinely is structural — the farm-gate-to-shelf mark-up — in which case the honest answer is to say that plainly and explain what enforcement or market-expansion measures are coming, and by when.

What the public does not need, and should not be asked to accept, is a shifting explanation that praises modernisation when it is politically convenient and blames the modernised consumer when the price data becomes politically inconvenient. A President who campaigns on a “world class nation” and a “better life for all” does not get to describe citizens living out that promise as victims of a circumstance they supposedly inflicted on themselves.

WHAT THIS PUBLICATION IS ASKING FOR

This is not a call for theatrics. It is a call for the government to finish the sentence it started. If retailer mark-ups between farm gate and consumer are, in the President’s own words, excessive, then the public is owed the data behind that claim: which commodities, what margins, at what point in the chain, and what regulatory or market-expansion response is planned and on what timeline. If the farmer-to-consumer market expansion is the actual policy answer — and the evidence suggests it is the more honest one — then it should be presented as such, without the accompanying suggestion that households erred by shopping in the modern retail economy this government spent four years telling them to trust.

Guyanese are not asking to be lectured on where to buy cassava. They are asking why buying it, wherever they buy it, has become a financial event rather than an errand. That is the government’s question to answer. It is not a cultural one, and it was never going to be solved by sending citizens back to a market this same government is, at this very moment, still building.

— The Board

  

Building Fast, Paying Forever: Guyana’s Developmental Dilemma

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Building Fast, Paying Forever: Guyana’s Developmental Dilemma


EDITORIAL — 592 GUARDIAN

Guyana’s construction surge is real, visible, and in many respects necessary. New highways, bridges, schools, hospitals, stadiums, hinterland facilities, housing schemes, and the ongoing modern  Silica City all project an image of a country finally breaking free from decades of infrastructural stagnation. That image has political value, but it also carries a serious fiscal and institutional warning: a country can build faster than it can maintain.

The real test begins after the cameras leave.

Every administration understands the power of a ribbon-cutting. A new road provides photographs, applause, speeches, music, food, and an immediate political message: we are delivering. A bridge becomes proof of modernity. A stadium becomes a national symbol. A new school, hospital, or housing development gives communities a concrete reason to feel seen.

There is nothing inherently wrong with that. Guyanese citizens have every right to demand and celebrate better public infrastructure after years of inadequate roads, drainage, public buildings, health facilities, and transportation links. Development cannot mean preserving dysfunction merely because repair and maintenance are less glamorous than a grand opening.

But government has increasingly encouraged a troubling definition of progress: if it is new, large, announced with fanfare, and physically visible, it is presumed to be successful

That is not development planning. It is development theatre unless the state can demonstrate that each project is affordable over its full life, resilient to Guyana’s climate, supported by qualified personnel, and subject to transparent maintenance and operating plans.

A highway does not end at its commissioning. A hospital is not complete when its doors open. A bridge is not a one-time expenditure. A model village is not sustainable merely because lots have been cleared, roads paved, and houses erected.

The real test begins after the cameras leave.

Oil money is not the whole story

The public conversation often treats Guyana’s current construction drive as though the country is simply spending an overflowing stream of petroleum money. That is an incomplete, and potentially dangerous, account.

Oil revenues have undoubtedly transformed the Government’s fiscal capacity. Transfers from the Natural Resource Fund have enabled expenditure on a scale that was inconceivable only a few years ago. Yet many major projects are also being financed through loans, including external borrowing from institutions and lenders such as the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the Caribbean Development Bank.

Borrowing is not automatically reckless. Governments commonly borrow for long-lived productive infrastructure. A well-designed bridge, road network, energy system, hospital, or port may yield public and economic benefits over decades, making it reasonable to spread the financing cost over time.

The question is not whether Guyana should borrow. The question is whether it is borrowing strategically, transparently, and within an honest assessment of future obligations.

For every loan-funded project, the country must ask:

What is the full capital cost, including variations, consultancy fees, land acquisition, compensation, and contingency spending?

 What are the interest rate, grace period, maturity, currency risks, and repayment schedule?

 What is the annual recurrent cost after construction is finished?

 Does the state have the engineers, technicians, nurses, teachers, maintenance crews, spare parts, equipment, and management systems needed to operate it?

 What revenue, savings, or measurable public benefit will justify the cost?

 Has Parliament and the public received sufficient information to scrutinize the terms?

 What happens if oil production declines, prices fall, costs rise, or project timelines slip?

A government flush with oil revenue can create the illusion that debt no longer matters. It does. Oil income may make borrowing easier today, but it does not erase the obligation to repay tomorrow. Nor does it guarantee that the country will receive value for every dollar spent.

The maintenance trap

The greatest danger in a rapid building program is not necessarily the first cost. It is the recurring cost that follows. Infrastructure is an asset only if it remains functional. Without routine maintenance, it becomes a liability with a ribbon-cutting photograph attached.

Guyana already knows this story. Roads deteriorate because drainage is neglected. Public buildings decay because small repairs are deferred until they become major rehabilitation projects. Recreational facilities are built but not properly staffed, secured, cleaned, or programmed. Equipment sits idle because a replacement part, a trained technician, or a maintenance contract was never budgeted. New facilities are handed over without a clear agency responsible for their upkeep.

The country’s tropical climate makes the matter even more urgent. Heavy rainfall, flooding, intense heat, high humidity, saline conditions in some areas, and drainage failures can rapidly undermine roads, bridges, buildings, electrical systems, and public spaces. A maintenance regime suitable for a temperate country cannot simply be imported and expected to work here.

The question for every new asset should be straightforward: who maintains it, with what budget, under which standards, and at what frequency?

If the answer is vague, the project is not fully planned.

A new highway requires drainage clearing, resurfacing cycles, signage replacement, lighting repairs, guardrail maintenance, vegetation control, traffic enforcement, accident response, and protection against unlawful encroachment. A hospital requires not merely a building but biomedical engineers, continuous equipment servicing, reliable electricity and water, waste systems, procurement discipline, pharmaceuticals, staffing, security, cleaning, and digital records management. A stadium requires a sustainable management and revenue model, not occasional national events followed by months of underuse. These are not side issues. They are the project.

Building versus governing

The administration’s appetite for new projects may be politically understandable, but governance cannot operate on appetite alone. It requires sequencing, prioritization, institutional readiness, and measurable value.

There is a difference between a national development plan and a constantly expanding catalogue of announcements.

When projects are announced in quick succession, sometimes before the public has received satisfactory information about existing commitments, the concern is not that Guyana is building too much in some abstract sense.                                                                                    The concern is whether the state has developed the capacity to govern the construction boom:

Can ministries supervise the contracts?                                                    Can procurement systems withstand the pressure? Can technical agencies evaluate designs and certify completed works independently? Can auditors trace expenditures, variations, and deliverables?              Can local authorities maintain the assets transferred to them?            ♦  Can the country prevent politically connected contractors from turning national development into private enrichment?

These questions become more pressing when capital expenditure rises rapidly. Large sums moving through weak or overstretched systems create opportunities for inflated costs, change orders, poor-quality work, delayed completion, inadequate inspection, and contracts that appear impressive on paper but deliver disappointing results on the ground.

The response cannot be, Look at what has been built.” The public is entitled to ask whether it was properly procured, competently built, independently inspected, economically justified, and sustainably maintained.Concrete is not evidence of value for money.

Silica City and the risk of prestige planning

Silica City is perhaps the clearest illustration of the broader dilemma. A planned city can be visionary. Guyana needs thoughtful urban development, stronger internal connectivity, climate-resilient settlement planning, and alternatives to the congestion and drainage pressures of the coast.

But a city cannot be willed into success through renderings, land clearing, ceremonial launches, and political declarations.   

A viable new city requires water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications, public transport, schools, health care, policing, jobs, commercial activity, drainage, waste management, land-use regulation, and an institutional framework for governance. Above all, it requires people who can afford and choose to live there, and economic activity strong enough to sustain it.

The country must avoid prestige planning: projects designed chiefly to announce a new era, create a visual legacy, or satisfy political timelines, but which later impose heavy operating costs on taxpayers.

Silica City should therefore be subjected to the most rigorous public scrutiny: its financing model, land allocation policies, environmental safeguards, utility plans, housing affordability, projected population, job base, governance structure, and long-term operating costs should be publicly available and continuously updated.

If it is truly a national project, it must survive public examination.

Expansion without Vision 

Expansion also carries an unavoidable demand for utilities, above all a dependable supply of electricity. Every new highway corridor, housing scheme, hospital, school, commercial centre, industrial facility, stadium, and planned community adds to the country’s energy burden. Yet the evidence to date suggests that electricity is already the weak link in Guyana’s development push. Increased demand, compounded by the effects associated with the El Niño phenomenon and stressed generation capacity, has produced recurring shortfalls that leave households and businesses grappling with daily blackouts.

The consequences are not confined to inconvenience: businesses lose productive hours, perishable goods are damaged, equipment is put at risk, families absorb the cost of backup generators and fuel, and investors confront uncertainty about whether the basic utility required to operate can be relied upon. Development cannot proceed at the speed promised in press releases when the power system is operating under strain. New communities, industries, hospitals, schools, and the ongoing Silica City cannot be sustained by ambition alone; they require generation capacity, transmission infrastructure, distribution upgrades, reserve power, skilled maintenance personnel, and credible long-term energy planning.

Otherwise, the country risks building an impressive physical landscape whose economic and social potential is repeatedly stalled by the absence of reliable electricity.

The missing maintenance architecture

Guyana needs a maintenance architecture as ambitious as its construction programme. That means treating preservation as a core budgetary responsibility rather than an afterthought left for future governments, depleted agencies, or communities already struggling to meet basic needs.

At a minimum, the Government should establish and publish a national public-assets register that identifies major infrastructure, its responsible agency, replacement value, condition, maintenance schedule, and estimated annual upkeep requirement.

Each major project should also carry a publicly disclosed lifecycle plan before construction begins. That plan should state:

The total expected cost over the asset’s useful life, not merely the construction cost.

 The ministry, regional authority, municipality, or agency responsible for maintenance.

 The annual recurrent budget required for staffing, utilities, repairs, replacement parts, and service contracts.

 The standards by which maintenance performance will be measured.

 The source of financing once initial project funds are exhausted.

 The independent oversight and audit arrangements governing the asset.

Parliament should insist on this information before approving substantial capital allocations and external borrowing. The Auditor General should have the resources and legal authority to conduct timely performance audits, not only financial audits, of major infrastructure projects. The Public Procurement Commission must be strong enough to scrutinise procurement before wrongdoing becomes irreversible The National Assembly should not be reduced to approving expenditure after political decisions have already been made. It must become a forum for testing the assumptions behind projects, borrowing plans, and lifetime costs.

Oil must create lasting capacity

The wisest use of Guyana’s oil wealth is not to create a permanent dependence on oil-financed construction. It is to use this temporary windfall to build institutions, human capital, diversified productive sectors, and durable public assets.

The country should not confuse expenditure with transformation.

A bridge that cuts travel time and unlocks commerce can be transformational.                                                                                              ♦  A hospital that is staffed, equipped, accountable, and accessible can be transformational.                                                                                        ♦  A school that produces capable citizens and workers can be transformational.                                                                                              ♦  Roads that connect farmers and hinterland communities to markets can be transformational.

But none of these outcomes is assured by construction alone.

Real development means a road remains safe and usable ten years later.                                                                                                                    It means drainage works when the rains come.                                        It means medical machinery is repaired rather than abandoned.          It means schools have teachers, hospitals have specialists, and public facilities have reliable utilities and competent management.                    It means citizens can inspect how public money was borrowed, spent, and safeguarded.

The nation should welcome development, but it must reject the notion that questioning it is opposition to progress. Scrutiny is not sabotage. Transparency is not obstruction. Maintenance is not a minor administrative detail.

They are the difference between a country that is merely building and a country that is truly developing.

Guyana is at a historic crossroads. It can use oil revenue and responsible financing to create infrastructure that serves several generations. Or it can rush into an era of grand announcements, debt-financed monuments, weak oversight, and decaying assets whose maintenance costs are left for the public to bear.

The ribbon will eventually be cut. The speeches will end. The food and drink will be gone.

What will remain is the bill, the debt, the maintenance burden—and the public’s right to demand that what was built in its name continues to work.

 

Change Eating Habits -Seriously, Pres Ali?

592 GUARDIAN♦ACCOUNTABILITY♦INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM♦GUYANA

Change Eating Habits -Seriously, Pres Ali?


OPINION BY: GHK LALLAugust 2026

Pres Ali means well.  I wonder, though, whether he is serious.  Or, if he takes himself seriouslyI put it gently.  He should listen to himself.  The parts of his speeches that are not AI influenced.  (Follow-up planned).  Change eating habits.  Well-intended.  But, Swiss cheese.

First, there must be a range of food options before people can change their eating habits.  They have choices.  Food options found affordable, in the basket.  Bitter reality for a third to a half of Guyana (maybe) is that they don’t have enough to eat.  If there isn’t enough, what is there to change?

When Guyanese are down to the bone, what opening for changing their eating habits?  When there’s a scramble to put together a simple meal, changing eating habits, for better or worse, is a luxury that eludes.  The focus is on quantity, not quality.  Quality is also costly. 

It’s about bulkage and less about roughage.  Nutrition would be nice to have, but the emphasis is on avoiding starvation. 

Does a man lost in the jungle, or adrift on the ocean, get picky and choosy?  Whither that luxury?  Especially when the only food around is the dead body of a past companion.  The president and his people disagree with me on plenty; I don’t think they can disagree on this point.

Second, Pres Ali took aim at ‘eating out.’  Sure, it’s expensive.  But if the masses don’t treat themselves, now and then, make the sacrifice, then how do investors flocking here recoup their cash?  Guyana has been marketed as business friendly.  Why transform Guyana, the culinary and hospitality part, to being bad for business? 

There’s a contradiction there.  I seek pardoned for tabling.  Some Guyanese use alcohol (other stuff) to numb their senses, relieve the pain of living in Guyana.  Others seek a bite to make them forget how hard it is in this luscious, fabulous, oil rich frontier that has the whole world drooling. 

While the whole world drools, it takes a hard man to shove locals away from what gives them some temporary ease.  See the children smile.

Instead of a Tylenol, poor Guyanese address their migraine and stomach pangs with a Taco or burrito, a burger or pizza.  I’m not talking about Japanese sushi, beluga caviar, or Hungarian goulash for Guyanese who struggle to get enough to eat.  Me, I am a roti and curry man, a peas and rice man.  So, it’s perplexing that the president (who should know better) suddenly is the new voice for a change in local eating habits.  I doubt that anyone could have imagined that presidential call in an oil rich country.  Here a billion is gone through by the PPP Government as if it’s a bottle of rum guzzled down, then to the next?  Meanwhile, poorer Guyanese, chronically short of funds and food, are counseled to change how they eat.

Third, it’s unlikely that Guyanese minimum wage workers, or local pensioners, or lower tier public servants even think of shopping at the high-end supermarkets.  Their minds may wander and settle on the wonders in those high-end and high-priced shops.  Reality check: when prices at municipal markets embarrass them, chase them home, what interest can they have about partaking of expensive goodies in supermarkets?

Fourth, the president and the PPP hierarchy are forever celebrating some new commercial arrival, some splendid ribbon cutting, some promising sod turning.  Now, there is this development that amounts to:  Beware of Supermarkets.  Bypass those megastores.  The Chinese put Guyanese corner shops out of business.  Remaining options, anyone?  What about those investors who plunked down their millions in the calculation that Guyanese sample their goods?  I hope that local entrepreneurs (supermarkets) aren’t included.

In reading what Pres Ali said, I recall that local beauty.  Belly full maan tell hungry belly maan -bare yuh chafe, bruddah.  Ting gun be bettah.  The mystery: change when there’s nothing.

Two Hundred and Three Years Later: What Got the Facts Wrong, What Got Ignored, and What Got in the Way

592 GUARDIAN◊ACCOUNTABILITY◊INTEGRITY IN JOURNALISM◊GUYANA

Two Hundred and Three Years Later: What Got the Facts Wrong, What Got Ignored, and What Got in the Way


OPINION BY:– Hem Kumar– August 2026

On August 18, a post from a Facebook page called Library of West Indian History began circulating on WhatsApp, marking the 203rd anniversary of the Demerara Rebellion. It got the broad shape of the story right — Jack Gladstone, his father Quamina, the Success plantation, the two-day uprising, the brutal suppression. It also got specific facts wrong, and the underlying question it raised — why does this story get so little sustained attention — turned out to be more precise, and more damning, than the post itself realized.

The corrections

The post names “Joe of Le Reduit” as the man who alerted authorities to the rebellion plan, saying he informed his master at 6 a.m. The documented record names the informant as Joseph Packwood, an enslaved house servant, who told his owner John Simpson — who then informed Governor John Murray. The plantation and the hour may be garbled from a secondary retelling; the name in the post does not match the primary accounts.

The post states 19 people were executed. Sources diverge here, and the divergence is worth stating plainly rather than picking whichever number is most dramatic: some accounts put the figure at 14 rebels tried and sentenced to hang, with roughly 200 more killed outright — including beheaded — as the militia moved through the plantations before formal trials began.

Other accounts put the number sentenced at 45, with 27 executed. Quamina was not among the tried; he was hunted down with dogs and killed on September 16, 1823. The precise death toll of the Demerara Rebellion has never been settled in the historical literature, and any single figure presented without qualification should be treated as provisional.

Jack Gladstone’s deportation destination is also unsettled across sources — most credible accounts point to St. Lucia, not Bermuda as the post hedges. This is a minor point next to the death toll, but it illustrates the same problem: a viral repost compressing genuinely contested history into confident-sounding numbers.

One further note, for anyone tracing this story back through a search engine: a Wikipedia mirror site currently in circulation attributes the rebellion’s leadership to a fabricated individual and invents a cause of death for him. That page is not Wikipedia and should not be cited by anyone doing further reading on this subject.

What actually happened on the anniversary itself

The more interesting failure isn’t the Facebook post. It’s what didn’t happen in Guyanese media  and more notably the State on August 18, 2026.

Three years ago, at the bicentenary, the story got real institutional weight. The University of Guyana held a symposium — “Honouring Our Ancestors’ Sacrifices” — with a keynote from Hamilton College’s Nigel Westmaas and a lecture on the Battle of Bachelor’s Adventure from historian Shammane Joseph Jackson. Stabroek News ran retrospectives. The 1823 Monument on the Georgetown Seawall, unveiled in 2013, became a point of public reference again. Even then, Westmaas himself noted what he called a “widespread lassitude on matters of history in present day Guyana” — an admission, from inside the commemorative effort, that public engagement was thin even at its peak.

This year, that peak has passed and nothing has replaced it. Kiskadee Watch — the digital outlet built from Stabroek News’s former staff after that paper’s closure in March 2026 — ran no news item, no editorial, no letter, and no opinion piece on the anniversary this week, despite a front page otherwise dense with accountability journalism: the MV Barima Commission of Inquiry, the Sigma Engineers procurement questions, an editorial naming the President’s brother directly. 

Kaieteur News’s archive for the same period shows the same gap. Guyana Chronicle’s most recent coverage of the rebellion traces back to the 2023 bicentenary concert — a government-organized one-off, not ongoing editorial attention.

What got in the way, this year specifically

August 18 was not a quiet news day. President Ali held a press conference that day announcing Guyana’s share of Stabroek Block production had risen to 39.8%, that a fifth FPSO vessel worth $12.7 billion was arriving that week, and that the MV Barima Commission of Inquiry would open the following month.

He also used the same appearance to push back directly on corruption allegations from Azruddin Mohamed concerning an undeclared farm. 

Any one of those stories would lead a news day on its own; together, they did.

That is a real, competing claim on newsroom attention, not a manufactured distraction — the oil production figures and the Barima COI timeline are legitimate accountability stories in their own right. But it sits on top of a structural problem that predates this particular week: Stabroek News, the one outlet that had treated 1823 as a subject worth returning to, no longer exists in its original form, and its successor is two months old and still finding its footing.                   

 A newsroom rebuilding itself from a closure has less institutional slack for a story that isn’t breaking that day — even a story that matters enormously and comes around, predictably, every August 18.

None of this excuses the errors in a WhatsApp repost. But it does mean the post was asking the right question by accident.

The story of Quamina and Jack Gladstone does not require an anniversary to be told correctly. It does, evidently, require someone to choose to tell it — and on its 203rd anniversary, in a news cycle crowded with oil barrels and a Commission of Inquiry, no one did.