AN OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT IRFAAN ALI


♦A 592-GUARDIAN SPECIAL APPEAL♦




AN OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT IRFAAN ALI.

Re: “APPEAL FOR CLEMENCY”

His Excellency Dr. Mohamed Irfaan Ali  

President of the Co‑operative Republic of Guyana  

Office of the President  

Georgetown, Guyana  

Dear Mr. President,

We at the 592 Guardian write to you not only as citizens concerned with justice, but as individuals deeply invested in how Guyana defines fairness, proportionality, and national gratitude.

The recent sentencing of former professional boxer Howard “Battersea Bomber” Eastman to 48 months’ imprisonment for possession of 265 grams of cannabis has stirred unease among many who believe that justice must be both lawful and humane. While the court has exercised its authority within the framework of existing legislation, this case presents an opportunity for executive reflection and, We respectfully submit our request for compassionate intervention.

Mr. Eastman is not an ordinary defendant. For two decades, from 1994 to 2014, he carried Guyana’s flag into international arenas, competing at the highest levels of professional boxing. In doing so, he elevated this country’s profile, inspired countless young Guyanese, and contributed to a legacy of national pride that transcends sport.

It is true that the court noted a prior offence, and that cannot be ignored. However, justice is not only about punishment—it is also about proportionality, rehabilitation, and context. A four-year custodial sentence for a non-violent cannabis offence, in a global environment where many jurisdictions are moving toward decriminalization or alternative sentencing, raises serious questions about whether our laws—and their application—are aligned with modern standards of justice.

Moreover, Mr. Eastman’s current circumstances—unemployment, instability, and apparent social vulnerability—point less to criminal enterprise and more to a man in need of structured support and rehabilitation. Incarceration alone is unlikely to resolve these underlying issues.

Your Excellency, this appeal is also grounded in the spirit of your administration’s recently articulated commitment to reparative justice. That initiative, as understood, seeks to confront structural inequities, correct historical imbalances, and advance a more humane and equitable system of judicial governance. In that context, the continued imposition of severe custodial penalties for low-level, non-violent narcotics offences appears misaligned with the broader philosophy of restorative and corrective justice.

A measured act of clemency in this case would therefore not stand in contradiction to government policy, but rather in affirmation of it. It would demonstrate that reparative justice is not confined to rhetoric or history but is actively shaping present-day decisions—especially where individuals from modest or vulnerable circumstances face punitive outcomes that may outweigh both the offence and the public interest.

The Constitution vests in your office the authority to grant clemency in appropriate cases. This is one such moment where mercy would not undermine justice but rather enhance it. A commutation of sentence, or conditional pardon, paired with mandatory rehabilitation, community service, or structured reintegration support, would send a powerful message: that Guyana is capable of both enforcing its laws and exercising compassion.

Such an act would also signal a willingness to re-examine our approach to low-level narcotics offences—an area where policy reform is increasingly urgent, both regionally and globally.

This is not merely about one man. It is about how a nation treats those who once brought it honor, and how it evolves in its understanding of justice.

We respectfully urge you to consider intervening in this matter.

Respectfully 

The 592 Guardian. 

 

THE BILLION DOLLAR DRAINAGE PARADOX- CROSSFIRE OR MISFIRE ?

The Billion-Dollar Drainage Paradox

 Billions Vanished; Floodwaters ReturnThe D&I Accountability Gap They Can’t Spin Away

The May 31 CHRONICLE– CROSSFIRE column titled “Floodwaters and Political Opportunism” is an audacious attempt to repackage a decade of administrative failure as leadership. The column praises President Irfaan Ali for convening emergency meetings “before dawn” and deploying pumps as if this were a triumph. However, this is not leadership—it is damage control for a system that should already be functioning effectively after $ 140 billion in spending.

The fundamental question the column dodges is this: if billions have truly been spent on drainage and irrigation (D&I), why does the nation revert to crisis mode with every heavy rainfall?
Let’s examine the actual numbers:

Spending Category Amount (GYD) Timeframe Documented Outcome
Total D&I allocated (government claim)

G$140 billion 2020–2026 Flooding persists nationwide 
D&I expended by mid-2024 G$14.8 billion 2020–mid-2024 G$14.8B spent but systems still fail 
2024 D&I budget allocation G$72.3 billion Single year Floods continued throughout 2024–2026 
40 mobile pumps purchase G$29.4 billion 2024 Still deploying pumps in May 2026 
Linden (Region 10) D&I projects (4 years) G$1.5 billion 2020–2024 Region 10 still flooded March 2026 
Liliendaal pump station G$1.054 billion Completed 2025 Georgetown still flooded December 2025 
CDC disaster response allocation G$73 billion (~US$350M) 2026 Victims report NO relief received 
2022 flood protection (sea/river defenses) G$5 billion G$5 billion Flooding returned 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026 
Region Two D&I works G$2.4 billion 2024 Ongoing—not completed; still flooding [29]
Region Six D&I modernization G$7 billion 2024 Still under construction, not operational 
2024 supplementary flood relief G$10 billion 2026 Aid to 30,000 households—emergency only 

 

These are not marginal investments. This is transformative-level spending that should have permanently resolved coastal flooding. Yet the flooding persists with devastating regularity.

Investigative Findings: Projects Announced, Promises Broken
The column breathlessly describes “hundreds of pumps operating across the country” and “newly acquired mobile systems.” But the investigative record tells a different story:
1. Geographic Spread of Failure (May 2026)
East Coast Demerara: ~100mm rainfall, flooding in most communities 
Leonora (Region 3): ~225mm rainfall, severe flooding 
Region 10 (Linden): Repeated flooding despite G$1.5B in D&I spending 
Berbice: Communities flooded simultaneously 
West Coast: Also affected, showing systemic failure 
When flooding hits five regions simultaneously, this is not an “unpredictable weather event.” This is systemic infrastructure collapse.
2. The December 2025 Georgetown Flooding Contradiction
In December 2025, downtown Georgetown flooded after “only a brief period of rain,” paralyzing commerce and schools. This occurred just months after:
President Ali boasted of “electronic monitoring of the drainage system by October 2025” 

Minister Mustapha announced billion-dollar drainage investments 
The result? Knee-high water in commercial streets, children removing shoes to walk to school, and businesses forced to close. 
3. The G$73 Billion CDC Reliefs Failure
Despite G$73 billion (~US$350 million) allocated to the Civil Defense Commission for disaster preparedness and response:
Residents report receiving NO cleaning supplies (mops, bleach) 
•No financial aid distributed 
•No emergency support provided 
•Families “deadlifting refrigerators out of contaminated floodwater” in the dark 

This is not “swift activation.” This is procurement paralysis at the expense of suffering citizens.
4. The 30,000-Household Emergency Pattern
The government distributed almost 30,000 hampers to flood victims in May 2026. This mirrors the 2021 flood crisis when 29,300 households in 300+ communities were affected. The pattern is clear:

•Flood → Emergency hampers → Water recedes → Families rebuild → Flood returns → Repeat
This is not governance. This is crisis management as a permanent state.

The Root Problem: Corruption, Cronyism, and Administrative Incompetence
The column dismisses criticism as “political theatre” and “manufactured outrage.” But the real crisis is documented in investigative reports:
1. Corruption at the Core of Infrastructure Failure
Shadow Attorney General Roysdale Forde explicitly states that Guyana’s infrastructure crisis is rooted in systematic corruption:

“Billions in public funds allocated for infrastructure projects have been misused or siphoned off, with political patronage and corruption at the forefront… contracts are routinely awarded to party loyalists, many of whom lack the competence to execute the work but are skilled in enriching themselves at the public’s expense.”

Forde goes further

“It is the result of political decisions driven by kickbacks, favoritism, and outright theft… widespread corruption has led to shoddy construction, overpriced repairs, and the creation of ‘ghost’ projects that serve only to line the pockets of those in power.”

2. The PPP/C Cronyism Network
Investigative reports document that up to 70% of contracts in some regions go to cronies through blatant favoritism. Businesses are routinely pressured to pay kickbacks of 10–20% of contract values just to secure deals.

3. The Heroes Highway Example
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio personally experienced the Heroes Highway during his March 2027 visit and called it “dangerous,” accusing contractors of doing a “terrible job”:

“If you did that job in America, someone would sue you for a lot of money… You’re better off with the dirt road… If you’re going to build a road, build a real road.” 

The highway was built by 12 local contractors with close ties to the ruling PPP/C. This is not accidental poor quality—this is systematic patronage.

4. The Kingston Waterfront Scandal
The Kingston Waterfront development project, launched as a “transformative urban renewal initiative,” has come under scrutiny for massive cost overruns and lack of accountability:

“Investigations have revealed irregularities in the bidding process, with a handful of well-connected contractors linked to PPP/C officials allegedly receiving inflated contracts.”

5. Oil-for-Infrastructure Deals Under Scrutiny
Investigative reports suggest that “Oil for infrastructure” deals are rife with corruption:

“Key government figures are accused of receiving kickbacks from foreign firms contracted to undertake these projects, inflating costs and delivering subpar results while siphoning off public funds.”

The Auditor General’s Flood Relief Investigation
In 2022, the Auditor General launched a special investigation into the Government’s Flood Relief Program after discovering major discrepancies:
•Office of the Prime Minister received G$183.5 million for ‘Other expenses’
G$10 billion supplementary budget approved for Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Management
Total revised allotment: G$10.184 billion
Hundreds of millions unaccounted for.
The Auditor General’s report explicitly flagged major discrepancies in how flood relief funds were spent. This is not speculation—this is official audit findings.
The “Swift Response” Myth Deconstructed
The column describes the government response as “swift activation” and “coordinated response.” Let’s examine that claim:
What the Column Claims:
• “President convened senior officials before dawn”
• “Pumps were deployed, drainage systems mobilized”
• “More than 200 pumping units were deployed nationally”
• “Dozens of pumps were already operational on East Coast Demerara”
What Actually Happened:
President had to convene emergency meetings at sunrise because the system failed 
200 pumping units deployed as emergency stopgaps, not as functional infrastructure 
30,000 households received emergency hampers, not systemic relief
G$73 billion CDC allocation yielded no visible mobilization for victims

Here’s the contradiction: If the system was already “fixed” with G$140 billion in spending, why does the President need to convene emergency meetings every time it rains?
The answer is simple: The infrastructure was not fixed. The money was wasted.

The Real Question: Why Does the President Still Have to Fix What Was Already Supposed to Be Fixed?

The column frames the President’s sunrise emergency convening as “leadership.” But this is the leadership of a lighthouse keeper who lights the lamp every night instead of fixing the broken bulb during the day.
A properly functioning D&I system would:

•Drain water naturally without emergency pump deployment

•Prevent floodwaters from entering homes, yards, and business

•Operate without requiring Presidential emergency meetings

•Not require 30,000 households to receive emergency hampers

The fact that the President must convene senior officials, including Vice-President Bharrat Jagdeo, ministers, regional leaders, and engineers every time it rains heavily is evidence of systemic failure, not leadership.

Why Criticism Is Not “Opportunism” — It’s Accountability

The column attempts to delegitimize dissent by calling it “political theatre,” “calculated exploitation,” and “livestream outrage.” But citizens are not “manufacturing” this crisis. They are living it:

Families in flooded homes with water “right with the bed”

•Small businesses destroyed, livelihoods disrupted

•Schoolchildren removing shoes to walk through floodwaters

•Entire regions facing simultaneous flooding

30,000 households receiving emergency hampers instead of permanent solutions.

This frustration is not political theater—it is accumulated anger from a decade of repeated flooding, broken promises, and unaccounted spending.

The Historical Context: This Is Not New

The column gestures at “historical perspective” and claims “recent responses demonstrate a level of capacity and coordination that would have been difficult to imagine in previous decades.” But the data contradicts this:
2005 Floods: Nationwide catastrophe, weeks of flooding
2013 Floods: 30,000+ households affected
2021 Floods: 29,300 households in 300+ communities affected
2025 Floods: Georgetown downtown paralyzed after brief rain
2026 Floods: Multiple regions simultaneously flooded, 30,000 households receiving hampers
The pattern is clear: Flooding recurs with increasing regularity, not decreasing frequency. The column’s claim of “improved capacity” is contradicted by the facts.

What the Public Is No Longer Buying

The column’s attempt to frame emergency response as success and criticism as opportunism is a political misfire. No serious observer doubts that emergency response is necessary. But response is not a substitute for competence, prevention, and accountability.

Guyanese are not buying the narrative that:

Claim Reality
G$140 billion in D&I spending is “working” Flooding persists annually, worse each year 
President convening emergency meetings is “leadership” It’s failure of preparedness requiring Presidential intervention 
Critics are “opportunists” They’re citizens demanding answers for recurring disaster
“Swift activation” proves competence Emergency pumps = stopgap for broken infrastructure
CDC “mobilized” with G$73B Victims report NO relief received
“Dozens of pumps operational” 200 pumps deployed as emergency stopgap
“Future investments required” It’s failure of preparedness requiring Presidential intervention 

 

G$140 billion already spentWHERE DID IT GO?

The Questions That Must Be Answered

The floodwaters will recede. But these questions remain:
1.Where did the G$140 billion go? If systems were properly built, why does flooding persist?
2.Why did the G$73 billion CDC allocation yield no relief for victims? Who authorized this spending?
3.Why are contracts routinely awarded to PPP/C loyalists without competitive bidding?
4.Why do 70% of contracts in some regions go to cronies?
5.Why did the Auditor General find hundreds of millions unaccounted for in flood relief?
6.Why does the President still convene emergency meetings every time it rains? 
7.Why did Georgetown flood in December 2025 after “electronic monitoring” was supposedly implemented?
8.Why are roads like Heroes Highway called “dangerous” by the U.S. Secretary of State?

Conclusion: The Public Has Seen This Script Before
The column’s rhetoric is familiar: praise emergency response, dismiss criticism, deflect from systemic failure. But the public is no longer buying it.

Guyana deserves more than narratives of reassurance. It deserves:

•Transparency on what is not working
•Accountability for why billions were wasted
•A credible plan to ensure the next rainfall event does not produce the same national distress

Until those questions are answered with honesty and measurable results—not rhetoric—the public will rightly reject any attempt to reclassify recurring disaster as governance success.

Politics at its worst is profiting from problems. Politics at its best solves them. This government has yet to prove it can do the latter after G$140 billion in spending.
The floodwaters will recede. What remains will be a clearer picture of who squandered the money, who failed to build the systems, and who is responsible for the suffering of 30,000 households.

History has a habit of distinguishing between the two. And voters usually do as well

EDITOR NOTE’S

Analysis of NDIA maintenance failures cited in recent audit reports
The recent Auditor General report on NDIA is quite clear: the problem is not simply “bad weather,” but a pattern of weak planning, poor records, vacant leadership posts, and incomplete maintenance oversight that undermines drainage performance.  NDIA spent G$6.674 billion on asset maintenance from January 2021 to June 2024, yet the audit still found no structured maintenance system, no comprehensive planning, and no reliable way to verify nearly half of sampled expenditure.
What the audit found
The audit says NDIA had over 30 vacancies every year from 2021 to 2024, with key positions such as CEO, Deputy CEO, Corporate Secretary/Legal Officer, Manager of Operations and Maintenance, Mechanical Engineers, Internal Auditor, and Engineering Technicians still vacant by September 2024. It also found that the Authority could not present its asset management policy, could not support claims about a multi-year strategic plan, and had no assessed training needs or training plan for staff. Those are not minor administrative gaps; they are the kind of failures that weaken daily upkeep and make systems break down when heavy rain arrives.
Maintenance spending gap
The report shows maintenance spending rising sharply: G$1.079 billion in 2021, G$1.643 billion in 2022, G$2.461 billion in 2023, and G$1.490 billion in the first half of 2024, totaling G$6.674 billion. But the audit also says NDIA’s budget documents did not explain how maintenance needs were calculated, and financial reports were too vague to show what was spent on which maintenance category. In one sample review of 99 assets costing G$2.314 billion, NDIA could present vouchers for only G$1.126 billion, leaving G$1.188 billion, or 51 percent, unverified.
Recordkeeping failures
The audit is especially strong on asset control and documentation. It found the asset register missing key details such as asset location, serial numbers, identification numbers, and transfer records, which meant the register could not reliably track equipment. It also found that proof of ownership for most of the more than 500 recorded assets was not provided, and that 10 pieces of heavy-duty equipment, motor vehicles, and cycles seen in the field were not recorded in the register. That kind of record failure makes it much easier for assets to be lost, misused, or simply left unaccounted for.

NDIA’s recent audit shows that billions were spent on drainage maintenance, but weak planning, vacant senior posts, poor asset records, and unverifiable expenditures left the system unable to deliver the reliability Guyanese communities were promised.

THE ALI ADMINISTRATION AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF STATE CAPTURE IN GUYANA

 

THE ALI ADMINISTRATION AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF STATE CAPTURE IN GUYANA

OPINION

BY: Edward Meertins- George

The rapid decline of Guyanese society under the administration of President Mohamed Irfaan Ali demands immediate, unflinching scrutiny. While Guyana sits on the cusp of unprecedented oil wealth, the reality for the average citizen is a grim landscape of rampant inflation, state capture, institutional paralysis, and systemic corruption.

 

A Foundation of Legal Contradictions

President Ali’s tenure began under a cloud of legal controversy, rooted in nineteen fraud charges regarding the undervalued sale of state lands. Although these charges were dropped after he assumed the presidency, the cloud of institutional compromise remains. This initial conflict set a dangerous precedent, signaling that accountability would be secondary to political power.

Institutionalized Corruption and Executive Inaction

Under Ali’s leadership, the executive branch has consistently failed to investigate serious allegations of corruption within its own ranks.

  • Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo: Credible, publicly aired allegations of corruption and bribery have met with absolute inaction and stonewalling.
  • Cabinet Accountability: Ministers, including Susan Rodrigues, Zulfikar Mustapha, Deodat Indar, and Juan Edgehill remain insulated from accountability despite widespread public concern over the management of state resources, infrastructure contracts, and agricultural allocations.

This pervasive inaction has fostered what citizens openly describe as a “family of government grifters,” where public office is treated as a mechanism for private enrichment rather than public service.

Intellectual Deficit, Performative Governance, and Economic Failure

There is a stark disconnect between President Ali’s public persona and the reality of his administration. Ali frequently engages in highly rehearsed, performative discussions regarding international matters, such as the Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS) and carbon management. However, this rhetorical polish vanishes when facing internal crises. The administration displays a total inability to deliver structural solutions to the skyrocketing cost of living and the severe affordability issues crushing ordinary Guyanese families. The presidency operates on optics, substituting international climate speeches for concrete domestic economic relief.

The depth of this domestic failure is explicitly captured by current data from Statistics Guyana and the International Monetary Fund, which pinpoints local food inflation driving overall consumer price increases. Concurrently, real unemployment persists as a systemic burden. The tragedy of Guyana’s oil boom is that while the country registers staggering GDP growth, the wealth remains concentrated at the top. The ordinary Guyanese public worker earns an average gross monthly salary of approximately G$100,000 (roughly $478 USD). This stands in humiliating contrast to the regional standard of administrative achievement demonstrated in Barbados under Prime Minister Mia Mottley, where the average monthly gross salary hovers around $1,950 USD—a 4-to-1 baseline earnings gap. Despite Guyana’s vastly superior GDP per capita (PPP) due to its oil boom, the wealth fails to reach public servants, proving that the Ali administration favors elite enrichment over the economic security of its workforce.

Geopolitical Collusion and the Extradition Calculus

The lengths to which this administration will go to protect its network of illicit enrichment have now spilled into the geopolitical arena. Rather than facing domestic justice, there is a clear, calculated collaboration with external actors, specifically US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s circle, to orchestrate the extradition and removal of prominent figures like Nazar and Azruddin Mohamed from the political and economic calculus. By utilizing international security apparatuses and high-level political alignments with US figures, the Ali government is actively clear-cutting internal competition and eliminating liabilities. These tactical maneuvers ensure that the massive flows of state contracts, gold extraction, and oil logistics remain entirely within the hands of the ruling family of grifters, completely insulated from local oversight or dissent.

Policies of Marginalization and Tokenism

The administration’s approach to governance has exacerbated deep-seated ethnic and social divisions. Rather than fostering genuine national unity, the state stands accused of pursuing policies of economic exclusion and marginalization. To deflect from these systemic inequities, the administration has utilized political tokenism—recruiting and rewarding a select few Afro-Guyanese allies to serve as the public face of an administration that systematically diverts resources away from marginalized communities.

ExxonMobil and the Capture of the State

Nowhere is state capture more evident than in the government’s complete alignment with ExxonMobil. The judiciary and regulatory bodies appear entirely subservient to foreign oil interests. The Ali government appears to be actively colluding with Exxon to shield them from full liability, refusing to enforce robust guarantees for full-parent company coverage in the event of a catastrophic oil spill. This alliance ensures the unrestricted plunder of Guyana’s natural wealth while leaving the local population to bear the entirety of the environmental and financial risk.

Dismantling the Kleptocracy: A Blueprint for Total Stamping Out of Corruption

When theft, graft, and administrative dysfunction permeate every layer of government, standard political mechanisms fail. Accountability cannot be achieved through a compromised judiciary or partisan oversight bodies.

 

Restoring Guyanese society requires immediate, draconian legislative and systemic interventions:

  1. Mandatory Property Seizure Laws: Implementation of aggressive Unexplained Wealth Orders (UWOs). Any current or former minister, public official, or close associate whose lifestyle or asset portfolio cannot be mathematically justified by their official government salary must face immediate, mandatory seizure of those properties and assets, with funds redirected directly to public sector salary stabilization.
  2. Strict Criminal Liability Penalties for Ministers: Introduction of mandatory minimum 20-year prison sentences for public officials found guilty of bribery, procurement fraud, or collusion with foreign entities to undersell state resources, with no executive pardons.
  3. Independent International Oversight: The establishment of an extra-governmental, internationally backed anti-corruption commission with the power to independently investigate and prosecute the theft of state resources.
  4. Civic Mobilization and Constitutional Reform: A unified, cross-ethnic civil society movement dedicated to restructuring the constitution to dilute executive overreach and guarantee absolute judicial independence.
  5. Oil Contract Renegotiation: A transparent auditing of all petroleum agreements, demanding strict environmental liability and equitable wealth distribution.

Guyana cannot survive a trajectory where state resources are weaponized against its own people to benefit a corrupt political elite and multinational corporations. The preservation of the republic depends on the collective refusal of its citizens to accept state capture as the status quo.

 

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

 

 

 

WHEN A FLAG TELLS THE WHOLE STORY

O P I N I O N & C O M M E N T A R Y

O P- E D — S TAT E C R A F T & N AT I O N A L

L E A D E R S H I P  O N S T A T E S M A N S H I P,

C E R E M O N Y & T H E S O U L O F A N A T I O N

When a Flag

Tells the Whole Story

A midnight flag raising is more than pageantry — it is a government’s sworn testimony before its own people. One administration delivered proof! The other delivered a confession. E D I T O R I A L   B O A R D 

There is a reason nations invest in ceremonies. A flag raised at the stroke of midnight before thousands of gathered citizens is not mere theatre. It is statecraft made visible — the distilled expression of a government’s relationship with its own dignity, and by extension, the dignity of every person who stands beneath that banner. To get it right is to say, quietly and powerfully: we are capable, we are organized, we are worthy of your trust. To get it wrong is to say something far louder, and far more damning.

The photographs and testimony emerging from Guyana’s 2026 Independence celebrations speak with an uncomfortable clarity. They invite — indeed, demand — a direct comparison with a decade prior, when the same flag, on the same pole, rose into the same night sky under an entirely different quality of governance.

T H E  A R C H I T E C T U R E  O F  E X C E L L E N C E

In 2016, under President David Granger, the Independence flag-raising was a masterclass in what government can be when it takes itself seriously. The event was impeccably choreographed — a product not of luck or last-minute heroism, but of institutional architecture. The Department of National Events, established that year under the Ministry of the Presidency and headed by Colonel Nazrul Hussain of the Guyana Defense Force, existed for precisely this purpose: to plan, coordinate, rehearse, and execute national moments with the precision they deserve.

What resulted was a dignified ceremony that elevated Guyana’s image at home and abroad. Agencies coordinated seamlessly. Crowds moved with order. The flag rose on cue. In the language of statecraft, this is not a small thing. It is the visible proof that a government has internalized what governance actually means: the painstaking, unglamorous work of systems, rehearsal, accountability, and institutional memory.

True statesmanship is not measured in speeches. It is measured in the gap between what a leader promises and what his administration actually prepares for.

T H E  A N A T O M Y  O F  F A I L U R E

Ten years later, the same sacred moment became a study in what happens when a government mistakes visibility for competence and confuses the performance of leadership with its substance. The 2026 ceremony, under President Irfaan Ali, collapsed under the weight of its own unpreparedness. The flag raising failed at midnight. Citizens were stranded for hours as transportation logistics crumbled. The US Ambassador   stranded for hours as transportation logistics crumbled. The US Ambassador, a diplomatic guest deserving of the highest protocol, was forced to board via two unstable planks — an image that will travel far beyond Guyana’s shores and linger long in diplomatic memory.

Cabinet members clustered together in a VIP section of a single deck — a staggering security lapse in a country presently navigating an active territorial dispute with Venezuela. Crowd management dissolved. The scaffolding of coordination that should have been invisible in its efficiency was instead conspicuous in its absence. What was missing, as observers have noted, was everything: no clear accountable agency, no operational plan, no rehearsal, no maritime contingency, no standard procedures for dignitaries.

It would be tempting to dismiss this as a single bad night. But a single bad night of this magnitude, at this symbolic moment, is not an isolated operational failure. It is a revelation of governing philosophy — or rather, its absence.

T H E  L E D G E R  O F  L E A D E R S H I P

2 0 1 6 — G R A N G E R

A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

  • Impeccable midnight flag raising
  • Professional execution and precision
  • Strong multi-agency coordination
  • Dignified, pride-inspiring ceremony
  • Smooth logistics and crowd management
  • Guyana’s image elevated globally
2 0 2 6 — A L I

A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

  • Flag raising failed at midnight
  • Embarrassing optics on world stage
  • Citizens stranded — transport chaos
  • Serious security breach in VIP section
  • Disorganized crowd, weak logistics
  • Diplomatic guest treated with disrespect
  • No accountable lead agency identified

Dedicated institutional body

 

T H E D I F F E R E N C E I S S T A T E S M A N S H I P

The distinction between these two moments is not partisan. It is not even, at its root, political. It is the ancient distinction between statesmanship and its impersonation. A statesman understands that the once he holds is a trust, not a trophy. That the resources of the state are not his personal instrument of prestige, but tools placed in his care for the service of a people. That every national ceremony is a covenant renewed in public — a government saying to its citizens: we see you, we honor you, we have prepared this moment for you.

President Granger’s 2016 celebration embodied this covenant. Whether one agrees with his politics or not, the operational record stands unambiguous: an administration that built institutions, appointed skilled administrators, and held itself to a standard worthy of the nation it served.

The DONE framework — created not for any single event but as a permanent architecture of national pride — is the signature of a leader who thought beyond the immediate and invested in lasting capacity.

Contrast this with an administration that, a decade later, with vastly more resources at its disposal owing to Guyana’s extraordinary oil windfall, could not manage the most fundamental ceremonial obligation of the state. The question this raises is not merely operational. It is moral. When a nation is richer than it has ever been, and its ceremonies grow more chaotic, the deficit is not financial. It is one of character, attention, and genuine care for the public good.

A flag raised in chaos does not merely embarrass a government — it diminishes a people. And a people diminished by their own leaders have every right to demand better.

W H A T  T H E  F L A G  D E M A N D S  O F  L E A D E R S

National symbols are not neutral objects. They carry the accumulated weight of sacrifice, struggle, and aspiration. Every person who ever bled for that flag — or who stood beneath it in hope and in pride — has a claim on how it is treated. To raise it sloppily, amid logistical chaos, before a crowd that has been stranded and a diplomat who has been disrespected, is to dishonor that accumulated weight. It is to say, implicitly, that the ceremony matters more than the preparation for it — that the appearance of patriotism is sufficient, even when the substance has not been earned.

True statesmanship has always known the di!erence. It knows that the midnight flag rise is not an opportunity for spectacle — it is a test. And the test is administered not in the cameras that capture the moment, but in the months of unglamorous planning that precede it: the rehearsals in the rain, the logistics meetings at odd hours, the insistence on protocol even when it is inconvenient, the culture of accountability that makes excellence inevitable rather than accidental.

Guyana deserves better — not as a slogan, but as a governing standard. Its people, its flag, and its future are not raw material for political theatre. They are a sacred trust. And the measure of any leader is whether, when the midnight hour comes, that trust has been honored in full.

The record, for now, speaks for itself. One era planned. The other improvised. One produced national pride. The other produced national shame. History does not grade on a curve, and neither should the electorate.

G U Y A N A  D E S E R V E S  B E T T E R ·  O U R  F L A G

. O U R  P E O P L E . O U R F U T U R E .

N AT I O N A L  E V E N T S  A R E  NOT  S TA G E S H O W S  F O R

P O L I T I C I A N S . T H E Y  A R E      R E F L E C T I O N S  O F  A N AT I O N ‘ S  C O M P E T E N C E ,            R E S P E C T  A N D

  S E L F – W O R T H .

.𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 .𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨

RAIN* NEGLECT* AND* STOLEN CLASSROOMS

When Neglect Becomes a Policy: Children Pay the Price for Government Failure

Rain, Neglect, and Stolen Classrooms

When rain keeps children out of school, the fault is not with the weather — it is with those who promised to protect our children and failed. The recent images of flooded accesses and closed classrooms are not accidents; they are proof of chronic administrative neglect and a dereliction of duty that should shame every official responsible for education and public works

This is not a minor logistics problem. It is a moral failure. Governments swear an oath to safeguard the welfare and future of the young; when pupils are sent home because stairways are impassable or classrooms are unsafe, that oath has been broken. The basic protective measures — reliable drainage, reinforced entrances, covered walkways, timely maintenance — are not luxuries. They are the fundamentals of an education system that respects its students. That these were not in place speaks to priorities tilted away from service and toward short-term optics.

We should be blunt: this is the predictable result of deferred maintenance and underfunding thinly disguised as bureaucracy.

Promises of assessments and “working closely” with affected schools are inadequate when children continue to lose instructional days. Formal statements and platitudes cannot substitute for boots-on-the-ground repairs, for committed budgets, and for transparent timelines that parents can measure against progress. Every day of delay compounds learning losses and widens inequality — the children from the poorest and most vulnerable communities will pay the highest price.

Accountability must be immediate and real. First, release the audit: list which schools were inspected, what vulnerabilities were recorded in recent years, and why recommended repairs were not completed. Second, publish a time-bound action plan with clear funding lines — not vague commitments but specific work packages, contractors, dates, and independent verification. Third, provide interim learning continuity measures for affected students: alternative safe spaces, catch-up programs, and transport arrangements where necessary.

Official Notice of Closure

Public outrage is not mere emotion; it is a civic corrective. It turns what might otherwise be an episodic crisis into a sustained demand for change. When communities raise their voices — when parents, teachers, civil society, and the media insist on answers — officials find the pressure to act. That pressure must be relentless until infrastructure is fixed, until accountability is visible, and until corrective systems are institutionalized so this never recurs.

But outrage alone is not enough. It must be channeled into practical, enforceable reforms. That means establishing routine, publicly accessible maintenance logs for every school, ring-fenced maintenance budgets that cannot be redirected, and a transparent complaints mechanism that compels timely responses. It means integrating climate and seasonal risk planning into school infrastructure standards so that what we tolerate now will not be the future’s norm.

 

Let us be clear: the children robbed of a day of school today may never fully recover all they lost — and the cumulative effect will be felt in national productivity and social cohesion for years. That cost is the direct result of administrative choices. 

Those choices can be changed.

The time for measured statements has long passed. What is required now is hard action: inspection reports opened to public scrutiny, a rapid roll-out of essential repairs, legally binding timelines, and real consequences for failure to deliver. If the State cannot ensure that its schools remain safe and accessible in predictable weather, then it is failing the most basic test of governance.

We must convert our outrage into oversight. Demand the records. 

Demand the plans. Demand the repairs. And do not accept anything less than a concrete program that guarantees our children’s right to education — come rain or shine.                           

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

 

                         

Revisiting the Exxon Oil Contract: Why It Is Essential Now

 

Revisiting the Exxon Oil Contract: Why It Is Essential Now

 

The Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) that Guyana signed with ExxonMobil and its partners in 2016 was negotiated under dramatically different circumstances than what we face today. At the time, Guyana had no prior experience in oil production, the recoverable reserves were estimated at around 3 billion barrels, and the country was still in its infancy as an emerging oil nation. Today, Guyana has over 11 billion barrels of recoverable reserves, has become one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, and is producing more oil than many established producers. 

These are not incremental changes—they are fundamental transformations in the material conditions that justified the original contract.

Contracts are not static; they are fluid instruments that must evolve as time, circumstances, and conditionalities change. The 2016 PSA itself acknowledges this principle: Clause 32 explicitly allows for renegotiation if both parties agree, without setting limitations on when or why such renegotiation can occur. The clause was never intended to lock Guyana into unfair terms for 40 years while the country’s circumstances and the global energy market evolve around it.

Equally important, we must invoke the sovereignty clause and assert Guyana’s constitutional and international law rights over its natural patrimony.

Under international law, and enshrined in Guyana’s own constitutional framework, no foreign or local business can supersede the rights of the owners of the patrimony—which are the people of Guyana. The state retains the sovereign authority to enact, modify, or cancel laws governing natural resources in the national interest. The stability clause in Article 32.1 does not eliminate this right; it merely prevents unilateral changes without due process. It does not forbid mutual renegotiation, and it certainly does not prevent Guyana from asserting its sovereign prerogative to protect its people’s interests.

The current terms of the PSA return far too little to Guyana:

  • Guyana receives only 12.5% of profit oil after Exxon recovers 75% of production for costs
  • After royalties and taxes, Guyana’s effective share drops to roughly 14.5% of total profit oil
  • Exxon pays no corporate income tax directly—the Guyanese government pays it on Exxon’s behalf
  • The 2% royalty rate is among the lowest globally, while most oil-producing nations charge 12–20%
  • No ring-fencing allows Exxon to claim costs from future projects against current revenue, delaying Guyana’s profit share indefinitely

In 2024 alone, Guyana paid over $260 billion GYD in tax liabilities on Exxon’s behalf—money that should have been Exxon’s responsibility. This is not a fair or sustainable arrangement for a country where poverty persists, and the minimum wage is being raised to $60,000/month.

Revisiting this contract is not only legally permissible—it is morally necessary. The “sanctity of contract” argument invoked by the current government masks a deeper reality: accepting 14.5% for depletable national resources while the private sector benefits from generous terms is the moral equivalent of stealing our sovereignty. Every year we delay, the inequity deepens, the legal entanglements grow harder to unwind, and the people of Guyana lose more of their rightful share.

The question is not whether we can revisit the Exxon contract—it is whether we will. The sovereignty clause, the changed conditions doctrine, and the explicit renegotiation provision in Clause 32 provide the legal foundation.

The moral imperative, the economic justice argument, and the constitutional duty to protect our patrimony provide the political and ethical justification. What remains is the collective will to act.

Guyana’s sovereignty is non-negotiable. The Essequibo belongs to Guyana—not by whim, but by right. And so does our oil. Revisiting the PSA is not anti-investment; it is pro-Guyana.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

WHEN GOVERNANACE BECOMES THEATER

When Governance Becomes Theatre

There is a particular kind of embarrassment that arrives dressed as service. It is the embarrassment of a State so centrally controlled, so politically staged, and so institutionally diminished, that the President of the Republic is seen performing the most elementary duties of a local overseer.

In any functioning system, drainage, clearing, and maintenance are the ordinary obligations of empowered councils, competent agencies, and accountable public works departments. In Guyana, however, they are increasingly treated as moments for executive display

That is the real offense here. Not the shovel itself, but the fact that the shovel has become a symbol of failure. When the Head of State must descend into the mud to do what properly resourced institutions ought already to have handled, the image may invite a smile, but the meaning behind it should provoke alarm. This is governance by improvisation, where the machinery of administration is so weak, or so politically constrained, that the country is left to rely on spectacle in place of structure

It would be easier to laugh if the matter were not so serious. But the laughter catches in the throat when one considers what this performance says about the condition of public administration in Guyana. 

If councils were trusted to govern, if ministries were disciplined enough to maintain standards, if taxpayers were receiving proper value for the billions spent in their name, then there would be no need for these choreographed excursions into roadside symbolism. 

A President with a shovel is not an inspiring image of national resolve. It is a confession that the system has been allowed to fail.

And then there is the salary, which makes the whole scene even more jarring. At roughly US$212,000 a year, the President is not only the highest-paid Head of State in the Region, but in the local vernacular the highest-paid shovel man in the Republic. 

The phrase is amusing, yes, but beneath the humor lies a very sharp truth: taxpayers are not funding presidential theatre. They are funding leadership, policy direction, institutional strength, and serious stewardship of public resources. 

Instead, they are offered a spectacle of micromanagement, as though governance were a photo opportunity and not a constitutional responsibility.

This is what makes the scene so politically corrosive. It normalizes the idea that the State must be visible to be effective, even when visibility is merely a substitute for competence. It flattens the distinction between leadership and labor, between oversight and performance, between genuine institutional authority and a carefully arranged public moment. 

The President is made to appear busy, engaged, and responsive, but the very need for such imagery suggests that the underlying structures are neither busy, nor engaged, nor responsive enough.

The deeper question is not why the President was holding a shovel. The deeper question is why the country has reached a point where such a display is necessary at all. A serious government would build systems that do not depend on presidential intervention to function. It would strengthen local government, resource public works, insist on maintenance, and insist even more on accountability. 

It would understand that the true measure of competence is not how often a leader is photographed in action, but how rarely the system requires such dramatic rescue.

Instead, Guyana is too often handed governance as theatre: grand promises, grand spending, grand economic rhetoric, and then the small humiliation of a president standing in water, shovel in hand, while the ordinary duties of the State remain unresolved. 

It is a style of rule that prefers symbolism to substance and optics to obligation. That may work for a day’s headline, but it cannot substitute for administration.

The most troubling part is how easily such scenes are absorbed into the political culture. A nation with serious institutional ambitions should not be comforted by these moments. It should be embarrassed by them. For every staged act of presidential labor is also an admission that something has gone badly wrong below the surface. 

The country is not being led by a strong, decentralized, well-functioning public order. It is being managed by a center that has become too heavy, too political, and too dependent on performance.

In the end, the shovel is not the story. The story is the decay that made the shovel necessary, the concentration of power that made the performance likely, and the political culture that now asks citizens to applaud what should have been prevented.

 A country can survive a flooded road. It should not have to survive governance reduced to mimicry.

And that is why this episode is 

more than a joke. It is a warning.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙥𝙚𝙣𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙤𝙥𝙞𝙣𝙞𝙤𝙣 𝙤𝙪𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙘𝙞𝙫𝙞𝙘, 𝙥𝙤𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡, 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙧𝙚𝙜𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙖𝙞𝙧𝙨.

 

THE 24.8 MILLION QUESTION

THE 592 GUARDIAN   •   INVESTIGATIVE EDITORIAL

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY SERIES

THE 24.8 MILLION QUESTION:

State-of-the-Art Rhetoric, Standard Passenger-Boat Reality


A detailed procurement query into the Ministry of Health’s water ambulance acquisition for Region 7 (Cuyuni-Mazaruni)

By: Hem Kumar

There is a particular kind of insult embedded in bureaucratic language—one that is the more offensive for being dressed in the vocabulary of good intentions. When the Ministry of Health of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana recently announced the handover of a new “water ambulance” to the Regional Democratic Council of Region 7 (Cuyuni-Mazaruni), the press release read like a triumph of modern governance. Words such as “state-of-the-art,” “highly connected regional network,” and “synchronous telemedicine” were deployed with the smooth confidence of officials who do not expect to be asked follow-up questions.

The public was not shown a technical specification sheet, a bill of quantities, or an independent surveyor’s assessment. The public was shown a photograph. And that photograph—circulated under the official banner of the Ministry itself—tells a story that is in direct, irreconcilable conflict with the text that accompanied it.

The sum involved is 24,883,154 Guyanese dollars. At the prevailing exchange rate of approximately 208 GYD to one United States dollar, that figure converts to USD 119,630—a figure that, rounded for public discussion, stands at one hundred and twenty thousand United States dollars. This is not a rounding error. This is not a procurement of modest ambition. This is an expenditure that, at international maritime commercial rates, should purchase a purpose-engineered emergency medical vessel equipped with professional-grade systems. What appears to have been delivered, based on the official photographic record, is something substantially less than that.

This editorial is not an attack on the aspiration. The residents of Region 7—scattered across one of Guyana’s most geographically challenging and medically underserved territories, navigating the treacherous rapids and volatile currents of the Middle and Lower Mazaruni River—deserve emergency medical transport of the highest standard. This editorial is a demand, made on their behalf and on behalf of every Guyanese taxpayer, for answers to questions that the official press release conspicuously failed to address.

I. THE VESSEL IN THE PHOTOGRAPH: WHAT THE OFFICIAL IMAGE REVEALS

The first and most fundamental tool of public accountability is the ability to compare an official claim against observable physical evidence. In this case, the Ministry itself has provided that evidence in the form of the handover photograph.

What does a genuine, purpose-built water ambulance look like at the USD 00,000–50,000 price point in international markets? It features a reinforced, high-freeboard hull specifically engineered for rough-water conditions; a wide transom or bow-loading door for horizontal stretcher access; enclosed, climate-regulated patient bay with minimum standing headroom of 6 feet for medical personnel; twin-engine propulsion for operational redundancy in emergencies; marine-grade satellite communications hardware; dedicated power inverters for medical equipment; and clearly delineated medical cross markings and emergency lighting arrays.

What does the official photograph reveal? A standard, low-clearance enclosed river commuter hull—a design template familiar to anyone who has taken a passenger launch on Guyana’s interior waterways—fitted with a single outboard engine, full-length commercial passenger windows, narrow side-entry doors, and what appears to be a standard low-profile roof. The vessel has been furnished with an official Ministry of Health sticker and a paint livery.

It is a legitimate and serviceable river craft. It is not, by any internationally recognized standard, a state-of-the-art water ambulance. And the difference between those two things is not cosmetic—it is the difference that determines whether a critically injured patient lives or dies during a midnight emergency evacuation on the Mazaruni.

II. SEVEN HARD QUESTIONS THE MINISTRY MUST ANSWER

The following questions are not rhetorical. They are the precise technical and financial interrogatories that any responsible parliamentary oversight body, any diligent Auditor General’s office, and any independent procurement review board should be placing before the Ministry of Health as a matter of urgency.

QUESTION 1: Where is the twin-engine redundancy—and who signed off on a single-engine configuration for emergency medical service?

The vessel visible in the official photograph is powered by a single outboard motor. In the conditions of Region 7’s river systems—known for their unpredictable currents, submerged rocks, and the operational reality that emergency calls do not arrive during calm daylight hours—a single engine is not a specification; it is a liability. International maritime safety standards for emergency medical vessels are unambiguous: redundant propulsion is not optional where human life depends on arrival.

If the original procurement tender specified twin-engine propulsion—as any competent specification for an emergency vessel in these waters should have—then the delivery of a single-engine vessel represents a direct failure of contract compliance. If the tender itself specified only a single engine, that failure occurred at the design stage and implicates whoever drafted the technical specifications. Either way, the public is owed a direct answer: what propulsion system was specified, what was delivered, and what was paid for?

QUESTION 2: How does a stretcher physically enter this vessel—and was patient loading ever tested before handover?

Emergency medical transport begins before the engine starts. It begins the moment paramedics attempt to load a patient. A trauma victim—a gunshot wound, a snakebite case going into shock, a woman in obstetric crisis, a child with a broken spine from a mining accident—cannot be bent, tilted, or squeezed through a narrow side door. Medical protocol for spinal and trauma cases mandates horizontal loading on a rigid stretcher.

A purpose-built water ambulance addresses this with a wide transom door at the stern, a bow-loading ramp, or a purpose-designed side hatch with sufficient clearance for a standard medical stretcher—typically 22 to 24 inches wide and 76 inches long. The vessel photographed shows a standard closed stern and conventional narrow side doors consistent with a passenger launch configuration. The Ministry is invited to demonstrate, on camera, with a stretcher and two crew members simulating an emergency load, precisely how this is achieved at 2:00 in the morning on a moving river. Until that demonstration is provided, the public is entitled to conclude that this fundamental operational requirement was never tested.

QUESTION 3: Can a medic stand upright inside this vessel—and if not, how is emergency clinical intervention performed?

The roof profile of the vessel in the photograph is consistent with standard river commuter construction, optimized for passenger capacity and fuel efficiency rather than clinical functionality. The interior headroom appears insufficient to allow a medical professional of average height to stand upright. This is not an aesthetic concern. CPR requires the practitioner to apply vertical, body-weight-assisted chest compressions from a standing position. IV bag administration requires the bag to hang above the patient. Airway management, wound packing, and defibrillation all require a medic who can move freely and with postural stability in a rocking vessel.

What is the interior standing headroom of this vessel at its tallest internal point? What is the specified minimum headroom in the original tender? Were these measurements verified at acceptance and handover? Was a medical officer present during the acceptance inspection to certify clinical operability?

QUESTION 4: What, precisely, does the “telemedicine” component consist of—and what does it cost as a line item?

The Ministry’s press release placed considerable emphasis on the vessel’s telemedicine capability, describing “synchronous” digital links to specialist physicians as a defining feature of this investment. Synchronous telemedicine—live two-way video consultation with a remote specialist—requires, at minimum: a marine-grade satellite internet terminal (such as a Starlink Marine or equivalent unit, retailing at USD 2 ,500– plus subscription @ $250 per month); a dedicated power inverter system rated for marine use; a ruggedized tablet or display with sufficient brightness for clinical use in sunlight; and a secure, encrypted communications platform.

The Ministry must produce the itemized bill of quantities that separates the vessel cost from the telemedicine hardware cost. If telemedicine hardware is not physically installed and operational on this vessel, then the word “telemedicine” in the press release is not a feature description—it is a misrepresentation used to justify a price point that the underlying asset does not support. The public requires a specific answer: what hardware is installed, who supplied it, at what cost, and can it be independently inspected and tested today?

QUESTION 5: Where is the patient privacy—and was medical dignity factored into the design at any stage?

The vessel in the photograph features large, fully transparent commercial glass windows running the length of the passenger cabin—standard construction for a commuter launch where the priority is natural light and passenger comfort. A medical transport vessel is not a commuter launch. A patient being evacuated from a mining injury, a sexual assault, an obstetric emergency, or a mental health crisis has a legal and ethical right to medical privacy. Exposure of vulnerable patients to the full view of bystanders, riverbank communities, and fellow travelers is not a minor operational inconvenience. In many jurisdictions, it constitutes a violation of patient rights.

Did the tender specification include privacy partitioning, opaque window film, or any other patient dignity provision? If so, has it been installed? If not, why was patient privacy omitted from a vessel whose sole stated purpose is medical transport?

QUESTION 6: What is the hull classification, and has it been certified for the specific hydraulic conditions of the Mazaruni River?

The Cuyuni-Mazaruni region is not a benign operating environment. The Mazaruni River is characterized by Class II–IV rapids in several stretches, shifting sandbanks, submerged debris, and seasonal flood conditions that can dramatically alter navigable channels within hours. A standard commuter passenger hull, optimized for calmer interior waterway conditions, is not automatically certified for rough-water emergency operations.

What is the hull’s certified operating classification? What is its rated maximum wave height and current speed tolerance? Was the hull design reviewed by a qualified marine architect for Region 7’s specific river conditions? Was a sea trial—or more precisely, a river trial under simulated emergency load conditions—conducted before the handover ceremony was organized and the press release written?

QUESTION 7: What is the full procurement audit trail—and who authorized the final payment?

Every public procurement in Guyana is governed by the Procurement Act and the regulations of the National Procurement and Tender Administration Board (NPTAB). The public is entitled to know: Was this contract subject to open competitive tendering or was it sole-sourced? If competitive, how many bids were received, and on what technical and financial basis was the winning bid selected? Was the evaluation committee comprised of qualified maritime and medical professionals, or administrative generalists? Was a technical inspection completed by an independent surveyor prior to handover? Who signed the acceptance certificate confirming delivery in conformance with specifications? Who in the Ministry hierarchy authorized final payment, and on what certification basis?

These are not hostile questions. They are the routine, minimum documentation that any transparent, accountable government procurement system generates as a matter of course. If the answers are clean, producing them costs nothing. The reluctance to produce them, should it arise, will itself constitute an answer.

III. THE COMPARATIVE VALUE ARGUMENT: WHAT 120,000 USD SHOULD BUY

To provide context that moves this debate beyond assertion, consider what USD 120,000 commands in the purpose-built emergency water vessel market. At that budget, international maritime suppliers—including regional manufacturers in Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, and the United States—can deliver vessels including a rigid inflatable boat (RIB) ambulance configuration with twin 150HP outboards, full paramedic bay with 6.5-foot headroom, rear transom door, two-stretcher capacity, and integrated GPS/VHF/AIS systems; an aluminum-hull shallow-draft medical launch purpose-built for river rapids with twin-engine redundancy, privacy-screened patient bay, roof-mounted emergency lighting, and marine Starlink installation; or a purpose-built fiberglass catamaran hull for river ambulance service with increased stability in fast-water crossings, integrated telemedicine suite, and solar supplemental power.

These are not hypothetical luxury items. They are standard, commercially available emergency medical vessel configurations. The question the Ministry of Health cannot escape is this: if these options exist at or near this price point in the international market, why was the procurement process unable to secure any of them? Was the market properly surveyed? Were international suppliers invited to tender? Was the specification written to invite genuine competition, or written around a predetermined supplier and a predetermined product?

IV. THE PATTERN THIS PROCUREMENT FITS

This editorial would be incomplete without acknowledging the wider context in which this procurement must be read. Guyanese civil society and the independent press have, over successive administrations, documented a pattern in which public sector infrastructure procurement—particularly for remote and hinterland communities where oversight is logistically difficult and community voices are least amplified—produces a recurring formula: premium price, bureaucratic fanfare, and sub-standard physical delivery.

Region 7 communities are not in a position to easily inspect or challenge what is delivered to them. Their geographic isolation—the very isolation that makes a proper water ambulance so critical—also makes them among the most vulnerable communities to procurement that prioritizes appearances over function. The Ministry of Health, which has a specific mandate to protect the health and lives of all Guyanese citizens regardless of geography, bears a heightened duty of care toward these communities, not a reduced one.

The framing of a standard river craft as “state-of-the-art” is, in this context, not merely a matter of imprecise language. It is the deployment of sophisticated rhetoric to manage the perceptions of an urban public that will likely never see the vessel—while the rural communities who will depend on it for their lives are left with something materially different from what they were promised and what their taxes paid for.

V. WHAT ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIRES

The 592 Guardian calls on the following institutions to act, without delay:

  • The Auditor General’s Office should initiate an immediate procurement audit of this contract, demanding the original tender documents, technical specification sheets, bid evaluation reports, supplier invoices, acceptance certificates, and all payment authorizations.
  • The Parliamentary Sectoral Committee on Social Services should summon the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health and the relevant Procurement Officers to provide testimony on the procurement process, the selection criteria, and the acceptance procedure.
  • The National Procurement and Tender Administration Board should review whether the procurement methodology and supplier selection conformed to the letter and spirit of the Procurement Act.
  • The Ministry of Health should, as a gesture of transparency and public confidence, invite an independent maritime surveyor and a registered medical officer to conduct a joint technical inspection of this vessel and publish their findings in full.
  • Civil society organizations and the legal fraternity are invited to consider whether the citizens of Region 7 have a cognizable public interest action arising from the delivery of an asset that may not conform to the specifications for which public funds were expended.

Somewhere in Region 7, tonight and every night, a community health worker is hoping that the next emergency—the mining accident, the difficult birth, the snakebite case—arrives during daylight hours, in calm water, with a stable patient who can be carefully positioned in a narrow side-entry door. They are hoping because hope, at this moment, is what the 24.8 million has left them.

The public is not asking for perfection. The public is asking for honesty—and for a government that understands the difference between a press release and a pulse.

THE 592 GUARDIAN • INVESTIGATIVE EDITORIAL

The 592 Guardian is committed to public interest journalism. Corrections or official responses from the Ministry of Health are welcomed and will be published in full.

Held to Ransom:    A Nation That Cannot    Stop Shooting Itself

THE 592 GUARDIAN — INDEPENDENT EDITORIAL Holding Power Accountable Since the Oil Boom 

MONDAY JUNE 01, 2026, EDITORIAL GUYANA — ENERGY & GOVERNANCE 

SPECIAL EDITORIAL 

BY: Hem Kumar

Held to Ransom:   

A Nation That Cannot Stop Shooting Itself 

A damning letter from a Turkish barge operator is not just a power crisis. It is the final bill arriving for decades of reckless contracting, grand promises, and a government that has never once been held accountable for the wreckage it leaves behind. 

THE EDITORIAL BOARD

THE 592 GUARDIAN

01 JUNE 2026 

A letter arrived last Sunday at the Ministry of Public Works. It was polite in tone, measured in language, and devastating in consequence. Signed jointly by Beyza Özdemir, Americas Director of Commercial Operations for Karadeniz Powership Yasin Bey, and Antonio Neto, Managing Director of Urbacon Concessions Investments, it informed the Government of Guyana that it could not be granted the thirty days it had begged for. Instead, it was being given until June 1 — this Monday — to accept a new pricing structure. Or the lights go out in New Amsterdam. 

The government, which stewards one of the most oil-rich nations on earth, was effectively on its knees before a barge operator, pleading for extra time. That image should shock every Guyanese. It does not arrive from nowhere. It is the logical endpoint of a pattern of governance so consistent in its failure,so brazen in its disregard for accountability, that it has become the defining feature of how this country manages its public resources. 

“Alignment and unification of the commercial terms and pricing structure across all country operations remain essential requirements for the continuation of the arrangement.”

— LETTER FROM KARPOWERSHIP/URBACON TO MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 25 MAY 2026 — TRANSLATION: ACCEPT OUR PRICE HIKE OR GO DARK. 

I THE LETTER AND WHAT IT REALLY SAYS 

The document, Ref. No. GY-071, is a masterclass in corporate coercion dressed as diplomacy. The two companies acknowledge that the original Powership Time Charter Plus Agreement expired on May 21, 2026. They note, with generous self-congratulation, that they have “continued services beyond the original contract expiry” out of “good faith.” They then decline the government’s written request — made in desperation on May 22 — for a thirty-day extension, granting instead a single week ending June 1. 

But the most telling line is buried mid-letter: the insistence on “alignment and unification of the commercial terms and pricing structure across all country operations.” In plain language, Guyana is being told it must now accept the same inflated, standardized rates Karpowership charges across its entire global fleet — rates which, as this newspaper has documented, have been vigorously contested in Pakistan, Lebanon, and South Africa as exploitative and opaque. 

This is not a negotiation. This is a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum issued to a nation that has no alternative. And the reason Guyana has no alternative is entirely a story of its own government’s making.

II THE FINANCIAL ANATOMY OF THE DEAL

When GPL inked its first contract with Urbacon Concessions Investments W.L.L. — the Qatari-registered shell company that serves as the local face of Turkey’s Karpowership International — on April 13, 2024, it did so under a corporate arrangement designed to obscure accountability. UCC Holdings is incorporated in Qatar. Its strategic partner is a Turkish company. Its managing director signed this week’s ultimatum letter. The chain of liability is long, the chain of proTt is short, and it runs directly to Istanbul. 

US$884M                             

ESTIMATED TOTAL ADDITIONAL                          COST FROM GTE DELAYS,INCLUDING RENTALS, FUEL &       LEGAL SETTLEMENTS                         

US$619M                              

HEAVY FUEL OIL IMPORT BILL FOR THE TWO-YEAR POWERSHIP RENTAL PERIOD ALONE 

US $97M

 SETTLEMENT PAID TO LINDSAYCA/CH4 AFTER THE

GOVERNMENT LOST ITS OWN 

LEGAL SETTLEMENTS 

ARBITRATION 

US$116M 

KARPOWERSHIP’S WINNING BID 

FOR THE 60MW DEMERARA 

VESSEL — THE HIGHEST AMONG 

ALL BIDDERS

The terms of the 36MW Berbice vessel deal set the stage: GPL agreed to pay 6.62 US cents per kilowatt hour as a monthly charter fee, plus a separate 0.98 US cents per kWh for operation and maintenance. That is before fuel. GPL is responsible for supplying the Heavy Fuel Oil itself. Former minister David Patterson was unambiguous: when all costs are aggregated, the true price of this power exceeded 55 US cents per megawatt, and the two-year bill would top US$200 million for the 36MW ship alone. 

When the government returned to the same company for the second, 60MW

vessel, competing bidders had offered to supply similar capacity for as little as US$37.7 million. Karpowership bid US$116.4 million — more than three times the lowest offer — and won. Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo conformed the award and offered the public a negotiated reduction from $0.1117 to $0.095 per kWh as consolation. The arithmetic of that generosity remains unexplained. 

DOCUMENTED 

The Two-Year Damage Sheet: A document presented to the National Assembly on April 22, 2025, revealed the combined daily rental cost of both ships at GY$48,847,450 — a staggering GY$35.6 billion over two years, or approximately US$165.8 million in charter fees alone. GPL’s fuel bill, separately, stands at GY$47 billion per annum, with 93% of that being imported Heavy Fuel Oil. Prime Minister Mark Phillips revealed in 2026 a 74.8% average increase in fuel import costs since the start of the year — costs the Guyanese taxpayer absorbs entirely. 

III THE ROOT CAUSE: GAS-TO-ENERGY AND THE BRIDGE THAT NEVER ENDED 

None of this would have been necessary had the Gas-to-Energy (GTE) project delivered on its central promise: cheaper, cleaner baseload power from Guyana’s own offshore gas reserves by the end of 2024. That promise was made repeatedly, loudly, and with the full authority of the state. It was not kept. 

When first conceived, the GTE project carried a price tag of US$478 million. By 2026, that figure had bloated past US$2 billion — with some analysts warning the final total, inclusive of grid upgrades, legal settlements, and delay costs, could approach US$3 billion. The ExxonMobil-built offshore pipeline was completed on schedule in 2024. It now lies idle, filled with nitrogen to prevent corrosion, waiting on a power plant that has not arrived. 

2018 — PROMISE MADE

GTE project announced at an estimated cost of US$478 million. Cheaper electricity “for all Guyanese” pledged as the cornerstone of the oil wealth dividend. 

EARLY 2024 — FIRST MISS 

Completion pushed from end-2024 to Q4 2025. GTE Task Force head Winston Brassington cites work delays, late equipment deliveries, and foundation issues at the Wales site. 

APRIL 2024 — THE BARGE ARRIVES 

GPL signs emergency contract with Urbacon/Karpowership for 36MW power ship at New Amsterdam. The “temporary” bridge solution begins. US$1M mobilization fee paid upfront. 

LATE 2024 — SECOND BARGE, HIGHER PRICE 

Government awards second Karpowership contract for 60MW — at US$116M, the highest bid submitted, beating competitors by as much as US$78 million. 

2025 — LEGAL DEFEAT 

Government loses arbitration against contractor CH4-Lindsayca and is forced to pay a US$97M settlement. Legal fees add approximately US$2M more. CH4 subsequently dissolves from the consortium; Lindsayca continues alone. 

MAY 2026 — THE ULTIMATUM 

Contract expires May 21. Government begs for 30-day extension May 22. Karpowership refuses. The nation is given until June 1 to accept new pricing terms — in secret, with no public disclosure, until a leaked document exposed the crisis.

IV THE COMPANY’S GLOBAL TRAIL OF CONTROVERSY 

The Guyana government, in its rush to the power ship solution, either did not perform due diligence on Karpowership’s global record — or it did and proceeded regardless. Either conclusion is troubling. 

In Pakistan, a Karadeniz subsidiary was accused of paying politically connected middlemen over US$5 million to clinch a five -year contract worth US$565 million. Pakistan’s Supreme Court rescinded the deal in 2012, triggering a seven-year legal battle and a continuing corruption investigation. In Lebanon, the company stands accused of paying commissions to a company linked to politically connected businessmen; the country’s financial public prosecutor impounded both operating ships as surety for a potential US$25 million fine. In Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Sudan, the company has been accused by US Senate investigators of deliberately causing blackouts to gain financial leverage during contract renegotiations — a playbook that Guyana’s current predicament should render hauntingly familiar. 

Investigators from South Africa’s amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism described the Karpowership business model with clinical precision: the company had “shifted decisively from being a provider of short-term power supply for urgent temporary shortfalls, to effectively making itself the costly solution to permanent ’emergencies.'” The company’s own founder once acknowledged, in a communication reviewed by US diplomatic sources, that the power ship “is intended as a short- to mid-term solution to help a country’s leadership mitigate potential social or political unrest.” The pitch is not about energy security. It is about political survival — and the price of that survival compounds annually. 

“The company shifted decisively from being a provider of short term power to making itself the costly solution to permanent ’emergencies.'” 

AMABHUNGANE CENTRE FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, ON KARPOWERSHIP’S GLOBAL BUSINESS MODEL 

THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME. THIS IS THE PATTERN.

The tragedy of the power ship crisis is not that it is surprising. It is that it is entirely predictable — the latest chapter in a decades-long pattern of megaproject mismanagement that has drained the Guyanese treasury across successive administrations, with the same architects, the same excuses, and the same absence of consequence. 

The Skeldon Sugar Factory, built by Chinese contractor CNTIC at a cost of approximately US$187–200 million — a sum that at the time exceeded the entire national budget — was commissioned in 2009 and never functioned as designed. It did not modernize GuySuCo; it accelerated its collapse. The contagion of its failure spread to every other sugar factory in the country. Guyana is still repaying the loans. The factory’s roof has since caved in. The debt, per the Caribbean Development Bank loan terms, runs until 2033. 

The Amaila Falls Hydro Project — another “transformative” energy solution — consumed over US$100 million before being abandoned. It left behind no power, no infrastructure, and a template for how grand announcements and opaque contracting can consume public funds without producing public benefit. 

The Cheddi Jagan International Airport expansion, the Sheriff Street Mandela Avenue road project, the Surendra Specialty Hospital: each a variation on the same story. Foreign contractors, cost overruns, deadline extensions, legal disputes, and a public that is informed only after the damage has been done. 

DOCUMENTED

The Pattern, Documented: “Afer losing some US$200 million in the Skeldon Sugar Factory, over US$100 million in the Amaila Falls Hydro Project, around US$100 million in the Surendra Specialty Hospital and a litany of impetuous sojourns, it seems that Guyana is witnessing an antithesis of The Midas Touch” — Kaieteur News analysis, October 2025. When GTE is added to this ledger, the cumulative cost of the PPP/C government’s failed megaprojects exceeds half a billion US dollars, excluding the ongoing power ship rental and fuel bills

VI THE ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT 

There is a structural reason these failures repeat. It is not incompetence alone, though there is incompetence. It is the near-total absence of public accountability in the contracting process. The details of the power ship agreements were not proactively disclosed. The scale of the GTE cost overruns was not proactively disclosed. The government’s legal defeat against Lindsayca and the resulting US$97 million settlement was not proactively disclosed. The approaching contract expiry — and the company’s pricing demands — was not proactively disclosed. Guyana, an oil-rich nation with billions in natural resource revenues, learned that its electricity supply was days from collapse through a leaked letter

Minister Deodat Indar, to whom the ultimatum was addressed, did not respond to media requests for comment on Saturday. The government, which controls the messaging infrastructure of a state flush with petroleum revenues, chose silence. The citizens who pay the fuel bills, who absorb the charter fees, who will absorb whatever new pricing Karpowership demands — they were the last to know, and may still not know the full terms of what is being agreed in their name. 

THE COMPOUNDING CRISIS 

Guyana sits on a gas pipeline built and paid for, lying idle under nitrogen, while it imports Heavy Fuel Oil at GY$47 billion a year, rents foreign-owned ships at US$165 million over two years, pays out US$97 million in lost arbitration, employs a US$50,000-a-month consultancy with reported ties to officials, and now faces an undisclosed price increase from a company with a documented global history of leveraging dependency for financial gain. 

Every dollar of this was preventable. None of it has been accounted for. No official has resigned. No contractor has been blacklisted. No independent public inquiry has been ordered. 

VII WHAT MUST HAPPEN NOW 

The immediate crisis must be managed — Guyana cannot negotiate from cold and dark. But managing the immediate crisis cannot become the permanent excuse for burying the larger accountability reckoning. This newspaper calls for the following, without equivocation: 

Full public disclosure of the new pricing terms being negotiated with Karpowership, before they are signed. The Guyanese public is the paying party. It has the right to know the cost before commitment, not after. 

An independent parliamentary inquiry into how a nation with the fastest growing oil economy in the Western Hemisphere arrived at a point where a foreign barge company could threaten its power supply with one week’s notice. This inquiry must have subpoena authority, public hearings, and a mandate to examine the GTE procurement, the Karpowership award process, and the Urbacon/UCC corporate structure. 

Accountability for the GTE delays. Winston Brassington has overseen a project that ballooned from US$478 million to over US$2 billion, missed its delivery date by more than two years, required an emergency foreign rental that will cost nearly US$900 million in total, and lost a US$97 million arbitration. These are not abstractions. They are Guyanese dollars that will not build schools, hospitals, or roads. 

A moratorium on emergency no-bid contracts of the type that delivered Karpowership its Guyanese monopoly. The procurement record shows that better, cheaper alternatives existed at every stage. They were not chosen.

A nation that cannot account for the past is condemned to repeat it. Guyana has repeated it in sugar, in hydro, in roads, in airports, in hospitals, and now — most expensively — in energy. The letter dated May 25, Ref. No. GY-071, is not merely a power company pressing for better rates. It is the invoice for years of decisions made without transparency, without competition, and without consequence. Until those conditions change, the next invoice is already being written. 

The lights may stay on after June 1. The reckoning, however, is overdue. 

— 

THE 592 GUARDIAN | EDITORIAL BOARD | 31 MAY 2026 

ALL FIGURES SOURCED FROM NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS, GPL PRESS RELEASES, KAIETEUR NEWS, STABROEK NEWS, AND AMABHUNGANE CENTRE FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM.

Deported Into Limbo: The United States and Mexico Are Abandoning People to Suffer and Die

Deported Into Limbo:

The United States and Mexico Are Abandoning People to Suffer and Die

A Human Rights Watch report has laid bare a moral catastrophe. Now someone must be held accountable.

Let us be precise about what is happening at the intersection of American immigration enforcement and Mexican indifference: elderly men and women — many of them sick, many of them long settled in the United States — are being flown to a country they do not know, stripped of their documents, and left on the street to die. This is not hyperbole. This is policy.

A new Human Rights Watch investigation, “Casting Us Aside to Die,” documents in exhaustive, damning detail how the Trump administration has deported more than 4,300 Cuban nationals to Mexico between January 2025 and March 2026 — part of a broader transfer of over 18,000 third-country nationals. These are not abstract numbers. These are grandparents. These are people with dialysis appointments and insulin prescriptions. These are human beings who spent decades building lives in America, paying taxes, raising children, burying parents — people who believed, however naively, that a life lived in good faith offered some measure of protection.

It offers none. Not anymore.

This Is Not Deportation. It Is Abandonment.

There is a word for what governments do when they remove someone from a country to which they have no legal connection, in which they have no family, no language, no resources, and no rights. That word is dumping. The Trump administration has constructed, with bureaucratic precision, a system for dumping human beings.

Cuba frequently refuses to accept its own citizens back. So rather than confront that diplomatic problem, Washington has found a workaround: ship people to Mexico instead, declare the deportation complete, and move on. Mexico, for its shameful part, has accepted these transfers without demanding a single meaningful protection in return. The result is a population of people in permanent legal limbo — no status in Mexico, no path back to the United States, no way forward to Cuba — stateless in everything but name, marooned in cities like Tapachula and Villahermosa that are already buckling under the weight of violence and poverty.

These are not sanctuary cities. They are dumping grounds.

The “Public Safety” Justification Is a Lie

The administration and its defenders will reach, as they always reach, for the public safety argument. They will invoke criminals and threats and the sovereign right to protect the homeland.

The data obliterates this case before it can be made.

Only 16 percent of those deported had convictions for violent offenses. More than a quarter — over 25 percent — had no criminal record whatsoever. They were deported not because they were dangerous, but because they were deportable — a legal category that, under this administration, has been stretched to justify nearly anything. When you strip away the rhetoric, what remains is a policy that targets the old, the sick, and the vulnerable with the same indiscriminate sweep it applies to anyone else. There is no meaningful individual review. There is no proportionality. There is only the machinery of removal, grinding forward.

One deported Cuban, elderly and stranded, put it with devastating plainness: “There’s no help. We can’t work because we don’t have papers. They don’t give us anything… How are we supposed to eat, to pay rent?”

There is no answer to that question. That is the point. The policy is not designed to answer it.

Mexico Must Stop Playing Innocent

Washington bears primary responsibility for this catastrophe — but it does not bear it alone. The Mexican government has been a willing accomplice, quietly accepting transfer after transfer while providing deportees with nothing: no shelter, no medical access, no documentation, no legal pathway, no plan. Mexican officials have allowed their southern border cities to become warehouses for people discarded by a more powerful neighbor, and they have done so without protest, without negotiation, and without shame.

This is a bilateral failure — and the Mexican government’s studied passivity makes it a participant, not merely a bystander. Accepting these transfers while offering no durable protection is not neutrality. It is complicity dressed up as diplomacy.

Mexico must demand — and the United States must provide — transparent legal agreements before any third-country transfer occurs. Anything less is a handshake over a mass abandonment.

What Must Happen Now

The remedies are not complicated. They require only political will, which is precisely what is absent.

The United States must immediately reinstate individualized review for every deportation case involving third-country transfer. Every person facing removal to a country they have no connection to must have access to a protection screening, legal counsel, and a genuine opportunity to contest their removal. Anything less is a violation of domestic due process guarantees and international legal obligations the United States has formally accepted and is now casually discarding.

Mexico must provide immediate humanitarian relief to those already stranded — emergency shelter, medical care, identity documentation, and a real pathway to legal regularization. Receiving these individuals and then leaving them to sleep in parks outside hospitals is not migration management. It is cruelty with paperwork.

And the international community — human rights bodies, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, allied governments — must refuse to look away. When two governments conspire through action and inaction to strand thousands of elderly, medically vulnerable people in indefinite limbo, the silence of the international community is not neutrality. It is permission.

History Will Not Be Kind

There is a particular kind of moral cowardice in policies designed to make suffering invisible — to move people far enough away that their desperation never becomes a domestic political problem. That is what this is. These Cubans are not being sent home. They are being sent away: away from American news cameras, away from American courts, away from American conscience.

They are being cast aside to die. Some of them already have.

The United States government is doing this in the name of American citizens. The Mexican government is enabling it in the name of diplomatic accommodation. And unless pressure — sustained, furious, and organized — is brought to bear on both capitals, it will continue.

This is not a migration policy failure. It is a human rights emergency, authored by governments that know exactly what they are doing and have decided, with full deliberation, to do it anyway. Call it what it is. Demand they stop.

 

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣 𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨. —