Yes, Venezuela’s Crisis Deepens—But Venezuelans in Guyana Aren’t Rushing Back Home

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BY: Hem Kumar                               

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣

Maduro’s grip weakens, promises of reform echo from Caracas—but are the roughly 40,000+ Venezuelans settled in Guyana rushing back home? The answer is a resounding “Nah, staying.”

Despite the massive political shift shaking Venezuela and nostalgic calls for compatriots to return, the sobering reality has set in among the Venezuelan diaspora in Guyana. A collapsed economy, severe humanitarian crisis, and daily survival struggles in their homeland mean that for migrants here, returning simply isn’t viable right now.

The Numbers Tell the Story
The United Nations estimated 40,456 Venezuelans were living in Guyana as of mid-2024. Some government officials and civil society groups suspect the real number could be closer to 50,000–100,000 when accounting for irregular arrivals. These aren’t temporary visitors—they’re families who’ve built new lives here because home became unlivable.

Venezuelans now constitute about 3% of Guyana’s total population. In the Barima-Waini region alone, particularly in communities like Mabaruma and Port Kaituma, they’ve become a significant demographic presence.

Why Haven’t They Returned? The Sobering Reality

  1. A Broken Economy That Won’t Fix Itself Overnight
    Venezuela’s economic collapse didn’t happen in a year—it took decades of mismanagement, corruption, and policy failures. Even if political leadership changes, rebuilding takes generations, not months. Meanwhile, Guyana’s economy is booming, with GDP surging 32.2% in 2023 alone thanks to its oil and gas sector.
    For a Venezuelan migrant in Guyana, the choice is stark: return to a country where hyperinflation has wiped out savings and salaries buy nothing, or stay where there’s actual work—even if it’s informal.
  2. Legal Limbo: No Refugee Status, No Work Permits
    Here’s the uncomfortable truth Guyana must confront: Venezuelan refugees are technically not recognized as refugees by Guyanese authorities. They live in legal limbo.
    • Refugee status: Not recognized
    • Stay permit: Renewable 3–6 months, but no work authorization
    • Employment: 75% work informally—street vending, construction, domestic work
    • Children: More than half are children, limited school access.
    • Healthcare: Almost none have insurance or protection.
    Without formal legal status, Venezuelans can’t participate in Guyana’s oil-windfall prosperity—even though the world’s fastest-growing economy needs workers.
  3. Humanitarian Crisis: Water, Food, Blackouts Still Rule Venezuela
    The same crises that forced them out remain unaddressed in Venezuela. For Warao Indigenous families—2,500 of whom fled to Guyana—return means going back to conditions many describe as “there is no food”.
  4. Guyana offers:
    • Stable currency and functioning businesses
    • Public healthcare available to migrants.
    • Children in school (despite barriers)
    • No daily blackouts or water shortages
  5. Guyana Is a Proven Magnet
    The economic and social conditions in Venezuela are so distressing that it’s “not reasonable to think that they have returned to their homeland by the droves”. Guyana’s oil developments are now a proven magnet attracting migrants—legal and illegal—from neighboring countries.
    Once people witness the difference—stable currency, functioning businesses, children in school—they don’t voluntarily leave.
  6. What This Means for Guyana’s Immigration Policy
    The Hard Truth
    Guyana’s open-door policy temporarily halted when it suspended the biometric registration system that granted renewable stay permits. Now Venezuelans continue entering via irregular routes, exposing themselves to trafficking, abuse, and exploitation.
    Roughly 25,000 Venezuelan refugees sheltered in Guyana are falling victim to smuggling networks or finding informal employment in the gold mining sector—dangerous, unregulated work.
  7. The Policy Gap
    Guyana is not a signatory to the UN’s 1951 Refugee Convention or the ILO Convention on Migrant Workers. This denies Venezuelans formal refugee status and exposes them to exploitation.
  8. Yet the government has established a Multi-Agency Coordinating Committee chaired by the Minister of Citizenship to address the influx. With UNHCR support, Guyana became the first country in the Caribbean and Americas to roll out government-led registration through UNHCR’s identity management system.

The question is: Why isn’t this enough?
These Critical Reforms Needed

  1. Formal Refugee Status Recognition
    • Grant official refugee status to Venezuelans fleeing persecution and economic collapse
    • Provide work permits tied to legal status, not marriage to Guyanese citizens
    • End the hypocrisy of welcoming migrants while denying them right
  2. Pathway to Permanent Residency
    • The current renewable 3–6 month permit system creates perpetual uncertainty[developmentaid]
    • Require renewal every few months forces migrants to miss work, travel long distances, and gather extensive paperwork—especially burdensome for those in remote areas.
    • Create a 5–10 year pathway to permanent residency for those who’ve established roots
  3. Integration Investment
    • Fund Spanish-to-English language programs (most Venezuelans don’t speak English)[migrationpolicy]
    • Subsidize transportation to healthcare and education facilities in remote regions
  4. Recognize :foreign credentials and skills to move migrants from informal to formal work
  5. The Broader Regional Lesson
    Trinidad and Tobago hosts the largest Venezuelan diaspora in the Caribbean—an estimated 60,000 Venezuelans, more than 4% of its population. Even there, despite political upheaval in Caracas, migrants aren’t rushing back. In 2022, only 2,000 Venezuelans returned home as cost of living rose in T&T—but thousands more stayed because leaving wasn’t viable.[youtube +1]
    Guyana is facing the same inflection point. This isn’t temporary displacement. This is permanent migration driven by irreversible collapse.
  6. The Bottom Line
    Venezuelans aren’t staying in Guyana because they love bureaucracy or enjoy living in legal limbo. They’re staying because:
    • Their homeland is unlivable—economy broken, food scarce, medicine unavailable, power unreliable
    • Guyana offers survival—even if imperfect, it’s better than the alternative
    • Hope is local now—their children’s future is here, not in a Venezuela that may take decades to recover
    The political shift in Venezuela hasn’t changed the fundamental calculus: return isn’t viable.
  7. What Guyana Must Do
    Guyana has a choice:
    Option A: Continue the current approach—welcoming rhetoric but restrictive policies, leaving 40,000+ people in legal limbo, vulnerable to exploitation, unable to contribute fully to the economy.
    Option B: Embrace the reality—formalize refugee status, grant work permits, create pathways to residency, invest in integration. Turn a humanitarian crisis into a demographic and economic dividend.
    With the world’s fastest-growing economy and a population of only 800,000, Guyana needs workers. Venezuelans are here, willing to work, desperate for stability.
  8. The question : is whether Guyana will recognize this reality and act accordingly.
    The Venezuelans who’ve settled here have already made their decision: they’re staying. Now Guyana must decide whether to welcome them properly or let them languish in the shadows.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

Billions in the Shadows: The Procurement Questions No One Is Answering

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BY: Staff- Writer 

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣

The controversy now engulfing Guyana’s small contractors’ programme is no longer about administrative delays or technical glitches. What has been exposed points to something far more serious: a system that appears compromised at its very foundation, raising urgent questions about fairness, transparency, and the politicisation of public resources.

Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo’s attempt to defend the initiative has done little to contain the fallout. Instead, it has drawn sharper attention to the contradictions at the heart of the programme—particularly the claim that “every legitimately prequalified contractor” will receive work, even as evidence continues to surface that the process itself may have been neither open nor equitable.

At the centre of this growing storm is a fundamental breach of principle. Public procurement—especially at a time of unprecedented national wealth—is supposed to operate on openness and equal access. Yet multiple reports indicate that the initial invitation to participate in this programme was not widely publicised to the general public. Instead, awareness appears to have been concentrated within select networks, with broader disclosure only emerging after information was leaked and subsequently raised by the Leader of the Opposition.

If true, that alone undermines the credibility of the entire exercise. A programme that begins without equal access cannot credibly claim equal opportunity.

But the concerns do not stop there.

Equally troubling are reports that several government ministers were actively compiling and submitting lists of individuals for consideration under the programme. This revelation cuts to the core of the issue. Procurement is meant to be governed by objective criteria—technical capacity, financial soundness, and proven ability to deliver. It is not supposed to be filtered through political offices or influenced by ministerial recommendations.

The obvious question arises: under what authority were ministers assembling lists of preferred participants in a supposedly structured procurement process?

And more importantly, what does that say about how contracts were intended to be distributed?

The existence of such lists suggests that the programme may have been operating less as a transparent economic initiative and more as a curated allocation exercise—one where access could be shaped, guided, or influenced long before any formal evaluation took place. Reports of conflicts between these lists and whatever criteria existed only deepen the concern, pointing to a system struggling to reconcile political inputs with procedural requirements.

It is therefore no surprise that the process ultimately stalled and spilled into the public domain. What is surprising is that it took this long.

The scale of the programme makes these concerns impossible to dismiss. With an estimated 1,200 contracts valued at up to G$15 million each, the initiative represents approximately G$18 billion in public spending. That is a substantial pool of national resources being distributed through a mechanism that is now facing serious questions about its integrity.

The structuring of these contracts just below the G$15 million threshold further intensifies scrutiny. While such thresholds are not unusual in procurement frameworks, their use at this scale raises legitimate concerns about whether the system was deliberately designed to reduce oversight. When billions of dollars are broken into smaller parcels that attract less stringent scrutiny, the cumulative effect can be the quiet weakening of accountability.

Vice President Jagdeo’s explanation—that the delays stem largely from applicants attempting to “cheat the system”—does not sufficiently address these structural concerns. Even if instances of manipulation occurred, they would only have been possible within a system that allowed for it. 

Responsibility, therefore, cannot be shifted entirely onto applicants when the design itself appears vulnerable.

More critically, there are growing questions about whether the process being described as “prequalification” meets any meaningful standard of vetting. If, as reported, entry into the programme required little more than basic registration, then the risk is not only unfair allocation but also poor execution. Contracts awarded without rigorous assessment of capacity are contracts that carry a high probability of delays, substandard work, and waste.

Overlaying all of this is the unmistakable political context. With Local Government Elections approaching, the distribution of hundreds of small contracts across communities is not a politically neutral act. Even in the absence of explicit intent, the optics are powerful: state resources flowing directly to individuals and networks at a time of electoral significance.

This is precisely why procurement systems must be insulated from political influence—not entangled with it.

The role of Vice President Jagdeo in addressing the issue has also reinforced longstanding concerns about the concentration of authority within the administration. As General Secretary of the ruling party and a dominant figure within its internal structures, his public intervention—rather than that of the President or the line Minister—signals where decisive influence is perceived to reside. In a system where party machinery and state operations are closely linked, that perception carries real implications.

Yet perhaps the most dangerous of this entire episode is the weakness of oversight at a time when it is needed most.

Guyana’s Parliament remains effectively dormant, with the Public Accounts Committee unable to perform its constitutional function of scrutinising public expenditure. This creates a vacuum of accountability just as billions of dollars are being channelled through programmes like this one. Without active oversight, even well-intentioned initiatives can drift into mismanagement. In less benign circumstances, they can become vehicles for systemic abuse.

And the risks are not abstract.

At a programme value of G$18 billion, even modest inefficiencies or irregularities translate into enormous sums. A leakage rate of just 10 percent—whether through poor oversight, inflated costs, or other forms of abuse—would amount to G$1.8 billion. That is not a theoretical concern; it is a reflection of what weak systems routinely produce.

Equally concerning is the manner in which the issue has been communicated to the public. State media coverage that largely echoes official explanations, without incorporating independent perspectives or critical voices, does little to inspire confidence. 

Transparency is not achieved by controlling the narrative—it is achieved by opening it to scrutiny.

Taken together, these developments point to a deeper and more unsettling reality. What is being contested is not just a programme, but a pattern—one in which access to state resources risks becoming increasingly mediated by political structures, informal networks, and discretionary influence.

Guyana’sw oil wealth has created an opportunity unlike any in its history. 

But it has also exposed the fragility of its institutions. If programmes of this magnitude can be launched without full transparency, influenced by political actors, and executed without robust oversight, then the country is not simply facing isolated governance failures—it is confronting the early formation of a system where public funds are neither fully public nor fully protected.

And that is a trajectory that, once entrenched, becomes exceedingly difficult to reverse.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

Locked Out, Cashing In: How Exxon Thrives While Guyana Waits

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BY: Hem Kumar                               

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣

ExxonMobil says it cannot access a significant portion of Guyana’s Stabroek Block due to Venezuela’s aggressive posture—but the reality is more layered: even as one-third of the acreage remains off-limits, the company continues to extract extraordinary value from what is already within reach.

Speaking at the Offshore Technology Conference (OTC) in Houston, Exxon’s Senior Director for International Government Relations, Craig Kelly, confirmed that operations are effectively blocked in the northern section of the block. The Venezuelan Navy, he said, controls the area north of the so-called “70-degree line,” cutting off access to a substantial portion of Guyana’s exclusive economic zone.

“That’s a large section of the Stabroek Block where we cannot do seismic,” Kelly stated.

Yet despite this restriction, ExxonMobil and its partners have already unlocked more than 11 billion barrels of oil equivalent from the concession—one of the most lucrative offshore discoveries in recent history. Production continues to surge, revenues continue to flow, and shareholder returns remain firmly insulated from the geopolitical impasse.
The border controversy, now before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), is undeniably serious. Guyana is seeking a final ruling to affirm the 1899 Arbitral Award, while Venezuela persists in rejecting the court’s authority, even as it escalates pressure through naval incursions and intimidation of offshore assets.

But for all the rhetoric about constraints, the current arrangement raises an uncomfortable question: who is truly disadvantaged by the status quo?

ExxonMobil has framed a favorable ICJ ruling as an “unlock” for future exploration. However, the absence of access to the northern third has not slowed its development model. Instead, operations have been concentrated in already de-risked, high-yield zones—allowing rapid extraction with minimal additional exploration cost.

In effect, the controversy has done little to disrupt the core business case. If anything, it has reinforced a strategy that prioritizes immediate returns over broader basin evaluation—an outcome that aligns neatly with shareholder interests, even as Guyana’s full resource potential remains partially stranded.

For Guyana, the stakes are existential: territorial integrity, sovereign rights, and the promise of fully realizing its offshore wealth. For Exxon, the calculus appears far simpler—maximize what is accessible now, and treat the rest as upside to be unlocked later, if and when geopolitics allow.

Until then, the oil keeps flowing—and the imbalance remains.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

Shots Across the Cuyuni: A Dangerous Pattern Guyana Cannot Ignore

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BY: Staff— Writer

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣.   

Guyana must treat the latest cross-border attacks along the Cuyuni River not as isolated incidents, but as part of a troubling and escalating pattern that demands firm international attention and decisive diplomatic pressure.

The reported shootings of Guyanese soldiers—one of whom sustained gunshot wounds—are not merely border skirmishes. They represent direct violations of Guyana’s territorial integrity and a dangerous provocation at a time when the matter of sovereignty is already before the International Court of Justice. The fact that these incidents follow a series of similar attacks over the past two years only deepens the concern: this is no accident, and it cannot be dismissed as routine tension.

Guyana’s formal protest to Venezuela is appropriate, but it must be matched with sustained international advocacy. Caracas cannot be allowed to ignore these developments or hide behind silence. Its failure to respond publicly raises serious questions about either its control over armed actors in the border region or its willingness to restrain them.

Even more troubling is Venezuela’s continued insistence that the Essequibo controversy be settled through political negotiation rather than judicial determination. This position directly undermines the authority of the ICJ and signals a preference for power-based outcomes over rule-based resolution. At a time when the court is actively considering the case, such rhetoric—combined with incidents of armed aggression—creates a volatile and unacceptable environment.

The stakes could not be higher. Essequibo is not only integral to Guyana’s sovereignty—accounting for roughly 70% of its landmass—but is also rich in natural resources, including gold, timber, and vast offshore oil reserves now producing hundreds of thousands of barrels daily. It is precisely this economic significance that heightens the urgency of defending Guyana’s territorial rights with clarity and resolve.

The international community must recognize that this is not a dormant territorial disagreement. It is an active and evolving threat with real consequences for regional stability. Guyana has chosen the path of law, taking its case to the ICJ in pursuit of a final, binding resolution. Venezuela must be held to that same standard.

IThere can be no tolerance for armed intimidation while legal proceedings are underway. Guyana’s sovereignty is not negotiable, and any attempt to undermine it—whether through legal argument or force—must be confronted decisively and without ambiguity.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

America’s Interest in Guyana’s Bauxite Must Be Met With Guyana’s Terms

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BY: Hem Kumar         

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣

The United States’ growing interest in Guyana’s bauxite industry is not an act of charity, nor is it simply about “investment” or “development.”

It is a calculated move in a global contest for control of critical minerals — and Guyana must respond with equal calculation, not passive acceptance.

Under Secretary Jacob Helberg’s remarks in Georgetown make one thing clear: Washington sees Guyana not just as a supplier of bauxite, but as a strategic asset in a wider effort to counter China’s dominance in global resource supply chains. The talk of advanced surveying, infrastructure expansion, and logistics integration is not neutral. It is the language of positioning — securing influence over where resources are found, how they are extracted, and who ultimately benefits.

Guyana, however, is not without leverage. In fact, it may be one of the most strategically positioned countries in the hemisphere today.

Geographically, Guyana is the natural Atlantic gateway for northern Brazil — a region with enormous industrial and agricultural output that remains logistically constrained. Any serious plan to reroute trade through Guyana immediately elevates the country from a peripheral player to a regional logistics hub of immense value.


At the same time, Guyana is rapidly emerging as an energy powerhouse. Cheap and abundant energy is the single most important ingredient for industrialization. This means Guyana is not confined to exporting raw materials — it has the capacity to process them.
And that is where the conversation must fundamentally shift.

If the United States wants access to Guyana’s bauxite, then it must be prepared to invest not just in extraction, but in production. Alumina refineries. Aluminum smelters. Downstream manufacturing. Jobs, technology transfer, and industrial capacity must be part of the equation.

Guyana cannot afford to remain a pit stop in a global supply chain where value is added elsewhere and profits are exported.
Anything less is a continuation of a model that has historically underdeveloped resource-rich nations.

Equally critical is the issue of data sovereignty. The proposal for advanced surveying of Guyana’s mining lands raises serious red flags. Geological data is not just technical information — it is strategic intelligence. It determines future wealth, bargaining power, and national security.

Guyana must make it unequivocally clear: all survey data generated within its borders is the sovereign property of the State. No exceptions. No ambiguity. No quiet concessions buried in agreements.

To allow foreign entities to control or exclusively access such data would be to surrender the blueprint of the country’s natural wealth.

There is also a deeper concern that cannot be ignored. If this initiative is part of a broader U.S. strategy to displace China, then Guyana risks being drawn into a geopolitical tug-of-war where its resources become the prize and its sovereignty the collateral.

This is precisely why the Ali administration must fully recognize the strength of its current position. Guyana is not desperate for attention; it is being actively courted. That distinction matters.

Negotiations conducted from a position of perceived need will yield vastly different outcomes than those conducted from a position of strategic strength.
The government must therefore set the terms clearly and unapologetically:
Guyana’s resources will not be extracted without value-added industries.
Guyana’s geography will not be leveraged without reciprocal national benefit. Guyana’s data will not be owned or controlled by foreign interests.

This moment is not just about bauxite. It is about defining the country’s development trajectory for decades to come.
The United States may be eyeing Guyana’s resources, but Guyana must ensure it is not being sized up for exploitation dressed as partnership.

If Washington wants in, it must come prepared to build — not just to take.

Policy Addendum: Terms Guyana Must Set for Any U.S. Engagement in the Mining Sector

To ensure that foreign interest translates into national development — not dependency — Guyana must establish clear, enforceable conditions for participation in its bauxite and wider mining industry.

First, mandatory value-added production must be non-negotiable. Any foreign investor, including U.S. companies, should be required to commit to establishing in-country processing facilities such as alumina refineries and, where feasible, aluminum smelters. Exporting raw bauxite while importing finished products is an outdated model that Guyana can no longer afford.

Second, binding local content and workforce development laws must be expanded beyond oil and gas into mining. This includes quotas for Guyanese employment at all levels, technical training programs, and the transfer of managerial and engineering expertise. If Guyana is to industrialize, its people must be at the center of that transformation.

Third, joint venture structures with meaningful state or local equity participation should be prioritized. Guyana must not remain a passive recipient of royalties; it should be an active stakeholder in the ownership and profitability of its resource sector.

Fourth, full data sovereignty over all geological and survey information must be codified in law. Any data collected through advanced surveying technologies must be stored within Guyana, controlled by the State, and accessible for national planning purposes. No exclusive ownership or external control of this data should be permitted under any agreement.

Fifth, infrastructure-for-development agreements must be structured carefully. Roads, ports, and logistics corridors built to facilitate mining must also serve national and regional economic integration — including agriculture, manufacturing, and trade with northern Brazil — rather than functioning solely as extraction channels.

Sixth, clear fiscal terms and anti-avoidance safeguards must be enforced. This includes transparent royalty structures, ring-fencing provisions, and strict monitoring to prevent profit shifting and tax erosion by multinational corporations.

Finally, a strategic resource governance framework must guide all agreements. Guyana should identify priority minerals, define long-term industrial goals, and align foreign investment with a national development plan — not the other way around.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

Carter Center Report Exposes Dangerous Delays in Electoral Reform as Political Advantage Trumps Democracy

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BY: Staff— Writer

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣.    

The Carter Center’s final report on Guyana’s 2025 elections does more than offer technical recommendations—it delivers a quiet but unmistakable warning: the country’s democratic framework is being strained not by chaos, but by calculated inaction.
At the heart of the report lies a troubling reality. The absence of meaningful reform in campaign financing, the continued blurring of lines between state resources and party interests, and the lack of equitable media access are not new problems. They are longstanding deficiencies that successive administrations have acknowledged but failed to correct.

The difference now is that the stakes are significantly higher. With unprecedented oil revenues flowing into the state, the opportunities for political advantage through public spending have expanded dramatically—and so too has the risk to democratic fairness.

The Carter Center’s concern that the ruling party appeared to benefit from biased state media coverage should not be treated as a passing observation. It speaks to a deeper structural imbalance where incumbency is leveraged not just through governance, but through control of national narratives. When state media ceases to function as a public good and instead becomes an extension of political messaging, the electoral playing field is no longer level—it is engineered.

Equally troubling is the continued opacity surrounding campaign financing. In any functioning democracy, transparency in political funding is essential to prevent undue influence and ensure accountability. In Guyana, however, this remains an unresolved issue, despite years of discussion and repeated calls for reform. The Carter Center’s warning is particularly pointed: in an era of oil wealth, the absence of clear rules governing political donations and expenditures creates fertile ground for abuse, whether through direct funding channels or the indirect use of state resources.

What is most concerning is not that these problems exist, but that they persist without urgency. The call for constitutional and electoral reform is not new. It has been echoed by local stakeholders, civil society, and international observers for years. Yet progress remains slow, fragmented, and often politically convenient. This pattern of delay raises an uncomfortable question—whether the lack of reform is due to incapacity, or whether it serves a deliberate political purpose.

The politically divided structure of the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) further compounds these challenges. Instead of functioning as an independent and impartial body, it continues to reflect the entrenched political polarization of the country. Without reform to its composition or operational framework, public confidence in the electoral system will remain fragile, regardless of how efficiently elections are administered on polling day.

The Carter Center’s recommendation for an independent audit of the voters’ list is another critical issue that demands immediate attention. Persistent doubts about the integrity of the list—whether justified or not—undermine trust in the electoral process. Addressing these concerns proactively is not optional; it is essential for legitimacy.

Perhaps the most telling statistic in the report is the 5 percent decline in voter turnout, despite an expanded voters’ list. This is not merely a numerical shift—it is a signal. It suggests growing disengagement, skepticism, or fatigue among the electorate. In a country where political participation has historically been high, any decline should be treated as a warning sign of eroding confidence.

What emerges from the Carter Center’s report is a paradox. On election day, procedures were largely orderly, transparent, and well-managed. Yet the broader electoral environment—shaped by financing gaps, media imbalance, and institutional weaknesses—remains deeply flawed. This is the illusion of procedural success masking systemic vulnerability.
Guyana now stands at a critical juncture. The question is no longer whether reforms are needed—the evidence is overwhelming. The question is whether there is genuine political will to implement them. Continued delay risks normalizing a system where electoral advantage is quietly embedded in the structures of governance itself.

If reforms continue to be deferred, the consequences will not be immediate instability, but something more insidious: the gradual erosion of public trust, the weakening of democratic norms, and the entrenchment of political inequality.
The Carter Center has done its part by documenting the risks and outlining the path forward. The responsibility now lies squarely with Guyana’s political leadership.

Whether they act—or continue to delay—will determine not just the credibility of future elections, but the integrity of the country’s democracy itself.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

Behind the Uranium Removal: Quiet U.S.–Venezuela Cooperation Raises Strategic Questions

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BY: Hem Kumar                                𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣

The United States has successfully removed weapons-grade nuclear material from Venezuela—but the real story may lie less in the operation itself and more in the unlikely cooperation that made it possible.

Announced on May 14 by the U.S. State Department, the accelerated extraction of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Venezuela’s dormant RV-1 reactor was completed more than two years ahead of schedule. Framed as a technical nonproliferation success, the mission involved the United Kingdom and oversight from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The material has since been transferred to the Savannah River Site in South Carolina for disposal.

On its face, the operation is a clear win for global nuclear security. Highly enriched uranium—capable of being repurposed into nuclear weapons—has now been removed from a country grappling with prolonged political and economic instability. The risk reduction is real and measurable.

But the deeper question is this: how did Washington and Caracas—two governments locked in years of hostility, sanctions, and mutual distrust—arrive at a point of operational cooperation on such a sensitive issue?

The answer is not publicly stated, and that silence is telling.

For years, Venezuela has been a focal point of U.S. foreign policy pressure, with sanctions targeting its oil sector, financial systems, and political leadership. Yet this mission required coordination at multiple levels—technical, diplomatic, and logistical. It implies not just consent, but active collaboration from Venezuelan authorities.

Was this a narrow, transactional agreement limited strictly to nuclear security? Or does it signal a more pragmatic recalibration behind the scenes?

Washington’s framing of the operation as “American leadership at its best” emphasizes outcome over context. Missing from the official narrative is any explanation of the diplomatic pathway that enabled the removal. That omission leaves room for speculation: whether concessions were made, whether sanctions dynamics are shifting, or whether both sides found common ground in preventing a shared risk from escalating.

The historical backdrop adds another layer of complexity. The uranium in question originated from the United States itself, supplied decades ago under the Atoms for Peace program—an initiative that distributed nuclear materials globally under the premise of peaceful use. Today’s operation is, in effect, a retrieval mission, underscoring the long-term consequences of those policies.

There is also the question of timing. Completing the operation ahead of schedule suggests urgency. That urgency may reflect intelligence assessments, shifting geopolitical calculations, or concerns about material security in a country facing institutional strain.

The involvement of the United Kingdom in transporting the material, and the IAEA’s technical oversight, lends the mission international legitimacy. But it also highlights a broader reality: nuclear risks do not respect political divides. Even adversarial states can find themselves compelled to cooperate when the stakes are sufficiently high.

Still, transparency remains limited. Without clarity on the terms of engagement, the public is left with a sanitized version of events—one that celebrates success while obscuring the negotiations that made it possible.

What is clear is this: the removal of HEU from Venezuela reduces a tangible global threat. What is less clear is what, if anything, the United States and Venezuela exchanged—politically or strategically—to make it happen.

In an era defined by fractured alliances and geopolitical rivalry, this operation stands as a reminder that quiet diplomacy often operates where public narratives do not. Whether it signals a fleeting alignment of interests or the early stages of a broader shift remains an open—and consequential—question.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

The Myth of the Unwilling Worker

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SPECIAL REPORT

Part 1 of 2: How a Single Statement Exposed a Much Bigger Story

BY: Hem Kumar                               

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣

There is a particular kind of arrogance that does not announce itself as arrogance. It arrives dressed as concern, framed in the language of partnership, and delivered with the calm authority of those who have never had to wonder whether the rules of a country apply equally to them.

That is precisely what was on display when the Chinese Association of Guyana issued its public statement about the trucking dispute — and in doing so, lit a fuse they did not expect.

The Association’s central claim, stripped of its diplomatic dressing, was this: Guyanese workers do not want to work weekends and public holidays. Therefore, it was implied, Chinese operators had little choice but to look elsewhere for the labour that locals supposedly refused to provide.

It was a breathtaking claim.

Not because it was unfamiliar — the narrative of the “lazy local worker” has been a colonial fixture for centuries, deployed whenever outside interests needed justification for importing their own people, their own terms, and their own profits. But because it was made in 2024, in a Guyana that can now look back at the evidence and say, with documented clarity: this is not true, and the people making this claim know it is not true.

“The narrative of the ‘lazy local worker’ has been a colonial fixture for centuries. It did not become truth by being repeated again in 2026.”

Walk Into Any Chinese-Owned Supermarket

Do it on a Saturday afternoon. Do it on a Sunday morning. Do it on Mashramani, on Republic Day, on a public holiday when most government offices are locked. Walk into any of the Chinese-operated retail chains that have spread with remarkable speed through Georgetown, through Agricola, and deep into the interior corridor to Lethem.

What will you find?

Guyanese workers. At the cash registers. Stocking shelves. Moving inventory. Handling customer queries. Doing exactly the kind of weekend and public holiday work the Association just told the nation that Guyanese workers refuse to do.

These are not foreign imports. These are not specially flown-in workers with a superior cultural work ethic. These are the same Guyanese men and women the Association’s statement implicitly dismissed — working extended hours, working demanding schedules, working in sectors where the operating model depends on exactly that availability.

So before we go any further, let us be precise about what was actually said when the Association blamed Guyanese workers for the trucking dispute: it was not an observation. It was a narrative strategy.

And it failed — because the evidence to dismantle it was hiding in plain sight, behind every checkout counter in every Chinese-owned store in this country.

The Six Hospitals They Did Not Build Alone

Perhaps the most powerful rebuttal to the “unwilling worker” claim does not come from retail at all. It comes from one of the most significant infrastructure undertakings in recent Guyanese history.

Six regional hospitals, constructed across this country’s diverse and often challenging geography. Projects requiring skilled tradespeople, construction labourers, logistics workers, ground clearance teams — work that is physically demanding, deadline-driven, and conducted in conditions that would test any workforce anywhere in the world.

Those hospitals were built with substantial Guyanese labour.

Let that sit for a moment. The very workforce being characterised as reluctant, as unfit for demanding schedules, as insufficiently committed to hard work — that workforce helped erect hospitals across six regions of this country. They showed up. They did the job. The buildings stand as evidence.

What the hospital contracts also produced, however, was something less visible but arguably more consequential: foreign contractors walked away with technical expertise, contractual precedent, and deepened footholds in Guyana’s infrastructure market. The labour was local. The institutional value accumulated elsewhere.

Guyana’s workers built those hospitals. Guyana’s workers did not inherit the contracts.

So What Is the Trucking Dispute Actually About?

The truckers raising concerns about displacement from their own sector are not making a cultural argument. They are making an economic one — and it is specific. The complaint is not that Chinese operators exist in the logistics sector. It is about how they have positioned themselves within it:

  • Price undercutting that does not appear sustainable at normal operating costs — raising legitimate questions about how those prices are being structured.
  • Vertical integration — ownership of both the vehicles and the contracts they service — that systematically excludes independent local operators from the value chain.
  • Entry into private market activity that goes beyond what partnership agreements and investment frameworks would typically envision.

These are structural complaints about market architecture. They deserve structural responses. What they received instead was a character attack on Guyanese workers — a deflection so transparent that it raises the obvious question: if your position is defensible on the merits, why attack the people raising concerns about it?

The Association’s statement did not answer the truckers’ economic grievances. It attempted to change the subject. And in changing the subject to labour character, it revealed more about the underlying dynamic than any formal investigation has yet confirmed.

The Contradiction the Statement Cannot Survive

Here is what cannot be reconciled:

If Guyanese workers refuse to work weekends and public holidays — Chinese-owned retail operations across this country could not function as they currently do, staffed as they are by local employees working exactly those schedules.

If local capacity is insufficient for demanding work — six regional hospitals could not have been built to completion with a workforce that was, by this account, too uncommitted to deliver.

The Association’s narrative requires you to believe both of these things while ignoring the evidence directly in front of you. That is not analysis. That is not fact. That is the construction of a justification, assembled after the conclusion was already decided.

The real questions the trucking dispute forces onto the table are not about Guyanese work culture. They are about:

  • What wage and contract terms are being offered to local workers in sectors where Chinese operators hold dominant positions?
  • What market mechanisms allow prices to be set at levels that independent local businesses cannot match?
  • What regulatory frameworks exist to ensure that investment partnership does not quietly become market capture?

These are the questions a serious policy response would address. These are the questions Part 2 of this analysis will follow directly into retail domination, mining operations, infrastructure dependency, and the larger question of what economic sovereignty actually looks like when the investment headlines are stripped away.

“The issue is not that Guyanese workers refuse to work. The evidence across retail, construction, and mining proves the opposite. The issue is whether Guyanese are being allowed to compete — on fair terms — in their own economy.”

CONTINUES IN PART 2: “WHO OWNS THE ECONOMY?”

Retail domination in Agricola and Lethem • Mining control and broken promises at Bosai • Infrastructure dependency • The reciprocity question • Who is responsible for ensuring openness does not become one-sided exposure?

This analysis is based on reported across sectors and documented cases. Specific figures and contract details referenced reflect publicly available and community-reported information.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

U.S.–Cuba Talks Held in Havana Amid Rising Tensions and Energy Crisis

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Havana, Cuba – Senior officials from the United States and Cuba convened in Havana on Thursday for high-level discussions, as the island faces a deepening energy crisis and strained bilateral relations.

The U.S. delegation was led by CIA Director John Ratcliffe, following a formal request by the United States for engagement with Cuban authorities. The Cuban government confirmed that the meeting was approved by the Revolutionary Directorate and included talks with counterparts from the Ministry of the Interior.

In an official statement, Cuban authorities emphasized that the country “does not constitute a threat to the national security of the United States” and rejected its continued designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Cuban officials reiterated that the nation does not harbor, support, or finance terrorist activities, and denied the presence of foreign military or intelligence bases on its territory.

The meeting marks a rare instance of direct engagement between the two countries’ security leadership, particularly given Cuba’s longstanding accusations against the CIA for actions undermining its government since the Cold War era.
Sources familiar with the discussions confirmed the CIA Director’s participation. The talks come amid heightened tensions and follow recent remarks by U.S. President Donald Trump, who described Cuba as a “failed country” seeking assistance during its ongoing economic crisis.

“Cuba is asking for help, and we are going to talk,” President Trump stated earlier this week.
The outcome of the meeting and its implications for future U.S.–Cuba relations remain unclear.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 592 𝙂𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙞𝙖𝙣-𝙏𝙧𝙪𝙩𝙝 , 𝘼𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮, 𝙄𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙜𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙄𝙣 𝙂𝙪𝙮𝙖𝙣𝙖 𝘼𝙣𝙙 𝘾𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙗𝙗𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙥𝙚𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚𝙨.— ✦—

PRESS RELEASE

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CUBA RELIEF DRIVE

Cuba has been under an economic blockade for more than 60 years, a blockade which has now been

intensified to the point of strangling the entire Cuban population, causing unbearable suffering and death. Despite years of hardship and arrested development as a result of this immoral and illegal blockade, the Cuban people have been there for us in Guyana and for people all over the world in their time of need.

Their sacrifice and love for humanity has restored human dignity and hope for a world governed by compassion and cooperation. It is now time for us to stand with Cuba.

Our people-to-people initiative is called ‘A Container of Love from the People of Guyana to the People of Cuba’. Organized by a broad-based coalition of concerned citizens, organizations and religious leaders from the Christian, Muslim and Hindu communities, we are aiming to fill a 20 ft container with necessities to be distributed to the neediest sections of Cuba’s population.

We are asking for donations of foodstuffs such as powdered milk, beans, canned foods, flour, rice, cooking oil and other non-perishable items, medicines including pain relievers vitamins/pre-natal vitamins and pediatric medicines, diapers for adults, babies and toddlers, soap, sanitary napkins, toothpaste, cleaning supplies, solar panels, solar lanterns, portable solar generators, solar powered torchlight, batteries, school supplies, new clothing and footwear. For a full list of items needed see the attached flyer.

As you are aware, the 60 plus years blockade on this sister nation has been intensified since January 30th, 2026, to include a complete fuel embargo. This is preventing Cuba from receiving vital petroleum products necessary for the functioning of their society, including the provision of life-saving medical services, food production and distribution, provision of electricity, functioning of water systems, transportation and vital revenue-generating industries such as tourism. The embargo includes cooking gas, causing severe difficulties in daily life. Cubans have had to cook with charcoal and wood fires, with no refrigeration to store food since January 30th, and with no end in sight.

The United Nations warns that this type of collective punishment of an entire population contravenes international law and that Cuba is fast approaching “humanitarian collapse”. The US-imposed fuel blockade has closed schools, grounded aircraft, and left garbage rotting in Havana’s streets. Cuba is struggling to keep its hospitals operational. Healthcare professionals are reporting that they are unable to keep the lights on to perform life-saving surgeries and other medical procedures, and unable to conduct basic scans such as x rays or ultrasounds.

Ambulances are also out of action and many people in urgent need of treatment are unable to get to the hospital due to no other form of transport being available. In March, the national electric grid collapsed, resulting in prolonged blackouts lasting over 40 hours in many areas. The fuel blockade has been described as an act of genocide.

Recently Guyanese experienced a fuel shortage for a day, and there was panic, imagine no fuel or cooking gas since January 30th.

We don’t need to remind you of all the sacrifice, good work, and the thousands of lives saved by the Cuban Medical Brigade during the last 48 years that they have operated in Guyana, often serving in hinterland areas where Guyanese doctors were unwilling to work.

We want to thank the media for your coverage of our recent solidarity events. Your coverage of this initiative will help this call to reach people far and wide. Drop-off points have been set up across the city of Georgetown in churches, mosques and the Hare Krishna Study Centre – for a full list of drop off points see attached flyer. We are counting on you and your media networks to reach Guyanese across the country to encourage as many people as possible to send donations.

We aim to ship the container in approximately 8 weeks and are depending on the generosity and support of the Guyanese people to fill the Container of Love.

Reverend Patricia Sheerattan-Bisnauth, General Secretary of the Guyana Presbyterian Church,sums up the initiative, “Our call is grounded not in ideology, but in humanity. Every child deserves nourishment, every elder deserves care, and every family deserves to live with dignity and peace.

Across the Caribbean, we understand the painful legacies of colonialism, exclusion, and economic injustice. Therefore, we cannot turn away from the cries of our Cuban sisters and brothers. This is a moment for moral courage and compassionate action. We call on governments, faith communities, civil society, and people of conscience everywhere to stand with the people of Cuba in their time of need through advocacy, humanitarian support and solidarity.”

Imam Haseeb Yusuf of the Eccles Sunnatul Jamaat called on Guyanese to donate generously: “In a world of great social upheaval and injustice, the global citizenship of conscience and humanity is called upon to respond to the desperate cries of oppressed people worldwide.

Out of our shared humanity, empathy, and instincts to work together, we find hope and courage to do whatever is within our means to come to the aid of the most vulnerable. We are appealing to the people of Guyana to help our Cuban brothers and sisters, who are living through a very severe humanitarian crisis. Please donate generously to this noble cause.

For further comments please contact:

Reverend Patricia Sheerattan-Bisnauth, General Secretary of Guyana Presbyterian Church – 647 7295

Reverend Francis Dean Alleyne, Roman Catholic Bishop of Georgetown – 614 2670

Imam Haseeb Yusuf of the Eccles Sunnatul Jamaat – 620 6880

Prabhu Dave, President of the ISKCON of Guyana Hare Krishna Study Centre – 621 1498

Maryam Perreira – Project Coordinator – 748 1660